Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Brent Dubois was convicted in 2011 of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, receiving a sentence of 188 months in prison and three years of supervised release. As part of his supervised release, a condition required him to participate in a substance abuse program, allowing the probation office to decide whether that would be inpatient or outpatient treatment. After a relevant amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines, Dubois’s sentence was reduced to 151 months. Upon completing his incarceration in 2023, Dubois began supervised release, but struggled to comply with outpatient treatment requirements. After repeated difficulties and four revocation hearings, his probation officer filed a petition for revocation, leading Dubois to admit to violations except one allegation, which the government withdrew.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas sentenced Dubois to ten months in prison and 32 months of supervised release, reimposing the original supervised release conditions. Notably, it again permitted the probation office to determine whether Dubois’s substance abuse treatment would be inpatient or outpatient. Dubois did not object to this condition at sentencing, but later appealed, arguing that the delegation of this decision to the probation office was improper.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case under the plain error standard, given Dubois’s lack of objection in district court. The Fifth Circuit held that permitting the probation office to decide between inpatient and outpatient treatment constituted an impermissible delegation of the district court’s core judicial sentencing function, particularly since the sentence following revocation was only ten months. The court found this error to be clear under existing precedent, affected Dubois’s substantial rights, and warranted discretionary correction. The Fifth Circuit vacated the supervised release condition at issue and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Dubois" on Justia Law

Farhan Sheikh, a college student and active iFunny user, posted a series of public messages threatening to kill doctors, patients, and visitors at a Chicago abortion clinic, naming the clinic and specifying a date. He repeatedly emphasized in follow-up posts and private messages that his threats were genuine and not satirical, even stating his intent to carry out the actions. After his posts were reported to the FBI, the clinic was warned, canceled appointments, increased security, and an employee took time off in response to the threat. Sheikh was arrested and indicted for transmitting threats in interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Sheikh moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the statute was facially unconstitutional and the grand jury had not been properly instructed on the law's requirements regarding true threats and criminal intent. The district court denied his motion and proceeded to trial, where evidence included employee testimony and images of security changes at the clinic. Sheikh testified that he did not intend to carry out the threats, but the jury convicted him. His motion for a new trial was denied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Sheikh’s constitutional challenge to § 875(c), his grand jury process objections, and his evidentiary complaints. The Seventh Circuit held that § 875(c) is constitutional when interpreted to criminalize only true threats made with at least reckless intent, consistent with recent Supreme Court and circuit precedent. The court found no reversible error in the grand jury process or the admission of evidence at trial, concluding that any evidentiary mistakes were harmless given the strength of the government’s case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Sheikh" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted in North Dakota for misdemeanor Sexual Assault after entering a guilty plea to having inappropriate contact with a person and having reasonable cause to believe the contact was offensive. He was originally charged with a more serious felony, but the plea agreement stipulated a lesser offense and specifically stated he was not required to register as a sex offender under North Dakota law. After relocating to Montana, the Department of Justice informed him that, based on Montana’s interpretation of his conviction and the age of the victim alleged in the charging documents, he was required to register as a sex offender under Montana law.The Nineteenth Judicial District Court of Montana reviewed his petition for a writ of prohibition seeking to prevent the Montana DOJ from requiring registration. The court denied his petition, reasoning that the proper remedy was to register and then later petition for removal under Montana Code Annotated § 46-23-506. The District Court also concluded that the facts alleged in the North Dakota charging document, though not proved beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the appellant, were sufficient to impose the registration duty.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court. The Supreme Court held that a writ of prohibition was an appropriate remedy because there was no statutory or administrative process for contesting the DOJ’s determination, and registration requirements under Montana law are punitive. The Court further held that Montana courts may not rely on facts not proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant when determining registration duties. Finally, the Court concluded that the North Dakota misdemeanor Sexual Assault statute is not reasonably equivalent to the Montana sexual offense statute that triggers registration, due to the lack of an age element in the North Dakota statute. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Cooper v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

Daquon Ray Washington was charged in 2019 with first degree burglary with a person present and grand theft of an automobile. The information alleged prior convictions and jail terms for burglary and receiving stolen property, making him subject to sentence enhancements under several provisions of the Penal Code, including two one-year enhancements under then-section 667.5(b). Washington pleaded no contest and admitted the prior convictions. He was sentenced to eight years in state prison, with the section 667.5(b) enhancements imposed but stayed.Following legislative amendments, Penal Code section 1172.75 (formerly section 1171.1) retroactively invalidated most enhancements imposed under section 667.5(b), except for those involving sexually violent offenses. The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) identified Washington as serving a sentence including an invalid enhancement. In April 2024, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied resentencing, concluding that Washington was ineligible because the enhancements were stayed at sentencing. While Washington’s appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court in People v. Rhodius clarified that section 1172.75 applies to invalid enhancements regardless of whether they were stayed or executed, mandating resentencing if such enhancements were imposed.While Washington’s appeal was pending, he was released on parole. The People argued in the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, that release on parole terminated eligibility for resentencing under section 1172.75. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, holding that eligibility for resentencing does not require the defendant to remain incarcerated until the resentencing takes place. Once identified by CDCR as eligible, subsequent release on parole does not preclude relief; resentencing can afford practical benefits, such as shortening the parole term. The appellate court reversed the superior court’s denial of resentencing and remanded for further proceedings consistent with section 1172.75. View "People v. Washington" on Justia Law

Craig M. Wood was convicted of abducting and murdering 10-year-old Hailey Owens in Springfield, Missouri. After eyewitnesses reported the abduction and provided Wood’s license plate number, police traced it to Wood's residence. Upon searching his home, officers found Hailey’s body in the basement, along with evidence of sexual assault and materials indicating Wood’s sexual interest in young girls. Wood was tried and found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.The Circuit Court of Greene County presided over Wood’s jury trial, entered judgment, and imposed the death sentence after the jury found multiple aggravating circumstances. The Supreme Court of Missouri previously affirmed Wood’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal in State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566 (Mo. banc 2019). Wood then filed a Rule 29.15 motion for postconviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel on numerous grounds related to evidence, trial strategy, and mitigation. The motion court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion, finding no basis for relief.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri, Wood raised 22 points concerning counsel’s performance and other alleged errors. The court reviewed whether the motion court’s findings and conclusions were clearly erroneous, applying the standard set forth in Rule 29.15(k). The Supreme Court of Missouri held that none of Wood’s claims demonstrated deficient performance or prejudice under the Strickland v. Washington standard. The court found the motion court’s factual determinations and legal conclusions were not clearly erroneous and affirmed the denial of postconviction relief. The judgment overruling Wood’s Rule 29.15 motion was affirmed. View "Wood vs. State of Missouri" on Justia Law

Richard James Johnson was charged with three moving violations in Missouri, including a class E felony charge for driving while intoxicated (DWI) as a persistent offender. The persistent offender charge was based on Johnson’s alleged prior DWI convictions on two separate occasions. Johnson argued that, under recent Supreme Court precedent, any fact that could increase the range of punishment—such as whether prior DWI convictions occurred on separate occasions—must be determined by a jury, not solely by a judge.The Circuit Court of Franklin County agreed with Johnson and dismissed the class E felony DWI charge, finding that the statute governing persistent offender status violated Johnson’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by not requiring a jury determination of the “separate occasions” element. The State sought review from the Missouri Court of Appeals, which denied its writ petition. The State then sought relief from the Supreme Court of Missouri, which issued a preliminary writ of prohibition.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed whether section 577.023.2, which assigns the fact-finding responsibility for persistent offender status to the trial judge, is facially unconstitutional. The court held that the statute is not facially unconstitutional because it is possible for the jury to determine the relevant facts in accordance with constitutional requirements. The statute can be applied constitutionally if, after the judge’s initial finding, the jury also finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is a persistent offender. Therefore, the circuit court lacked authority to dismiss the felony charge on facial constitutional grounds. The Supreme Court of Missouri made permanent its preliminary writ of prohibition, ordering the circuit court to set aside its dismissal of the class E felony DWI charge. View "State ex rel. Catherine Hanaway vs. Hellmann" on Justia Law

While released on bond for a burglary charge, the defendant evaded police during a traffic stop, abandoning his truck in a pond and fleeing on foot. The next day, officers returned and, after a series of encounters involving the defendant and his girlfriend, discovered multiple firearms and ammunition in a nearby SUV, to which the defendant later admitted ownership. Because he had a prior felony conviction, a grand jury indicted him for being a felon in possession of a firearm under federal law. The defendant entered into a plea agreement with the government, recommending certain offense levels and sentencing enhancements, but the agreement did not bind the district court.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky received a presentence report that calculated a higher base offense level than the plea agreement had contemplated, after discovering an additional prior controlled substance conviction. Both parties acknowledged the report’s accuracy at sentencing, though they advocated for a lower sentence in line with the plea agreement. The government also acknowledged the court’s independent authority to calculate the guidelines. Ultimately, the district court adopted the presentence report’s range and sentenced the defendant to 110 months, at the bottom of the applicable guidelines range.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed whether the government breached the plea agreement and whether the sentence was unreasonable. The court held that the government had not breached the plea agreement because the agreement allowed either party to argue for other guideline calculations, and the government did not recommend a higher sentence. The court also found that the sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable, as the district court considered the relevant statutory factors and the defendant’s history. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Messersmith" on Justia Law

William White, a federal prisoner serving a lengthy sentence, was transferred from one federal correctional institution to another, spending three days at a federal transfer center in Oklahoma City, where he was held in a Special Housing Unit for security reasons. During this brief transit period, he was not offered, nor did he participate in, any evidence-based recidivism reduction programming required under the First Step Act of 2018 (FSA). White later sought to have his time at the transfer center count toward FSA time credits, which could reduce his period of incarceration.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied White’s habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The court found that the Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) refusal to award FSA time credits for the three-day transfer period was consistent with BOP regulations and policy statements, which generally do not consider prisoners in transit or in certain housing statuses to be “successfully participating” in qualifying programs. The court also rejected White’s claim that his due process rights were violated, holding that the FSA does not create a protected liberty interest in earning time credits during every day of incarceration.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that, under the plain text of the FSA, a prisoner is entitled to time credits only for days in which he actually participates in qualifying programming or productive activities. Because White did not participate in any such programming during his three days in transit, he was not statutorily entitled to those time credits. The court further held that the FSA does not create a constitutionally protected liberty interest in earning time credits, so the BOP’s actions did not violate due process. View "White v. Warden of Fed Correctional Ins - Cumberland" on Justia Law

On June 15, 2021, two individuals in Portland, Maine reported being struck from behind by a man who inflicted a sharp pain, with one sustaining a wound on her back. The assailant was described as an African-American male with short spiky hair, wearing a green shirt, and carrying a backpack and tablet. Police identified Saad Zackaria as the likely suspect and located him at the Preble Street Resource Center, where staff permitted officers to enter. Zackaria was found fully dressed near the shower room; after he reentered the shower room with the door partially open, officers observed various sharp objects on the floor, including tweezers, a box cutter, and a wire. Zackaria was subsequently arrested.Following his arrest, Zackaria was charged in June 2021 and indicted in August. The Cumberland County Unified Criminal Docket found him incompetent to stand trial in August 2021, but competency was restored in March 2022. Pretrial motions, including a motion to suppress evidence, were denied after a hearing. Delays arose from counsel withdrawal, attorney illness, and a mistrial due to juror unavailability. Zackaria filed motions to dismiss for delay and for a new bail hearing, both denied in early January 2024. After a jury trial in January 2024, Zackaria was found guilty of aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon and two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon and received a sentence including incarceration and probation.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment. The Court held that Zackaria did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the shower room or common area of the shelter under the Fourth Amendment, due to the circumstances of his use and the openness of the space. Additionally, the Court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the speedy trial claim, noting that most delays were not attributable to the State or Zackaria, and that the lengthy pretrial detention did not prejudice the defense. View "State of Maine v. Zackaria" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged in federal court with possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). He pleaded guilty. At sentencing, a dispute arose over whether he was subject to a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence based on a prior conviction under California Penal Code § 311.11, which criminalizes possession of images depicting a minor “personally engaging in or simulating sexual conduct.” The defendant argued that the California statute was broader than the federal definition of child pornography and therefore should not trigger the federal mandatory minimum.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming agreed with the government and found that the prior California conviction qualified as a predicate offense, applying the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence required by 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2). The defendant appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s application of the mandatory minimum sentence de novo. Employing the categorical approach, the appellate court examined whether the elements of the California offense categorically matched the federal generic offense of possession of child pornography. The Tenth Circuit concluded that California Penal Code § 311.11, as interpreted by the California Supreme Court, criminalizes conduct such as “any touching” with sexual intent, which can include nonexplicit, nonsexual images far removed from the federal definition of child pornography. Because the California statute sweeps more broadly than the federal generic offense, the prior conviction does not qualify as a predicate offense under § 2252A(b)(2).The Tenth Circuit held that the mandatory minimum sentence was improperly applied and therefore vacated the defendant’s sentence, remanding the case for resentencing. View "United States v. Griffin" on Justia Law