Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves the suppression of DNA evidence obtained through a search warrant. The warrant affidavit included a false statement made by New Mexico Highlands University Police Chief Clarence Romero to FBI Agent Bryan Acee, who then included it in the affidavit. The district court suppressed the evidence, ruling that the inclusion of the false statement violated Franks v. Delaware, which prohibits recklessly or intentionally including a material, false statement in a search-warrant affidavit.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico found that Chief Romero's false statement was material to the finding of probable cause and that it was made with reckless disregard for the truth. The court also rejected the Government's argument that Franks did not apply to Chief Romero because he was off duty and lacked an official investigatory role. The court held that Franks extends to off-duty officers who are actually involved in an investigation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The Tenth Circuit held that Franks applies to off-duty officers who are actually involved in an investigation with the knowledge and acquiescence of on-duty officers. The court reviewed the district court's finding for clear error and affirmed the decision, noting that Chief Romero's actions and the reliance of other officers on his information demonstrated his involvement in the investigation. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order suppressing the DNA evidence. View "United States v. Norton" on Justia Law

Triston Harris Steinman was stopped by Nevada State Trooper William Boyer for speeding. During the stop, Boyer observed an ammunition box in Steinman's car and learned that Steinman had a felony conviction. Boyer asked Steinman to exit the vehicle and sit in the patrol car while he ran a criminal history check. Steinman admitted to having ammunition but denied having firearms. Boyer eventually seized the car and obtained a search warrant, leading to the discovery of firearms, ammunition, and other contraband.The District Court for the District of Nevada suppressed the evidence, ruling that Boyer unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion and lacked probable cause to seize the vehicle. The court also found the search warrant overbroad and invalid.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Boyer did not unlawfully prolong the stop, as his actions were within the scope of the traffic stop's mission and did not measurably extend its duration. The court also found that Boyer had reasonable suspicion of an independent offense after learning of Steinman's felony conviction. Additionally, the court ruled that Boyer had probable cause to seize the vehicle based on evidence of federal and state law violations. The court concluded that the search of the vehicle was permissible under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, despite the overbroad warrant. Thus, the suppression of the evidence was reversed. View "USA V. STEINMAN" on Justia Law

George Kevin Dickerson was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder. The case arose from an incident on January 8, 2023, when Dickerson called 911 and confessed to killing his mother-in-law, Rose Dennis, and her husband, Andy Martin, with a kitchen knife. Police found Martin dead and Dennis severely injured. Dickerson claimed that an accidental overdose of his antidepressant medication, venlafaxine, caused a violent outburst and a disconnect from reality, leading to his actions.The District Court of Natrona County oversaw the initial trial. Dickerson entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency (NGMI). The court ordered a mental examination, which concluded that Dickerson did not have a mental illness or deficiency that would absolve him of criminal responsibility. The court also admitted evidence of a prior statement by Dickerson about provoking Martin to facilitate moving Dennis to an assisted living facility, following a Gleason hearing.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case. Dickerson appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its jury instructions regarding his NGMI plea and the inference of malice from the use of a deadly weapon. He also contended that the court abused its discretion in admitting his prior statement about Martin. The Supreme Court found no plain error in the jury instructions, noting that the NGMI instruction allowed the jury to consider whether Dickerson’s overdose was involuntary. The court also upheld the instruction on inferring malice from the use of a deadly weapon, citing precedent. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in admitting the prior statement, as the district court had carefully considered its relevance and potential for unfair prejudice.The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed Dickerson’s convictions. View "Dickerson v. State" on Justia Law

The applicant pled guilty to robbery and received a ten-year confinement sentence. He later filed for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming his plea was involuntary because he believed he would receive shock probation after an initial period of incarceration. He also argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for shock probation, which was necessary for him to be considered for it.The 453rd District Court of Hays County reviewed the application and forwarded it to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. The habeas court concluded that the applicant's plea was involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel, citing Ex parte Bittikoffer. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals found this reliance misplaced, as Bittikoffer did not address involuntary plea claims based on ineffective assistance of counsel.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the applicant's plea was not involuntary because the counsel's advice and representation before the plea were competent. The court explained that a plea is not rendered involuntary due to counsel's post-plea actions. However, the court found that the applicant's counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file the motion for shock probation, which the applicant was entitled to under his plea agreement. This failure deprived the applicant of a hearing on shock probation.As a result, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas granted habeas corpus relief, vacated the applicant's sentence, and remanded him to the custody of the Sheriff of Hays County for a new punishment hearing. The court ordered that copies of the opinion be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Correctional Institutions Division and Board of Pardons and Paroles. View "EX PARTE MOSQUERA" on Justia Law

Shenisa Mohammed, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 2010. In 2020, she pleaded guilty to arson under Virginia Code § 18.2-77. The Department of Homeland Security charged her as removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), alleging her arson conviction qualified as an aggravated felony. Mohammed sought cancellation of removal, but the immigration judge (IJ) concluded that her arson conviction was an aggravated felony, making her removable and ineligible for discretionary relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, and Mohammed petitioned for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court confirmed its jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of removal, limited to constitutional claims or questions of law. The court reviewed de novo whether Mohammed’s state conviction for arson qualified as an aggravated felony under the INA.The court applied the categorical approach to determine if the Virginia arson statute matched the federal arson statute under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). The Virginia statute criminalizes maliciously burning or aiding and abetting the burning of certain properties. The federal statute criminalizes maliciously damaging or destroying property used in interstate commerce by fire or explosives. The court found that both statutes prohibit malicious burning, and the federal statute implicitly includes aiding and abetting liability through 18 U.S.C. § 2.The court concluded that the Virginia arson statute is not broader than the federal arson statute, as aiding and abetting is considered an alternative theory of liability under federal law. Therefore, Mohammed’s state arson conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony. The Sixth Circuit denied Mohammed’s petition for review. View "Mohammed v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Police officers responded to a noise complaint at a house party in Sanford, North Carolina, on September 12, 2021. They heard gunshots and saw the defendant, Chad Marques Jennings, run to a van and speed away. After a chase, officers detained Jennings, who admitted to having a gun in his waistband. Bullet casings found at the scene matched Jennings' gun. Jennings, a convicted felon, was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and pled guilty.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina held a sentencing hearing where Jennings' attorney spoke, and Jennings was invited to address the court. Jennings spoke about his struggles with alcoholism, read a poem, and a prepared speech. The court interrupted Jennings twice with questions and later prevented him from reading a letter to his mother, focusing instead on questioning him about his criminal history. The court sentenced Jennings to the statutory maximum of 120 months, citing the seriousness of the offense and his criminal history. Jennings appealed, arguing that the court denied him the full exercise of his allocution right.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in its handling of Jennings' allocution. The court found that the district court's interruptions were permissible clarifying questions and that the exclusion of the letter to Jennings' mother was within the court's discretion to limit irrelevant or repetitive information. The court concluded that Jennings was given a reasonable opportunity for allocution and affirmed the district court's judgment and sentence. View "United States v. Jennings" on Justia Law

A father, Scott Williams, and his son, Taeyan Williams, were convicted by a federal jury of various drug-related offenses, including conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute marijuana and cocaine. The case stemmed from an investigation into the disappearance of a drug dealer, Noah Smothers, who supplied drugs to Scott and Taeyan. A search of Scott's home revealed large quantities of drugs, firearms, and cash. Both Scott and Taeyan were found guilty of conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute, while Scott was also convicted of additional charges related to methamphetamine and evidence destruction.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied Scott's motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search, despite his claim that law enforcement failed to knock and announce before entering. The court held that suppression was not the appropriate remedy. Scott and Taeyan were sentenced to 276 months and 150 months in prison, respectively, followed by five years of supervised release. Both appealed their convictions and sentences.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Taeyan's conviction, finding sufficient evidence to support his possession with intent to distribute charges, based on his connection to the drugs found in Scott's home. The court also upheld the district court's denial of Scott's motion to suppress, citing exigent circumstances that justified the no-knock entry. Additionally, the court rejected Scott's request for a sentence reduction under the newly promulgated U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1, advising him to seek relief through a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582. Finally, the court found no improper delegation of judicial authority in the conditions of Scott's supervised release, affirming the district court's judgments in their entirety. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Hector Flores, Jr. was sentenced to five years of probation under the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA) for child endangerment, a state jail felony under Texas Penal Code § 22.041. The offense occurred on federal property, Big Bend National Park, where Flores placed his daughter in imminent danger by not providing food for four days in freezing temperatures. After violating his probation terms by testing positive for cocaine, the district court revoked his probation and resentenced him to two years of imprisonment followed by one year of supervised release.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially sentenced Flores to probation. After he violated the terms of his probation, the court revoked his probation and imposed a new sentence of two years of imprisonment, the maximum allowed under Texas law for his offense, followed by one year of supervised release. Flores appealed, arguing that the additional one-year term of supervised release exceeded the maximum sentence authorized by Texas law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that under the ACA, a federal court may impose a term of supervised release in addition to the maximum term of imprisonment allowed by state law. The court reasoned that supervised release serves rehabilitative purposes distinct from imprisonment and does not extend the term of imprisonment. The court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the combined sentence of imprisonment and supervised release was permissible under federal law and consistent with the ACA's requirement for "like punishment." View "USA v. Flores" on Justia Law

Jackson Daniel Bowers was convicted in 2019 of possession of heroin with intent to distribute and sentenced to 36 months imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. In 2023, while on supervised release, Bowers was accused of committing two state crimes: fourth-degree assault and violating a protective order. His probation officer recommended revoking his supervised release. Bowers resolved his state charges by entering a deferral agreement without admitting guilt.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington held a revocation hearing. Bowers requested a jury trial, which the district court denied. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Bowers had committed the alleged violations and revoked his supervised release, sentencing him to nine months imprisonment followed by 36 months of supervised release. Bowers appealed, arguing that Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in revocation proceedings, separate from the Sixth Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Article III’s jury provision and the Sixth Amendment are equivalent in scope. It found that the history and precedent indicate that the Sixth Amendment was meant to complement, not supersede, Article III. Therefore, a right not triggered by the Sixth Amendment cannot be independently triggered by Article III. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s revocation of Bowers’ supervised release. View "United States V. Bowers" on Justia Law

Anthony Brian Walker, a member of the Chickasaw Nation, was convicted of first-degree murder in Indian Country after an altercation with three teenagers in Ada, Oklahoma. On November 29, 2021, Walker was riding his bicycle when he encountered the teenagers in a red SUV. After a confrontation where Walker spat at the car and punched one of the teenagers, Jason Hubbard, Walker later approached the SUV with a knife and stabbed Hubbard, who subsequently died from the wound. Walker turned himself in the next day and admitted to the stabbing, claiming he acted because he believed Hubbard had a gun.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma presided over Walker's trial. Walker's defense included claims of self-defense and heat of passion. He requested jury instructions on these defenses, as well as on second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. The district court provided instructions on self-defense and the lesser-included offenses but did not include an instruction on imperfect self-defense, as Walker did not request it. The jury found Walker guilty of first-degree murder.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. Walker argued that the district court erred by not instructing the jury on imperfect self-defense and the government's burden to disprove it. The Tenth Circuit held that Walker did not preserve this argument because he never requested an imperfect self-defense instruction at trial. The court found no plain error in the district court's failure to sua sponte instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense, as it was not required to do so without a specific request. The Tenth Circuit affirmed Walker's conviction. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law