Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Husband and Wife divorced in 2020, with Husband required to pay child support and attorney fees. Two years later, Wife initiated a contempt proceeding against Husband for failing to comply with the divorce decree. On the day of the contempt trial, Husband informed the court he was unable to attend due to vehicle issues. The magistrate court proceeded with the trial in his absence, found him in criminal contempt, and sentenced him to 70 days in jail, with 50 days suspended, and ordered him to pay additional attorney fees.The district court affirmed the magistrate court's decision to hold the trial in Husband's absence but reversed the incarceration sanction, finding insufficient evidence that Husband waived his right to counsel. The district court concluded that the magistrate court violated Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 75(l)(1) by imposing incarceration without an attorney present to represent Husband.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the magistrate court erred in holding the contempt trial in Husband's absence. The court held that a contemnor's right to be present at a criminal contempt trial is protected under the Sixth Amendment, similar to a criminal defendant's right. The court concluded that Husband's willful absence did not constitute a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to be present. The proper procedure would have been to issue a writ of attachment to ensure Husband's attendance.The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the order of contempt and remand to the magistrate court for further proceedings. The court also found the district court's failure to address Wife's request for attorney fees harmless, as Husband's appeal was not frivolous. No attorney fees were awarded on appeal, and costs were awarded to Husband. View "Salazar v. Salazar" on Justia Law

Hugo Sanchez pleaded guilty to multiple felony offenses involving two juvenile victims. Eight years later, he filed a petition to establish factual innocence under Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) 34.900-.990. The district court dismissed the petition without prejudice, stating that Sanchez did not meet the pleading requirements under NRS 34.960.Previously, Sanchez had filed a direct appeal, which was dismissed after he voluntarily withdrew it. He later filed a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming actual innocence regarding some charges. The State argued that such a claim should be raised in a petition to establish factual innocence. The district court denied the State's motion to dismiss and allowed Sanchez to amend his petition. Sanchez then filed an amended petition to establish factual innocence, supported by a declaration from one of the victims recanting her previous statements. The district court initially set a hearing but later limited it to the pleading requirements under the factual-innocence statutes and subsequently dismissed the petition without prejudice.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case to determine if an order dismissing a petition to establish factual innocence without prejudice is appealable. The court concluded that such an order is not appealable under NRS 34.970(9) or any other statute or rule cited by Sanchez. The court noted that the factual-innocence statutes do not provide for an appeal from an order dismissing a petition without prejudice and that such an order does not constitute a final judgment. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Nevada dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "SANCHEZ VS. STATE" on Justia Law

John Paul Alvarez was initially charged with misdemeanor possession of stolen property in Reno Municipal Court, to which he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 30 days in county jail. Subsequently, he was charged with residential burglary, conspiracy to commit burglary, and grand larceny in the Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County, based on the same incident. The primary issue on appeal was whether Alvarez's prosecution and conviction for grand larceny violated double jeopardy principles, given his prior guilty plea to possession of stolen property.In the lower court, Alvarez filed a motion to dismiss the grand larceny charge on double jeopardy grounds, arguing that the State was barred from prosecuting him for grand larceny because it involved the same act as the possession-of-stolen-property offense. The district court denied the motion, concluding that under the Blockburger test, each offense required proof of a fact not required by the other. The case proceeded to trial, and the jury found Alvarez guilty of residential burglary, conspiracy to commit burglary, and grand larceny.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and held that a defendant cannot be convicted of both a theft crime and possessing or receiving the property stolen in the commission of the same theft crime. The court reaffirmed that theft crimes and possession of stolen property are mutually exclusive, alternative offenses. Consequently, the district court erred in denying Alvarez's motion to dismiss the grand larceny charge, as his prior conviction for possession of stolen property precluded the grand larceny conviction. The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed Alvarez's grand larceny conviction but affirmed the other convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "ALVAREZ VS. STATE" on Justia Law

Lance A. Roberts appealed the district court's decision affirming the magistrate court's denial of his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion in a misdemeanor DUI case, his Rule 35 motions in felony DUI cases, and the dismissal of his petitions for post-conviction relief in those felony DUI cases. Roberts sought to amend his multiple DUI convictions over the past two decades, arguing that his April 1998 conviction for a second "adult" misdemeanor DUI should have been charged as a second "juvenile" misdemeanor DUI. He claimed this error had a domino effect, leading to subsequent DUIs being charged as felonies and resulting in a persistent violator sentencing enhancement in his most recent felony DUI case.The magistrate court initially granted Roberts' Rule 35 motion to amend his April 1998 conviction, but the State's motion to reconsider was denied. Roberts then filed multiple motions and petitions to amend his subsequent DUI convictions and eliminate the persistent violator enhancement. The magistrate court denied these motions, and the district court affirmed, concluding that neither Rule 35(a) nor post-conviction relief statutes authorized the requested relief. The district court also reversed the magistrate court's amendment of the April 1998 conviction and dismissed Roberts' petitions for post-conviction relief.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the district court's decisions. The Court held that Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) does not allow for the amendment of a criminal conviction and is limited to correcting illegal sentences apparent from the face of the record. The Court also affirmed that Idaho Code section 19-4901(a) does not permit the relief Roberts sought, as his claims were time-barred and could have been raised on direct appeal. Consequently, the Court affirmed the district court's denial of Roberts' motions and petitions for post-conviction relief. View "State v. Roberts" on Justia Law

Nathan Wilson and Christopher Beasley were alleged to have set fire to a police car during a protest in Santa Monica, California, following the killing of George Floyd. They were federally indicted on one count of arson. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing they were selectively prosecuted based on perceived anti-government views. Alternatively, they sought discovery on their selective-prosecution claim.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied the motion to dismiss but granted discovery on the selective-prosecution claim. The government indicated it would seek appellate review rather than comply with the discovery order, leading the district court to dismiss the indictment without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, which allows for government appeals in criminal cases without requiring final decisions. The court found that the district court abused its discretion by granting discovery based on an erroneous view of the law. The district court had incorrectly defined the control group for determining discriminatory effect, failing to account for relevant factors beyond committing the same crime in the same location.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s selective-prosecution discovery order and the dismissal of the indictment without prejudice. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. The court did not address whether the defendants presented evidence of discriminatory intent. View "USA V. WILSON" on Justia Law

Anthony Vasquez was convicted of multiple offenses, including aggravated first-degree murder, unlawful possession of a firearm, and tampering with a witness, for shooting and killing Juan Garcia in 2013. Vasquez was sentenced to life without parole. On appeal, the Court of Appeals vacated the aggravated murder conviction, concluding it was not a drive-by shooting, and affirmed the other convictions. Vasquez was resentenced to 660 months. He appealed again due to a clerical error, and the Court of Appeals remanded for clarification.Following the State v. Blake decision, which held the former simple possession statute unconstitutional, Vasquez filed a CrR 7.8 motion for relief from judgment, arguing his judgment and sentence (J&S) was invalid due to a drug possession conviction. The State conceded, and Vasquez was resentenced to 620 months. The resentencing judge limited the scope of arguments, rejecting Vasquez's request to consider his youth at the time of the crime.Vasquez appealed, arguing the superior court erred by not conducting a de novo resentencing and not considering his youth. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that resentencing should be de novo unless specifically restricted by an appellate court. The court noted that the resentencing judge should exercise independent discretion and consider all relevant arguments and evidence.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that at a resentencing hearing, the court has the same discretion as an original sentencing judge. The parties must be allowed to present mitigating and aggravating factors, and the judge must exercise independent discretion in sentencing. The case was remanded for a new resentencing hearing. View "State v. Vasquez" on Justia Law

In May 2006, Timothy Kelly was convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance and other burglary-related offenses. His offender scores for these offenses ranged from 11 to 14 points. Later, in November 2006, Kelly was convicted of additional offenses, including first-degree burglary and firearm-related crimes, with offender scores ranging from 21.5 to 26.5 points. In 2021, following the decision in State v. Blake, which invalidated Washington’s drug possession statute, Kelly sought resentencing. The trial court vacated his drug possession conviction and adjusted his offender scores but denied resentencing for the May 2006 convictions, as Kelly had already served his sentence.The Court of Appeals held that Kelly’s request for resentencing on his non-drug-related May 2006 convictions was time-barred under RCW 10.73.090(1) and .100. The court also ruled that the trial court lacked the authority to run Kelly’s firearm enhancements concurrently. Kelly appealed, arguing that the Blake decision was material to his sentences and that his judgment and sentence were facially invalid due to the unconstitutional conviction.The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the Court of Appeals. The court held that while Blake was a significant change in the law, it was not material to Kelly’s non-drug-related sentences because his offender scores remained above 9 points, and his standard sentencing ranges did not change. The court also held that Kelly’s judgment and sentence were not facially invalid, as the sentencing court did not exceed its authority. Additionally, the court declined to overrule State v. Brown, which held that firearm enhancements must run consecutively and cannot be modified through an exceptional sentence. The court concluded that the invited error doctrine did not preclude the State from challenging the judgment and sentence. View "State v. Kelly" on Justia Law

Edward Mero was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder and two counts of tampering with physical evidence. The first murder involved his roommate, who was found dead in their apartment after a fire in 2013. The second murder involved a woman he hired for a date in December 2014, whose body was found in a shallow grave in May 2015. Mero was arrested in 2017 and charged with both murders and related tampering charges.The trial court joined the charges in a single indictment and denied Mero's motion to sever them, reasoning that the distinct evidence for each murder would allow the jury to consider each charge separately. During the trial, a juror was dismissed after overhearing derogatory comments made by defense counsel. Mero later moved to vacate his convictions, arguing that his trial counsel had a conflict of interest due to an undisclosed business relationship with an Assistant District Attorney (ADA). The trial court denied the motion, finding that the potential conflict did not affect the defense.The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decisions, including the denial of the severance motion and the motion to vacate. The court found that the evidence for each murder was distinct enough for the jury to consider separately and that the potential conflict of interest did not impact the defense. Two Justices dissented, arguing that the proof for the second murder was significantly stronger and that the jury would likely be prejudiced by the joinder.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever, as the jury was capable of considering the evidence for each charge separately. The court also found that the potential conflict of interest did not operate on the defense, and Mero's other claims were either without merit or unreviewable. View "People v Mero" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of felony driving while intoxicated under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3) after being stopped by state troopers for crossing the fog line three times within a short distance. The defendant argued that the stop was unlawful and that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. During the suppression hearing, the troopers testified that they observed the defendant's vehicle crossing the fog line multiple times, and upon stopping him, noted signs of intoxication, including the smell of alcohol, slurred speech, and bloodshot eyes. The defendant failed several sobriety tests and admitted to drinking.The suppression court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the troopers had probable cause to stop the vehicle based on the observed traffic violation. At the bench trial, the troopers' testimonies were consistent with their earlier statements, and the court admitted the police report of the defendant's refusal to take a chemical test. The court found the defendant guilty of driving while intoxicated and sentenced him accordingly.The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, concluding that the troopers had probable cause to stop the defendant's vehicle for violating VTL § 1128 (a) by crossing the fog line multiple times. The majority rejected the defendant's claims, while the dissenting justices argued that there was no evidence of unsafe driving. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, holding that the troopers had probable cause for the stop and that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the conviction. The court also found that the weight of the evidence claim was unreviewable. View "People v Rufus" on Justia Law

Dylan Ketcham was convicted of the murder of Jordan Johnson, attempted murder, and elevated aggravated assault against Caleb Trudeau. The incident occurred on January 24, 2020, when Ketcham and Johnson exchanged hostile messages and agreed to meet. Trudeau accompanied Johnson, expecting a fistfight. Ketcham shot Johnson in the head and attacked Trudeau with a machete, causing severe injuries. Johnson died days later, and Trudeau survived but with lasting impairments.The State initially charged Ketcham with elevated aggravated assault and later with murder after Johnson's death. A mental examination deemed Ketcham competent for trial. A mistrial was declared in September 2022 due to prejudicial evidence. Before the new trial, the court limited the admission of certain text messages between Johnson and Trudeau. During the January 2023 trial, the court allowed some messages to be discussed but limited their use to showing the relationship and state of mind, not self-defense. The jury found Ketcham guilty on all counts.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. Ketcham argued that the trial court erred in limiting the jury's consideration of the messages and in not ordering a competency evaluation during the trial. He also challenged his sentence as a misapplication of sentencing principles and an illegal de facto life sentence. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's handling of the messages or in its decision not to order a competency evaluation. The court also upheld the sentences, finding them proportionate to the crimes committed and not constituting a de facto life sentence. The judgment and sentence were affirmed. View "State of Maine v. Ketcham" on Justia Law