Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Jacob Parlin was arrested after law enforcement, investigating a narcotics operation, intercepted communications implicating him in drug transactions. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) began wiretapping a suspected dealer’s phone, capturing conversations among Parlin, the dealer, and a third party, which discussed drug sales and pricing strategies. Following these intercepts, officers stopped Parlin's vehicle and discovered nearly two pounds of pure methamphetamine, along with drug paraphernalia and a small quantity of drugs indicative of personal use.A federal grand jury indicted Parlin on conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine, as well as substantive distribution and possession charges. At trial in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, Parlin objected to a police officer's testimony about the typical amount of methamphetamine held by users versus distributors, arguing the officer was giving undisclosed expert testimony. The court allowed the testimony, finding it was based on the officer’s personal observations. Parlin was convicted by a jury on both counts. He then moved for acquittal or a mistrial, asserting the testimony was improper; the district court denied these motions, determining the testimony was appropriately limited and other evidence supported the verdict.Parlin appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, contending the district court erred by admitting the officer’s opinion testimony and that, without it, the evidence was insufficient to prove intent to distribute. The First Circuit held that, even if admitting the testimony was error, it was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of Parlin's intent to distribute, including recorded phone calls and the large quantity of drugs. The court affirmed Parlin’s conviction on both counts. View "United States v. Parlin" on Justia Law

Border Patrol officers apprehended the defendant, a Mexican citizen, near Sunland Park, New Mexico. He admitted to being in the United States without authorization. The government charged him with illegal reentry after removal, under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b). The defendant had previously been deported multiple times since 2008 and had three prior convictions for illegal reentry between 2011 and 2014. He also had a conviction for animal cruelty after killing a young horse in 2013 and a history of law enforcement encounters involving allegations such as domestic violence and substance offenses, though not all resulted in convictions.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico presided over the case. The defendant entered a fast-track plea agreement, resulting in a calculated sentencing guideline range of four to ten months, or without the fast-track plea, eight to fourteen months. Before sentencing, the district court indicated a possible upward variance. During the hearing, the government sought a high-end sentence, and the defendant asked for twelve to eighteen months, but no more than twenty-four months. The district court rejected the plea agreement, allowed the defendant to proceed, and ultimately imposed a twenty-four-month sentence, citing the defendant’s repeated illegal entries, criminal history, and the animal cruelty conviction. The district court gave a detailed explanation referencing the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.On appeal, before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant challenged the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, arguing the district court lacked compelling justification for the upward variance and that the sentence created unwarranted disparities. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion, found the detailed explanation sufficient, and concluded the upward variance was justified in light of the defendant’s history and the § 3553(a) factors. The court affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Zamora-Guerra" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted in Oklahoma state court of several serious crimes, including first-degree rape of a child under fourteen, forcible sodomy, lewd or indecent acts to a minor, rape by instrumentation, and commission of a lewd act in front of a minor. He asserted membership in the Kickapoo Tribe and claimed the crimes occurred in Indian country, which would affect the state court’s jurisdiction. The specific area in question was formerly part of the Citizen Potawatomi reservation.After conviction, the petitioner challenged the state court’s jurisdiction in the Oklahoma state courts, raising various arguments about the land’s status. He also brought claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, denial of due process, and violations of federal law. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected his jurisdictional arguments and other claims. He then sought habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that Congress had clearly disestablished the Citizen Potawatomi reservation in 1891, citing statutory language and Supreme Court precedent. The court found that the petitioner had waived arguments regarding the land as a dependent Indian community or an Indian allotment by failing to properly preserve those claims. Additionally, the court determined that the petitioner’s other claims (including those alleging violations of the Indian Child Welfare Act, ineffective assistance, improper questioning, and due process violations) were procedurally barred as they had not been properly exhausted in state court and did not meet the requirements for overcoming an anticipatory procedural bar. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. View "Wahpekeche v. Pettigrew" on Justia Law

A bank robbery occurred at City National Bank in Oklahoma City on November 7, 2022. During the incident, two eyewitnesses—a teller and a customer—testified that the robber brandished what appeared to be a real firearm, describing it as a “Glock” or “Glock-like handgun.” Surveillance video supported their accounts, but law enforcement did not recover the weapon. The defendant, Akin Wofford, was charged with armed bank robbery and with possessing and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence.The case was tried in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. At trial, the government relied on eyewitness testimony and video evidence to prove the existence of a firearm. The jury was instructed, without objection, that the government did not need to produce the actual weapon and that “witness identification of the weapon as a firearm is sufficient.” The jury convicted the defendant on both counts.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant argued that the jury instruction on Count Two violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by relieving the government of its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed and brandished a “firearm.” The Tenth Circuit reviewed the claim for plain error because no objection was raised at trial. The court held that, when read as a whole, the instructions did not misstate the law or mislead the jury, and that the challenged instruction did not direct the jury to automatically accept witness testimony as sufficient. The Tenth Circuit concluded there was no plain error and affirmed the conviction in full. View "United States v. Wofford" on Justia Law

The case involved a defendant charged with five counts of sexual assault-related offenses based on two separate incidents. The first three counts were based on allegations by the defendant’s half-sister, who claimed he sexually assaulted her at gunpoint after driving her to a remote location. The defendant’s account of this event differed significantly, alleging that his half-sister attempted to extort money from him by threatening to make false accusations if he did not comply. The remaining two counts arose from allegations by a minor, N.W., who testified that the defendant sexually assaulted and kidnapped her at knifepoint after driving her from a party to a remote location. The defendant asserted that the sexual encounter with N.W. was consensual and that her allegations were motivated by resentment.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota conducted a jury trial. The jury acquitted the defendant on the counts related to his half-sister but found him guilty of aggravated sexual abuse and kidnapping with respect to N.W. Following the verdict, the defendant appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, arguing that he was unfairly prejudiced by the joinder of all charges in a single trial and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions on the counts involving N.W.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the defendant’s claims. Applying plain error review to the joinder issue, the court found no error because evidence from one alleged assault would have been admissible in a separate trial for the other under Federal Rule of Evidence 413, and the jury’s split verdict indicated it considered the evidence separately. Addressing sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court held that the jury’s credibility determinations were nearly unreviewable and that the minor victim’s testimony alone was sufficient to uphold the convictions. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Shaune Aaron Price was arrested while in possession of a Glock 9mm handgun, later linked to three shootings. A search of his cellphone indicated that he also possessed a Glock .40. He pleaded guilty to two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm under federal law. Before his federal sentencing, Price served over 24 months in state prison for a related unlawful weapon use conviction.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri calculated a sentencing range under the Guidelines and initially imposed a 65-month sentence on each count, to run consecutively, totaling 130 months. Defense counsel requested a reduction under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) for the time Price had already served in state custody. After a brief recess and further consideration, the district court increased the sentences on the counts, then subtracted the time served in state custody, again arriving at a total sentence of 130 months. The court made clear its intent was to impose a 130-month sentence regardless of the adjustment for time served.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Price argued that the district court erred by increasing his sentence before reducing it, and by not crediting the full 24 months and 17 days served. The Eighth Circuit held that, even if there was error in the procedure or the calculation of days, the error was harmless because the record clearly showed the district court’s intent to impose a total sentence of 130 months, regardless of the adjustments. The court also specified that harmless error doctrine applies to misapplications of § 5G1.3(b) when the record demonstrates the district court would have imposed the same sentence. The judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Price" on Justia Law

The case involved a defendant who was charged in the District Court with armed robbery after allegedly entering a bank, presenting a note stating "I have a bomb," and leaving with money that included a dye pack. The allegations did not indicate the teller observed any weapon or bomb. After the defendant left the scene, he was arrested a few hours later, and money stained by the dye pack was recovered nearby. The defendant was subsequently arraigned on charges of armed robbery and making a bomb/hijack threat.At arraignment, the Commonwealth moved for pretrial detention under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 276, section 58A (§ 58A), arguing the charges constituted predicate offenses under the statute’s force clause, which permits pretrial detention for certain dangerous offenses. A District Court judge ordered the defendant held without bail, citing both charged offenses as predicate offenses. The defendant petitioned for review in Superior Court, where a judge again ordered him held, citing armed robbery as the qualifying predicate offense. The defendant then sought relief in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, and a single justice reserved and reported the case to the full court. While the appeal was pending, the defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to prison, rendering the question of pretrial detention technically moot.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts exercised its discretion to address the issue due to its recurring nature. The court held that armed robbery, as defined in Massachusetts law, does not categorically require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force necessary to qualify as a predicate offense under § 58A’s force clause. Because armed robbery can be accomplished through minimal physical force or even without the victim’s awareness of a weapon, it does not satisfy the statutory standard. The court ordered that the Superior Court’s pretrial detention order be vacated. View "Agostini v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The case concerns criminal charges against a man arising from two separate incidents involving his estranged wife and their children at their home in Missoula County, Montana. The first incident, in June 2022, involved a domestic dispute in which the man was alleged to have yelled at and threatened his children and wife, resulting in a 911 call and subsequent police investigation. The second incident, in October 2022, occurred while the couple was separated and involved a physical altercation during a visit by the man to drop off dog food, which escalated to allegations of assault, strangulation, and injury to the wife. Law enforcement responded on both occasions, collecting statements and evidence from the family.After the second incident, the State amended its charges to include multiple felonies and misdemeanors. The defendant initially entered into a plea agreement, pleading no contest to certain charges in exchange for dismissal of others. However, the Fourth Judicial District Court, after reviewing a presentence report, rejected the plea agreement, expressing concerns regarding the defendant’s criminal history and risk to public safety. The defendant then withdrew his pleas, and the matter proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found him guilty on all counts, including Partner or Family Member Assault, destruction/tampering with a communication device, aggravated assault, and strangulation.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the defendant argued due process violations and cumulative error, including claims of police misconduct, judicial bias, and the State knowingly presenting false evidence. The Supreme Court held that the defendant’s claims were not preserved for appeal and declined to exercise plain error review. The Court further found no basis for cumulative error or denial of a fair trial, and affirmed the District Court’s judgment. View "State v. Stinger" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted by a jury in 2018 of several offenses, including aggravated assault, sexual assault, assault on a peace officer, escape, and criminal possession of dangerous drugs. After initially having court-appointed counsel, he retained private attorneys under a fixed-fee contract, with his grandmother paying $150,000 upfront. Ten months later, the relationship between the appellant and his retained counsel deteriorated to the point of a complete breakdown, leading counsel to seek withdrawal. The court held a hearing, found an irreconcilable breakdown, allowed withdrawal, and appointed new counsel. The appellant was then represented by court-appointed attorneys through his trial and sentencing. His conviction and subsequent claims of error, including those relating to ineffective assistance of counsel, were affirmed on direct appeal, and his petition for certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court.In postconviction proceedings before the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, the appellant asserted numerous grounds for relief, focusing on claims of ineffective assistance by retained trial counsel (for seeking withdrawal but keeping the fixed fee) and by appellate counsel (for not arguing that separate counsel should have been appointed at the withdrawal hearing). After a bench trial and extensive litigation, the District Court denied all claims, finding no constitutional violations. The court also noted that the appellant’s dispute over fees had been separately resolved through mediation and civil proceedings.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the circumstances did not demonstrate a structural denial of counsel warranting a presumption of prejudice under United States v. Cronic, nor did the fixed-fee contract create an actual conflict of interest resulting in ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington. The Court further found that appellate counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise the claim regarding appointment of separate counsel at the withdrawal hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s denial of postconviction relief. View "Briggs v. State" on Justia Law

After being stopped in a single traffic incident, the defendant was charged in the First Judicial District Court, Broadwater County, Montana, with four offenses: criminal possession of dangerous drugs (methamphetamine), criminal possession of drug paraphernalia, displaying fictitious license plates, and driving without a valid license. The charges stemmed from the discovery of a glass pipe containing methamphetamine residue; the pipe itself was the basis for the paraphernalia charge, and the residue formed the basis for the felony drug possession charge.The defendant pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor counts—possession of drug paraphernalia, displaying fictitious license plates, and driving without a license—but did not plead guilty to the felony drug possession charge. Immediately after his guilty pleas to the misdemeanors, he moved to dismiss the felony charge, arguing that Montana’s double jeopardy and same-transaction statutes—specifically § 46-11-503(1)(b), MCA—barred further prosecution because all charges arose from the same transaction and shared the same objective. The District Court denied this motion, holding that the offenses, though related, were distinct under Montana law and that the defendant had not yet been subjected to multiple prosecutions. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea to the felony, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s decision. It held that § 46-11-503(1)(b), MCA, did not bar prosecution of the unresolved count because no conviction had been entered on the other counts at the time of the motion. The court also concluded that Montana law permits prosecution and conviction for both offenses arising from the same transaction unless one is a lesser-included offense of the other, which was not the case here. View "State v. Standifur" on Justia Law