Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Late at night, police officers responded to a 911 call reporting a man with a gun in an area known for gang activity. The caller provided a description and stated that the man put a gun in a white Kia parked nearby. An officer recognized someone matching the description—later identified as Perez—who entered a nearby apartment. Officers, without a warrant or exigent circumstances, approached the residence, saw Perez inside through the screen door, and ordered him to come out at gunpoint. Perez initially did not comply but eventually exited and was detained outside. A witness identified Perez as the suspect, and a subsequent search of the Kia and Perez’s person uncovered a firearm, drugs, and related evidence.Perez moved to suppress the evidence in the Superior Court of Orange County, arguing that his seizure inside the apartment violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers lacked probable cause and a warrant. The prosecution argued that the initial detention was justified by reasonable suspicion and that no warrant was necessary since officers did not physically enter the residence. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the detention was proper, and Perez ultimately pleaded guilty and was sentenced.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that Perez was seized while still inside the residence and that, under the Fourth Amendment, such a seizure requires both probable cause and a warrant or exigent circumstances. The court rejected the prosecution’s arguments that the officers’ conduct was permissible as a mere detention or as a warrantless arrest effected from outside the home. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to allow Perez to withdraw his plea and to grant suppression of the evidence and identification derived from the unlawful seizure. View "People v. Perez" on Justia Law

Three defendants were charged following a federal investigation into La Asociación Ñeta, an organization originally founded to advocate for prisoners’ rights in Puerto Rico, but later alleged to have evolved into a criminal enterprise engaged in drug trafficking and violence. The defendants were accused of conspiring to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, and of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute heroin, cocaine, and marijuana. The indictment described La Ñeta as an enterprise whose members facilitated drug transactions and other criminal conduct. The defendants were tried jointly before a jury and convicted on both counts.After conviction in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, the defendants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Their appeals were consolidated with those of several codefendants. In an earlier opinion, the First Circuit rejected most challenges but found that it could not resolve whether certain hearsay statements used at trial were admissible under United States v. Petrozziello because the District Court had not made the required findings. The First Circuit remanded for the District Court to make explicit findings about whether the statements were made by coconspirators during and in furtherance of the conspiracy, and retained jurisdiction over the appeals.After the District Court made its findings, the First Circuit reviewed the record and supplemental briefs. The court held that the challenged statements were properly admitted under Petrozziello or, where any error occurred, it was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. The court also rejected a cumulative error argument, finding no basis to overturn the convictions. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the convictions of all three defendants. View "United States v. Rosario-Orangel" on Justia Law

The defendant was involved in an incident in August 2022 in which, while intoxicated, he assaulted a woman with whom he had a long-term relationship, causing physical injuries that required medical attention. When deputies attempted to arrest him, he resisted and injured two officers. He was subsequently charged with several offenses, including resisting an executive officer and inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant, and admitted to aggravating factors based on his prior convictions. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he was sentenced to county jail on the misdemeanor count and received a four-year suspended prison sentence with four years of probation on the felony count, along with presentence custody credits.After being arrested for a new offense and failing to comply with the conditions of his release, his probation was revoked by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (Judge Emily Cole), and the previously suspended four-year prison sentence was imposed. The court recalculated his presentence custody credits, but an error was made in the calculation. While his appeal was pending, appellate counsel notified the trial court (Supervising Judge Michelle deCasas) of the miscalculation, requesting correction. The trial court acknowledged the mistake but concluded it lacked jurisdiction to correct it after the notice of appeal had been filed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that Penal Code section 1237.1 expressly confers jurisdiction on the trial court to correct errors in presentence custody credit calculations even after a notice of appeal is filed, provided the defendant requests the correction. The court found that the miscalculation was conceded by both parties and modified the judgment to award the correct amount of 400 days of presentence custody credit. The judgment was otherwise affirmed as modified. View "People v. Taft" on Justia Law

A defendant with a prior felony conviction was found with a firearm while on supervised release, in violation of federal law prohibiting felons from possessing firearms. The conduct leading to the indictment included absconding from supervision and being discovered with a gun, which also violated the terms of his supervised release. He moved to dismiss the federal indictment, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to him, relying on recent Supreme Court decisions concerning the Second Amendment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted the motion to dismiss, finding the relevant federal statute unconstitutional as applied to the defendant. The district court placed the burden on the government to justify the restriction, considered only the defendant's felony convictions (not his entire criminal record), and did not account for his supervised release status. The government appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.While the appeal was pending, the Sixth Circuit issued new precedent clarifying the proper standard for reviewing Second Amendment challenges. This precedent shifted the burden to the defendant to show he is not dangerous and required courts to consider the full criminal history and supervised release status. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that the district court had not applied the correct legal standard and that the existing record was insufficient for an individualized dangerousness determination. The appellate court vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded for reconsideration of the motion to dismiss, instructing the district court to apply the correct legal standard consistent with current circuit precedent and to provide the defendant an opportunity to demonstrate he is not dangerous. View "United States v. Hostettler" on Justia Law

A defendant violently attacked and confined a homeowner over a six-hour period in the homeowner’s house. The defendant struck the homeowner multiple times, tied him up with various restraints, and used weapons, including a handgun. During the ordeal, the homeowner was forced to help the defendant carry stolen items, attempted to escape unsuccessfully, and was continuously under threat until he finally managed to flee. As a result, the State charged the defendant with multiple felonies, including two counts of criminal confinement: one as a Level 3 felony (for use of a deadly weapon) and another as a Level 4 felony (for inflicting moderate bodily injury).The Ohio Circuit Court entered convictions for both confinement counts and sentenced the defendant to consecutive terms for those offenses, along with sentences for other crimes. On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, applying the Wadle test for double jeopardy, even though the parties had agreed that the Powell test was applicable.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case on transfer. It held that when a statute defines a base offense and elevated forms (such as higher felony levels based on enhancing circumstances), those forms constitute a single statutory offense. Therefore, the Powell test, not the Wadle test, governs whether multiple convictions for elevated offenses violate Indiana’s substantive double jeopardy doctrine. Applying the Powell test, the court found the evidence supported only a single, continuous period of criminal confinement, not two discrete offenses. The court reversed the conviction for the lesser (Level 4) offense, ordered the trial court to vacate that conviction, and remanded for resentencing, thereby reducing the defendant’s aggregate sentence. View "Moyers v. State of Indiana" on Justia Law

The case arose from a criminal prosecution in which a defendant was charged with murdering his wife, claiming self-defense. During pretrial proceedings, the lead prosecutor, the Anne Arundel County State’s Attorney, conducted witness interviews alone, including one with a witness who relayed that the defendant stated his wife had previously threatened him with a knife—a fact potentially relevant to the defense. The State’s Attorney did not initially disclose this information to defense counsel, resulting in a discovery dispute. At a subsequent hearing, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County found a discovery violation and concluded that the State’s Attorney had made herself a likely necessary witness in the case by interviewing witnesses alone. The court disqualified her from acting as prosecutor and imposed a firewall order mandating that she have no further involvement in the case except as a witness, with very limited exceptions.The State appealed these interlocutory orders to the Appellate Court of Maryland. The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the disqualification order was not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine because determining whether the State’s Attorney was a necessary witness was not completely separate from the merits of the criminal case. The court did not separately address the firewall order.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Maryland considered whether the disqualification and firewall orders were immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The Supreme Court held that the disqualification order was not immediately appealable because resolving whether the State’s Attorney was a necessary witness was not completely separate from the merits of the prosecution. However, the Supreme Court determined that the firewall order, which barred the State’s Attorney from participating in the case except as a witness, was immediately appealable as it raised important separation of powers concerns and was distinct from the merits. The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on the firewall order. View "State v. Houston" on Justia Law

A defendant was charged with murder following an altercation at an apartment, where the victim died from stab wounds to his back. The defendant claimed he acted in self-defense, stating that the victim had ordered him to leave, attempted to re-enter forcefully, and ended up on top of him during a struggle. The defendant then struck the victim multiple times with an unknown object. There was no evidence or claim that the victim was armed or had threatened to use a weapon, and the victim subsequently sought help from a neighbor before succumbing to his injuries.The Third District Court in Salt Lake County held a pretrial justification hearing pursuant to Utah Code section 76-2-309. The defendant argued that he could make a prima facie claim of justification merely by proffering facts, which should be accepted as true. However, the district court interpreted the statute to require more than a proffer and considered both the defendant’s proffer and attached exhibits. The court found that the evidence did not support the defendant’s assertion of self-defense, as there was no indication he reasonably believed force was necessary to defend against imminent unlawful force or a forcible felony. Thus, the court denied the motion to dismiss.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the interlocutory appeal. It held that to make a prima facie claim of justification under the statute, a defendant must present evidence at the hearing that, if believed by the factfinder, would be legally sufficient to satisfy each element of the justification claim. This is a burden of production, not of proof. The court concluded that the defendant had not presented evidence supporting each element of self-defense and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. View "State v. Jennings" on Justia Law

A woman was discovered dead and buried in a shallow grave on Crescent Beach in Riverside, Rhode Island, in June 1994. The investigation quickly focused on Gary Tassone after the victim’s estranged husband reported her missing and provided information connecting her to Tassone. Detectives interviewed Tassone, who gave several statements to police—initially denying, then repeatedly revising, his account of the night, ultimately admitting to being with the victim, striking her with a shovel, and leading police to evidence he claimed to have discarded. Physical evidence, including sand and personal items, further linked him to the crime scene. Tassone was indicted and charged with first-degree murder.The Superior Court held a suppression hearing and denied Tassone’s motion to suppress his confessions, finding he was not in custody at the outset and that his statements were voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waivers of his rights. At trial, the jury convicted Tassone of first-degree murder, finding the crime involved torture or aggravated battery, and he was sentenced to life without parole. The conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. Tassone later sought postconviction relief in the Superior Court, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel based on various alleged failures by trial counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the Superior Court denied his application.On review, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief. The Court held that Tassone failed to demonstrate that his counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable or that any alleged deficiencies prejudiced his defense, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, including his own detailed confessions and corroborating physical evidence. As a result, the judgment was affirmed. View "Tassone v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law

A defendant was indicted in Guilford County in 2019 on multiple charges related to a series of motor vehicle and credit card thefts. He chose to represent himself at trial and was convicted by a jury of thirteen offenses. The trial court consolidated these convictions into two judgments for sentencing, applying the North Carolina Structured Sentencing Act. However, in one judgment, the trial court incorrectly calculated the defendant’s prior record level, assigning him nine points instead of the correct ten, and sentenced him as a level III offender rather than level IV.On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that the trial court had erred in accepting the defendant’s waiver of counsel, prejudicing his trial, and remanded for a new trial. The appellate court also noted clerical errors in the original judgments but did not rule on them due to the new trial order. Following retrial, the defendant was again convicted, and the trial court corrected the prior record level, assigning ten points and sentencing him as a level IV offender, resulting in a longer sentence for one judgment than was imposed at the initial sentencing. The defendant appealed, arguing that under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1335, the trial court could not impose a more severe sentence after his successful appeal and retrial.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that when a trial court must correct an illegal sentence to comply with the structured sentencing framework, it may lawfully impose a harsher sentence on remand, even if N.C.G.S. § 15A-1335 generally prohibits harsher resentencing following a successful appeal. The Court concluded that the specific provisions of structured sentencing control when in conflict with the general bar of § 15A-1335, affirming the Court of Appeals’ decision upholding the corrected sentence. View "State v. Thomas" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was convicted of robbery with a dangerous weapon after an incident in which the victim, Damon Scott, was assaulted outside an apartment. Scott was struck from behind, pistol-whipped by the defendant, and stomped by multiple attackers. He lost consciousness and later awoke in the road, realizing his phone, house key, and $250 were missing. Scott identified the defendant as his primary assailant and testified to the presence of a firearm during the attack. The missing possessions were never recovered, and Scott was hospitalized for serious injuries. At trial, the State introduced evidence of the defendant's prior participation in a similar armed robbery to demonstrate intent.The case was first reviewed in the Superior Court, Cabarrus County, where the trial judge denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the robbery charge, finding sufficient evidence for the jury to decide whether the defendant, or someone acting with him, took Scott's property. The jury convicted the defendant of both robbery with a dangerous weapon and assault inflicting serious bodily injury. The defendant then appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, arguing that the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove that he or an accomplice took Scott’s property. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and vacated the robbery conviction, concluding the evidence of opportunity, intent, and plan did not amount to substantial evidence under North Carolina Supreme Court precedent.Upon discretionary review, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the trial court properly denied the motion to dismiss. The Court found that, viewing the evidence as a whole and in the light most favorable to the State, there was more than a scintilla of evidence to permit a reasonable inference that the defendant, or someone acting in concert with him, took Scott’s property. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "State v. Perry" on Justia Law