Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

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The petitioner was charged with first-degree murder. During the investigation, the prosecution informed the defense that an investigating officer had a sustained finding of dishonesty, and the police department intended to release related records under Penal Code section 832.7(b)(1)(C). The defense requested these records under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) and filed a Pitchess motion seeking additional Brady material. The trial court, after an in-camera review, found no additional Brady material and ordered the release of the dishonesty records but issued a protective order limiting their dissemination.The trial court's protective order restricted the defense from sharing the records outside the defense team. The petitioner sought an extraordinary writ of mandate to vacate this protective order, arguing that the records were nonconfidential and subject to public inspection under section 832.7(b)(1)(C). The Court of Appeal initially denied the petition, but the Supreme Court directed the appellate court to reconsider.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and concluded that the records of the officer's sustained finding of dishonesty were nonconfidential and subject to public inspection under section 832.7(b)(1)(C). The court held that the trial court should not have issued a protective order for these records, as they were not confidential. Consequently, the appellate court granted the petition for writ of mandate and directed the trial court to vacate its protective order concerning the records of the officer's dishonesty. View "Banuelos v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

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In this case, Charles House was involved in drug trafficking activities, traveling to California to obtain large quantities of marijuana and methamphetamine, which he then shipped to addresses in Indiana. In October 2018, FedEx personnel alerted law enforcement to suspicious packages addressed to various locations in Anderson, Indiana. A drug-sniffing dog indicated that five of the twelve packages contained drugs, leading to a state warrant and the discovery of methamphetamine and marijuana. Subsequently, law enforcement installed a pole camera to surveil House’s residence for thirteen months, capturing his activities and patterns related to drug distribution.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana denied House’s motion to suppress the pole camera evidence, relying on the precedent set in United States v. Tuggle, which held that the warrantless use of pole cameras does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. House was found guilty on all counts, including drug distribution and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and reaffirmed the Tuggle decision. The court held that the warrantless use of pole cameras to observe a home does not amount to a search under the Fourth Amendment, as it is consistent with Supreme Court precedent and the rulings of other federal courts. The court emphasized that House did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the activities observable from public thoroughfares. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of House’s motion to suppress the pole camera evidence. View "United States v. House" on Justia Law

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The defendant was convicted of murder and criminal possession of a firearm. The case involved the shooting of the victim, Derrick Nichols, who was found dead near the defendant's vehicle. An eyewitness, Sheleese Lockhart, testified that she saw the victim being shot from inside the defendant's car. The police recovered several items belonging to the victim and shell casings from the crime scene. Gunshot residue tests on the defendant's hands, clothing, and car revealed particles consistent with gunshot residue.The trial court admitted the gunshot residue evidence and allowed expert testimony on the matter. However, it precluded the defendant's expert from testifying about surveillance footage that the defense argued showed the victim walking outside the car before being shot, contradicting the eyewitness testimony. The trial court applied the standard for nonpercipient witness identification rather than the standard for expert testimony.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict, as the physical evidence did not render the state's theory of the case a physical impossibility. The court found that the trial court improperly applied the wrong standard in precluding the defendant's expert testimony about the surveillance footage. This error was not harmless because the expert's testimony could have challenged the credibility of the state's key eyewitness. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.The court also addressed the admissibility of the gunshot residue evidence, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony that one and two element particles consistent with gunshot residue were found on the defendant and in his vehicle. The probative value of this evidence was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

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Dzung Ahn Pham, a former licensed physician, sought to withdraw his guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute controlled substances in violation of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Pham admitted in his plea agreement to conspiring with a pharmacist to prescribe and distribute over 150,000 narcotic pills, knowing he was doing so outside the usual course of professional medical practice and without a legitimate medical purpose. He later argued that his plea was not knowing and voluntary, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Ruan v. United States, which he claimed required the government to prove that he knew he was not authorized under the CSA to issue the prescriptions.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Pham's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court held that the indictment, plea agreement, and colloquy all incorporated the elements of the offense, including the standard of guilty knowledge required for conviction. Pham's admissions during the plea process were found to be consistent with the requirements set forth in Ruan.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Pham's admissions to knowingly and intentionally issuing prescriptions outside the usual course of professional medical practice and without a legitimate medical purpose provided the requisite proof that he acted in an unauthorized manner. Therefore, Pham failed to demonstrate that his guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary, and the district court did not err in denying his motion to withdraw the plea. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the plea agreement and colloquy met the standards established by Ruan, and Pham's appeal was dismissed. View "USA V. PHAM" on Justia Law

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Francine Erica Segura was involved in an armed home invasion robbery and was subsequently charged and convicted of multiple crimes, including second-degree kidnapping and aggravated robbery. She was sentenced to 111 years in prison, which was later reduced to 73 years upon her request for sentence reconsideration. Segura then filed a pro se motion under Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(c), claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel and requesting postconviction counsel.The trial court reviewed Segura's motion and denied ten out of eleven claims, forwarding the remaining claim to the prosecution and the Office of the Public Defender (OPD). Due to a conflict of interest, an attorney from the Office of Alternate Defense Counsel (OADC) was appointed. This attorney filed a supplemental motion focusing on the single surviving claim, which was ultimately denied after an evidentiary hearing. Segura appealed, and the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision in part, ruling that the trial court had improperly restricted the scope of postconviction counsel's representation.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that under Rule 35(c)(3)(IV)-(V), a trial court must either deny all claims in a pro se motion or forward the entire motion to the OPD if any claim has arguable merit. The court rejected the prosecution's argument for a hybrid approach that would allow partial denial of claims. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, ruling that the trial court violated the procedural requirements of Rule 35(c)(3)(IV)-(V) by limiting the scope of postconviction counsel's representation. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "People v. Segura" on Justia Law

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Pete Paul Martinez was charged with first-degree murder and pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). Dr. Charles Harrison, a psychologist at the Colorado Mental Health Institute, conducted a sanity evaluation and concluded that Martinez was legally sane at the time of the offense. The prosecution did not initially list Dr. Harrison as an expert witness but later included him in a supplemental witness list without formally designating him as an expert. During the trial, Dr. Harrison testified about Martinez's mental state without being formally tendered and accepted as an expert witness.The trial court admitted Dr. Harrison's testimony, and Martinez was convicted. On appeal, a division of the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, ruling that Dr. Harrison's testimony was inadmissible because he was not formally offered and accepted as an expert witness. The majority held that his testimony exceeded the scope of lay testimony under Colorado Rule of Evidence (CRE) 701. Judge Tow dissented, arguing that Martinez had waived any objection and that any error was not plain.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and concluded that CRE 702 and relevant case law do not require a formal offer and acceptance of an expert witness for their testimony to be admissible. The court held that as long as the expert testimony meets the requirements of CRE 702 and the standards set in People v. Shreck, the lack of formal tender and acceptance does not render the testimony inadmissible. The court found that the trial court did not err in admitting Dr. Harrison's testimony and reversed the appellate court's decision, remanding the case for further proceedings on unresolved issues. View "People v. Martinez" on Justia Law

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Rodolfo Maisonet was arrested for conspiring to distribute cocaine, a crime subject to a mandatory minimum sentence. He initially cooperated with the government, providing some information about the drug distribution scheme. However, he continued his criminal activities and was caught again. Before sentencing, Maisonet submitted an affidavit with additional information about the conspiracy, but the district court found that he had not fully disclosed all relevant information and imposed the mandatory minimum sentence.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida held that Maisonet's lies and ongoing criminal activity made him ineligible for the safety valve provision, which allows for sentencing without regard to mandatory minimums if certain conditions are met. The court also indicated that his affidavit did not provide all necessary information about the drug distribution scheme.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court disagreed with the district court's legal conclusion that Maisonet's continued criminal activity and lies automatically disqualified him from safety valve relief. The statute requires that a defendant provide all information by the time of sentencing, regardless of whether the government already knows the information or if the defendant's cooperation was prompted by a government investigation. However, the appellate court affirmed the district court's factual finding that Maisonet's affidavit did not fully disclose all relevant information about the drug distribution scheme. This factual determination was not clearly erroneous, and thus, the district court's imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence was upheld. View "USA v. Maisonet" on Justia Law

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DeRon Edrias Gude was convicted of felony murder and other charges related to the shooting death of Nyyokokie Hendley. On October 11, 2016, Gude called 911 to report a shooting at his home, claiming it was an accident during a fight. Police found Hendley dead from a gunshot wound to the head, with a 9-millimeter handgun near her feet and marijuana in an unlocked safe. Gude was indicted on multiple charges, including malice murder and felony murder. At trial, Gude testified that Hendley had threatened him and pointed a gun at him, leading him to shoot her in self-defense. The jury found Gude guilty of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault and other charges.The DeKalb County Superior Court granted Gude’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the marijuana charge, and the jury found him not guilty of malice murder but guilty on the remaining counts. Gude was sentenced to life in prison for felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, plus five years for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Gude’s motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and addressed Gude’s claims of plain error in the jury charge on aggravated assault and ineffective assistance of counsel. The court assumed, without deciding, that the trial court committed an obvious error in the jury instruction but found that Gude failed to show the error likely affected the trial's outcome. The court noted that the jury was properly instructed on the burden of proof and provided with a copy of the indictment. Additionally, Gude’s defense was self-defense, and the jury’s verdict indicated they found he intended to shoot Hendley. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that Gude did not demonstrate plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel. View "GUDE v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

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Joseph Donnell Starks was convicted of felony murder and other crimes following a vehicular collision that resulted in the death of Kristin Dyer and serious injury to Joshua Cash. The incident occurred on December 14, 2016, and Starks was indicted on multiple charges, including felony murder, homicide by vehicle, serious injury by vehicle, and driving under the influence. During the trial, the court directed a verdict for Starks on one count, and the jury found him guilty on the remaining counts. Starks was sentenced to life in prison for felony murder and received concurrent sentences for other charges.Starks filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. His subsequent appeals were dismissed as untimely. However, a habeas court later granted his petition to pursue a direct appeal. Starks argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present medical evidence that could support a defense theory that he was unconscious due to a medical condition rather than intoxication.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that Starks's trial counsel made a strategic decision to focus on evidence of intoxication rather than a medical condition, which was not objectively unreasonable. The court held that Starks failed to show that his counsel's performance was deficient or that it prejudiced his defense. Therefore, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was rejected.The State raised two sentencing issues on appeal, arguing that the trial court improperly merged the homicide by vehicle convictions and that sentences for other offenses should not have been served concurrently with the felony murder sentence. The Supreme Court of Georgia found that the trial court properly merged the homicide by vehicle convictions under the rule that only one conviction and sentence may be imposed for the killing of a single victim. Additionally, the court held that the trial court had discretion to run sentences concurrently with the felony murder sentence. The judgment was affirmed. View "STARKS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

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William C. Pounds III was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Kendra Jackson. The incident occurred on June 12, 2015, and Pounds was indicted later that year. During the trial, evidence showed that Pounds had a tumultuous relationship with Jackson and was also engaged to another woman, Vicinda Crawford. On the day of the incident, Pounds called 9-1-1, claiming Jackson had committed suicide. However, conflicting accounts from Pounds and expert testimony suggested otherwise, leading to his conviction.Initially, the trial court sentenced Pounds to life in prison without parole for malice murder, merging the aggravated assault count and vacating the felony murder count by law. Pounds filed an untimely motion for a new trial, which was denied. The trial court later granted an out-of-time appeal, but the appeal was dismissed because the motion for a new trial was still pending. After further proceedings, the trial court denied the motion for a new trial on the merits, allowing the appeal to proceed.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the conviction. The court found that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the conviction for malice murder. The court also addressed several claims by Pounds, including alleged evidentiary errors and ineffective assistance of counsel. The court concluded that any errors in admitting certain testimonies were harmless and did not affect the verdict. Additionally, the court found that Pounds's trial counsel did not perform deficiently by not objecting to a juror who knew Jackson's stepmother, as the juror affirmed her ability to remain impartial.Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding no reversible error in the proceedings. View "POUNDS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law