Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Federal and state authorities initially suspected Luz Jiminez of involvement in a drug-trafficking organization based in Phoenix, Arizona. Investigators obtained a wiretap order to intercept communications from Jiminez and her associates. Through intercepted calls, they learned Jiminez planned to pick up luggage for someone named “Rondo,” later identified as Liggins. Using a “check and miss” scheme, Liggins sent a bag containing nearly $37,000 from Detroit to Phoenix, which Jiminez retrieved but abandoned after noticing surveillance. A police dog alerted to drugs, and a warrant led to the discovery of the money. Separately, Detroit authorities arrested DeHaven Murphy, who possessed heroin and later implicated Liggins. Murphy arranged recorded calls with Liggins, but Detroit officers testified their investigation was independent of the Arizona wiretap.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan presided over Liggins’s trial, where a jury convicted him on drug charges. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the conviction due to judicial bias and remanded for a new trial. On remand, Liggins moved to suppress evidence derived from the Arizona wiretap, arguing violations of federal wiretap laws. The district court denied the motion, finding Liggins lacked standing as an “aggrieved person” under Title III and that the Detroit evidence was untainted by the Arizona wiretap. Liggins entered a conditional guilty plea to preserve his right to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed whether Liggins qualified as an “aggrieved person” entitled to move for suppression under Title III. The court held that regardless of the interpretation, Liggins was not an “aggrieved person”: he did not participate in intercepted calls, the calls did not use his property, and he was not named or targeted in the wiretap application. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress. View "United States v. Liggins" on Justia Law

The defendant, while on supervised release following a federal conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, was arrested in May 2023 for new state charges involving drug trafficking, possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia, and being a felon in possession of a handgun. These events occurred after violations that led to his second supervised release revocation but before the hearing for those violations, and were not discovered by the federal probation office until several months later. Upon learning of the May 2023 incident, after the defendant had completed his sentence and was again on supervised release, the probation office initiated the proceedings at issue, seeking a third revocation based on the new conduct.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky held a hearing to determine if the defendant could knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel in the revocation proceeding, ultimately allowing him to represent himself. After a subsequent hearing, the district court found violations of supervised release, classified the new conduct as a Grade A violation, and imposed a 24-month term of imprisonment, the statutory maximum. The defendant timely appealed, challenging the validity of his waiver of counsel, the sentencing procedure, and the constitutionality of his underlying conviction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the right to counsel in a supervised release revocation is not derived from the Sixth Amendment but is governed by statutory and due process considerations. The court reviewed the waiver of counsel for abuse of discretion and found the district court’s inquiry sufficient under the totality of the circumstances. The court also found no procedural error in sentencing, concluding that the district court did not improperly rely on prohibited factors. Finally, the court declined to consider the challenge to the underlying conviction, holding that such arguments must be raised on direct appeal or collateral review. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Spence" on Justia Law

A man was convicted of sex trafficking a minor after police located the missing child in an apartment where he was staying. The police had responded to a missing persons report filed by the minor’s father, who believed the child was endangered. Investigators traced the minor’s Snapchat activity to an IP address at the apartment and, after gaining access from a tenant in the building, entered the unlocked apartment briefly to ask about the missing child. During this encounter, the defendant emerged from a bedroom. Subsequent evidence, including text messages from a phone recovered from the minor, supported the prosecution’s case.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence related to the police entry and admitted several text messages and emails as evidence. During jury selection, the court temporarily sealed the courtroom while questioning potential jurors about sensitive matters, with defense counsel expressly stating there was no objection. At the close of trial, the court mistakenly allowed alternate jurors into the deliberation room but promptly removed them and instructed the jury to disregard any statements by the alternates and restart deliberations if needed. The defendant was convicted by a jury and sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment plus supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the police entry was justified under the emergency-aid exception, the temporary courtroom sealing did not violate the public trial right due to waiver, and the evidentiary rulings were not an abuse of discretion. The court also found no reversible error in the alternate juror incident, as there was no showing of prejudice. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Rowell" on Justia Law

The case concerns a criminal defendant who, while living with his parents and sister, became involved in a heated conflict with his sister. During the altercation, he threatened her and, at one point, pointed a gun and later a taser at her, ultimately leading her to leave the house. The defendant was charged by the Riverside County District Attorney with multiple offenses, including assault with a semiautomatic firearm, making criminal threats, assault with a deadly weapon, and misdemeanor battery. The defendant filed a motion for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, supported by diagnoses from mental health professionals indicating longstanding mental disorders that contributed to his conduct.Prior to trial, the Superior Court of Riverside County held a hearing on the motion. The court found a connection between the defendant’s mental health diagnoses and his conduct but concluded that his actions were primarily motivated by his sister’s threats to out him to their parents, rather than by his mental disorder alone. The court denied the diversion motion, reasoning that the defendant did not fall within the “spirit” of the diversion statute because he had been compliant with mental health treatment at the time of the incident and had no prior criminal history.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case after the defendant petitioned for a writ of mandate. The appellate court held that the trial court abused its residual discretion by denying the motion on improper grounds, misapplying the legal standard for diversion. The appellate court directed the trial court to vacate its order and conduct a new hearing consistent with the correct legal standards, emphasizing that eligibility for diversion does not require a mental disorder to be the sole motivating factor in the offense. The petition was granted and remanded for further proceedings. View "Flareau v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Daqua Ritter was indicted for three federal crimes connected to the murder of Ernest “Dime” Doe, a transgender woman in rural South Carolina. Ritter and Doe had a secretive sexual relationship, and Ritter was sensitive about public knowledge of this relationship, especially since Doe openly referred to Ritter as her boyfriend. Evidence at trial showed Ritter pressured Doe to keep their relationship hidden and reacted angrily when others mentioned it. Doe was found shot dead in a car, and Ritter was last seen with her hours before her death. After the murder, Ritter disposed of his gun and burned his clothes. A federal grand jury indicted Ritter for willfully causing bodily injury based on Doe's gender identity resulting in death, using a gun during a crime of violence, and making false statements to investigators.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina presided over Ritter’s trial. A jury convicted Ritter on all charges, and the district court sentenced him to life in prison. Ritter moved for a new trial, claiming juror bias and prejudicial hearsay testimony, and challenged the sufficiency of evidence for two counts. The district court held an evidentiary hearing regarding juror bias and denied the motion for a new trial, finding the juror credible and impartial. It also denied the motion for a mistrial based on hearsay, issuing a curative instruction to disregard the testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding no juror bias or in denying a mistrial based on hearsay, as the curative instruction was sufficient. The court also found that, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Ritter on all counts, including motive based on gender identity and the likelihood that false statements would be communicated to federal law enforcement. The judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Ritter" on Justia Law

The defendant is incarcerated for murder and has been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. She has spent most of her sentence in an inpatient psychiatric treatment program and has been largely unresponsive to medications administered under an involuntary medication order. After other treatments failed, the acting warden petitioned for authorization to administer electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), as her condition persisted and she lacked the capacity to provide informed consent. Both parties stipulated to her incapacity to consent to ECT, and she conceded on appeal that ECT is medically necessary.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County held an evidentiary hearing and granted the warden’s petition, authorizing ECT for six months, the maximum period allowed by statute. On appeal, the defendant did not challenge the medical necessity of ECT but argued that the statutory requirement for “no less onerous alternatives” to ECT should include procedural alternatives, specifically the possibility of obtaining informed consent from a surrogate decisionmaker under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5326.7.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. It held that the “no less onerous alternatives” language in Penal Code section 2679 refers to medical alternatives to ECT, not alternative procedural methods such as surrogate consent. The court found that the statutory scheme intentionally excludes ECT from expedited surrogate decision-making provisions, requiring judicial authorization instead. The court rejected the argument that the warden must seek surrogate consent before judicial authorization and affirmed the trial court’s order authorizing ECT. View "P. v. T.B." on Justia Law

David Ho-Romero was stopped at the border near San Diego in February 2021, and authorities discovered over 11 kilograms of methamphetamine in his vehicle. He was subsequently indicted for importing methamphetamine. During the investigation, prosecutors called Witness 1, Ho-Romero’s former romantic partner, to testify before a grand jury. After learning of Witness 1’s involvement from his roommate, Ho-Romero contacted Witness 1 and her friend (Witness 2), making statements that the government interpreted as threats. Based on these communications, Ho-Romero was charged with witness tampering but pled guilty only to drug importation, not to tampering. The parties agreed to dismiss the tampering charges in exchange for Ho-Romero stipulating to the admissibility of Witness 1 and Witness 2’s grand jury testimony.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California ordered a presentence report recommending an obstruction of justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Defense counsel objected, arguing Ho-Romero did not willfully obstruct justice. At sentencing, the district court applied the enhancement, interpreting “willfulness” as an objective standard without requiring a finding of specific intent to obstruct justice. The court found only that Ho-Romero’s statements could be understood as threats. With the enhancement, the Guidelines range increased, but the court imposed a downward departure, sentencing Ho-Romero to 60 months imprisonment and five years of supervised release. Ho-Romero appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo for legal error. The court held that § 3C1.1 requires a finding that the defendant acted with the specific intent to obstruct justice, citing United States v. Lofton as controlling law. The district court erred by not making such a mens rea finding. The Ninth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, requiring proper findings as to Ho-Romero’s conscious purpose to obstruct justice. View "United States v. Ho-Romero" on Justia Law

Late one evening, a Minnesota state trooper observed a vehicle driven erratically by Dante Joseph Tyus. When law enforcement attempted to stop the car, Tyus fled until officers forced the vehicle to a halt. Tyus, the car’s sole occupant, appeared intoxicated and was arrested. The car was towed to a police parking lot and later processed for forfeiture, during which no firearm was found. While in jail, Tyus made numerous calls urging his girlfriend, D.B., to promptly retrieve items from the vehicle, using language that officers interpreted as coded references to a hidden firearm. Acting on a tip, police searched the car again days later and found a concealed loaded firearm. DNA testing eventually indicated a strong likelihood that Tyus’s DNA was on the weapon.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota presided over Tyus’s jury trial, during which the government introduced the jail calls and DNA evidence. Tyus’s expert challenged the DNA analysis. After the government presented its evidence, Tyus moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing the evidence was insufficient, but the district court denied the motion. The jury found Tyus guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm. At sentencing, the court applied a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, based on Tyus’s attempts to have D.B. remove the firearm, and imposed a sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment.Tyus appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, challenging both the sufficiency of the evidence and the application of the obstruction enhancement. The Eighth Circuit held that sufficient evidence supported the conviction, as the combination of circumstantial evidence and DNA results permitted the jury to find that Tyus knowingly possessed the firearm. The court also found that the sentencing enhancement was properly applied, as the district court did not clearly err in finding Tyus attempted to obstruct justice. The judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Tyus" on Justia Law

A patrol-level police officer in Colombia was convicted after a jury trial of conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States. The officer did not dispute that he participated in communications about a proposed cocaine export scheme, but argued that he lacked criminal intent because he believed he was assisting the Colombian National Police in arranging a seizure of the cocaine, rather than joining a drug-trafficking conspiracy. His defense at trial centered on his understanding that he was participating in an anti-narcotics operation and not an illegal export scheme.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over the jury trial. The prosecution presented evidence of the officer’s participation in meetings and communications with a DEA informant posing as a drug trafficker. The defense sought to introduce evidence that the officer’s colleague, who recruited him into the scheme, had previously assisted the Colombian National Police's anti-narcotics unit in successful drug seizures. The district court excluded this evidence, accepting the government’s argument that it constituted impermissible propensity evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). The officer was convicted and sentenced to 165 months in prison, followed by five years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the district court erred in excluding the challenged evidence. The appellate court found the evidence relevant to corroborate the officer’s account of conversations with his colleague, directly impacting his state of mind, and determined that it was not barred by Rule 404(b). The court further held that the exclusion was not harmless, as the officer’s defense turned on criminal intent and the evidence could have affected the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated the conviction and remanded for further proceedings. View "U.S. v. Cardenas" on Justia Law

During a lawful traffic stop in Philadelphia, police officers observed a vehicle with a malfunctioning brake light. Upon contacting the driver, Devaghn Hawkins-Davenport, the officers requested that he lower his tinted windows, making the interior visible. One officer saw a firearm lying in plain view on the front passenger seat. The officer quickly seized the firearm for safety and asked Hawkins-Davenport whether he had a license to carry it; Hawkins-Davenport responded that he did not. He was then arrested and charged with offenses related to carrying firearms without a license.Hawkins-Davenport filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the firearm and statements made during the stop, arguing that the stop and subsequent search violated his constitutional rights. The Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas held a suppression hearing and granted the motion, finding no evidence of danger to the officers beyond the presence of the firearm and noting Hawkins-Davenport’s cooperation during the stop. The suppression court concluded there was no reasonable suspicion or probable cause justifying the seizure of the firearm or the statements.The Commonwealth appealed, and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed the suppression order. The Superior Court determined that officer safety during traffic stops justified the precautionary removal of a firearm seen in plain view and accessible to the driver, regardless of licensure status or other indicia of danger. The court found this was a minimal intrusion necessary for officer safety and permitted under established precedent.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Superior Court’s order. The Court held that during a lawful traffic stop, an officer who observes a firearm in plain view and within reach of the driver may seize the weapon as a reasonable safety precaution before ascertaining licensure status. The disposition affirmed the reversal of the suppression order. View "Commonwealth v. Hawkins-Davenport" on Justia Law