Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In May 2022, Martin Marroquin was arrested and charged with two counts of burglary in Stanislaus County. He posted a $40,000 bail through The North River Insurance Company and Bad Boys Bail Bonds (collectively, Surety) and was released. Marroquin failed to appear in court on July 14, 2022, leading to the forfeiture of his bail and the issuance of a bench warrant. Surety was notified and had 180 days to return Marroquin to custody. Marroquin was later found to be in custody in North Kern State Prison on other charges, with a hold placed on him for the Stanislaus County charges.The Superior Court of Stanislaus County initially tolled the 180-day deadline for Surety to return Marroquin to custody. Surety later moved to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bail, arguing that Marroquin was in custody on other charges and a hold had been placed on him. The People opposed, arguing that future transportation costs for returning Marroquin to Stanislaus County should be settled first. The trial court denied Surety's motion but extended the tolling period.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that under Penal Code section 1305, the trial court must vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bail if the defendant is arrested outside the county where the case is located. The court found that the trial court erred by conditioning the relief on the resolution of future transportation costs under section 1306. The appellate court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "P. v. The North River Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Admilson Pires, was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of a minor and sex trafficking of a minor. The case began when the Norwood Police Department received a tip about a missing sixteen-year-old girl, Daisy, who was found at an apartment in Norwood, Massachusetts. Daisy revealed that she had been engaging in commercial sex. During the investigation, it was discovered that Pires and another individual, Sandro Rosa (known as Eli), were involved in trafficking Daisy.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts conducted the trial, where Pires was found guilty on both counts. He was sentenced to 132 months' imprisonment for each count, to be served consecutively. Pires appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conspiracy conviction and that there were errors in the trial, including the admission of expert testimony and statements made by the prosecution during summation.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the conspiracy conviction, noting that Eli's involvement went beyond merely providing shelter and included actions that indicated a tacit agreement to traffic Daisy. The court also held that the expert testimony about typical patterns of sex trafficking was admissible and relevant to the case, and that the prosecutor's statements during summation did not amount to misconduct that would warrant a reversal of the conviction.The First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Pires's convictions and sentences. View "U.S. v. Pires" on Justia Law

Bruce Anderson killed his estranged wife in 1983 and was convicted of first-degree murder by a Massachusetts jury in 1989, receiving a life sentence without parole. After an unsuccessful appeal to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Anderson filed a federal habeas corpus petition in 1991, which was denied by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The First Circuit affirmed the denial, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1994.In 2019, Anderson filed a second habeas petition under section 2254, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel by Attorney Stephen Hrones, who represented him at trial, on direct appeal, and during the first federal habeas proceedings. The district court dismissed the petition without prejudice, citing it as a "second or successive habeas corpus application" that lacked authorization from the First Circuit. Anderson did not appeal this dismissal but instead sought authorization from the First Circuit, which was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed whether Anderson's second habeas petition was "a second or successive habeas corpus application" under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). The court concluded that it was, emphasizing that pre-AEDPA practice and AEDPA's purposes support treating such petitions as successive. The court noted that Anderson's choice to retain the same counsel for his first habeas petition did not exempt his second petition from being considered successive. The court vacated the district court's denial of the petition and remanded it with instructions to dismiss. The court also affirmed the district court's decision that any Rule 60(b) motion by Anderson would be untimely. View "Anderson v. Divris" on Justia Law

Eliezer Rosario-Ramos and his brother were indicted for carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury and bank larceny after assaulting and robbing an elderly woman, Zulma Lebrón-Serrano. Rosario-Ramos pled guilty to the carjacking offense and proposed a fifteen-year sentence. The district court, citing the brutal nature of the attack and the victim's subsequent death, sentenced him to twenty-three years. Rosario-Ramos appealed, claiming procedural and substantive defects in his sentence.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico initially reviewed the case. Rosario-Ramos contested the Probation Office's recommendation of a twenty-five-year sentence, arguing against the application of the murder cross-reference. The district court declined to apply the murder cross-reference but found that the attack contributed to the victim's death, leading to a twenty-three-year sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, finding no procedural error in the determination that the attack contributed to the victim's death. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing an upward variance based on the brutal nature of the attack and the personal connection between Rosario-Ramos and the victim. The court found the sentence substantively reasonable despite being higher than the Guidelines range and the sentence proposed by both parties, noting the district court's thorough explanation of the aggravating factors. The court concluded that the district court's rationale was plausible and the sentencing outcome defensible. View "United States v. Rosario-Ramos" on Justia Law

Kevin Hodge was involved in a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and pleaded guilty to the charge. The indictment specified that the conspiracy involved more than 50 grams of methamphetamine, which typically carries a ten-year statutory minimum sentence. However, Hodge met the criteria for the statutory "safety valve," which allows courts to disregard mandatory minimum sentences. Despite this, the district court sentenced him to ten years without discussing his eligibility for safety valve relief.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois initially handled the case. Hodge pleaded not guilty but later changed his plea to guilty. The court granted multiple continuances for his sentencing, partly due to his wife's serious health issues. The presentence investigation report (PSR) confirmed Hodge's eligibility for the safety valve, recommending a Guidelines range of 135 to 168 months. Hodge requested a sentence of time served, citing his wife's health and his role as primary caregiver. The district court sentenced him to 120 months, acknowledging his wife's health issues but emphasizing the large quantity of drugs involved. The court did not address Hodge's safety valve argument.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court had committed procedural error by not addressing Hodge's statutory safety valve argument, which is a principal mitigating argument. The Seventh Circuit noted that the district court's silence on this issue left uncertainty about whether it considered the safety valve's applicability. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit vacated Hodge's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, requiring the district court to engage with the safety valve argument. View "United States v. Hodge" on Justia Law

Andrew Miller was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court of Raleigh County, West Virginia, of wanton endangerment, malicious wounding, and felony possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. The jury also found him to be a recidivist felon, leading to a life sentence with the possibility of parole. The case arose from an incident where Miller allegedly shot Anthony Goard during a dispute over drugs at Niesha Dotson’s apartment. Miller claimed that another individual, J.T., was the actual shooter.At trial, the State presented testimony from Dotson and Goard, both of whom had used drugs at the time of the incident. Dotson testified about a disagreement over drugs between her and Miller, while Goard identified Miller as the shooter but initially told hospital staff he did not know who shot him. The State also introduced a 9 millimeter firearm with Miller’s DNA, although Goard identified a different firearm as the one used in the shooting. Miller testified in his defense, asserting that J.T. shot Goard and that he left the scene to avoid being implicated due to his parole status.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case, focusing on Miller’s claim that his constitutional right to silence was violated. The court found that the circuit court erred by allowing the State to cross-examine Miller about his post-arrest silence, which was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court noted that this improper questioning directly prejudiced Miller’s defense, as it suggested to the jury that Miller fabricated his story about J.T. being the shooter.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia vacated Miller’s convictions and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the constitutional error was not harmless and affected the jury’s verdict. View "State of West Virginia v. Miller" on Justia Law

Samuel Joseph was convicted of drug and firearm offenses. He appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during two encounters with law enforcement. The first encounter occurred in Charleston, West Virginia, where an officer, after receiving a tip about possible drug activity, observed Joseph's suspicious behavior and items consistent with drug distribution in a motel room. Joseph was apprehended after fleeing from officers, and a search of his duffel bag, which he abandoned during the chase, revealed drugs and firearms.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia denied Joseph's motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the encounters. Joseph argued that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him and that the search and seizure violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion based on their observations and Joseph's behavior, and that the subsequent search and seizure were lawful.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Joseph based on their observations and his unprovoked flight. The court also found that the officers' actions following the stop, including the use of a drug-detection dog and obtaining a search warrant for the duffel bag, were permissible and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, the court rejected Joseph's arguments regarding the lack of bodycam footage and the reliability of the initial tip, as well as his claim that the traffic stop in Parkersburg was impermissibly prolonged. The court concluded that the district court's factual findings were not clearly erroneous and upheld the denial of the motion to suppress. View "United States v. Joseph" on Justia Law

Shaun Jeff Snow was charged with multiple offenses, including first-degree murder and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. He entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to second-degree murder in exchange for the dismissal of other charges and a stipulated sentencing range of sixteen to twenty-four years. The plea agreement did not mention restitution. At the sentencing hearing, the court imposed a twenty-year prison sentence and deferred the issue of restitution for sixty days. Seventy-eight days later, the prosecution filed a motion for restitution, and 108 days after sentencing, the court entered a post-sentencing restitution order for $13,852.60.Snow did not appeal his conviction or sentence but later filed a motion to waive restitution, which the district court denied. Snow then appealed, arguing that his sentence was illegal under the precedent set by People v. Weeks. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the post-sentencing restitution order, concluding that Snow's Crim. P. 35(a) claim was an illegal manner claim and thus time-barred.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that the district court's deferral of the restitution issue in its entirety at sentencing was not authorized by law, making Snow's sentence illegal. The court concluded that the post-sentencing restitution order must be vacated. The court remanded the case with instructions to the district court to enter an order reflecting that Snow owes no restitution. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory requirements for restitution orders and ensuring timely and effective assessment of restitution. View "Snow v. People" on Justia Law

Ryan Wallace Bonde was sentenced to two concurrent, four-year community corrections sentences as part of a plea agreement. After successfully completing the residential portion, he was transferred to nonresidential status. However, following his arrest for new offenses, his nonresidential status was terminated, and he was resentenced to the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC). Bonde requested presentence confinement credit (PSCC) for the 355 days served during the nonresidential portion of his community corrections sentences, which the district court denied based on the precedent set in People v. Hoecher.The district court ruled that Bonde was not entitled to PSCC for time served on nonresidential status but could qualify for good time and earned time credit. Bonde was resentenced to two concurrent, four-year sentences in the CDOC, receiving PSCC for time served in jail and during the residential portion of his community corrections sentences, along with 153 days of earned time credit. Bonde appealed, arguing that the reasoning in Hoecher had been undermined by subsequent legislative amendments, which now support granting PSCC for time served on nonresidential status.The Colorado Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that it was bound by the express holding in Hoecher, which denies PSCC for time served during nonresidential community corrections sentences. The court noted that Bonde did not demonstrate that nonresidential offenders face liberty restraints that constitute "confinement" under the PSCC statute.The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, reaffirming the holding in Hoecher. The court concluded that nonresidential community corrections sentences do not qualify for PSCC, as the freedoms associated with nonresidential status are inconsistent with the notion of confinement under section 18-1.3-405. The court emphasized that any policy-based changes to grant PSCC for nonresidential community corrections sentences should be directed to the legislature. View "Bonde v. People" on Justia Law

The police were conducting an operation to arrest Anthony Veloz at a motel when they encountered Oscar Jonas Ganaway walking toward the motel. An officer asked Ganaway where he was going, and Ganaway pointed to Veloz's room. A detective then asked Ganaway if he could pat him down for weapons, and Ganaway consented. During the patdown, the detective found methamphetamine and arrested Ganaway. Ganaway moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the initial encounter was a seizure and the evidence should be suppressed.The Arapahoe County District Court granted Ganaway's motion to suppress, finding that the initial encounter was a seizure and that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion. The court concluded that the evidence obtained from the search must be suppressed. The People appealed the trial court's order.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that the initial encounter between the police and Ganaway was not a seizure, meaning it did not trigger Fourth Amendment protections. The court further held that Ganaway voluntarily consented to the patdown. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the trial court's suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "People v. Ganaway" on Justia Law