Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Marcus Dixon, while on supervised release after a federal prison sentence, was arrested based on his suspected involvement in a hit-and-run accident and drug dealing. Probation officers conducted warrantless searches of his property, including a Pontiac, a cellphone, a home in Silvis, Illinois, an Audi, and a duffel bag, finding evidence of drug distribution and firearms. Dixon was convicted on multiple counts related to drug possession and firearms. He moved to suppress the evidence obtained from these searches, arguing they exceeded the scope authorized by his supervised release conditions. The district court denied his motion, leading to this appeal.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois denied Dixon's motion to suppress, concluding that he lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched items and places. The court also found that the searches were supported by reasonable suspicion. Dixon was subsequently convicted on all counts by a jury and sentenced to 260 months in prison. He appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, challenging the searches' legality and the denial of an evidentiary hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Dixon failed to establish Fourth Amendment standing as he did not provide evidence of a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched items and places. The court also found that the searches of the Pontiac and cellphone were reasonable and permissible under Dixon's supervised release conditions. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing, as Dixon did not identify any disputed material facts warranting such a hearing. View "United States v. Dixon" on Justia Law

In October 2018, a sheriff’s deputy in Smyth County, Virginia, stopped Ashley Langley for erratic driving. Langley admitted there were drugs in the vehicle, and a search revealed methamphetamine, distribution paraphernalia, and a firearm. Langley and her passengers informed officers that more drugs were at Langley’s residence, where her out-of-state supplier, Jerada Henderson, was staying. Officers obtained a warrant to search Langley’s home, where they found more methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, a firearm, and two cell phones belonging to Henderson. Henderson was arrested and charged with drug and firearm offenses.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia denied Henderson’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from his cell phones, finding the warrant valid and the officers’ reliance on it reasonable. The court also rejected Henderson’s proposed jury instruction regarding the insufficiency of a single drug transaction to prove conspiracy. Henderson was convicted of possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute and conspiracy but acquitted of firearm charges. The district court calculated his sentence, attributing to him drugs sold by Langley before his October 2018 delivery and applying a firearm enhancement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress, finding the officers’ reliance on the warrant reasonable. The court also upheld the rejection of Henderson’s proposed jury instruction, noting that evidence of a substantial drug quantity can support a conspiracy conviction. Finally, the court found no clear error in the district court’s drug quantity calculation or the application of the firearm enhancement, affirming Henderson’s convictions and sentence. View "United States v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Patrick Barkers-Woode and Nana Mensah were involved in a conspiracy to defraud Sprint Corporation by exploiting a sales promotion that offered smartphones to new customers at no upfront cost. Conspirators in Ghana obtained personal information of unsuspecting individuals and used it to sign them up as new Sprint customers, arranging for the smartphones to be sent to vacant homes. Barkers-Woode, Mensah, and others tracked, retrieved, and delivered the smartphones to a buyer. The conspiracy was responsible for 274 orders of 833 smartphones, resulting in $357,565.92 in actual loss and $595,399.76 in intended loss. A jury convicted both defendants of mail fraud, aggravated identity theft, and conspiracy to commit these offenses.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania sentenced Barkers-Woode to 111 months’ imprisonment and Mensah to 99 months’ imprisonment. Both defendants appealed, challenging their sentences and, in Barkers-Woode’s case, the admission of certain evidence during the trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the District Court erred in applying a 14-point enhancement based on intended loss rather than actual loss, as required by the court's decision in United States v. Banks. This error affected the defendants' substantial rights, leading the court to reverse and remand for resentencing based on actual loss. The court also upheld the District Court's application of a 2-point enhancement for the number of victims, recognizing that victims of identity theft are included within the definition of "victim" under the Sentencing Guidelines.Additionally, the court affirmed the District Court's decision to admit testimony about a related fraud against Walmart, as it directly proved the conspiratorial agreement. The court also upheld the decision to require Barkers-Woode to proceed pro se after his sixth attorney withdrew, citing his extremely dilatory conduct. Finally, the court rejected Mensah's argument that sentencing enhancements should be based on facts charged in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, reaffirming the precedent set in United States v. Grier. View "USA v. Barkers-Woode" on Justia Law

The appellant moved to Texas in 2009 and married Wasam Moussa in Jordan in 2018. Moussa requested a divorce shortly after their marriage but did not follow through. In May 2019, Moussa moved to Texas to live with the appellant. Three days later, the appellant called a friend, Vernie “Alicia” Smith, and confessed to hitting Moussa, covering her mouth, and that she stopped breathing. Moussa was found unresponsive and later pronounced dead. The appellant was charged with murder, with the indictment alleging two theories: intentional or knowing causation of death and intent to cause serious bodily injury resulting in death.The trial court presented a jury charge that failed to include the element "causes the death of" in the second theory of murder. The appellant did not object to this omission. The jury convicted the appellant of murder. On appeal, the Second Court of Appeals found that the omission resulted in egregious harm, since it allowed the jury to convict without finding that the appellant caused Moussa’s death. The court reversed the conviction and remanded the case.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and agreed with the lower court's finding of egregious harm. The court held that the jury charge error affected the very basis of the case, depriving the appellant of a fair trial. The court emphasized that the omission of the causation element in the jury charge's application paragraph allowed the jury to convict without determining whether the appellant's actions caused Moussa's death. The court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, maintaining that the appellant suffered egregious harm due to the jury charge error. View "Alkayyali v. State" on Justia Law

In May 2016, a jury convicted the appellant of two counts of capital murder for fatally shooting his son and his partner's son. The trial court sentenced him to death based on the jury's punishment phase verdicts. The appellant raised twenty-six points of error and five supplemental points of error on direct appeal.The trial court's judgment of conviction was affirmed, but the death sentences were reversed and remanded for a new punishment trial. The appellant's competency to stand trial was challenged, leading to a retrospective competency trial where a jury found him competent during his 2016 trial. The appellant's supplemental points of error regarding the retrospective competency proceedings were overruled, including the trial court's determination of feasibility, evidentiary rulings, denial of a mistrial, and cumulative error claims.The appellant's requests for substitute counsel and to represent himself were denied, with the court finding he did not clearly and unequivocally assert his right to self-representation and suffered from severe mental illness. His pro se motion for a speedy trial was disregarded as he was represented by counsel. The trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence from a hotel room and a Jeep was upheld, as he lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in both.The appellant's absence from the courtroom during certain proceedings did not constitute constitutional error. The jury charge errors in the punishment phase, including the incorrect formulation of the verdict form and the erroneous burden of proof on the mitigation issue, resulted in egregious harm, leading to the reversal of the death sentences and a remand for a new punishment trial. Other punishment phase issues raised by the appellant were dismissed as moot. View "BLUNTSON v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

In December 2019, Andrew Christian Temple, Vanessa Marquez, David Deschepper, and others were part of the homeless community in Temecula, California. On December 21, 2019, Temple fatally stabbed Deschepper in a Motel 6 parking lot after an altercation. Temple claimed self-defense, stating that Deschepper had attacked him first. However, evidence showed that Temple used excessive force, including pursuing and repeatedly stabbing Deschepper even after he fell to the ground.The Superior Court of Riverside convicted Temple of second-degree murder, finding that he used a deadly weapon and inflicted great bodily injury. Temple was sentenced to 16 years to life in prison. On appeal, Temple argued that the trial court erred in jury instructions regarding imperfect self-defense and mental disorders, in using CALCRIM No. 225 instead of CALCRIM No. 224, and in denying a trial continuance to locate a material witness.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that any instructional error regarding imperfect self-defense was harmless, as the evidence overwhelmingly showed that Temple used excessive force. The court also found no error in using CALCRIM No. 225, as the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence only for Temple’s mental state. Lastly, the court ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance, as there was no indication the witness could be located within a reasonable time.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, upholding Temple’s conviction and sentence. View "People v. Temple" on Justia Law

In April 2019, the State of Montana charged Cheyene Leilani-Amber Zielie with several offenses, including felony possession of dangerous drugs. In September 2019, she pled guilty to the felony charge and received a three-year suspended sentence. In March 2021, the State filed a petition to revoke her suspended sentence due to violations, but later moved to dismiss the petition with prejudice, which the District Court granted. Subsequently, in May 2021, the State filed a second petition to revoke her suspended sentence based on new criminal charges.The District Court of the Eighth Judicial District initially dismissed the first petition with prejudice, which led to confusion about whether the entire case was dismissed. When the State filed the second petition, the District Court issued an arrest warrant, and the case proceeded. During a hearing in November 2022, the defense argued that the case had been dismissed with prejudice, and thus the court lacked jurisdiction. The District Court denied the motion to dismiss, interpreting the original dismissal as pertaining only to the petition, not the entire case. The court then revoked Zielie’s suspended sentence and sentenced her to three years with the Department of Corrections.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the District Court only had the authority to dismiss the petition to revoke, not the entire sentence, and that the dismissal order was a clerical error. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s denial of the motion to dismiss but reversed the decision regarding the additional 66 days of credit for time served. The case was remanded for resentencing to include the additional credit. View "State v. Zielie" on Justia Law

Ryan Bloomer was charged with his fourth DUI offense in 2021 and pleaded guilty in 2022. Before he was sentenced for this offense, he was charged with a fifth DUI in April 2023, to which he also pleaded guilty. The District Court sentenced Bloomer for both offenses during the same hearing in May 2023. For the fourth DUI, Bloomer was sentenced under the statute in effect at the time of the offense, § 61-8-731, MCA (2019), to thirteen months at the Department of Corrections (DOC) followed by a five-year suspended sentence. For the fifth DUI, he was sentenced under the new statute, § 61-8-1008(2), MCA (2021), to a concurrent nine-year term with the DOC, with five years suspended.The Fourth Judicial District Court sentenced Bloomer for both DUI offenses during the same hearing. Bloomer challenged the sentence for his fifth DUI, arguing that it was unlawful because he had not been "previously sentenced" for his fourth DUI under § 61-8-1008(1), MCA, before being sentenced for his fifth DUI under § 61-8-1008(2), MCA.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the plain language of § 61-8-1008(2), MCA, requires that a defendant must have been previously sentenced for a fourth DUI before being sentenced for a fifth DUI. Since Bloomer was sentenced for both offenses contemporaneously, the court concluded that the District Court imposed an unlawful sentence for the fifth DUI. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court's sentence for the fifth DUI and remanded the case for resentencing under § 61-8-1008(1), MCA. View "State v. Bloomer" on Justia Law

James Houston Parker was convicted in May 2023 by a jury in the Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, for two counts of felony tampering with or fabricating physical evidence. The charges stemmed from an incident on June 9, 2022, where officers responded to a call about an assaulted woman, P.H., who had severe facial injuries. P.H. had been at Parker's residence earlier that evening. Officers found blood and bleach at Parker's residence, and Parker had blood and bleach on his shoes. Parker was uncooperative during evidence collection, and his fingerprint was found on a bleach bottle in a nearby dumpster.The District Court instructed the jury to convict Parker based on him acting "knowingly" rather than "purposely," which Parker did not object to at trial. The jury acquitted Parker of aggravated assault but convicted him on the tampering charges. Parker was sentenced to six years in the Department of Corrections.Parker appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, arguing that the District Court committed plain error by using the incorrect mental state in the jury instructions, that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the instruction, and that the prosecutor's actions constituted misconduct. The Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that although the instruction was erroneous, the overwhelming evidence showed Parker acted with purpose. The court held that the error did not result in a miscarriage of justice or undermine the trial's fairness.The Supreme Court also found that Parker's ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed because there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome even if the objection had been made. Lastly, the court determined that the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct that deprived Parker of a fair trial. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed Parker's conviction. View "State v. Parker" on Justia Law

Ryan Gabriel appealed an Eleventh Judicial District Court order affirming the Justice Court’s order of protection in favor of Kai Groenke, an attorney for Gabriel’s former partner. Gabriel had sent a series of threatening and harassing emails to Groenke, including threats of professional disciplinary action, accusations of mental illness, and threats of violence. Groenke obtained a temporary order of protection, which Gabriel violated by continuing to send harassing communications.The Justice Court held a hearing where Groenke, her father Fritz, and her husband testified about Gabriel’s threatening behavior and its impact on Groenke’s mental health and safety. Gabriel argued that his communications were provoked by Groenke and that he was the victim of harassment. The Justice Court found Gabriel’s behavior to be consistent with stalking and granted a ten-year order of protection.Gabriel appealed to the District Court, which reviewed the case and affirmed the Justice Court’s decision. Gabriel then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and upheld the lower courts' decisions. The court found that Gabriel’s conduct met the statutory definition of stalking, causing substantial emotional distress and fear for safety. The court rejected Gabriel’s arguments about the relevance of the Oregon trial court’s stay and his claims of provocation. The court also declined to address Gabriel’s First Amendment argument, as it was raised for the first time in his reply brief. The Supreme Court affirmed the Justice Court’s order of protection. View "Groenke v. Gabriel" on Justia Law