Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1995, a woman was murdered in Houston, and Carlos Ayestas was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Years later, Ayestas’s counsel discovered an internal memorandum from the prosecution recommending the death penalty in part because Ayestas was not a U.S. citizen. This memorandum had not been disclosed during Ayestas’s trial. Ayestas then sought to amend his federal habeas petition to add Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment selective-prosecution claims, arguing that the prosecution’s decision was improperly influenced by his non-citizen status.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Ayestas’s motion to amend, finding it constituted a “second or successive habeas corpus application” barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) because the claims could have been discovered earlier with due diligence. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions clarified the law on what constitutes a “second or successive” application, prompting Ayestas to seek relief under Rule 60(b). The district court granted this motion, allowed discovery on Ayestas’s selective-prosecution claims, and ordered the Harris County District Attorney’s Office (HCDA) to produce decades of charging memoranda and the full prosecutorial file.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the discovery order was immediately appealable by the HCDA under the collateral-order doctrine. The Fifth Circuit determined the district court lacked jurisdiction over Ayestas’s selective-prosecution claims because both his 2015 motion to amend and his later Rule 60(b) motion constituted successive habeas applications barred by § 2244(b). The court concluded that Ayestas had not shown the claims were based on a new rule of constitutional law or that the underlying facts could not have been discovered earlier with due diligence. The Fifth Circuit vacated the discovery order and dismissed the selective-prosecution claims. View "Ayestas v. Harris County" on Justia Law

In 2017, a Kentucky jury convicted Ricky Lee Welch of robbery, kidnapping, burglary, and being a persistent felony offender. Welch was sentenced to 50 years in prison. He unsuccessfully appealed his conviction to the Kentucky Supreme Court. Subsequently, Welch sought post-conviction relief in Kentucky state court, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied his motion in May 2020. Although Kentucky law generally requires appeals to be filed within 30 days, Welch’s court-appointed attorney missed this deadline due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Six weeks after the deadline, Welch moved for a belated appeal based on a state law exception for attorney error; the state court granted this motion and considered his appeal on the merits.The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief, and the Kentucky Supreme Court declined review in June 2023. Welch then filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, which dismissed his petition as untimely, reasoning that the period during which he pursued the belated appeal did not toll the one-year federal habeas statute of limitations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that under Kentucky law, Welch’s belated appeal fit within a well-established exception to the state’s timeliness rules for appeals when delay results from ineffective assistance of counsel. Because Kentucky courts accepted and adjudicated his belated appeal under this exception, his post-conviction application remained “pending” for purposes of federal law, and the federal habeas statute of limitations was tolled during this period. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and found Welch’s federal habeas petition timely. View "Welch v. Plappert" on Justia Law

Two men wearing masks and armed with guns entered a Miami convenience store and exchanged gunfire with the store clerk during a failed robbery attempt. The suspects fled the scene, and shortly afterwards, a Ford Explorer registered to Rodrick Maurice Hamilton crashed nearby. Blood and a cellphone belonging to Hamilton were found in the vehicle. Hamilton’s girlfriend testified that he directed her to falsely report the vehicle stolen, and he later told her he was leaving for Georgia. Investigators also discovered evidence linking Hamilton and co-conspirator Untarius Alexander to the robbery, including phone records, location data, and clothing matches from surveillance footage. Both men were indicted and prosecuted in federal court.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida conducted a jury trial, resulting in Hamilton’s conviction for conspiracy and attempt to commit Hobbs Act robbery. The district court sentenced Hamilton to 170 months in prison, which included a twenty-month upward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines range. The government’s motion to dismiss a firearm charge was granted in light of United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022). Hamilton appealed his convictions and sentence, raising several challenges, including the propriety of a jury flight instruction, alleged prosecutorial misconduct, the handling of a juror’s post-verdict statement, and the sentencing process.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the flight instruction was proper, the prosecutor’s comments during closing arguments did not violate Hamilton’s Fifth Amendment rights, and the district court acted within its discretion by denying a new trial and declining to investigate the juror’s post-verdict remarks under Rule 606(b). In addition, the appellate court found no procedural or substantive error in the upward departure at sentencing, as proper notice was given and the sentence was justified by Hamilton’s criminal history and the need for deterrence. View "United States v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

The case involves an early-morning stop of Juan Jose Ponce at a border checkpoint in Sarita, Texas, where a Border Patrol agent, Carlos Garcia, questioned him and observed unusual features in his vehicle. Ponce was driving an SUV with a roof rack but was transporting a ladder inside the car, which Garcia found atypical. Ponce appeared nervous and wore a surgical mask despite traveling alone. Upon request, Ponce consented to unlocking and opening the back hatch of his SUV for Garcia to look inside. During this inspection, Garcia noticed a speaker box with loose screws, which—based on his experience—suggested it might conceal contraband or a person. Garcia opened the speaker box and found a woman unlawfully in the United States. Ponce was indicted for transporting an undocumented person.Proceedings began in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, where Ponce moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search of the speaker box exceeded his consent and lacked probable cause. The district court held a hearing where both Ponce and Garcia testified. The court found Ponce’s consent to be valid, voluntary, and extending to containers within the vehicle. Even if consent did not reach the speaker box, the court determined Garcia obtained probable cause during his inspection. The district court denied the suppression motion, and Ponce entered a conditional guilty plea while preserving his right to appeal.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the lower court’s findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Garcia obtained probable cause to search the speaker box during the consensual inspection. The court affirmed that Garcia’s actions were consistent with the Fourth Amendment, and upheld the denial of Ponce’s motion to suppress. View "USA v. Ponce" on Justia Law

Federal agents investigated a fatal fentanyl overdose in Goleta, California, and traced the source to Isaac Tekola. They discovered that Tekola had been selling drugs for years, primarily from his apartment. A search of his apartment revealed significant quantities of fentanyl, cocaine, methamphetamine, and Alprazolam, along with nearly $13,000 in cash, drug paraphernalia, and evidence that drug sales occurred at his residence. Tekola admitted that the cash came from drug dealing, and that a safe in his closet was used to store drugs and proceeds. His cell phone contained numerous messages confirming that his apartment was the hub of his trafficking operation.A grand jury indicted Tekola on several counts of possession with intent to distribute controlled substances under 21 U.S.C. § 841. He pled guilty to all charges without a plea agreement. At sentencing, the United States District Court for the Central District of California applied a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) for maintaining a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing controlled substances. Tekola argued that, because his apartment was his primary residence, drug trafficking was not a primary or principal use of the premises. The district court found overwhelming evidence that the apartment was used as the central location for his drug business and imposed an above-Guidelines sentence of 105 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines for abuse of discretion. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the § 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement. The Ninth Circuit clarified that maintaining a primary residence as a central hub for substantial drug trafficking activity qualifies for the enhancement, even if the premises also serve as a residence, affirming Tekola’s sentence. View "USA V. TEKOLA" on Justia Law

After a road-rage incident in which a firearm was allegedly discharged, law enforcement investigated and tied the suspect to a residence using law enforcement databases, vehicle registration information, and visual surveillance. The police observed a vehicle matching the description from the incident parked at a house on West Iliff Lane, saw the suspect washing the car in the driveway, and watched him enter and exit the house. These observations occurred several weeks after the incident. Officers obtained a search warrant for the house and vehicle based on an affidavit summarizing the investigation and linking the suspect to the location. Execution of the warrant resulted in the discovery of firearms, ammunition, and controlled substances, leading to charges for drug offenses and possession of a firearm by a felon.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the search warrant was supported by probable cause. The defendant pleaded guilty but preserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant argued that the affidavit supporting the warrant failed to establish a sufficient nexus between the alleged offense and the residence and challenged the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) under the Second Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concluded that the affidavit provided a substantial basis for finding probable cause, as law enforcement’s observations and the suspect’s connection to the residence justified the search. The court also held that the Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) was foreclosed by binding Tenth Circuit precedent. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Becker" on Justia Law

Missouri police, acting on information from an informant, identified a suspect using a phone number ending in 6984 and obtained a search warrant to track the phone, believing the suspect was Brandon Whitehead, also known as “T.” The individual using the phone, however, was Michael Hunt. Police tracked the phone to Hunt, stopped him for speeding, and after a K-9 alerted to narcotics, discovered fentanyl and drug paraphernalia in his vehicle. Hunt was charged with possession with intent to distribute fentanyl under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B).Hunt filed several pretrial motions in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, including a motion to suppress evidence, arguing the warrant lacked probable cause because it misidentified the suspect, and a motion to dismiss for alleged violations of the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment. The district court denied these motions. At trial, both parties submitted a verdict form that erroneously listed conspiracy as the charge. The jury returned a guilty verdict on the incorrect form. Upon realizing the error, the district court issued a corrected form, and the jury again found Hunt guilty. Hunt moved for a new trial, which the district court also denied. He was sentenced to 180 months in prison followed by 8 years of supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The court held that Hunt could not challenge the verdict form error because he had invited the error by jointly proposing it, and the jury was properly instructed on the actual charge. The court also found no violation of the Speedy Trial Act or the Sixth Amendment, as most delay was attributable to Hunt and only 55 non-excludable days elapsed. Finally, the denial of the motion to suppress was upheld, as probable cause existed for the warrant. The judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Hunt" on Justia Law

Rodrigo Rodriguez-Mendez was convicted by a jury in 2002 of leading a violent drug trafficking organization, resulting in convictions for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, possession with intent to distribute, and possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. Due to two prior felony drug convictions, he received a mandatory life sentence on the conspiracy count, along with concurrent and consecutive sentences for the other counts. The conviction and sentence were previously affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.In 2021, Rodriguez-Mendez sought a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that changes under the First Step Act constituted “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a reduction. The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska denied his motion, finding itself bound by Eighth Circuit precedent that non-retroactive changes in law could not serve as a basis for relief. This denial was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit. After amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines in 2023, Rodriguez-Mendez filed a second motion, claiming his sentence was “unusually long” under the new policy and that his medical condition warranted compassionate release. The district court again denied relief, holding that his sentence was not unusually long in light of his conduct, that his medical care needs were being met, and that his rehabilitation did not constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Rodriguez-Mendez’s sentence was not unusually long given his offense conduct, he did not demonstrate inadequate medical care putting him at serious risk, and rehabilitation alone or in combination with other factors did not warrant a sentence reduction in his case. Thus, the denial of his motion for compassionate release was affirmed. View "United States v. Rodriguez-Mendez" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant charged with multiple offenses, including felony conspiracy to commit theft, felony theft, and several misdemeanors. While released on bond for the felony charges, he was arrested and charged with new misdemeanors. He entered into a global plea agreement with the prosecution, agreeing to plead guilty to certain charges in exchange for a recommended deferred sentence on the felony conspiracy count under Wyoming Statute § 7-13-301. However, after a presentence investigation, it was revealed that he had previously received a deferred sentence for a misdemeanor in 1996, but his probation was revoked at that time and he did not receive a discharge and dismissal of the offense.After accepting the guilty pleas but before sentencing, the District Court of Campbell County considered whether the prior 1996 deferred sentence rendered the defendant ineligible for another deferred sentence under Wyoming law. Despite the prosecution’s continued recommendation for deferral, the district court concluded the defendant was not eligible because he had previously received a deferred sentence, and instead imposed a suspended prison sentence. The defendant timely appealed, and the district court stayed imposition of the sentence pending appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming reviewed the statutory language of Wyoming Statute § 7-13-301 de novo. The court held that the statute’s plain language makes a defendant ineligible for a deferred sentence only if he has previously been convicted of a felony or has received a “discharge and dismissal” under this or a similar statute in any jurisdiction. Because the defendant had not previously been convicted of a felony and had not received a discharge and dismissal, he remained eligible for a deferred sentence. The court reversed the district court’s sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing, clarifying that the district court retains discretion to grant or deny a deferred sentence. View "Maki v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

Three men, including the defendant, devised a plan to rob an individual known for cultivating marijuana and possessing a large collection of firearms in his Marshfield home. The defendant became increasingly focused on the victim’s assets, repeatedly seeking information and a floor plan from an acquaintance. After recruiting his associates, the defendant and his coventurers executed the plan, entering the home in the early morning hours. A violent confrontation ensued, resulting in the victim being struck multiple times with a metal frying pan and sustaining fatal wounds, including a deep laceration to the arm that caused him to bleed to death. Forensic evidence, including the defendant’s DNA on items at the scene and on bloody footwear, as well as physical evidence linking the defendant to the aftermath and disposal of stolen firearms, tied him to the crime.After a first trial ended with a mistrial on the murder charge but convictions on related counts, a second jury in the Superior Court found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder. He was also convicted of burglary with assault on an occupant, unarmed robbery, and larceny of firearms. The defendant appealed, arguing insufficient evidence of premeditation, error in denying an involuntary manslaughter instruction, improper admission of hearsay, and duplicative convictions.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence amply supported the murder convictions, that the trial judge properly denied the request for an involuntary manslaughter instruction, and that while certain hearsay evidence was improperly admitted, the error was not prejudicial due to overwhelming independent evidence. The court also found no error in the conviction for burglary with assault. The convictions and sentences were affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Moscaritolo" on Justia Law