Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves two grand jury subpoenas issued to an accounting firm and an investment company in connection with an alleged illegal tax-shelter scheme. The investment company claimed that the documents sought were protected by attorney-client privilege. The government moved to compel the production of these documents, arguing that the crime-fraud exception applied, which would negate the privilege claims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia denied the investment company’s motion to intervene and ordered the accounting firm to comply with the subpoena. The court also ruled that the crime-fraud exception applied, compelling the investment company, the accounting firm, and other third parties to produce the requested documents. The investment company appealed these orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeals. The court noted that typically, orders related to grand jury subpoenas are not appealable unless the party stands in contempt. The investment company had not stood in contempt before appealing, which generally precludes appellate review. The court also considered the Perlman exception, which allows immediate appeal if the subpoenaed party is unlikely to risk contempt to protect another’s privilege. However, the court found that this exception did not apply because the investment company could have raised its privilege arguments on appeal by standing in contempt.The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction, emphasizing that the investment company’s failure to stand in contempt foreclosed its ability to seek immediate appellate review. The court held that the investment company must comply with the district court’s orders or stand in contempt to preserve its right to appeal. View "In Re: Grand Jury Investigation" on Justia Law

Alvin Johnson pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine under a plea agreement. The agreement included a stipulation regarding the drug quantity and its base offense level but allowed the Government to make a sentencing recommendation. Johnson was initially sentenced to 128 months in prison, classified as a career offender based on prior convictions. He later successfully challenged one of these convictions, leading to a recalculated Guidelines range of 57-71 months.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina initially sentenced Johnson to 128 months. Upon remand, after Johnson's successful challenge to his career offender status, the Probation Office recalculated his Guidelines range to 57-71 months. The Government then moved for an upward departure or variance, arguing that Johnson's criminal history warranted a higher sentence. The district court agreed and sentenced Johnson to 120 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. Johnson argued that the Government breached the plea agreement by seeking a sentence above the recalculated Guidelines range. The court found that the plea agreement did not restrict the Government from recommending a higher sentence and that the Government had reserved the right to make a sentencing recommendation. The court held that the Government did not breach the plea agreement and affirmed the 120-month sentence. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Elijah Dante Dobbins was convicted by a jury of third-degree sexual abuse of a minor, strangulation of a household member, unlawful contact, and permitting a house party. The incident occurred during a party at Dobbins's apartment, where a physical altercation between Dobbins and his girlfriend, Harmony Lehmbeck, was recorded by a coworker. The videos showed various stages of the struggle, including moments where Dobbins appeared to choke Lehmbeck. Lehmbeck testified that Dobbins did not choke her and that she did not lose consciousness.The District Court of Natrona County admitted the videos as evidence during the trial. After the case was submitted to the jury, the court clarified which exhibits were admitted and stated that the videos would not be sent to the jury room but could be reviewed in the courtroom if requested. During deliberations, the jury asked to view the videos to clarify the alleged strangulation and battery. The court, with the approval of both parties, allowed the jury to view the videos twice under supervision.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the videos were non-testimonial, meaning the district court had broad discretion to allow the jury to review them during deliberations. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the jury to view the videos again, given their short duration and the need for clarity on the strangulation charge. The court concluded that the district court's controlled procedure for reviewing the videos was appropriate and did not unduly emphasize the evidence. View "Dobbins v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves a probationer who was arrested during a traffic stop and subsequently charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and unlawful possession of a firearm. During the traffic stop, a state trooper observed the vehicle speeding and making unsafe lane changes. Upon stopping the vehicle, the trooper noticed suspicious behavior from the back seat passenger and found drugs and a firearm in the vehicle. The probationer was found to have thrown a bag containing drugs to the back seat passenger as the vehicle was being pulled over.The Superior Court judge found the probationer in violation of his probation conditions, revoked his probation, and sentenced him to state prison. The probationer appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove he possessed cocaine with intent to distribute and unlawfully possessed a firearm. He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for not moving to suppress the evidence on equal protection grounds, alleging racial animosity by the state trooper.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and upheld the lower court's decision. The court found sufficient evidence to support the probation violation, including the possession and intent to distribute cocaine and the unlawful possession of a firearm. The court also rejected the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, stating that the exclusionary rule does not generally apply to probation revocation proceedings and that the counsel's performance did not fall below the standard of an ordinary fallible lawyer.The court affirmed the revocation of probation and the denial of the motion for a new hearing. View "Commonwealth v. Gelin" on Justia Law

Dajuan Martin was arrested after being seen riding a stolen scooter in New Orleans. During the police pursuit, he discarded a Glock 26, 9mm semi-automatic handgun, which was later recovered with a magazine containing 16 rounds of ammunition. Martin pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) calculated his offense level at 12, with a criminal history category of III, suggesting a sentencing range of 15 to 21 months. However, the government objected, arguing for a higher base offense level due to the firearm's large capacity magazine.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana accepted the government's argument, raising Martin's base offense level to 20, resulting in a new sentencing range of 30 to 37 months. Martin was sentenced to 33 months of imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release. The court also imposed conditions for supervised release, including participation in a drug and alcohol treatment program and submission to searches under certain conditions. However, the written judgment included additional requirements not stated during the oral pronouncement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Martin challenged the district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines' commentary defining "large capacity magazine" and the discrepancies between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment regarding supervised release conditions. The Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's use of the commentary, finding it consistent with the Guidelines. However, it agreed with Martin that the written judgment improperly broadened the conditions of supervised release.The Fifth Circuit affirmed Martin's sentence in part, vacated it in part, and remanded the case for the district court to amend the written judgment to conform to the oral pronouncement. The court also rejected Martin's constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), citing consistent precedent upholding the statute's constitutionality. View "USA v. Martin" on Justia Law

The case involves Lucas Sirois and Alisa Sirois, who were indicted for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute marijuana under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). They sought to enjoin the Department of Justice (DOJ) from prosecuting them, arguing that their conduct was in substantial compliance with the Maine Medical Use of Cannabis Act, which allows for the use, distribution, possession, and cultivation of medical marijuana under state law. The defendants claimed that the DOJ's prosecution violated the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment, which prohibits the DOJ from using funds to prevent states from implementing their medical marijuana laws.The United States District Court for the District of Maine denied the defendants' request for injunctive relief. The court held a hearing where the government presented evidence that the defendants' operations, particularly a grow operation known as the "Shoe Shop," violated Maine's medical marijuana laws by operating as a collective and engaging in black-market sales. The court found that the government had met its burden of production, showing a substantial evidentiary basis for the prosecution. However, the defendants failed to meet their burden of persuasion to demonstrate that the prosecution lacked a substantial evidentiary basis or was arbitrary or irrational.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The appellate court held that the defendants did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that they were in substantial compliance with Maine's medical marijuana laws. The court noted significant evidence that the Shoe Shop operated as a collective and that Lucas Sirois engaged in black-market sales. The court concluded that the defendants failed to demonstrate that the DOJ's prosecution would prevent Maine from giving practical effect to its medical marijuana laws, as required under the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment. Therefore, the denial of the motion to enjoin the prosecution was affirmed. View "United States v. Sirois" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendants, Aurea Vázquez Rijos, Marcia Vázquez Rijos, and José Ferrer Sosa, were involved in a murder-for-hire plot that resulted in the death of Adam Anhang Uster in Old San Juan, Puerto Rico, in 2005. Adam, a Canadian entrepreneur, was attacked and killed by a man hired by the defendants while walking with his wife, Aurea. The motive was financial gain from a prenuptial agreement that favored Aurea significantly more in the event of Adam's death than in the case of a divorce.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico tried the defendants. A federal jury convicted Aurea of murder for hire and all three defendants of conspiring to commit murder for hire. Each received a life sentence. The defendants appealed, raising numerous issues related to the trial, sentencing, and post-trial phases.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court addressed various claims, including the sufficiency of the evidence, the denial of severance, the admission of certain evidence, judicial bias, and the handling of post-trial motions related to the mental health of a key witness, Alex Pabón Colon. The court found that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the convictions and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings on severance, evidentiary matters, and judicial conduct.The court also examined the defendants' claims regarding the mental health of Pabón, who testified that he was hired by the defendants to kill Adam. The court concluded that the district court did not err in its handling of Pabón's competency and the related post-trial motions. The court affirmed the district court's decisions across the board, upholding the convictions and sentences of the defendants. View "United States v. Vazquez-Rijos" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of assault in the first degree after an altercation with a friend, during which he stabbed the friend multiple times. Following the incident, the defendant sought medical treatment at a hospital for injuries sustained during the fight. While at the hospital, he was questioned by several police officers without being advised of his Miranda rights. The defendant moved to suppress the statements made during these interactions, arguing that he was in custody and subject to interrogation without proper Miranda warnings.The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the defendant was not in custody during the hospital questioning. The court noted that the defendant was not handcuffed, was coherent despite his intoxication, and was not subjected to prolonged or aggressive questioning. The defendant was subsequently found guilty of assault in the first degree and sentenced to ten years of incarceration, suspended after seven years, with five years of probation.The Appellate Court reversed the conviction, concluding that the defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes when questioned by the police at the hospital. The court reasoned that the presence of multiple officers, the defendant's physical condition, and the nature of the questioning created a custodial environment. The Appellate Court held that the trial court should have suppressed the statements and remanded the case for a new trial.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the defendant was not in custody during the hospital interactions. The court emphasized that the defendant was not physically restrained by the police, the questioning was not aggressive or prolonged, and the defendant was informed that he was free to leave for police purposes. The court concluded that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would not have felt a restraint on freedom of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Therefore, the police were not required to administer Miranda warnings, and the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress was affirmed. View "State v. Garrison" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of home invasion and first-degree burglary after breaking into an apartment while armed with a Crosman Vigilante air gun. The air gun was loaded with pellets but lacked a CO2 cartridge, and the chamber for the cartridge was sealed with duct tape. The defendant was identified by one of the residents after a physical altercation and was later arrested. The state needed to prove that the defendant was armed with a "deadly weapon or dangerous instrument" to secure a conviction.The Superior Court in the judicial district of Danbury denied the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal, which argued that the air gun was not operable and thus not a deadly weapon. The jury was instructed that a deadly weapon is any weapon from which a shot may be discharged, whether loaded or unloaded, and found the defendant guilty of home invasion and first-degree burglary. The trial court rendered judgment consistent with the verdict and sentenced the defendant to sixteen years of incarceration, suspended after twelve years, and five years of probation.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the question of whether the air gun was a deadly weapon was subject to plenary review. The court concluded that the air gun, which required significant effort to be made operable due to the duct tape sealing the CO2 chamber, was not a weapon from which a shot could be readily discharged. The court held that the trial court's instruction to the jury was legally erroneous, as it did not convey the immediacy requirement implied by the statute defining a deadly weapon. Consequently, the defendant's conviction could not stand, and the judgment was reversed, with the case remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Carter" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of assaulting public safety personnel and interfering with an officer after injuring a police officer during the execution of an arrest warrant. The warrant included charges of assault in the first degree and criminal possession of a firearm. The officers, part of a multi-agency task force, used significant force to enter the defendant's residence, where the defendant resisted arrest, leading to the officer's injuries.The trial court admitted testimony about the felony charges in the arrest warrant and identified the task force as the "Violent Fugitive Task Force." The defendant objected, arguing that this evidence was unduly prejudicial. The trial court overruled the objections, finding the evidence relevant to explain the officers' conduct and the reasonableness of their use of force. The jury found the defendant guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years of incarceration followed by two years of special parole.The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the evidence was relevant to show the officers were acting in the performance of their duties and that any prejudice was mitigated by limiting instructions. The defendant appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, arguing that the evidence was unduly prejudicial.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the names of the felony charges, as they were relevant to the officers' use of force and the performance of their duties. However, the Court found that the name "Violent Fugitive Task Force" had no probative value and was unfairly prejudicial. Despite this, the Court concluded that the error was harmless given the strength of the state's case and the defense's focus on causation rather than the officers' conduct. The judgment of the Appellate Court was affirmed. View "State v. Delacruz-Gomez" on Justia Law