Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A longtime deputy sheriff was convicted by a federal jury of mail and wire fraud after she submitted an insurance claim for items stolen during a burglary at her home, some of which she falsely claimed as her own but actually belonged to her employer, the sheriff’s office. She also used her employer’s fax machine and cover sheet in communicating with the insurance company and misrepresented her supervisor’s identity. The criminal conduct arose after a romantic relationship with a former inmate ended badly, leading to the burglary, but the fraud conviction was based on her false insurance claim, not on the relationship or the burglary itself.Following her conviction, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) determined that her crimes constituted conduct “arising out of or in the performance of her official duties” under Government Code section 7522.72, part of the Public Employees Pension Reform Act, and partially forfeited her pension. The administrative law judge and the San Francisco Superior Court both upheld CalPERS’s decision, reasoning that her actions were sufficiently connected to her employment, particularly in her misuse of employer property and resources and in the context of her relationship with the former inmate.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division One, reversed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the statute requires a specific causal nexus between the criminal conduct and the employee’s official duties, not merely any job-related connection. The court found that the deputy’s fraudulent insurance claim, although it referenced employer property and resources, did not arise out of or in the performance of her official duties as required by the statute. Accordingly, the pension forfeiture determination was set aside. View "Myres v. Bd. of Admin. for CalPERS" on Justia Law

A police officer stopped a vehicle driven by the appellant for traffic violations and discovered that his driver’s license had been canceled. During the stop, the officer smelled a strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle. Citing only the odor as justification, the officer conducted a warrantless search of the car. During the search, the officer found ammunition in a locked safe in the backseat. The appellant was prohibited by law from possessing ammunition and was subsequently charged with that offense, as well as with driving after cancellation.The trial court, the Scott County District Court, granted the appellant’s motion to suppress the ammunition, ruling that the search violated his constitutional rights. This ruling came after the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Torgerson, which held that the smell of marijuana alone is not sufficient to establish probable cause for a warrantless vehicle search. The State appealed. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied because, at the time of the search, officers could reasonably have relied on existing appellate precedent that arguably permitted such searches.The Supreme Court of Minnesota, reviewing the case, rejected the application of the good-faith exception. The court held that there was no binding appellate precedent specifically authorizing warrantless vehicle searches based solely on the smell of marijuana at the time of the search, and previous Minnesota Supreme Court decisions had emphasized the need to evaluate the totality of the circumstances. The court concluded that the good-faith exception did not apply, reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "State of Minnesota vs. Douglas" on Justia Law

The case centers on Brett Dewayne Cole, who was charged with three counts stemming from allegations of sexual abuse against his stepdaughter, K.Z., a member of the Choctaw tribe. In May 2019, K.Z., then ten years old, disclosed to school personnel and a nurse examiner that Cole had sexually assaulted her on multiple occasions at their family home, including acts of touching and oral and anal penetration. Cole denied any inappropriate conduct. During trial, the government sought to introduce testimony from three witnesses—Cole’s half-sister, half-brother, and stepcousin—about prior instances in which Cole allegedly molested them as children, with these incidents occurring when Cole himself was a juvenile.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma presided over Cole’s case. At the first trial in January 2023, evidence of Cole’s prior acts as a juvenile was admitted over his belated objection, but the jury failed to reach a verdict and a mistrial was declared. In a second trial held in March 2023, similar evidence was presented, and the jury convicted Cole on all counts. Cole appealed, arguing that Federal Rule of Evidence 414 did not permit admission of the prior acts because he was a juvenile at the time, and that the evidence’s prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that acts of child molestation committed as a juvenile qualify as “crimes” under Rule 414 and are admissible. It further found that the district court properly balanced the probative value against any prejudicial impact and did not abuse its discretion. The Tenth Circuit affirmed Cole’s conviction. View "United States v. Cole" on Justia Law

The defendant was involved in a fatal shooting during a drug transaction in Hartford, Connecticut. He testified at trial that he acted in self-defense, claiming the victim drew a gun on him during a dispute. However, other witnesses contradicted this account, and no gun was found on or near the victim. After the shooting, the defendant fled the scene and did not report the incident to the police. He was later arrested and charged with murder.The case was tried before the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford. At trial, the defendant testified in his own defense. The prosecutor, with approval from the trial court, cross-examined the defendant regarding his failure to report to police that he had acted in self-defense prior to his arrest. The defense objected, arguing that the questioning infringed upon the defendant’s right to remain silent, but the trial court overruled the objection, reasoning that, by testifying, the defendant waived his Fifth Amendment right regarding silence and that his failure to report was inconsistent with a claim of self-defense. The jury found the defendant guilty of murder, and he was sentenced to fifty years in prison.On direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, the defendant argued that the trial court committed plain error by allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine him about his prearrest silence. The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the trial court did not commit plain error because established case law allows impeachment using a defendant’s prearrest, pre-Miranda silence, particularly when the defendant testifies and claims self-defense. The Court concluded that the circumstances did not present an obvious or egregious error requiring reversal. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Thorpe" on Justia Law

An individual was accused of sexually assaulting his fiancée’s seven-year-old niece while visiting the child’s home. The child reported the incident to her sibling, who then informed their mother. Law enforcement conducted interviews with the child, her family, and the accused, and collected physical evidence, including a blanket identified by the child. DNA analysis of the blanket matched the accused. The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual intercourse without consent. At trial, the child, family members, law enforcement, and crime lab personnel testified. The defense focused on challenging the investigation rather than the child’s credibility. The accused was found guilty on both charges.After conviction, the accused appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Montana, raising several issues including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the conviction. The accused then sought postconviction relief in the District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District, Fallon County, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective, particularly in the cross-examination of a law enforcement officer. The District Court denied the petition, finding the claims both procedurally barred and without merit. The defense attorney was later disbarred and did not participate in the postconviction proceedings.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the denial of postconviction relief. The Court held that the accused did not establish ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard set by Strickland v. Washington. The Court found that the defense counsel’s cross-examination strategy fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and did not prejudice the outcome, given the strong physical evidence and the content presented to the jury. The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the District Court’s denial of postconviction relief. View "Kapps v. State" on Justia Law

In this case, a man was charged with multiple felony counts arising from sexual abuse allegations involving two victims: his adopted daughter, who disclosed in 2021 that she had been repeatedly molested by him from age 10 to 14, and his sister-in-law, who reported a 2009 incident in which he sexually assaulted her when she was 17. After investigations and forensic interviews, the defendant was charged with one count of felony sexual assault and three counts of felony sexual intercourse without consent. The charges related to both victims were tried together before a jury.Prior to trial in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, neither party objected to the joinder of charges or moved to sever them. During voir dire, a Yellowstone County Undersheriff, whose office had investigated the case, was seated as a juror without objection or peremptory strike from either party. During trial, the State raised concerns about the Undersheriff’s impartiality, but the defendant’s counsel argued against removing him, and the District Court declined any implied motion to strike. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to 100 years in prison.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the defendant raised three issues: whether the presence of the Undersheriff as a juror or the joinder of charges should be reviewed under the plain error doctrine, and whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to either issue. The Supreme Court held that neither issue merited plain error review because the defendant had affirmatively waived challenges below, and there was no manifest miscarriage of justice. The Court further determined that the record was insufficient to review the ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal, leaving that question for postconviction proceedings. The Court affirmed the conviction. View "State v. Soapes" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and robbery for an offense committed at age 17, resulting in a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole under Massachusetts law. Decades later, following developments in constitutional law, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that life-without-parole sentences for juveniles were unconstitutional and ordered that such sentences be modified to life with the possibility of parole. As a result, the petitioner’s sentence was changed; he became parole eligible, was granted parole, and was released.After this modification, the petitioner sought to file a second habeas corpus petition in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled that this petition was “second or successive” under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) and thus subject to its “gatekeeping” requirements, concluding that the addition of parole eligibility did not constitute a new judgment for purposes of federal habeas law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed de novo whether the sentence modification constituted a new judgment. The court held that the change from life without parole to life with parole eligibility was a material change, making the sentence a new judgment under federal law. The court reasoned that, because the petitioner’s current custody was authorized by this new judgment, his second-in-time habeas petition did not trigger the restrictions of § 2244(b).Therefore, the First Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the petitioner need not obtain pre-authorization to file his habeas petition, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Donovan v. Massachusetts Parole Board" on Justia Law

Investigators from the DEA and Owensboro Police Department began an investigation in September 2021 into suspected methamphetamine trafficking involving Cedric Swanagan and Courtland Reed. Wiretap evidence, corroborated by intercepted communications and witness testimony, linked Swanagan and Reed to multiple drug transactions, including a key February 2022 incident where Reed paid Nicole Toliver for methamphetamine that was found in her car during a traffic stop. Both defendants were ultimately indicted for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute large quantities of methamphetamine.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky presided over the consolidated trial. Swanagan moved to suppress evidence from the wiretap, arguing the supporting affidavit contained intentional or reckless falsehoods, but the court denied his motion without a Franks hearing, finding no substantial preliminary showing of falsity. At trial, law enforcement officers testified about intercepted calls, interpreting slang and summarizing conversations. The district court managed objections to this testimony, ensuring officers spoke from personal experience and refrained from narrating facts beyond their direct knowledge. Reed was shackled during trial, but the court took steps to conceal this from the jury. After jurors potentially saw defendants in shackles in the courthouse lobby, the court conducted voir dire and found no actual prejudice. Both defendants were convicted, and the court denied motions for acquittal and new trial. Swanagan was sentenced to 360 months based on enhancements for his leadership in the conspiracy and prior convictions; Reed received a 300-month sentence based in part on a prior burglary conviction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions and Swanagan’s sentence, finding no reversible error in evidentiary rulings, jury management, or sufficiency of the evidence. The court vacated Reed’s sentence, holding that his Kentucky burglary conviction did not qualify as a “serious violent felony” for sentence enhancement under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 851, and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Reed" on Justia Law

Juan Carlos Alvarez, a member of the Southwest Cholos gang, was convicted of capital murder for his involvement in two separate fatal shootings in Houston, Texas in June 1998. The first incident resulted in the deaths of Adrian and Michael Aguirre at an apartment complex, while the second led to the murder of sixteen-year-old Jose Varela and Hugo Perez. Alvarez was identified through eyewitness accounts, testimony from co-participants, forensic evidence, and his own admissions to police. The prosecution presented overwhelming evidence, including ballistics linking Alvarez’s firearm to the shootings and DNA evidence connecting his shotgun to one of the victims. At trial, Alvarez was represented by two attorneys; the defense focused on challenging witness credibility and provided mitigation evidence through family members and a psychologist.On appeal, Alvarez’s counsel raised numerous claims in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA), which affirmed the conviction and death sentence. Subsequent state habeas proceedings involved multiple attorneys and filings, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and issues regarding consultation with the Mexican consulate. Alvarez also asserted the introduction of tainted DNA evidence and misconduct by the Houston Crime Lab. The TCCA dismissed some of these habeas applications as an abuse of the writ, finding certain claims procedurally barred. Alvarez then sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, which denied all claims and refused to grant investigative funding or a certificate of appealability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of habeas relief, analyzing three certified claims: deprivation of counsel due to one attorney allegedly sleeping during trial, ineffective assistance for failing to present additional mitigation evidence, and claims regarding tainted DNA evidence. The Fifth Circuit held that Alvarez was not constitutionally deprived of counsel since his second attorney was actively engaged, and there was no unreasonable application of federal law or unreasonable factual determination by the state courts. It also found no ineffective assistance in the mitigation phase and concluded the DNA-related claims were procedurally barred and, alternatively, meritless. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment denying habeas relief. View "Alvarez v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

Federal agents arrested a defendant after he engaged in explicit online communications with an undercover agent posing as the father of an eight-year-old girl. Over several months, the defendant requested sexually explicit images of the fictitious child, instructed the agent on how to sedate her to facilitate the abuse, and provided detailed suggestions about the nature of the photographs. The defendant attempted to access links purported to contain the requested images, which were in fact fake and used to record his attempts.A grand jury indicted the defendant on three counts: attempted enticement of a minor to engage in criminal sexual activity, attempted sexual exploitation of a child for the purpose of producing a visual depiction, and attempted receipt of child pornography. At trial in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, the government presented evidence through two FBI agents. After the government rested, the court granted the defendant’s motion for acquittal on the enticement charge but denied it on the other two; the defendant was convicted by a jury on attempted sexual exploitation and attempted receipt of child pornography and was sentenced to 180 months, the statutory minimum for the exploitation charge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the conviction for attempted sexual exploitation. The court held that the defendant’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge was preserved and, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, found sufficient evidence to support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. The court further held that the jury was properly instructed that conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) does not require direct communication with a minor, and that the statute covers conduct involving an intermediary. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v Carpenter" on Justia Law