Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case centers on Taiwan Orran Reed, who was convicted by a jury in August 2020 of multiple offenses, including pimping, pandering, human trafficking, and rape involving two victims. The jury also found special circumstances under California’s one strike law, resulting in Reed’s sentence of 21 years four months in prison, plus 30 years to life. Reed, who is African American, later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Riverside County Superior Court, seeking relief under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020. He alleged that racially discriminatory language—specifically being referred to as a “gorilla pimp”—was used by the prosecutor and expert law enforcement witnesses during his trial.After Reed’s retained counsel withdrew due to personal reasons and lack of payment, the superior court appointed the Riverside County Public Defender to represent Reed at an evidentiary hearing on his habeas petition. The Public Defender objected to the appointment, arguing that under Government Code section 27706, subdivision (g), his office has discretionary authority to decline representation in postconviction habeas matters, unlike mandatory representation required in trial proceedings under subdivision (a). The trial court disagreed and compelled the Public Defender to accept the appointment, finding that the Public Defender had not demonstrated unavailability.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, granted the Public Defender’s petition for writ of mandate. The appellate court held that section 27706(g) governs public defenders’ representation of habeas petitioners, granting them discretion to decline such appointments without a showing of unavailability. The trial court’s order compelling the Public Defender to represent Reed was vacated, and the superior court was directed to appoint alternate counsel for Reed’s habeas petition. View "Harmon v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

A police officer in Peoria, Illinois, encountered a parked vehicle in a closed, dark parking lot at around 2:45 a.m. Inside the vehicle were Dazmine Erving and a female companion. The officer observed Erving make a sudden movement that appeared to be an attempt to hide something, smelled burnt cannabis, and noticed the woman provided false identification information. The officer determined that Erving was on federal supervised release for a weapons offense, only twelve days into his release. After allowing both individuals to retrieve their belongings, the officer conducted a limited search under the driver’s seat, where he discovered a handgun. Erving admitted ownership of the firearm.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois reviewed Erving’s motion to suppress the firearm, arguing the search was not justified under the Fourth Amendment. The district court found the officer’s testimony credible and held that, considering the totality of circumstances—furtive movement, odor of cannabis, Erving’s criminal history, and his companion’s false statements—a protective search was warranted. Erving’s motion to suppress was denied. He then pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon and admitted to violating supervised release; the court sentenced him to the upper range of the advisory Guidelines and imposed a consecutive sentence for the supervised release violation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court found the protective search justified under the Fourth Amendment, as the officer had reasonable suspicion that Erving was dangerous and could gain immediate access to a weapon. The appellate court also rejected Erving’s arguments regarding procedural and constitutional errors at sentencing, concluding the district court did not rely on impermissible factors or speculation in imposing sentence. The denial of the suppression motion and the sentencing decision were affirmed. View "United States v. Erving" on Justia Law

Raymond Richardson was indicted for first-degree robbery under West Virginia law, specifically charged with using the threat of deadly force against Denise Cool to steal money. However, at trial, the prosecution presented evidence that Richardson accomplished the robbery by physically assaulting Cool rather than by threatening her with a deadly weapon. Richardson admitted to hitting Cool but denied taking her money. The jury found him guilty of first-degree robbery, assault during the commission of a felony, and possession with intent to deliver cocaine. The central issue on appeal concerned the alleged variance between the indictment and the State’s theory at trial.Following his conviction, Richardson sought post-conviction relief in state court, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the variance between the indictment and the evidence presented at trial. At an evidentiary hearing, Richardson and his trial counsel testified. Counsel acknowledged missing the indictment’s specific language but stated that the variance did not affect the defense strategy, which was focused on denying any theft rather than disputing the manner in which the robbery was committed. The state court denied habeas relief, finding Richardson had sufficient notice of the charges and was not prejudiced by the variance. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding the difference between the indictment and trial evidence did not mislead Richardson or prejudice his defense.On federal habeas review, the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia denied Richardson’s petition, finding he received adequate notice under the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the variance did not violate due process because Richardson was convicted of the offense charged, had actual notice of the evidence to be presented, and failed to show that the variance hindered his defense. The court found no ineffective assistance of counsel or prejudice and affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. View "Richardson v. Frame" on Justia Law

Between June 2022 and February 2023, two individuals participated in a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in Tennessee. One defendant regularly supplied methamphetamine, while the other purchased and resold it. Law enforcement surveilled their activities, conducted searches, and utilized confidential sources to purchase drugs from both parties. Both defendants gave statements to investigators about the extent and nature of their drug transactions.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee charged each defendant with multiple counts related to methamphetamine distribution. Both pled guilty to lesser offenses in exchange for dismissal of other charges. The court calculated each defendant’s sentencing range using drug quantity estimates derived from statements and physical evidence. One defendant objected to the amount attributed, arguing that the calculation relied on unreliable statements and overstated her culpability. Despite objections, the court imposed a sentence within the adjusted Guidelines range. The other defendant requested a downward variance based on age, health, and criminal history, but the court denied this, citing insufficient evidence of mitigating circumstances.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed both sentences for procedural and substantive reasonableness under the abuse of discretion standard. The court held that the sentence for the first defendant was procedurally unreasonable because the district court relied on an uncorroborated out-of-court statement to estimate drug quantity, lacking sufficient indicia of reliability. The court reversed her sentence and remanded for resentencing, restricting the government from introducing new evidence. For the second defendant, the court found the sentence both procedurally and substantively reasonable, affirming the district court’s decision. Thus, the appellate court reversed and remanded for one defendant, and affirmed for the other. View "United States v. Crafton" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted of a federal crime and, after the enactment of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA), was sentenced to pay $7,567.25 in restitution to his victim, even though his criminal conduct occurred before the MVRA became law. Years later, the petitioner challenged the continued obligation to pay restitution, arguing that applying the MVRA retroactively to his conduct violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.The United States District Court initially sentenced the petitioner under the MVRA. When the petitioner challenged the restitution order, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found against him, ruling that restitution under the MVRA is not criminal punishment and thus not subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Eighth Circuit’s decision rested on its interpretation that MVRA restitution was a civil remedy rather than a criminal penalty.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and reversed the Eighth Circuit’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that restitution imposed under the MVRA constitutes criminal punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court explained that the statutory text and structure, as well as its placement in the criminal code and its role as a penalty imposed at sentencing, demonstrate that restitution under the MVRA is penal in nature. The Court further noted that only criminal defendants can be ordered to pay restitution, it is imposed in criminal proceedings, and the government, not the victim, is the adverse party. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its ruling, allowing the Eighth Circuit to consider other arguments raised by the government. View "Ellingburg v. United States" on Justia Law

The defendant was arrested on October 2, 2021, for misdemeanor driving under the influence and was released after signing a citation promising to appear in court on December 14, 2021. The Riverside County District Attorney filed a misdemeanor complaint on November 17, 2021. The defendant failed to appear on the scheduled date, resulting in a bench warrant for her arrest. After a subsequent stop and another citation, she failed to appear again, leading to another bench warrant. In March 2024, the defendant voluntarily contacted the court, had her matters calendared, and pled not guilty. She later filed a motion to dismiss, arguing her Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial had been violated due to delays.The Riverside County Superior Court denied the motion, finding the defendant’s own failures to appear contributed to the delay. The defendant then sought review by petitioning the Appellate Division of the Riverside County Superior Court. The Appellate Division, in a divided opinion, held that the prosecution’s failure to file a formal complaint within 25 days as required by Penal Code section 853.6 deprived the trial court of personal jurisdiction and automatically relieved the defendant of any obligation to appear. Based on this, it ordered the trial court to vacate its order and reconsider the motion to dismiss.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision. It held the lower court had abused its discretion by misinterpreting Penal Code section 853.6. The Court of Appeal clarified that the failure to file charges within 25 days did not relieve a defendant of the obligation to appear or deprive the court of personal jurisdiction. The appellate court issued a writ directing the Appellate Division to vacate its opinion and reconsider the defendant’s writ petition consistent with this interpretation. View "People v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

In September 2022, police received a tip that the defendant was armed on the roof of a public housing building. When officers arrived and announced themselves, the defendant jumped off the roof and was found injured. He informed police that he had three firearms on the roof, where officers subsequently recovered two Glock pistols modified to fire automatically, a tactical rifle, a micro conversion kit, multiple magazines—including high-capacity ones—and 279 rounds of ammunition. At the time, the defendant was on supervised release for a prior firearm-possession conviction.The defendant pled guilty in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico to possessing machine guns and being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition. The district court calculated an advisory guidelines range of sixty-three to seventy-eight months based on the total offense level and criminal history. The defendant requested a sentence at the bottom of the range, citing improved mental health and questioning the evidence, while the government requested a sentence at the top of the range due to the defendant’s criminal history and the quantity and type of weapons and ammunition possessed. The district court imposed a ninety-six-month sentence, an eighteen-month upward variance, citing the dangerousness of the weapons, the large cache of ammunition, the defendant’s prior conviction, his commission of the offense while on supervised release, and his active surveillance of the rooftop.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the defendant argued his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable and that the government breached the plea agreement by defending the upward variance. The First Circuit held that the district court adequately explained its reasons for the upward variance, properly considered aggravating factors not captured by the guidelines, and did not abuse its discretion. The court also found no breach of the plea agreement. The judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Maldonado-Velazquez" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who was stopped by police after a reported road-rage incident in which a firearm was allegedly brandished. During the traffic stop, officers observed a loaded firearm in plain view. The defendant, who had prior felony convictions and was still on state parole, was then charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of federal law.After a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, the defendant was convicted of the charged offense. At sentencing, the District Court calculated the advisory guidelines range based on the defendant’s criminal history and prior convictions, including a prior drug offense and an unlawful wounding conviction. The Court determined that these prior convictions triggered a heightened sentencing range under the guidelines, but imposed a sentence below the statutory maximum. The defendant appealed, challenging both the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the interstate commerce element and the constitutionality of the statute as applied, as well as the classification of his prior unlawful wounding conviction as a “crime of violence” under the guidelines.Reviewing the appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the defendant’s challenges to his conviction were foreclosed by binding circuit precedent. On the sentencing issue, the court acknowledged that a recent Supreme Court decision, Delligatti v. United States, abrogated prior circuit precedent regarding the interpretation of “crime of violence.” Under Delligatti, the defendant’s prior unlawful wounding conviction qualifies as a crime of violence for purposes of the sentencing guidelines. The Third Circuit accordingly affirmed both the conviction and the sentence. View "USA v. Minter" on Justia Law

Patrick J. Newcomer was serving supervised release for two separate federal convictions related to burglary of a Post Office and possession of a firearm by a felon. After completing his prison terms and beginning supervised release, he was again convicted in state court of two counts of burglary and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. These new convictions constituted violations of his federal supervised release conditions.Following Newcomer’s state convictions, the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska revoked his supervised release for both federal cases. The court imposed 24 months’ imprisonment for each federal conviction, to run concurrently, and ordered these terms to be served after his state sentences. Additionally, the district court imposed two terms of supervised release—12 months each—set to run consecutively upon his release from imprisonment. Newcomer appealed, arguing that under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), the new terms of supervised release should run concurrently.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the legality of the district court’s revocation sentence de novo. It held that 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) governs only the commencement of original supervised release terms and does not apply to supervised release imposed following revocation. Instead, 18 U.S.C. § 3583 provides the relevant authority, permitting a district court to impose additional supervised release upon revocation, and does not require such terms to run concurrently. The Eighth Circuit found that the district court acted within its discretion in imposing consecutive supervised release terms and affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Newcomer" on Justia Law

In 2002, an individual disappeared from her home in Ada, Oklahoma, and her ex-boyfriend quickly became a suspect. Evidence implicating him included his presence at her home, strange phone calls to her family, and physical injuries. Law enforcement discovered blood in his car and house, and, after consulting with his attorney, he led officers to the woman’s body, which was buried and showed signs of gunshot wounds. He subsequently pleaded guilty to murder in Oklahoma state court and was sentenced to life without parole.Many years later, following the Supreme Court’s ruling in McGirt v. Oklahoma, which clarified that certain areas in Oklahoma are Indian country and subject to federal—not state—jurisdiction for major crimes involving Native Americans, the state court vacated his conviction. As a member of a federally recognized tribe and with the crime occurring within the Chickasaw Nation Reservation, only the federal government could prosecute him. A federal grand jury indicted him for murder in Indian country and for causing death while violating federal firearm statutes. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma dismissed one firearm count as time-barred, and a jury convicted him on the remaining counts.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered three main arguments: (1) alleged failures in the jury selection process under the Jury Selection and Service Act, (2) denial of a motion to suppress statements about the location of the victim’s body, and (3) denial of a motion to compel disclosure of communications between the government and former defense counsel. The Tenth Circuit held that the defendant failed to comply with the procedural requirements for challenging jury selection, that Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence did not apply to his statements to law enforcement, and that any error in denying document disclosure was harmless. The convictions were affirmed. View "United States v. Mullins" on Justia Law