Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A police officer in Kalispell, Montana, conducted a traffic stop after observing traffic violations. While the officer was engaged with the driver, the defendant, Sean Doman, stopped on a nearby public sidewalk and began recording the police interaction with his phone. The officer, concerned for safety, called for backup. When the backup officer arrived, he repeatedly asked Doman to move further away from the scene, stating that filming was allowed but Doman’s proximity and engagement were distracting. Doman refused to comply with the officer’s orders to reposition, insisting on his right to film from his chosen spot. After several warnings, Doman was arrested for obstructing a peace officer.The case was first tried in the Kalispell Municipal Court, where a jury found Doman guilty of obstructing a peace officer under Montana law. At trial, the jury was instructed that citizens have a First Amendment right to film police, subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, but also that it is not a defense if the officer was acting illegally, as long as the officer acted under official authority. Doman did not raise constitutional objections to the statute during trial. On appeal to the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Doman challenged the constitutionality of the obstruction statute as applied to his conduct. The District Court affirmed the conviction, holding that Doman failed to preserve his constitutional arguments for appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo. It held that sufficient evidence supported the conviction because a rational juror could find that Doman knowingly impeded the officers’ duties by refusing to comply with reasonable orders during a traffic stop. The court declined to address Doman’s constitutional claims, finding them unpreserved and not warranting plain-error review. The Supreme Court affirmed Doman’s conviction. View "City of Kalispell v. Doman" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a theft that occurred in Great Falls, Montana. The defendant, who had been living with her cousin at the cousin’s home and then at the home of another relative, was accused of stealing property from a storage unit rented in the name of the cousin’s daughter and paid for by the cousin’s husband. Surveillance footage and gate access records showed the defendant, along with a co-defendant, accessing the storage unit multiple times and removing property. The defendant acknowledged taking some items that did not belong to her but claimed she believed she had permission to retrieve her own belongings and returned most of the items.The Eighth Judicial District Court held a jury trial where the prosecution introduced text messages between the co-defendant and the complaining witness, which discussed details of the alleged theft and the property taken. Although the defense objected to these messages as hearsay, the court admitted them. The jury ultimately convicted the defendant of felony theft of property valued between $1,500 and $5,000 but acquitted her of burglary. The defendant appealed, arguing that the admission of the text messages constituted an abuse of discretion and that the error was not harmless.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court’s error in admitting the hearsay text messages was harmless. The Court held that the error was not harmless because the messages impermissibly bolstered the prosecution’s case and undermined the defendant’s credibility, contributing to the conviction. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the State failed to demonstrate there was no reasonable possibility that the inadmissible evidence contributed to the conviction. View "State v. Henderson" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who, after being indicted on multiple charges related to mail fraud, theft from an employee benefit plan, and filing false tax returns, repeatedly chose to represent herself rather than accept legal counsel. The charges stemmed from her actions following her grandmother’s death: she continued to receive and conceal pension payments that should have stopped, and she prepared fraudulent tax filings for herself and others, keeping a portion of the illicit refunds.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, presided over the trial. Throughout the proceedings, the district court made extensive efforts to inform the defendant of her constitutional right to counsel, the risks and disadvantages of self-representation, and the complexity of the charges. The court appointed standby counsel, but the defendant persisted in her wish to proceed without representation and consistently rejected the assistance of counsel, including private and standby counsel. Despite her refusal to participate actively in her trial—declining to make arguments, cross-examine witnesses, or present evidence—the jury convicted her on all counts.Upon appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the defendant argued that the district court should have forced her to accept counsel and that her waiver of the right to counsel was not knowing or voluntary. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the record as a whole and determined that, despite the absence of a formal Faretta hearing, the totality of circumstances demonstrated that the defendant’s waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The court carefully examined whether she understood her options and the consequences of self-representation. Concluding that the district court had not erred, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment. The holding is that a defendant’s waiver of counsel is valid if the record as a whole shows the waiver was knowing and voluntary, even without a formal hearing. View "USA v Salley" on Justia Law

A murder occurred in 2014 when the victim, Justin Triplett, was shot multiple times at his apartment. Jason Johnomar Zapata became a suspect after evidence connected him to the murder weapon and ammunition. Nearly a year later, while in custody on unrelated charges, Zapata was subjected to what is known as a Perkins operation: he was placed in a holding cell with two undercover agents posing as inmates. During the operation, a law enforcement officer conducted a fake lineup and falsely told Zapata that a witness had identified him as the killer. When asked if he wanted to discuss the murder, Zapata invoked his right to counsel. Nevertheless, the deputy returned Zapata to the cell, announced to the undercover agents that Zapata would be charged with murder, and the agents subsequently questioned Zapata, eliciting an incriminating confession.At trial in the Superior Court of Riverside County, Zapata moved to suppress his statements, arguing that his Miranda rights were violated because he had invoked his right to counsel before the confession and had not waived it. The trial court denied the motion, admitted the confession into evidence, and Zapata was convicted by a jury of second degree murder. The jury did not reach a verdict on the personal firearm enhancement, but Zapata later admitted a lesser firearm use enhancement.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that when a suspect invokes the right to counsel and a known law enforcement officer actively “stimulates” a Perkins operation in a manner that amounts to custodial interrogation, any resulting incriminating statements are inadmissible under Miranda and Edwards. The court found the admission of Zapata's statements prejudicial and reversed the judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "P. v. Zapata" on Justia Law

A man was charged with one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering and seven counts of money laundering after opening numerous bank accounts and using them to launder millions of dollars in fraud proceeds for a group operating romance and business email scams. He also recruited and supervised a co-conspirator, helping that person set up a similar laundering operation. The laundered funds were ultimately sent to Africa. Following his arrest, the defendant attempted to cooperate with the government but did not enter into a plea agreement. At his first change-of-plea hearing, he hesitated and the hearing was postponed. At the second hearing, with two lawyers present, he pleaded guilty to all charges, affirming he did so knowingly and voluntarily.Before sentencing, the defendant’s bond was revoked after he was arrested for assaulting his girlfriend. While in custody, he moved to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging one of his lawyers coerced him into pleading guilty and that he was not aware of a co-conspirator’s cooperation with the government. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia held an evidentiary hearing, found the attorneys credible and the defendant not credible, and denied the motion to withdraw the plea.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, the calculation of the loss amount, several sentencing enhancements, the denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and the substantive reasonableness of the 120-month sentence. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the plea, did not err in its application of sentencing enhancements and guidelines, and that the sentence imposed was substantively reasonable. The court affirmed the judgment. View "USA v. Mullings" on Justia Law

The case centers on a defendant who was accused of touching a minor inappropriately during a trip to the store in October 2021. Two months after the alleged incident, the victim made a separate allegation against her father, claiming he had broken her half-sister’s leg, based on a social media post. This accusation was later determined to be false after investigation, with the victim’s mother and a counselor concluding the report was made due to the victim’s misunderstanding and feelings toward her father. The defendant was indicted on multiple counts of sexual assault and simple assault, with events alleged to have occurred in Gilford and Laconia.The Superior Court (Attorri, J.) presided over the trial. Before trial, the defendant sought to cross-examine the victim about her false accusation against her father, arguing it was relevant to her credibility. The initial ruling permitted this, but upon the State’s motion for reconsideration, the court excluded the evidence, finding it not probative of the victim’s character for truthfulness because she believed the accusation was true when made. At trial, the State introduced limited evidence regarding the defendant’s alcohol consumption on the day of the alleged assaults. When the jury inquired about the locations of the alleged offenses, the court declined to provide the indictments, instructing the jury to rely on its recollection of the evidence.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding cross-examination on the false allegation, as it lacked sufficient probative value and risked confusing the jury. The court also ruled that the trial judge’s response to the jury’s question was proper and that any error in admitting evidence of the defendant’s alcohol consumption was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The convictions were affirmed. View "State v. Hodgdon" on Justia Law

The defendant owned a house on Farm Island, New Hampshire, near a summer camp with which he had a history of disputes. After hearing a group outside his house at night, he yelled at them and, when unable to reach the police, left a voicemail for the camp, using profane language and stating, “you better get them the f**k out of here or I will shoot them.” He also accused the group of damaging his property. The State charged him with harassment, alleging that his communication constituted a threat to the life or safety of another, made with the purpose to annoy or alarm.The Superior Court of Carroll County held a jury trial. During trial, the State introduced the voicemail, evidence of the contentious relationship between the defendant and the camp, and testimony from camp staff and police. Over the defendant’s objections, the court admitted testimony from a camp director about security measures the camp undertook in response to the message, including ceasing use of part of the island and enhancing security. The defendant moved to dismiss for insufficient evidence of the required mental state; the court denied the motion. The jury convicted the defendant, and he appealed.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant acted with the purpose to annoy or alarm and that the communication constituted a true threat as defined by federal law. However, the court found that admitting testimony about the camp’s security response was error under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 403, as its limited probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. This error was not harmless. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire therefore reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Owen" on Justia Law

In 2008, a federal grand jury indicted Michael Bowe on charges including conspiracy and attempt to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and for using, brandishing, or discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, with the firearm offense predicated on the Hobbs Act offenses. Bowe pleaded guilty and admitted in court to shooting a security guard during the attempted robbery. He was sentenced in 2009 to 288 months’ imprisonment, including a mandatory 120-month consecutive sentence for the firearm offense. He did not file a direct appeal.Over the years, Bowe challenged his conviction and sentence through several motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, citing Supreme Court decisions such as Johnson v. United States, United States v. Davis, and United States v. Taylor, which altered the understanding of what qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c). His initial and successive motions were denied by the United States District Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, largely because, at the time, circuit precedent held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery remained a crime of violence. The Eleventh Circuit repeatedly denied his applications, relying on its decision in In re Baptiste, which interpreted statutory bars to successive claims as applicable to federal prisoners.Subsequently, the Supreme Court abrogated Baptiste, holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)’s bar on “old claims” does not apply to federal prisoners seeking successive § 2255 motions. On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Bowe made a prima facie showing under § 2255(h)(2) that his conviction for discharging a firearm during a crime of violence may no longer be valid in light of Davis and Taylor. The court granted his application for leave to file a second or successive § 2255 motion. View "In re: Bowe" on Justia Law

In 1993, Joseph Cornette was involved in a drunk driving incident that resulted in a serious car accident and injury to another driver. He pleaded guilty to Assault Second Degree and Driving Under the Influence (DUI), with other charges being dismissed as part of a plea agreement. After serving his sentence and remaining crime-free for decades, Cornette received an unconditional pardon for his assault conviction from the Governor of Delaware. He then petitioned for discretionary expungement of the pardoned assault conviction, without seeking expungement for the DUI conviction.The Superior Court of the State of Delaware denied Cornette’s petition. Initially, a court commissioner found that DUI offenses are not eligible for expungement and denied relief. On appeal, a Superior Court judge denied Cornette’s petition on the grounds that Delaware law requires all charges in a case to be eligible for expungement before any charge in that case may be expunged. The court reasoned that because Cornette’s DUI conviction was not eligible for expungement, the pardoned assault conviction could not be expunged either. A motion for reargument was also denied.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the case and reversed the judgment of the Superior Court. The Supreme Court held that under 11 Del. C. § 4375, an individual with a pardoned conviction may seek discretionary expungement of that specific conviction, even if other charges in the case are not eligible for expungement. The Court concluded that the statute permits partial expungement and does not require all charges in a case to be eligible. The case was remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "Cornette v. State" on Justia Law

The case centers on a defendant who was indicted on two counts: unlawful possession of a firearm by a drug user and making a false statement during the purchase of a firearm. The indictment alleged that, on specific dates in 2022, the defendant, as an unlawful user of marijuana and cocaine, possessed multiple firearms and falsely represented on a federal form that he was not an unlawful user or addict of a controlled substance. The evidence included the defendant’s admissions of regular drug use, his possession of firearms during the same period, and his acknowledgment that he was not prescribed any controlled substances. Additional evidence established that, at the time of a firearm purchase, he smelled of marijuana, and a subsequent search uncovered both a loaded pistol and marijuana in his vehicle. Drug tests confirmed recent use of marijuana and cocaine.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, rejected his claims that the statutes were unconstitutionally vague, and found him guilty on both counts in a bench trial based on stipulated facts. The court concluded that the statutory terms were not vague as applied to the defendant, given his admissions and the explicit warning on the federal form. The court also held that the statute prohibiting firearm possession by drug users was consistent with historical tradition and deferred ruling on the as-applied Second Amendment challenge until trial evidence was complete. The defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit vacated the conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a drug user under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) and remanded for the district court to reassess the defendant’s as-applied Second Amendment challenge in light of intervening circuit precedent. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision on all other issues, including the conviction for making a false statement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A). View "United States v. Ledvina" on Justia Law