Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A man suffering from diagnosed schizoaffective disorder was involved in a series of violent encounters with law enforcement officers after he believed, due to his delusions, that he was being pursued by the CIA. The incident began at a gas station where he brandished a firearm at a woman he thought was an agent. He later fired gunshots and fled, leading officers on a high-speed chase during which he shot at officers and other vehicles, eventually wounding a pursuing officer in a physical confrontation. Evidence showed he possessed firearms, body armor, and hallucinogenic mushrooms, although toxicology results for drug use were inconclusive. The defendant testified that he acted out of fear for his life, believing officers were working with the CIA to kill him.The Superior Court of Tulare County presided over the trial. The defendant requested that the jury be instructed on imperfect self-defense, arguing he honestly, though unreasonably, believed he needed to defend himself. The trial court denied this request, relying on People v. Elmore, which held that imperfect self-defense is not available where the belief is purely delusional and lacks an “objective correlate” in reality. The court found that the defendant’s belief was entirely delusional, with no objective facts supporting a need for self-defense, as the officers had not threatened or harmed him prior to his attack.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that imperfect self-defense does not apply when a defendant’s belief in the need for self-defense is wholly delusional and unsupported by any objective facts. The court concluded that the mere presence and lawful actions of peace officers do not constitute an objective correlate sufficient to warrant an imperfect self-defense instruction. The judgment was affirmed. View "P. v. Chang" on Justia Law

In late 2021, a man began communicating online with an individual named “Alice,” who claimed to have two young daughters. Over several months, he discussed his interest in engaging in sexual activities with the purported children, communicated using various means, and ultimately traveled from Montana to West Virginia with the intention of meeting Alice and her daughters. Upon arrival, he was arrested by federal agents, who revealed that Alice and the children were fictitious personas created by law enforcement. He subsequently pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted enticement of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia sentenced him to 324 months’ imprisonment, applying two Sentencing Guidelines enhancements—one for use of a computer to entice a minor and another for an offense involving a minor under 12 years old—based on his interactions with the fictitious children. At sentencing, the defendant did not object to these enhancements. Later, after the court granted his motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 due to ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a timely notice of appeal, he was allowed to pursue a direct appeal challenging the application of the enhancements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the sentence for plain error. The court held that the term “minor” as used in the relevant Guidelines enhancements is ambiguous as to whether it includes fictitious minors, and that the Guidelines commentary, which expressly includes fictitious minors, is entitled to deference. The court found no error, plain or otherwise, in the district court’s application of the enhancements and affirmed the sentence. View "US v. Hodges" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of attempting to kidnap a federal officer and assaulting a family member of a federal official. During sentencing in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, the court heard arguments from counsel for both the defense and the government, but did not ask the defendant if he wished to speak personally before sentencing—a procedural requirement known as allocution, mandated by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.Shortly after imposing concurrent maximum sentences for both counts, the government realized the allocution right had been overlooked and promptly moved to reopen sentencing under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a), which allows correction of “arithmetical, technical, or other clear error” within 14 days of sentencing. The district court granted the government’s motion over the defendant’s objection, vacated the original sentence, and set a new sentencing hearing. At the subsequent hearing, the defendant was allowed to address the court and allocute. The district court then reimposed the same sentences as before.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether the district court had the authority to correct its failure to afford allocution by reopening sentencing under Rule 35(a). The Ninth Circuit held that the failure to allow a defendant the right to allocute under Rule 32 constitutes “other clear error” correctable under Rule 35(a). The court concluded that resentencing after a belated allocution is permissible under Rule 35(a), even if it requires the exercise of judicial discretion. The Ninth Circuit therefore affirmed the sentence imposed by the district court. View "USA V. DEPAPE" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty in 2024 to being a felon in possession of a firearm. At sentencing, the government sought an increased base offense level under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which applies if the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions for a crime of violence. The defendant conceded that a previous conviction for third-degree assault in Oregon counted as one predicate crime of violence, but contested whether his 2021 Oregon conviction for attempted first-degree assault qualified as a second predicate.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon concluded that attempted first-degree assault under Oregon law does qualify as a crime of violence and increased the defendant’s base offense level accordingly. The court calculated a Guidelines range of 108 to 135 months and sentenced the defendant to 80 months’ imprisonment. The defendant appealed, arguing that the attempt statute in Oregon is broader than the federal definition of attempt and should not qualify under the “force clause” of the Sentencing Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. Applying its precedent, the court held that the “attempted use” of physical force, as required by the force clause in the Sentencing Guidelines, means taking a substantial step toward the use of physical force. Because Oregon law requires a substantial step toward causing serious physical injury for a conviction of attempted first-degree assault, the Ninth Circuit concluded that such a conviction qualifies as a crime of violence. The court rejected the argument that a narrower “probable desistance” test should apply and affirmed the sentence imposed by the district court. View "USA V. CHAVEZ-ECHEVERRIA" on Justia Law

The case concerns a federal defendant who, after serving a prison sentence for drug trafficking, began a term of supervised release. Following her initial release, she violated the conditions of supervised release, resulting in revocation and a new term of supervised release. During her second supervised release period, she again violated the conditions by changing her address without notifying her probation officer. A warrant was issued, but authorities did not apprehend her until over a year after her supervised release term was scheduled to expire. While absconding, she committed a separate state drug offense and was convicted in state court.The United States District Court concluded that her state drug offense, committed after her supervised release term had expired by the original schedule, constituted a violation of supervised release because her period was tolled (paused) while she was absconding. The court treated the drug offense as a Grade A violation and imposed another prison sentence followed by a new term of supervised release. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, adopting the view that abscondment automatically tolled the supervised release period, allowing post-expiration violations to be treated as if they occurred during the term.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision. The Court held that the Sentencing Reform Act does not authorize an automatic extension of a supervised release term when a defendant absconds. The Act specifies when supervised release begins and ends, provides mechanisms for revocation and extension under defined circumstances, and allows delayed adjudication of violations only for conduct occurring before expiration if a warrant or summons issues before the term ends. The Court concluded that abscondment does not automatically extend or toll the supervised release term beyond its judicially prescribed limit. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Rico v. United States" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted of conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine based on his role as a supplier to a lower-level dealer operating in Sunset Park, Brooklyn. The prosecution established that, beginning in late 2013 or early 2014, the defendant supplied large quantities of cocaine and heroin to his co-conspirator, knowing and assisting as the cocaine was converted into crack for resale. Law enforcement began investigating the operation in 2014, conducting controlled purchases and making several arrests of individuals involved in the conspiracy. The defendant was ultimately linked to the conspiracy through surveillance, witness testimony, text messages, and physical evidence such as drug ledgers.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York presided over the trial, where the jury found the defendant guilty of conspiring to distribute at least 280 grams of crack cocaine, but acquitted him of involvement with larger quantities of heroin and powder cocaine. The court denied the defendant’s post-trial motions challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. At sentencing, the court calculated a sentencing range of life imprisonment under the United States Sentencing Guidelines but imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release. The judgement included standard conditions of supervised release that were not orally pronounced at sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, the district court’s jury instructions were proper, and the sentence imposed was reasonable. However, the Second Circuit found that the district court erred by imposing standard conditions of supervised release without properly notifying the defendant at sentencing. The appellate court affirmed the conviction and sentence, vacated the standard conditions of supervised release, and remanded for further proceedings on that issue. View "United States v. Fabian" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was released from custody on the express condition that he appear at a scheduled adjudicatory hearing related to an unrelated felony. He failed to appear at the specified time and place, leading the State to charge him with the felony offense of Bail Jumping under Montana law. The defendant was arrested about ten weeks after missing the hearing. He pled not guilty and subsequently moved to dismiss the charge, arguing both that the statute was unconstitutionally vague—particularly regarding the requirement that his failure to appear be “without lawful excuse”—and that the State had failed to allege sufficient facts to establish probable cause, since it did not affirmatively show he lacked a lawful excuse.The Twentieth Judicial District Court of Montana denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The defendant then entered a plea agreement, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion. He admitted to the facts constituting the offense, including that he did not have a lawful excuse for missing the hearing.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether Montana’s bail-jumping statute is unconstitutionally vague and whether the State must allege facts negating the existence of a lawful excuse to establish probable cause. The Supreme Court held that the statute provides fair notice and sufficient guidelines to defendants and law enforcement, and is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant’s conduct. The Court also held that the State is not required to allege or prove the absence of a lawful excuse in its charging documents; rather, the existence of a lawful excuse is an affirmative defense for which the defendant carries the initial burden of production. The Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court. View "State v. Trombley" on Justia Law

The defendant was originally arrested for felony DUI in 2019 and sentenced to two years in the custody of the Montana Department of Corrections, followed by four years of suspended time, with credit for time served. After completing a residential treatment program, the remainder of his custodial sentence was to be served on probation, with the four-year suspended period to follow. The defendant later violated probationary terms, leading to a first revocation, where the district court imposed a suspended sentence except for placement into a treatment program and credited time served.Following additional probation violations, a second revocation proceeding occurred. After a hearing, the Fifth Judicial District Court found further violations and imposed a new disposition of five years, three months to the Department of Corrections, with credit for 505 days previously served. This resulted in a net DOC sentence of 1,410 days. Both the defendant and the State asserted that the district court improperly included the probationary portion of the original custodial sentence as part of the suspended time available for revocation, contrary to Montana law.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the district court erred by revoking and converting the remaining probationary period from the custodial portion of the sentence into a DOC commitment. The court determined that, under Montana statutes, only the suspended portion of a sentence may be revoked upon a petition, and the district court’s authority did not extend to the probationary period remaining on the custodial portion. The court reversed the disposition in part and remanded for correction, instructing the district court to revoke only the 1,204 days of remaining suspended time, and clarified that credit for time served must be properly applied as required by law. View "State v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted in Oregon in 2001 of attempted unlawful sexual penetration in the first degree and sexual abuse in the second degree. After completing his sentence, including probation, in 2014, he moved to Montana in 2016 and registered as a sexual offender as required by law. In 2023, the Montana Department of Justice attempted to verify his address, but the verification was returned undeliverable. The defendant left a voicemail reporting a new address but did not update his registration in person, as required by the current statute.The State of Montana charged the defendant in 2024 with failure to register as a sexual offender, expressly citing the 2023 version of the Sexual or Violent Offender Registration Act (SVORA) in its charging documents. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that retroactive application of the 2023 SVORA to his pre-2007 conviction violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Montana Constitution. The Second Judicial District Court agreed and dismissed the charge, concluding that applying the 2023 SVORA retroactively was unconstitutional.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s dismissal de novo. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the State charged the defendant under the 2023 SVORA—and this Court has previously held that the post-2007 version of SVORA is punitive and cannot be applied retroactively to convictions predating its enactment—the prosecution could not stand. The Court emphasized that the State could not rely on older versions of SVORA not cited in the charging documents and did not address arguments regarding restoration of rights, limiting its decision to the ex post facto violation. The order of dismissal was affirmed. View "State v. Pratt" on Justia Law

An orthopedic surgeon partnered with a medical supply businessman to form a durable medical equipment company. The company was formally listed under the surgeon’s mother’s name, even though she had no actual ownership or management role. The surgeon provided his mother’s personal information to his partner, who submitted Medicare enrollment forms on the company’s behalf. In January 2019, the company submitted a Medicare form notifying a change in business hours, but it falsely listed the mother as the sole owner and manager. The company ceased operations after Medicare began to suspect fraud.A federal grand jury in the Southern District of Florida indicted the surgeon on charges of conspiracy to defraud the United States and pay health care kickbacks, and making a false statement relating to health care matters. The jury acquitted him of conspiracy but convicted him of making a false statement. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida sentenced him to thirty-three months in prison, imposed three years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay $315,704.52 in restitution and to forfeit $125,000. The defendant challenged several aspects of his conviction and sentence, including venue, the sufficiency of the indictment, the sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, forfeiture, and restitution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings on all grounds except restitution. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the false statement conviction and found no error in the jury instructions or the forfeiture order. However, the court determined that the government had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the false statement actually caused the losses for which restitution was ordered. The restitution order was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings on that issue. View "United States v. Alexander" on Justia Law