Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Three individuals visiting Las Vegas became involved in a confrontation in a casino parking garage, leading to a physical altercation. The appellant joined the fight, and after security intervened, the victims attempted to leave in their car. The appellant pursued them in a rented vehicle, exited to brandish a gun, and later chased them onto a nearby street. Shots were fired into the victims’ vehicle during the pursuit, resulting in the deaths of two individuals and wounding a third. Evidence, including surveillance footage, ballistics, and phone records, implicated the appellant. He admitted to being present and pointing a BB gun but denied participating in the shooting.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County conducted a jury trial, which found the appellant guilty on two counts of murder with the use of a deadly weapon and one count of attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon. The parties waived the penalty phase, and the court imposed a sentence of life without parole.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed several arguments on appeal, including sufficiency of the evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, improper admission of text messages, autopsy photographs, sentencing errors, jury instructions, and cumulative error. The court determined that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict and found no prosecutorial misconduct. It held that the district court erred by admitting unauthenticated text messages, as the State failed to establish their authorship. However, the court concluded this error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. The Supreme Court of Nevada found no abuse of discretion in admitting autopsy photographs, sentencing, or jury instructions, and it rejected the claim of cumulative error. The court affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "Talley v. State" on Justia Law

In 1998, a jury convicted Travis Scott Frederickson of two counts of first-degree murder, found that he personally used a firearm, and found true a special circumstance of multiple murder. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Following changes in California law that gave courts discretion to strike certain firearm enhancements, Frederickson petitioned for resentencing. In 2024, Frederickson asked the Superior Court of Orange County to recall his sentence and resentence him under the amended law. The prosecution agreed that the court could resentence as to the firearm enhancement, but argued that the court could not take any action that would effectively strike or dismiss the special circumstance finding.The Superior Court, however, reduced Frederickson’s convictions from first-degree to second-degree murder and imposed sentences on those lesser charges, including firearm enhancements. The trial court explicitly stated it was not striking or dismissing the special circumstance findings, but rather vacating the first-degree murder convictions; since the special circumstance only attaches to first-degree murder, it no longer applied once those convictions were vacated. The court entered new judgments for second-degree murder and imposed sentences accordingly.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not violate Penal Code section 1385.1—which prohibits judges from striking or dismissing special circumstance findings—by vacating the first-degree murder convictions and resentencing on the lesser offenses under section 1172.1. The appellate court reasoned that when a conviction is validly vacated, the attached special circumstance falls away by operation of law, not by judicial action proscribed by section 1385.1. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Frederickson" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was charged with several violent offenses, including first-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, stemming from incidents that took place over the course of about a year. The defendant entered into a plea agreement covering multiple cases, pleading guilty to first-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, attempted second-degree murder, and criminal discharge of a firearm at occupied dwellings. In exchange, the State dismissed additional charges. Based on his criminal history and the plea agreement, the defendant faced a controlling sentence of 620 months for first-degree murder and 233 months for voluntary manslaughter, with these sentences to be served consecutively, while all other sentences would run concurrently.The Sedgwick County District Court accepted the plea, reviewed an expert report on the defendant’s drug abuse and mental health, and heard arguments regarding mitigating factors, including the defendant’s age and potential for reform. Despite these arguments, the district court imposed consecutive sentences for the first-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter convictions, citing the presence of two victims as its rationale. The defendant appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by not giving sufficient weight to mitigating factors and by failing to provide a detailed explanation for the consecutive sentences.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case for abuse of discretion. The court held that neither statute nor caselaw required the district court to consider mitigating factors or to provide a lengthy explanation for its sentencing decision. The court found that the district court’s brief statement—that there were two victims, each entitled to their own sentence—satisfied statutory requirements and was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or based on error. The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the judgment, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences. View "State v. Macormac " on Justia Law

Kyle Romey was charged with the first-degree premeditated murder of his mother after her body was found with extensive blunt-force injuries in the trailer home they shared. On the morning of the incident, Romey went to his sister’s house, displayed signs of distress, and admitted to having “hurt Mama . . . bad.” Romey’s sister observed him using methamphetamine and drinking “bong water” before they returned to the trailer and discovered their mother’s body. Romey claimed to have blacked out and not remembered the killing. Police later arrested him; forensic evidence showed blood and DNA from both Romey and his mother on weapons found at the scene.The District Court of Sedgwick County excluded evidence of Romey’s post-arrest drug use, finding it irrelevant to his mental state at the time of the killing due to intervening drug consumption. The court instructed the jury on first-degree premeditated murder and lesser included offenses but denied Romey’s request for a voluntary manslaughter instruction, concluding there was no evidence of sufficient provocation. Romey was convicted by a jury of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for more than 54 years, based on a criminal-history score of A. He appealed directly to the Kansas Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the conviction, holding that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding of premeditation and that the district court did not err in excluding evidence or refusing the manslaughter instruction. However, the court found that Romey’s criminal-history score was improperly calculated—certain convictions should not have been counted—requiring resentencing. The court also declined to consider Romey’s challenge to the calculation of jail credit because it was not properly preserved, but allowed for this issue to be addressed upon remand for resentencing. The conviction was affirmed, sentence vacated, and the case remanded with directions. View "State v. Romey " on Justia Law

A man was accused by his fiancée’s daughter, “Jane,” of sexually abusing her over several years, beginning when she was four years old. The allegations surfaced after Jane confided in a friend, leading to a criminal investigation. The investigation resulted in the discovery of web bookmarks with pornographic and incestuous titles on the man’s phone and computers. At trial, the prosecution presented testimony from Jane and others about sexual misconduct, as well as evidence of the bookmarks. The man denied the allegations, claiming Jane’s mother fabricated the accusations as part of a custody dispute.The Ellsworth District Court admitted the web bookmark evidence over the defense’s objection, finding it relevant to the charges requiring proof of sexual intent. The jury convicted the defendant on multiple counts, including aggravated criminal sodomy and related offenses. The district court sentenced him to life imprisonment without parole for 50 years, plus a consecutive term. On appeal, the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, upholding the admission of the web bookmarks and finding no prejudicial prosecutorial error or cumulative error.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case after granting further review. The court held that the web bookmark evidence was properly admitted because it was material and probative to the charged offenses, particularly those requiring proof of sexual intent. The court also found that a prosecutor’s “golden rule” argument during closing was error but deemed it harmless in light of the strong evidence against the defendant. The court further held that, even considering another harmless evidentiary error identified by the Court of Appeals, there was no cumulative error sufficient to deny the defendant a fair trial. The Supreme Court affirmed both the Court of Appeals’ and the district court’s judgments. View "State v. Cunningham " on Justia Law

A Malaysian national who worked as a managing director for Goldman Sachs in Malaysia was prosecuted for his role in a large-scale financial scheme involving 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), a Malaysian state-owned investment fund. The government presented evidence showing that, along with other conspirators, he participated in three major bond offerings raising $6.5 billion, from which more than $2.5 billion was diverted for bribes and kickbacks to officials and participants, including himself. The funds were laundered through shell companies, and the defendant received $35.1 million that was deposited in an account controlled by his family members. The defendant’s wife asserted at trial that these funds were legitimate investment returns, not criminal proceeds.Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied several motions by the defendant. The court rejected his arguments that the indictment should be dismissed for lack of venue, concluding that acts in furtherance of the conspiracy passed through the Eastern District of New York. The court also found that the government did not breach an agreement regarding his extradition from Malaysia, since the superseding indictments did not charge new offenses. The district court excluded a video recording offered by the defense as inadmissible hearsay, and ultimately, a jury found him guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment and ordered to forfeit $35.1 million.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the defendant argued improper venue, breach of extradition agreement, erroneous exclusion of evidence, and that the forfeiture was an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment. The Second Circuit held that the district court had not erred in any respect. Venue was proper, the extradition agreement was not breached, the evidentiary ruling was not an abuse of discretion, and the forfeiture was not grossly disproportionate to the offense. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and forfeiture order were affirmed. View "USA v. NG CHONG HWA" on Justia Law

A man was stopped by police while walking along a road after a report of a violent incident involving a vehicle and a fleeing suspect. The man matched the description of the person who fled the scene. Without first giving Miranda warnings, an officer handcuffed him and questioned him briefly at the roadside, where he made limited admissions about a fight. Hours later, at the police station, different officers gave him Miranda warnings, obtained a signed waiver, and questioned him further. During this interview, the man made additional incriminating statements. He was later indicted for two forms of second degree murder based on the death of the other individual involved in the incident.The Superior Court partially granted and partially denied the defendant’s motion to suppress his statements. It suppressed the initial roadside statements, finding a Miranda violation, and also suppressed statements made after the defendant invoked his right to remain silent. However, the court found that the post-Miranda statements made at the police station were voluntary and admissible. At trial, the jury convicted the defendant of reckless second degree murder and acquitted him of knowing second degree murder. The defendant also objected to the admission of certain recorded jail calls, arguing they were irrelevant.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the trial court erred in admitting the post-Miranda interview statements and the jail calls. The court held that the trial court’s finding that the defendant’s post-Miranda statements were voluntary was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, considering the circumstances and the break between interviews. Regarding the jail calls, the court held that even assuming error in admitting certain portions, any such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to overwhelming evidence of guilt. The conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Sleeper" on Justia Law

In November 2018, police and firefighters responded to a fire at the defendant’s home. About forty minutes after their arrival, while the main section of the house remained ablaze, officers seized a digital video recorder (DVR) from the garage attached to the house without first obtaining a warrant. The State alleged that the DVR contained footage relevant to a broader investigation, including suspicion of arson and multiple related homicides. The defendant moved before trial to suppress the DVR, arguing that its warrantless seizure was unconstitutional.The Superior Court, Law Division held a multi-day suppression hearing, heard testimony from several first responders, and reviewed video and photographic evidence. The trial judge found the officers credible but determined that exigent circumstances did not justify the warrantless seizure because the garage fire had been extinguished for about thirty minutes and the garage was physically distant from the still-burning portion of the house. The Appellate Division affirmed, agreeing that the officers had time to secure a warrant and that the facts did not support an objectively reasonable belief that immediate seizure was necessary.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and, applying a de novo standard to the legal conclusions, found that under the totality of the circumstances, the police acted reasonably and that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless seizure of the DVR. The Court explained that no bright-line rule governs exigency, and its determination requires a fact-sensitive analysis. Here, the seriousness of the crime, the urgency of the situation, the difficulty of obtaining a warrant at that hour, and the risk of evidence destruction supported the officers’ actions. The Court reversed the suppression order and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Caneiro" on Justia Law

Gene Roper, a convicted sex offender, was required to register his location under the Sex Offender Registration Notification Act due to a prior conviction for attempted lewdness with a child under 14. After repeated violations of registration requirements and additional criminal conduct, including multiple failures to register, resisting arrest, and battery, Roper moved from Nevada to Tennessee without notifying authorities, resulting in his fourth failure-to-register offense. His history also included significant mental health challenges, homelessness, and substance abuse issues.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee accepted Roper’s guilty plea to the federal failure-to-register charge. At sentencing, the court imposed a 30-month prison term, which Roper did not appeal. However, the court also ordered a 20-year term of supervised release, exceeding the five-year period recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines but remaining under the statutory maximum of life. The district court justified this decision by referencing Roper’s mental health needs, criminal history, repeated noncompliance with prior supervision, and risk to public safety. The court also ordered conditions such as mental health treatment and substance abuse testing.Roper appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, arguing that the district court erred procedurally by relying on his mental illness to lengthen his supervised release, and that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. The Sixth Circuit held that it was permissible for the district court to consider mental health issues as one factor among several when determining the length of supervised release. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s justification and affirmed the 20-year term, concluding that it was reasonable under the circumstances and did not violate statutory or constitutional limits. View "United States v. Roper" on Justia Law

A lawful permanent resident from Mexico entered the United States in 2016 and, in 2024, pleaded guilty to eight criminal offenses in New Mexico, including child abuse and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The child abuse conviction was based on an incident in which he punched a child in the lip. The aggregate sentence for all convictions was approximately 21.5 years. Following these convictions, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, alleging that his child abuse conviction qualified as a removable offense under federal law, and that the aggravated assault conviction constituted an aggravated felony.An Immigration Judge denied the petitioner’s motion to terminate the proceedings, sustaining both charges of removability. The petitioner’s counsel declined to seek any further relief from removal, reserving only the right to appeal. The Board of Immigration Appeals considered the case next, focusing on whether the New Mexico child abuse statute fit the federal definition of a removable “crime of child abuse.” Applying the categorical approach, the Board concluded that the statute matched the federal standard and dismissed the petitioner’s appeal, not addressing the aggravated assault conviction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision. The court held that the petitioner failed to show a realistic probability that New Mexico would apply its child abuse statute in a way broader than the federal definition. The court also determined that the petitioner was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal, regardless of whether his aggravated assault conviction constituted an aggravated felony, because he had multiple convictions with aggregate sentences exceeding five years within seven years of his admission as a permanent resident. Finding no basis for remand or relief, the Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review. View "Santiago v. Bondi" on Justia Law