Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2001, Phuoc Thien Luu, then 17, participated in an attempted home invasion robbery with three others. One accomplice shot the homeowner, who survived. Luu and another accomplice, Dung Van Nguyen, were charged with attempted murder and related crimes. Nguyen was found guilty of attempted murder and sentenced to 102 years to life plus 10 years. Luu was found not guilty of attempted murder but guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter and related crimes, receiving a sentence of 25 years to life plus 1.5 years.In 2022, both Luu and Nguyen filed petitions under Penal Code section 1172.6 for resentencing. The People conceded Nguyen was entitled to relief, and he was released. However, they argued Luu was ineligible because attempted manslaughter is not mentioned in section 1172.6. The trial court initially issued an order to show cause but later ruled Luu was statutorily ineligible for relief.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that excluding Luu from relief under section 1172.6, despite his conviction under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, led to an unjust and absurd result. The court held that a petitioner is eligible for relief under section 1172.6 if they were charged with attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine and convicted of the lesser included offense of attempted manslaughter. The court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case, directing the trial court to reissue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing. If the People cannot prove Luu's guilt under current laws, the court must resentence him with credit for time served. View "People v. Luu" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances and sentenced to death for the murder of Alfonso Martinez during a robbery and kidnapping, and for the benefit of a criminal street gang. The jury also convicted him of the attempted murder of Deborah Pizano during the same incident, and for the second-degree robbery of both Martinez and Pizano. Additionally, the defendant was convicted of five counts of attempted murder related to a separate drive-by shooting, along with other related charges.The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress his custodial statements, finding that he was properly advised of his Miranda rights and that his waiver was voluntary. The court also denied the defendant's motion to sever the charges related to the American Legion Park incident from those related to the Bedlow Drive shooting, finding that the evidence was cross-admissible and that the charges were of the same class.The California Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the first-degree murder conviction, finding that the jury's special circumstance findings indicated that the jury necessarily found the defendant guilty under a valid theory of felony murder. However, the court reversed the six counts of attempted murder, finding that the jury was instructed on an invalid natural and probable consequences theory, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also vacated the gang-murder special circumstance finding due to insufficient evidence under the amended statute.The court held that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting a rap song found in the defendant's possession, but found the error harmless. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the defendant's motions for mistrial and a new trial based on alleged juror misconduct and emotional responses from court personnel during victim impact testimony.The case was remanded for any retrial on the reversed counts and for the trial court to strike the gang-murder special circumstance finding. The court affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "People v. Hin" on Justia Law

Leon Carter was charged by the State of Wisconsin with sexual assault, strangulation, and kidnapping. During his trial, the jury sent a note to the judge with a question, but the bailiff answered it without consulting the judge. The jury found Carter guilty on all counts. After learning of the bailiff’s response, Carter moved for a mistrial, which was denied.On direct appeal, Carter’s appellate counsel filed a no-merit brief, summarizing the record and explaining why potential legal arguments, including those related to the bailiff’s actions, lacked merit. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals agreed and affirmed the convictions, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied certiorari.Carter then sought federal habeas relief, asserting two violations: that the state appellate court denied him a meaningful appeal under Anders v. California, and that the state trial judge erred by not holding a hearing to investigate jury intrusion, contrary to Remmer v. United States. The district court rejected the Anders claim and did not consider the Remmer claim. Carter appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.The Seventh Circuit concluded that Carter’s Anders claim failed, as the Wisconsin Court of Appeals had adequately reviewed the record and briefs, ensuring his appeal was resolved on its merits. The court also found that Carter’s Remmer claim could not overcome the high hurdle set by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), as the bailiff’s communication with the jury did not rise to the level of presumptive prejudice established in Remmer. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. View "Carter v. Tegels" on Justia Law

An informant informed law enforcement that a person named "Tom Collins" was dealing heroin from a residence in Albany, Oregon. Detectives planned to use the informant in a controlled buy at the residence. Instead of waiting for the results of the controlled buy to apply for a warrant, the detectives applied for and obtained a search warrant that anticipated the controlled buy. The state argued that the warrant was an "anticipatory warrant" as approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Grubbs. The defendant argued that such warrants are incompatible with Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.The Linn County Circuit Court denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search, ruling that anticipatory warrants were valid under both the Oregon and U.S. Constitutions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that anticipatory warrants were permissible under Article I, section 9, and that the affidavit established probable cause.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and declined to address the constitutional question. Instead, the court focused on Oregon's statutory warrant requirements, specifically ORS 133.555(2) and ORS 133.545(6). The court concluded that the affidavit in support of the warrant failed to comply with ORS 133.545(6), which requires that the facts and circumstances show that the objects of the search are in the places to be searched at the time of the warrant's issuance. As a result, the warrant did not comply with ORS 133.555(2), and the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress.The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court, remanding the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "State v. Lee" on Justia Law

The appellant, Samuel Cocking, was skateboarding in Carson City with a concealed firearm that lacked a serial number. After tripping, he was ridiculed by a group of minors, leading to a verbal altercation. The minors' father, Philip Eubanks, approached, and Cocking shot and killed him. Cocking was charged with open murder, carrying a concealed firearm without a permit, and possession of a firearm not imprinted with a serial number. He pleaded no contest to involuntary manslaughter, carrying a concealed firearm without a permit, and possession of a firearm not imprinted with a serial number, reserving the right to appeal the constitutionality of the gun charges.The First Judicial District Court in Carson City denied Cocking's motion to dismiss the gun charges, ruling that the statutes did not violate his Second Amendment rights. Cocking was sentenced to consecutive prison terms totaling 43-108 months.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. Cocking argued that the statutes regulating concealed carry and unserialized firearms were unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, as clarified by the U.S. Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen. The court held that the concealed carry statute did not violate the Second Amendment because it only regulated the manner of carrying firearms, not the right to carry them openly. The court also held that the statute requiring firearms to have serial numbers did not infringe on the Second Amendment, as unserialized firearms are not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.Additionally, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion at sentencing by relying on impalpable or highly suspect evidence. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "COCKING VS. STATE" on Justia Law

The appellant, Quashawn Sheridan, was on probation for a category D felony related to sex offender registration. While on probation, he was convicted of two misdemeanors: obstructing or resisting an officer by flight and failure to register with law enforcement as a convicted person within 48 hours. The district court revoked his probation, concluding that these misdemeanors were nontechnical violations because they constituted crimes of violence.The Second Judicial District Court in Washoe County revoked Sheridan's probation based on the belief that his misdemeanors were nontechnical violations. The court characterized his actions as violent crimes, which under Nevada law, would justify probation revocation without the need for graduated sanctions.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and determined that the crimes Sheridan was convicted of do not categorically constitute crimes of violence. The court emphasized that specific factual findings are necessary to classify these misdemeanors as violent crimes. The court found that the district court did not provide sufficient factual support to justify its conclusion that Sheridan's actions were violent. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court's decision to revoke Sheridan's probation and remanded the case for further proceedings. The district court was instructed to consider the imposition of graduated sanctions for Sheridan's technical probation violations, as required by NRS 176A.510. View "SHERIDAN VS. STATE" on Justia Law

In 1991, Timothy Patric Antonelli was convicted of first-degree murder under the provocative act doctrine for his role in a home invasion robbery where an accomplice was killed by a victim. In 2018, Senate Bill 1437 was enacted, and later amended by Senate Bill 775 in 2021, allowing for resentencing of individuals convicted of murder under theories imputing malice based solely on participation in a crime. Antonelli sought relief under this statute, arguing his conviction was based on such a theory.The trial court summarily denied Antonelli's petition. On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Antonelli was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 because the provocative act murder doctrine required personal malice, meaning he was not convicted under a theory imputing malice. The court deemed the jury instructions irrelevant to this determination.The California Supreme Court reviewed the case to resolve a conflict with another appellate decision, People v. Lee, which held that pre-2009 provocative act murder convictions did not necessarily require personal malice. The Supreme Court agreed with Lee, noting that prior to the 2009 decision in People v. Concha, the law allowed for malice to be imputed to a non-provocateur accomplice. Therefore, Antonelli was not categorically ineligible for relief under section 1172.6.The Supreme Court also held that the jury instructions were relevant to determining eligibility for resentencing. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeal to consider whether the trial court's previous denial of Antonelli's petition, based on findings that he was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life, precluded him from seeking relief under the new law. View "P. v. Antonelli" on Justia Law

Police stopped Prince Irell Seuell in Van Buren County, Michigan, in November 2023, discovering drugs, a semiautomatic pistol, and an outstanding warrant. Seuell pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, and the government dropped the drug distribution charge. The presentence report calculated a Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months, and the district court sentenced Seuell to 70 months.Seuell challenged his conviction and sentence. He argued that the felon-in-possession statute violated the Second Amendment as applied to him, but he waived this argument at sentencing. The district court offered to appoint new counsel to file a motion challenging the statute, but Seuell chose to proceed with sentencing without raising the motion. The court found this waiver binding.Seuell also contested the base offense level set by the presentence report, arguing that he did not know his pistol could carry a large capacity magazine. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the relevant Guideline does not contain a state-of-mind requirement and applies whenever the firearm qualifies. The court noted that the Sentencing Commission knew how to add a state-of-mind requirement when it wished to do so and rejected Seuell's argument.Additionally, Seuell challenged the district court’s enhancement for using a firearm in connection with another offense. The Sixth Circuit found no clear error in the district court’s finding that Seuell committed another felony offense and connected his pistol to drug trafficking. The court noted that the drugs and drug paraphernalia were found in close proximity to the loaded pistol, supporting the enhancement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed Seuell’s conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Seuell" on Justia Law

Julian R. Bear Runner, an enrolled member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe (OST) and its President from December 2018 to December 2020, was convicted of wire fraud, larceny, and embezzlement and theft from an Indian Tribal Organization. He manipulated the Tribe’s travel policies to embezzle over $80,000, which he used for gambling at the Prairie Wind Casino. Bear Runner pressured travel specialists to approve fraudulent travel requests and never repaid the advance payments.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota sentenced Bear Runner to 22 months in prison and ordered $82,484 in restitution. Bear Runner appealed, arguing that the government failed to prove the requisite criminal intents for his offenses and that the district court committed procedural and substantive errors in sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the jury’s verdict, stating that sufficient evidence supported the finding that Bear Runner intended to defraud, steal, and embezzle. The court noted that fraudulent intent could be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding Bear Runner’s actions, including his manipulation of the approval process and his failure to repay the funds.Regarding sentencing, the court found no procedural error, as Bear Runner did not accept responsibility for his actions. The court also found no substantive error, as the district court acted within its discretion in considering similarly situated defendants and determining that Bear Runner’s individual circumstances warranted a different outcome. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Runner" on Justia Law

Karl Gustke, the criminal defendant, was released on a $100,000 surety bond, for which his father, John Gustke, was jointly liable through a promissory note and indemnity agreement. Karl violated his bond conditions by consuming alcohol, removing his GPS ankle monitor, and absconding from the state. Consequently, the bond was forfeited. John Gustke petitioned to intervene in the forfeiture proceedings, seeking remission of the forfeited bond.Initially, the district court denied John's motion to intervene, but the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed this decision in a prior appeal (Gustke I), remanding the case for further proceedings. On remand, the district court allowed John to intervene and present evidence. After considering the evidence, the district court ordered $25,000 of the forfeited bond to be remitted to John, while upholding the forfeiture of the remaining $75,000. John appealed this decision.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the district court's decision for an abuse of discretion. The court considered factors such as the willfulness of Karl's breach, the costs and inconvenience to the government, the participation of the surety in apprehending Karl, and any mitigating factors. The court found that Karl's willful violation of bond conditions and the resulting costs and delays justified a substantial forfeiture. The district court had considered mitigating factors, including Karl's mental health and John's efforts to locate him, but found these did not fully outweigh the need for forfeiture.The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the remission of $25,000 of the $100,000 bond was reasonable and supported by sufficient evidence, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "Gustke v. State" on Justia Law