Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

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Frederick Marsalia Rosenau was convicted of felony murder and a violation of the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act in connection with the shooting death of Quincy Suggs. Suggs was shot and killed on September 16, 2014. Rosenau, along with co-defendants Lavarr Pierce, Khadijah Jenkins, and Julius Lofton, was charged with multiple offenses, including malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, arson, and gang-related activities. Lofton pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and testified against the others. Rosenau, Pierce, and Jenkins were tried together, and the jury found Rosenau guilty of felony murder, aggravated assault, and a gang act violation. He was sentenced to life in prison without parole for felony murder and an additional 15 years for the gang act violation.Rosenau filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. He then appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his gang act conviction, that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial after the prosecutor commented on his silence, and that his trial counsel was ineffective for not retaining a gang expert and for not objecting to certain testimony.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the evidence was sufficient to support Rosenau's gang act conviction. The court held that the trial evidence established the existence of a criminal street gang, Rosenau's association with the gang, and that the aggravated assault of Suggs was intended to further the gang's interests. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rosenau's motion for mistrial, as the curative instruction given to the jury was sufficient. Lastly, the court concluded that Rosenau's trial counsel was not ineffective, as the decisions made were reasonable trial strategies. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Rosenau's convictions. View "Rosenau v. State" on Justia Law

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Shawn Hylton was indicted for felony murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Lathan Davenport. Hylton filed a motion for immunity from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2, which the trial court granted. The State appealed, arguing that the trial court's order lacked sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law for meaningful appellate review and that the evidence did not support Hylton's claim of self-defense.The DeKalb County grand jury indicted Hylton on December 19, 2023. Hylton filed his motion for immunity on March 12, 2024, and after an evidentiary hearing on July 2, 2024, the trial court granted the motion on July 10, 2024. The State filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was submitted to the Supreme Court of Georgia for a decision on the briefs.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. The evidence showed that Davenport had a violent reputation and had previously attacked Hylton. On the day of the shooting, Davenport severely beat Hylton and later approached him aggressively, prompting Hylton to shoot Davenport in self-defense. The Supreme Court found that the trial court's implicit findings were supported by the evidence and that Hylton had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he reasonably believed deadly force was necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decision to grant Hylton immunity from prosecution, concluding that the trial court did not err in its findings. View "State v. Hylton" on Justia Law

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Loren Dean Raver was pulled over while driving a stolen Ford F-150 and subsequently arrested. The truck's owner, Stacie Grandpre, confirmed that she did not know Raver and had not given him permission to drive her truck. Upon searching the vehicle, deputies found syringes, a spoon with a crystalline substance, and stolen copper wire and tools. Raver was charged with multiple counts, including felony theft and misdemeanors. He entered a no contest plea for felony theft and misdemeanor theft of the copper wire, and the other charges were dropped.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, held a sentencing hearing where the State requested $17,470.36 in restitution for Grandpre's losses, including vehicle damage, hunting gear, car rentals, and cleaning costs. The State presented testimony from a State Farm Insurance claims specialist, who attributed the damages to the theft based on Grandpre's statements and the investigation. Raver, a mechanic, contested the amount, claiming the truck had no issues during his possession and proposed a lower restitution amount.The District Court ordered the full restitution amount, finding a reasonable connection between the damage and Raver's theft. The court found the State's evidence credible and Raver's testimony not credible. Raver appealed, arguing insufficient causation and challenging the inclusion of the bumper replacement cost.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The court found that the evidence presented, including the State Farm investigation and Grandpre's statements, supported the restitution amount by a preponderance of the evidence. The court also rejected Raver's argument regarding the bumper, as there was insufficient evidence to refute the State Farm conclusion. View "State v. Raver" on Justia Law

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In March 2022, Brian Milazzo was stopped at a driver’s license checkpoint in Randolph County, Missouri. Milazzo, who was driving a pickup truck with a passenger, did not have his driver’s license but had proof of insurance on his phone. After being asked to pull over, the officers noticed the passenger was not wearing a seatbelt and refused to identify himself. The officers decided to arrest the passenger for failing to wear a seatbelt. When the passenger refused to exit the vehicle, the officers instructed Milazzo to unlock the passenger-side door multiple times. Milazzo did not comply, leading the officers to break the window to arrest the passenger. Milazzo was subsequently arrested and charged with interfering with an arrest.The Circuit Court of Randolph County overruled Milazzo’s motions for judgment of acquittal, and the jury found him guilty of interfering with an arrest. Milazzo was sentenced to 21 days in jail. He appealed the conviction, arguing insufficient evidence to support the charge, specifically that failing to unlock the door did not constitute physical interference.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. The court interpreted the statute on interfering with an arrest to include not only affirmative acts but also omissions that hamper law enforcement. The court found that Milazzo’s refusal to unlock the door constituted physical interference as it created a material barrier to the officers’ ability to arrest the passenger. The court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment and sentence against Milazzo. View "State v. Milazzo" on Justia Law

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Brian K. Heathcock was found guilty of first-degree tampering, felony resisting arrest, and tampering with a victim. In September 2018, Heathcock threw his girlfriend's cell phone out of a moving car, then drove off with her car when she exited to retrieve it. The girlfriend reported the car stolen. Heathcock was later spotted by a deputy sheriff in Warren County, leading to a high-speed chase. He was eventually found near a Walmart, where he admitted to taking the car and stealing CDs.Heathcock pleaded guilty to first-degree tampering in Montgomery County in October 2019. In November 2020, he was charged in Warren County with another count of first-degree tampering for the same vehicle incident. Heathcock moved to dismiss this count on double jeopardy grounds, but the circuit court overruled the motion. He was also charged with felony resisting arrest and tampering with a victim. A jury found him guilty on all counts, and the circuit court sentenced him to five years in prison for each count, with some sentences to be served concurrently and others consecutively. Heathcock renewed his double jeopardy objection in his motion for a new trial.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's judgment. The court held that Heathcock's convictions were based on two distinct acts of tampering, as he operated the vehicle unlawfully on separate occasions. The court found that each act of operation constituted a discrete crime, and thus, did not violate double jeopardy protections. The court concluded that Heathcock's actions in Montgomery and Warren Counties were separate offenses, justifying multiple convictions. View "State v. Heathcock" on Justia Law

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Jon Woods, a workers' compensation attorney, was convicted of 37 felony counts of workers' compensation fraud. Woods had engaged in unlawful kickback and referral fee arrangements, referring copy and subpoena work to companies that provided financial benefits to him and his firm. This corruption affected the workers' compensation system, as the employer's insurance company had to cover the costs.The Superior Court of Orange County reviewed the case, where Woods was found guilty on all counts and received a four-year prison sentence. He was also ordered to pay $701,452 in restitution. Woods appealed, arguing that the Williamson rule precluded convictions on counts 5 through 37, and that the court erred in limiting his cross-examination of certain prosecution witnesses.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Woods that the Williamson rule applied, as his conduct fell under a more specific statute, Labor Code section 139.32, which criminalizes kickback schemes and is a misdemeanor. Therefore, the court reversed Woods's convictions on counts 5 through 37, the white-collar sentencing enhancement, and the restitution award based on these charges. However, the court found no error in the trial court's limitation of cross-examination of prosecution witnesses and affirmed the remainder of the judgment. View "People v. Woods" on Justia Law

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Charles Warner was convicted in federal district court in New Mexico for being a felon in possession of a firearm and dealing in firearms without a license. Warner appealed his conviction on four grounds: he argued that he was not prohibited from owning firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), that his suppression challenge regarding evidence seized at his house was improperly denied, that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of dealing in firearms without a license, and that the number of firearms in his possession was improperly counted.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico denied Warner's pre-trial motion to dismiss the felon-in-possession charge and his motion to suppress evidence seized from his computers. At trial, Warner testified that he knew he was a convicted felon but did not know he was prohibited from possessing firearms under federal law. The jury convicted Warner on both counts. At sentencing, the district court applied a sentencing enhancement for possessing between 25 and 99 firearms, based on expert testimony, and sentenced Warner to 33 months' imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Warner is a "prohibited person" under § 922(g) because he has two prior state-law felony convictions for which he could have been sentenced to more than one year of imprisonment and has not had all of his civil rights restored. The court also rejected Warner's constitutional challenge to § 922(g), holding that it is foreclosed by recent Tenth Circuit precedent. The court found that any alleged error in the denial of Warner's suppression motion was harmless because none of the evidence Warner sought to suppress was used in the prosecution's case-in-chief. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Warner of dealing in firearms without a license and affirmed the district court's application of the sentencing enhancement for possessing between 25 and 99 firearms. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Warner's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Warner" on Justia Law

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In 2001, a jury convicted Kim H. Tang of first-degree murder and using a deadly weapon. The court found true that Tang had one prison prior, one serious felony prior, and one strike prior. Tang was sentenced to 50 years to life, plus a five-year serious felony enhancement and a one-year weapon enhancement. The court imposed and stayed a one-year enhancement for the prison prior. Tang appealed, and in 2002, the Court of Appeal modified the judgment to strike the prison prior enhancement.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Tang's motion for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, which was enacted to invalidate certain sentence enhancements. The court concluded that Tang was ineligible for resentencing because the prison prior enhancement had been stricken, not imposed.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that a stricken enhancement is not considered an imposed enhancement under section 1172.75, subdivision (a). Therefore, Tang was not eligible for resentencing under the statute. The court directed the trial court to issue an amended abstract of judgment reflecting that the enhancement was stricken. View "P. v. Tang" on Justia Law

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Lance Maytubby was called to the police station by Officer T.J. White to answer questions regarding accusations of sexual abuse made by his nieces, R.L. and Z.L. During the interview, Officer White informed Maytubby that he was not under arrest and could leave at any time. The interview, which was recorded, took place in a non-coercive environment, and Officer White maintained a friendly tone. Despite initially denying the accusations, Maytubby eventually confessed after Officer White suggested that mitigating circumstances, such as Maytubby being a pastor and a family man, could be included in the report to the district attorney.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma held a pretrial suppression hearing where Officer White testified. The district court denied Maytubby's motion to suppress his confession, finding that the interrogation was not coercive and that Maytubby's statements were voluntary. The court noted factors such as the short duration of the interview, the non-coercive environment, and the absence of physical abuse or aggressive behavior by Officer White. A jury later convicted Maytubby on several counts of aggravated sexual abuse and abusive sexual contact, leading to a life sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Officer White's statements during the interview were not coercive and did not overbear Maytubby's will. The court found that the interview was conducted in a non-coercive manner, and Officer White's comments about including mitigating factors in the report were proper and did not imply control over sentencing. The court concluded that Maytubby's confession was voluntary and upheld the conviction. View "United States v. Maytubby" on Justia Law

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Juan Carlos Enriquez, a pharmacy technician, was involved in a scheme to refer Medicare and Medi-Cal beneficiaries to pharmacies owned by his alleged co-conspirator, Irina Sadovsky, in exchange for kickbacks. Enriquez was indicted for conspiracy to receive healthcare kickbacks in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and for receiving prohibited payments in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing it failed to state an offense and lacked specificity because it did not negate the statutory safe harbor for a bona fide employment relationship under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(B).The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Enriquez’s motion to dismiss. Enriquez then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his pretrial motion. The district court sentenced him to one day of imprisonment, followed by two years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay $121,115 in restitution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. Enriquez argued that the principles from Ruan v. United States, which required the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant knew they were acting in an unauthorized manner under the Controlled Substances Act, should apply to the AKS. He contended that the AKS bona fide employment safe harbor should be treated as a "quasi-element" for pleading purposes. The Ninth Circuit declined to extend Ruan’s reasoning to the AKS or to pleading requirements, affirming that indictments need not allege affirmative defenses. The court held that the indictment provided sufficient detail to inform Enriquez of the charges and enable him to prepare his defense. The district court’s denial of Enriquez’s motion to dismiss was affirmed. View "USA V. ENRIQUEZ" on Justia Law