Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Shawn Lamar Peake-Wright, Jr. was a passenger in a car driven by Kimberly Manney in Kalamazoo, Michigan, when they were stopped by Sgt. Timothy Millard. Sgt. Millard recognized Peake-Wright and knew of his criminal history. During the stop, Peake-Wright exhibited strange behavior, including removing his jacket in freezing weather and repeatedly standing up despite officers' instructions to remain seated. Sgt. Millard, suspecting that Peake-Wright's jacket might contain contraband, searched it and found a loaded 9mm pistol.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan denied Peake-Wright's motion to suppress the evidence of the firearm, holding that the search was justified under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The court found that Peake-Wright's behavior and criminal history provided probable cause to believe that his jacket contained evidence of a crime.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the duration of the traffic stop was reasonable and that the officers had probable cause to search Peake-Wright's jacket. The court emphasized that the totality of the circumstances, including Peake-Wright's erratic behavior and criminal history, justified the search under the automobile exception. The court concluded that the search was lawful and upheld the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Peake-Wright" on Justia Law

Michael Mills was convicted of being a felon in possession of ammunition after a shootout involving members of the Detroit gang, It’s Just Us (IJU). Mills, armed with a loaded pistol-grip shotgun, fired two shots during the altercation, resulting in the death of IJU member James Matthews Jr. Mills was subsequently arrested and charged. A jury found him guilty, and the district court sentenced him to the statutory maximum of 120 months, applying a sentencing enhancement based on Mills's role in Matthews's death.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan initially sentenced Mills, but the case was remanded by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for additional factual findings regarding the sentencing enhancement. On remand, the district court reaffirmed its findings, concluding that Mills caused Matthews's death, had the necessary mental state for second-degree murder, and rejected Mills's justification defense. The district court reimposed the same 120-month sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case again. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Mills committed second-degree murder with malice aforethought, based on his actions and social media messages indicating a premeditated intent. The court also found no clear error in the district court's rejection of Mills's justification defense, noting that Mills had viable alternatives to engaging in the shootout. Additionally, the appellate court determined that the district court properly considered the sentencing factors, including the need for deterrence and Mills's criminal history.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Mills's 120-month sentence. View "United States v. Mills" on Justia Law

Christopher William Kuehner was charged with engaging in a child exploitation enterprise. He used a website and a messaging server dedicated to sexual violence and the sexual exploitation of minors, employing two different usernames to produce and encourage the production of child sexual abuse material. Authorities identified Kuehner as the person behind these usernames and charged him accordingly.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia conducted a two-day bench trial, during which Kuehner was found guilty and sentenced to twenty years in prison. Kuehner raised several challenges on appeal, including the district court's interpretation of the child exploitation enterprises statute, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, and the denial of his motion to vacate his conviction based on the Government's alleged failure to disclose certain information.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that the child exploitation enterprises statute does not require each predicate felony to be committed in concert with three or more people; rather, the total number of people can be summed across the relevant predicate offenses. The court also found that there was substantial evidence to support Kuehner's conviction, including his own admissions, forensic evidence, and testimony from minor victims. Finally, the court determined that there was no Brady violation, as the undisclosed information from Google and Discord was not material to Kuehner's defense. View "U.S. v. Kuehner" on Justia Law

Trevon Bey was convicted by a jury of possession of a firearm by a felon and carrying a loaded firearm in public. The trial court dismissed a prior strike conviction and sentenced Bey to three years for each count, to be served concurrently. Bey appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly revoked his self-representation status, that his conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon violated his Second Amendment rights, and that California's concealed carry laws were unconstitutional under a recent Supreme Court decision.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially allowed Bey to represent himself but later revoked this status due to his disruptive behavior and failure to follow court rules. Bey repeatedly challenged the court's authority, disrespected the court, and disrupted proceedings, despite multiple warnings. The court appointed standby counsel to represent him, citing his inability to adhere to courtroom protocol.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Bey's self-representation status due to his continuous disruptive conduct. The court also found that Bey's conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon did not violate his Second Amendment rights, referencing recent Supreme Court decisions that upheld prohibitions on firearm possession by felons. Additionally, the court rejected Bey's challenge to California's concealed carry laws, noting that the unconstitutional "good cause" requirement was severable from the rest of the licensing scheme.The Court of Appeal agreed with both parties that the sentence for carrying a loaded firearm in public should be stayed under Penal Code section 654, as it was based on the same act as the possession charge. The court modified the judgment to stay the sentence on count 2 and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "People v. Bey" on Justia Law

Julian Omidi and his business, Surgery Center Management, LLC (SCM), were involved in a fraudulent scheme called "Get Thin," which promised weight loss through Lap-Band surgery and other medical procedures. Omidi and SCM defrauded insurance companies by submitting false claims for reimbursement, including fabricated patient data and misrepresented physician involvement. The scheme recruited patients through a call center, pushing them towards expensive medical tests and procedures regardless of medical necessity.A grand jury indicted Omidi and SCM for mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and related charges. After extensive pretrial litigation and a lengthy jury trial, both were convicted on all charges. The district court sentenced Omidi to 84 months in prison and fined SCM over $22 million. The government sought forfeiture of nearly $100 million, arguing that all proceeds from the Get Thin scheme were derived from fraud. The district court agreed, finding that even proceeds from legitimate procedures were indirectly the result of the fraudulent scheme.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's forfeiture judgment, holding that under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), all proceeds directly or indirectly derived from a health care fraud scheme must be forfeited. The court rejected the argument that only proceeds from fraudulent transactions should be forfeited, noting that the entire business was permeated with fraud. The court concluded that there is no "100% Fraud Rule" in forfeiture cases seeking proceeds of a fraud scheme, and all proceeds from the Get Thin scheme were subject to forfeiture. View "United States V. Surgery Center Management, LLC" on Justia Law

Nghia Le was involved in a methamphetamine distribution operation centered at a motorcycle shop rented by Ryan Negrotto. Le supplied methamphetamine to the shop, where drug transactions took place. Le was indicted on multiple charges, including using or maintaining a drug premises. Le admitted to using the shop for drug distribution but contested that he maintained it.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana applied a two-level offense enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12), concluding that Le maintained the premises for drug distribution based on his admission in the factual basis supporting his guilty plea. Le objected, arguing that he did not have control over the shop, but the district court overruled his objection and sentenced him to 135 months for the methamphetamine charges, with additional sentences for other charges.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in applying the enhancement based solely on Le's ambiguous admission. The appellate court noted that the factual basis did not clearly establish that Le maintained the shop, as it primarily indicated his use of the premises. The court also found insufficient evidence that Le had a possessory interest or control over the shop. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit vacated Le's sentence for the methamphetamine charges and remanded for resentencing, allowing the district court to reconsider the enhancement with more developed arguments. The court affirmed the rest of Le's conviction and sentence, rejecting his argument that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Le" on Justia Law

Dwayne Sherman was indicted for several offenses related to drug trafficking in Central Pennsylvania, including six counts of money laundering, one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, and one count of conspiracy to launder money. The charges stemmed from activities between 2012 and 2018. Evidence presented at trial included testimony from a drug dealer, Paul Alston, who bought cocaine from Sherman, and FBI informant Ruben Martin, who received large sums of cash from Sherman intended for Mexico. Sherman admitted to selling cocaine and making money drops but claimed ignorance of the money's criminal origins.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied Sherman’s motion for a new trial but vacated three of his money-laundering convictions, finding they were separate means of committing a single offense. At sentencing, the court applied a dangerous-weapon enhancement based on Sherman’s testimony about having access to handguns while storing drug proceeds at home, resulting in a 262-month imprisonment sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. Sherman argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, the government’s proof of the drug conspiracy varied from the indictment, and the district court erred in applying the dangerous-weapon enhancement. The Third Circuit found that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict, including Sherman’s knowledge and intent regarding the money laundering and drug conspiracy charges. The court also found no impermissible variance between the indictment and the trial evidence and upheld the district court’s application of the dangerous-weapon enhancement. Consequently, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Sherman" on Justia Law

The petitioner pleaded guilty to three counts of first-degree sodomy and was sentenced to 60 months in prison for Count 1, 100 months for Count 3, and 100 months for Count 5, with the sentences for Counts 3 and 5 to be served consecutively. The trial court also imposed terms of post-prison supervision (PPS) for each count, calculated as 240 months minus the term of imprisonment served for each count. The petitioner completed his prison terms and was released in April 2016.The Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision calculated the PPS terms by subtracting the time served for each count from the 240-month maximum, resulting in 180 months for Count 1 and 140 months for Counts 3 and 5. The petitioner argued that the "term of imprisonment served" should be the total time served for all counts, which would result in a shorter PPS term. The board rejected this argument, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the board's decision.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the "term of imprisonment served" in ORS 144.103 refers to the time spent in prison for the specific count of conviction, not the total time served for all counts. The court also concluded that the PPS term begins when the offender is released into the community, not while still incarcerated on other counts. Therefore, the court affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision. View "Kragt v. Board of Parole" on Justia Law

The case involves the defendant, who was charged with 46 sex crimes against the same person over an eight-year period. The counts in the indictment were identical and did not specify the incidents they were based on. During the first trial, the state did not link any specific incidents to the counts, and the jury found the defendant not guilty of 40 counts and guilty of six. The defendant appealed, arguing an evidentiary error, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case.On remand, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, claiming that retrying him on the six counts of conviction would violate his constitutional rights against double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion, and the case proceeded to a second jury trial, where the defendant was again convicted of the six counts. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the Court of Appeals had erred in resolving the case on preservation grounds. The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant had consistently raised the same double jeopardy argument throughout the case: that due to the lack of specificity in the indictment and the first trial, it was impossible to determine the factual basis for any count, and there was a risk that he would be convicted based on incidents of which he had already been acquitted. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings to address the merits of the double jeopardy issue. View "State v. Dodge" on Justia Law

Wendy Johnson pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter after causing the death of Stephanie Heneha-Roubidoux in a drunk-driving accident. The government sought criminal restitution for Stephanie’s lost income, presenting testimony from an expert and Stephanie’s wife, Kristi Heneha-Roubidoux. Johnson argued for zero lost-income restitution, citing the government’s expert who stated Stephanie would have consumed all her income personally. The district court declined to deduct personal consumption from the restitution award.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma sentenced Johnson to 36 months in prison and three years of supervised release, without imposing a fine due to her lack of financial resources. The court ordered restitution of $158,009, based on the government’s reduced request of $208,009 minus a $50,000 insurance settlement received by Kristi. The court found Kristi’s testimony about Stephanie’s income credible and relied on it, despite the defense expert’s criticism of the government’s expert for not applying a personal-consumption deduction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the district court erred in rejecting the personal-consumption deduction for a legally incorrect reason, as household contributions do not fall within “lost income” under the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA). The appellate court vacated the restitution award and remanded the case for the district court to reconsider the personal-consumption deduction and the payment schedule. The appellate court also addressed the sealing of certain documents, granting the parties' request to redact specific private information and keep the district court’s statement of reasons under seal. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law