Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A cheesesteak restaurant owner, Nicholas Lucidonio, was involved in a payroll tax fraud scheme at Tony Luke’s, where he avoided employment taxes by issuing paychecks for “on-the-books” wages, requiring employees to sign back their paychecks, and then paying them in cash for both “on-the-books” and “off-the-books” wages. This led to the filing of false employer tax returns that underreported wages and underpaid employment taxes. Employees, aware of the scheme, received Form W-2s listing only “on-the-books” wages, resulting in underreported income on their personal tax returns. The conspiracy spanned ten years and involved systemic underreporting of wages for 30 to 40 employees at any given time.Lucidonio pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to defraud the IRS (Klein conspiracy) under 18 U.S.C. § 371. He did not appeal his conviction but challenged his sentence, specifically the application of a United States Sentencing Guideline that increased his offense level by two points. The enhancement applies when conduct is intended to encourage others to violate internal revenue laws or impede the IRS’s collection of revenue. Lucidonio argued that the enhancement was misapplied because it required explicit direction to others to violate the IRS Code, which he claimed did not occur, and that his employees were co-conspirators, not additional persons encouraged to violate the law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court disagreed with Lucidonio’s interpretation that the enhancement required explicit direction. However, it found that the government failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Lucidonio encouraged anyone other than co-conspirators, as the employees were aware of and participated in the scheme. Consequently, the court vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing without the enhancement. View "United States v. Lucidonio" on Justia Law

Scott Davis purchased property in Tomball, Texas, using fraudulently obtained loan proceeds from the Paycheck Protection Program. He later used this property as collateral to secure a $360,000 loan from Gravity Capital. Davis pleaded guilty to wire fraud and agreed to forfeit the Tomball property. The district court issued a preliminary order of forfeiture and notified interested parties. E. Alan Tiras and Gravity Funding filed ancillary petitions claiming an interest in the property. The district court granted Tiras' petition but denied Gravity Funding's petition due to a drafting error, as the petition was signed on behalf of Gravity Funding instead of Gravity Capital.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas found that Gravity Funding had no interest in the loan issued to Davis, and Gravity Capital was not a party to the petition. Consequently, the court denied Gravity Funding's petition. Gravity Funding and Gravity Capital appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the petition failed to comply with 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) because it was signed by Gravity Funding, not Gravity Capital. The court also noted that any attempt to amend the petition to include Gravity Capital was untimely, as it was made eleven months after the statutory deadline. The court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that Gravity Capital's failure to assert a valid interest under § 853(n) also invalidated its challenge to the Tiras petition. The court emphasized the importance of strict compliance with statutory requirements in forfeiture cases. View "United States v. Tiras" on Justia Law

Oljine Noguez and Manuel Zepeda Mendoza were investigated for their alleged involvement in an opioid trafficking operation. Following the investigation, the State of Texas seized their bank accounts and cash, initiating four civil-forfeiture actions. The State alleged that the funds were contraband related to the trafficking operation, attaching a sworn declaration and affidavit from the investigating officer, Bryan Bacon, to each notice of seizure. Nearly two years later, the Claimants filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, arguing that the State had no evidence to support its claims. The State responded but did not attach any exhibits, instead referencing Officer Bacon’s affidavit.The trial court considered the motion and granted summary judgment for the Claimants, noting that the State did not attach the affidavit to its response. The State then filed a motion for leave to file a response with the affidavit attached, which the trial court denied, finalizing its order granting summary judgment to the Claimants. The State appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the State failed to meet its burden by not attaching the affidavit and not sufficiently directing the trial court to specific portions of the affidavit.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i) does not require the attachment of previously filed summary judgment evidence. The Court found that the State’s response sufficiently pointed out and discussed the evidence, reversing the Court of Appeals’ judgment. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, instructing the trial court to reconsider the no-evidence motion in light of the opinion that previously filed evidence referenced in a response can be considered without being attached. View "THE STATE OF TEXAS v. THREE THOUSAND, SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY-FOUR DOLLARS AND TWENTY-EIGHT CENTS U.S. CURRENCY ($3,774.28)" on Justia Law

The case involves $14,100.00 in cash seized by the Linn County Sheriff’s Office from a Bitcoin ATM kiosk in Cedar Rapids during a fraud investigation. Bitcoin Depot, the owner of the ATM, sought the return of the seized funds, while Carrie Carlson, the customer who deposited the money, also filed a competing claim for the return of the funds. Carlson had deposited the money into the ATM and received Bitcoins in return, which were transferred to a wallet as directed by a scammer.The Iowa District Court for Linn County held a hearing on the competing claims and ordered the return of the seized funds to Carlson. The court reasoned that Carlson was a victim of fraud and likened the situation to recovering stolen property from a pawnbroker. The court also considered the transaction a "smart contract" and concluded that Bitcoin Depot had reason to know of potential duress due to the warning provided on the ATM.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and concluded that Bitcoin Depot had the greater right to possession of the seized funds. The court found that Bitcoin Depot acted in good faith and without reason to know of Carlson’s duress. The court rejected the district court’s analogy to pawnbrokers and the characterization of the transaction as a smart contract that inherently involved knowledge of duress. The court held that Carlson did not meet her burden to show that Bitcoin Depot had reason to know of her duress, and thus, the contract was not voidable.The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case with instructions to return the seized funds to Bitcoin Depot. View "In the Matter of Property Seized for Forfeiture from Bitcoin Depot Operating, LLC v. Carlson" on Justia Law

Vanessa Gale was at a convenience store in Davenport when she encountered Romaro Houston. They walked outside together and got into Gale’s car. Shortly after, police officers arrived to arrest Houston, leading to a search of Gale’s body and purse. The search uncovered cash, methamphetamine, and marijuana. Gale was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of marijuana, both alleged as second offenses.In the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Gale filed a motion to suppress the evidence from the search, arguing that the stop and subsequent search were unlawful. The district court denied her motion. Gale consented to a trial on the minutes of testimony, and the court found her guilty on both counts, sentencing her based on the belief that she had prior convictions for possession of a controlled substance.Gale appealed, and the case was transferred to the Iowa Court of Appeals. She argued that the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress and that her sentence was illegal because her prior conviction did not qualify as a predicate offense under Iowa Code § 124.401(5). The State agreed that the minutes of testimony were inaccurate regarding her prior conviction. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress and upheld the sentence, stating it could not take judicial notice of the Cedar County case filings.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed with the parties that Gale’s prior conviction was for possession of prescription drugs without a prescription, which does not qualify as a predicate offense under § 124.401(5). The court concluded that Gale’s sentence for second-offense possession counts was illegal and remanded the case for resentencing. The decision of the court of appeals was affirmed in part and vacated in part, and the district court judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "State of Iowa v. Gale" on Justia Law

Ronald Eugene Cooley was charged with failing to fulfill his sex offender registration requirements after moving to a new address. Iowa law mandates that sex offenders must appear in person to notify the sheriff of any change in residence within five business days. Cooley claimed he attempted to register his new address in person, but the sheriff's office was closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The State argued that Cooley could have registered by calling a phone number posted on the sheriff's office door. The district court did not include the "appear in person" requirement in the jury instructions, and Cooley was convicted.The Iowa District Court for Linn County denied Cooley's motions for acquittal and a new trial, concluding that the closure of the sheriff's office did not absolve Cooley of his duty to register. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, agreeing that the district court did not err in omitting the in-person requirement from the jury instructions.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that appearing in person is an essential element of the crime of failing to register a change of address. The court found that the district court erred by not including this requirement in the jury instructions. The court concluded that the error was not harmless, as it could not be determined whether the jury would have found Cooley guilty beyond a reasonable doubt if properly instructed. The Iowa Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, reversed the district court judgment, and remanded the case for a new trial. View "State of Iowa v. Cooley" on Justia Law

Melissa S. Bret was charged with theft by shoplifting goods valued at $500 or less and having two prior convictions for the same offense, which would classify the crime as a Class IV felony. A jury found her guilty of shoplifting property valued at $77.64. After the jury returned its verdict, the district court adjudged Bret guilty of theft by shoplifting, a Class IV felony, and sentenced her to 1 year’s imprisonment. However, no evidence was presented regarding Bret’s prior convictions, and the court did not make any findings about such convictions.The District Court for Douglas County initially adjudged Bret guilty of a Class IV felony based on the jury's verdict. During the sentencing hearing, the court and both parties proceeded under the assumption that Bret was being sentenced for a Class IV felony. The presentence investigation report also indicated that Bret was charged with and convicted of a Class IV felony. However, the court did not hold a separate enhancement hearing to determine the existence of prior convictions, nor did the State present evidence of such convictions.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the district court erred in enhancing Bret’s offense to a Class IV felony without evidence of prior convictions. The court held that the sentence imposed was illegal because it exceeded the permissible statutory penalty for a Class II misdemeanor, which is the correct classification based on the jury's finding of the value involved. The Supreme Court vacated Bret’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. The court also concluded that the State did not waive its right to seek enhancement and may attempt to prove Bret’s prior convictions on remand. View "State v. Bret" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with three counts of sexual assault of a child and one count of child abuse, involving two young victims, M.R. and E.R. The alleged crimes occurred while the defendant was babysitting the children during their mother's part-time evening job. M.R. disclosed the sexual assaults years later, and E.R. disclosed the physical abuse during a forensic interview. The defense argued that the children's memories were unreliable and that the defendant lacked the opportunity to commit the crimes.The trial court joined the charges for a single trial, and the jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. The defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the joinder of charges, request a limiting instruction, and object to certain testimonies on hearsay and foundation grounds. He also claimed the trial court erred in overruling an objection to a witness's testimony about delayed disclosures of abuse.The Nebraska Supreme Court found that the charges were properly joined as they were "connected together" under the relevant statute, given the overlapping timeframes, locations, and witnesses. The court also held that the defendant failed to show prejudice from the joinder, as the evidence was cross-admissible for proper purposes, and the jury was instructed to consider each charge separately. The court found no merit in the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, as the objections would likely have lacked merit or the evidence was cumulative. The court also ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the witness's testimony about delayed disclosures. The judgment was affirmed. View "State v. Corral" on Justia Law

The defendant, Jessica Warren, was convicted of driving after suspension or revocation, with death resulting, under RSA 263:64, V-a, following a jury trial in the Superior Court. On September 5, 2018, Warren, whose license was suspended, drove a minivan in Concord, passing a delivery truck that blocked a bike lane. Her minivan collided with a bicyclist, who died from the collision, and then veered into the opposite lane, hitting a curb and another vehicle.In the Superior Court, Warren requested a jury instruction that required the State to prove she knowingly committed the act that violated a rule of the road. The court, however, issued an instruction that did not require the State to prove any mental state regarding the "unlawful operation" element. Warren objected, but the court overruled her objection, and the jury convicted her.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. Warren argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that the "knowingly" mens rea applied to the "unlawful operation" element of RSA 263:64, V-a. The State contended that the statute omits a culpable mental state and that the "knowingly" mens rea is inapplicable to the "unlawful operation" element. The Supreme Court agreed with the State that the "knowingly" mens rea is inapplicable but concluded that "criminal negligence" is the appropriate mental state for the "unlawful operation" element. The court held that the trial court erred by not including this mens rea element in its jury instruction.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the conviction and remanded the case, holding that "criminal negligence" is the appropriate mens rea for the "unlawful operation" element of RSA 263:64, V-a. View "State v. Warren" on Justia Law

In 2009, Wesley Swick pled guilty to possessing a stolen firearm and was sentenced to 33 months in prison and two years of supervised release. His federal sentence was to run concurrently with longer state sentences. Swick was released from state prison in 2017 but did not report to federal probation as required. His failure to report went unnoticed until after his supervised release period should have ended. During this time, Swick committed several state crimes and served additional time in state prison.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas revoked Swick's supervised release based on his failure to report and subsequent criminal activities. The court asserted jurisdiction using the fugitive tolling doctrine, which pauses the supervised release period when a supervisee absconds from supervision. Swick was sentenced to 24 months in prison, to run consecutively with a separate federal sentence for a felon-in-possession charge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that fugitive tolling applies to supervised release, meaning that Swick's supervised release period was tolled when he failed to report to probation. The court found sufficient evidence to support the district court's conclusion that Swick intentionally avoided supervision, as he did not report to federal probation despite knowing his obligation to do so. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to revoke Swick's supervised release and the imposition of the 24-month prison sentence. View "United States v. Swick" on Justia Law