Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

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In early 2023, James Kirkwood committed a series of robberies, including one at a Dollar Tree store in San Antonio, Texas. During this incident, he threatened a 71-year-old cashier by implying he had a gun and demanded cash. The cashier, believing the threat, called her manager, who gave Kirkwood $260. Three days later, Kirkwood was apprehended after robbing another Dollar Tree. He was subsequently charged under a federal robbery statute and pled guilty. The cashier, A.C., quit her job on the day of the robbery, citing ongoing psychological distress, and later took a lower-paying job as a dishwasher. She reported no physical injuries but claimed lost income and damages due to psychological harm.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas sentenced Kirkwood and, under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), ordered him to pay restitution to A.C. for both her alleged mental anguish and lost income. The district court acknowledged uncertainty in the law but proceeded, suggesting the issue could be resolved on appeal. Kirkwood’s counsel objected to the lost-income calculation but did not specifically object to the restitution for mental anguish. Kirkwood appealed the restitution order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the statutory basis for awarding restitution under the MVRA. The court held that the MVRA does not authorize restitution for purely psychological harm or for lost income unaccompanied by bodily injury. The court found no statutory provision allowing restitution for mental anguish alone and determined that lost income is compensable only when it results from bodily injury. The Fifth Circuit therefore vacated the restitution award to A.C. View "USA v. Kirkwood" on Justia Law

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Robert Carter, convicted of wire fraud, sought compassionate release from his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), citing family caregiving obligations. The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin denied his motion on February 6, 2026. Carter was required to file a notice of appeal within 14 days, but his notice was postmarked February 27 and received March 2, missing the deadline even under the prison-mailbox rule.Following the denial, Carter did not file a motion for extension of time, which would ordinarily be fatal in civil cases under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5). However, Rule 4(b)(4), governing criminal cases, allows the district court to extend the time to appeal “with or without motion” for up to 30 days after the deadline. Carter argued that the district judge implicitly granted an extension by docketing his late notice of appeal, but the court found this reasoning unpersuasive, emphasizing that docketing is a ministerial act and does not imply a judicial finding of excusable neglect or good cause.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the matter. Adopting the consensus of other circuits, the court held that if a notice of appeal in a criminal case is filed within the 30-day extension window, the appeal should not be dismissed until the district judge has made a finding regarding excusable neglect or good cause, even without a formal motion for extension. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit suspended further proceedings and remanded the issue to the district court for a determination on whether Carter’s delay was justified. View "USA v Carter" on Justia Law

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A West Virginia defendant was indicted in 2018 on multiple sexual offense charges involving a seven-year-old girl. Prior to trial, the court granted the defendant’s motions to exclude a video interview of the victim and records from her therapy sessions, limiting both the State and the defense from introducing certain hearsay evidence. During opening statements at the first trial, defense counsel referenced specific statements made by the victim in the excluded materials, suggesting an alternative perpetrator. The State objected after the opening statements, arguing that the defense had violated pretrial evidentiary rulings. The trial court found that the defense’s actions had gone “far afield” of its orders and, over the defendant’s objection, granted the State’s motion for a mistrial.The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds, arguing that the mistrial was not required by “manifest necessity.” The trial court denied the motion, finding that the defense had created the necessity for a mistrial. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia later affirmed, holding that the defendant’s right against double jeopardy was not violated because defense counsel’s conduct in opening statement created a manifest necessity for the mistrial. The defendant subsequently filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, which granted relief, concluding that the defense had not violated any pretrial orders and that manifest necessity was lacking.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that, under the highly deferential standard of review required by AEDPA, the state court’s conclusion that manifest necessity justified the mistrial was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The case was remanded with instructions to deny the habeas petition. View "Wood v. Straughn" on Justia Law

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In 2008, a drive-by shooting occurred in Modesto, California, following an altercation between rival gangs. The front passenger of a Honda Civic, identified as the appellant, fired several shots, one of which killed Chanthol Ouk, a bystander with no gang affiliation. The appellant and a codefendant were charged with murder and related offenses, including firearm and gang enhancements. The preliminary hearing included law enforcement testimony relaying hearsay statements from witnesses, which indicated that the appellant was the shooter.After the preliminary hearing, the appellant pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and shooting at an occupied building, admitting to a gang enhancement and personal firearm use. Defense counsel stipulated that the preliminary hearing transcript provided the factual basis for the plea. The Superior Court of Stanislaus County sentenced the appellant to 31 years in prison. In 2024, the appellant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that changes in the law invalidated certain theories of murder liability. The prosecution opposed, citing the record of conviction, including the preliminary hearing transcript, to assert that the appellant remained liable as the actual killer. The trial court denied the petition at the prima facie stage, finding no competing theories or facts suggesting conviction under an invalid legal theory.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s denial. It held that a preliminary hearing transcript, even if containing hearsay admitted under section 872, may be considered at the prima facie stage of a section 1172.6 petition. The court concluded that the statutory hearsay limitations apply only at the evidentiary hearing stage and not to the initial screening. However, in the interest of justice, the appellant was granted 30 days to file an amended petition in the superior court to allege additional facts if available. View "P. v. Prak" on Justia Law

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The case concerned a man who, along with his wife, fostered and adopted numerous children over more than a decade. Several of these children, as well as a foster child, later accused him of sexual abuse and physical battery. Earlier reports of abuse did not result in charges, but after renewed allegations and an investigation, he was charged with seventeen counts, including various degrees of sexual abuse of minors, battery, and child endangerment. At trial, multiple victims and witnesses testified about both the charged acts and related behaviors, such as physical punishments, “daddy tax” massages, and controlling conduct allegedly used to maintain silence and compliance among the children.The District Court of Natrona County handled extensive pretrial proceedings, including multiple notices by the State to introduce evidence of uncharged acts under Wyoming Rule of Evidence 404(b). The court found this evidence relevant to issues like motive, intent, course of conduct, and family dynamics, and concluded its probative value outweighed any potential prejudice. The court also instructed the jury on the proper use of this evidence. During trial, certain defense requests—such as playing the entirety of a recorded interview and cross-examining a victim about a prior unrelated falsehood—were denied.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Wyoming, the appellant challenged the district court’s evidentiary decisions and alleged prosecutorial misconduct. The Supreme Court held that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Rule 404(b) evidence, limiting cross-examination, or declining to admit the full interview without an offer of proof. The Court also found no prosecutorial misconduct in the State’s questioning, and, because no error was established, rejected the claim of cumulative error. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Marler v. State" on Justia Law

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After receiving reports that Tyler Denby threatened several individuals in Alliance, Nebraska, law enforcement located him sitting in his vehicle. Upon observing a marijuana pipe in his pocket, officers searched Denby and his vehicle, finding various electronic devices, children’s items, and a collection of girls’ underwear. This discovery led investigators to obtain a warrant to search Denby’s SD cards, which contained child pornography. Denby subsequently confessed to possessing and transporting child pornography across state lines.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska presided over Denby’s trial. Denby moved to suppress the evidence from his vehicle and his confessions, but the court denied the motion. He also sought to reopen the suppression hearing based on new evidence, which was denied as untimely and futile by a magistrate judge. Denby filed motions in limine to exclude certain evidence, which the court granted in part and denied in part. A jury convicted Denby of transporting and possessing prepubescent child pornography, and the district court sentenced him to 262 months’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit addressed Denby’s claims regarding his competency, the suppression motion, evidentiary rulings, and the reasonableness of his sentence. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not ordering a competency evaluation or by admitting certain evidence, including the girls’ underwear, for non-propensity purposes under Rule 404(b)(2). The appellate court found no error in denying suppression or reopening the hearing and concluded that the sentence was substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Denby" on Justia Law

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Two men developed a friendship that eventually soured over disputes regarding unauthorized sales of vehicle parts and property misuse. After reconciling, tensions resurfaced, leading one man to make threats against the other, including statements about shooting him. On the day of the incident, after further conflict and threats, the defendant confronted the victim at a vehicle lot. A physical altercation ensued, during which the defendant claimed the victim reached for his concealed gun, which discharged as they both fell, resulting in the victim’s fatal gunshot wound.The Cherokee District Court tried the defendant for first-degree premeditated murder and related weapon offenses. During trial, the prosecution presented evidence of prior threats and forensic evidence suggesting a close-range intentional gunshot. The defense argued the shooting was accidental, occurring during a struggle. The court instructed the jury on self-defense but did not provide lesser included offense instructions, after the defense indicated it was not requesting them. The jury convicted the defendant of all charges.On direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas, the defendant challenged the omission of lesser included offense instructions and claimed prosecutorial error in closing arguments. The Supreme Court held that the district court erred by not instructing on lesser included offenses, including second-degree intentional murder, second-degree reckless murder, reckless involuntary manslaughter, and excessive force involuntary manslaughter. However, applying the clear error standard, the court found overwhelming evidence of premeditation and intent, and concluded the defendant did not firmly convince the court the jury would have reached a different verdict with those instructions. The court also found no prosecutorial error, holding the prosecutor’s statements were within permissible bounds. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. View "State v. Barker " on Justia Law

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The State charged an individual with two counts of child abuse based on allegations that he physically harmed his son, resulting in various injuries. Evidence presented at the preliminary hearing included testimony from the child's teacher, nurse, social worker, and detective, as well as medical documentation and photographs of injuries. The allegations included choking by twisting a shirt around the child’s neck and beating with a hand, stick, and belt. The child reported difficulty breathing during the choking incident and described multiple physical injuries.The Sedgwick District Court reviewed the charges at a preliminary hearing and dismissed both counts. For the first count, the court found insufficient probable cause that the accused's actions could cause death or great bodily harm. For the second count, the court initially considered evidence of beating or striking but ultimately dismissed the charge after applying a “parental discipline” affirmative defense, concluding the conduct was within a parent’s discretion. The State appealed, and the Kansas Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision, instructing the charges be reinstated and the defendant bound over for trial.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case. It held that a court has no authority to consider affirmative defenses at a preliminary hearing and that the State had provided sufficient evidence to bind the defendant over on both counts of child abuse. The Court further rejected arguments that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and found K.S.A. 21-5109(d) did not prohibit prosecution under the general child abuse provision. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the district court, reversed the district court’s dismissal, and remanded the case with instructions to bind the defendant over for trial on both counts. View "State v. Ross " on Justia Law

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David Jeremy Zobel was indicted in the District of Columbia on charges including child-pornography distribution and attempted sexual exploitation of a minor. The charges stemmed from an undercover FBI operation in which an individual, believed to be Zobel, engaged in online chat conversations, shared child pornography, and claimed to be a convicted sex offender. The government matched details from the chat, including photographs of court documents, to Zobel’s prior conviction in Ohio. When agents approached Zobel, he fled but was later apprehended, and evidence linked his device to the chats.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed several motions in limine concerning the admissibility of evidence related to Zobel’s prior conviction. Initially, the court excluded a summary of Zobel’s 2011 conviction under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 414, reasoning that the probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice under Rule 403. The court indicated this decision could be reconsidered if the defense raised an identity argument. Later, as the defense confirmed an identity defense, the government renewed its request to admit the evidence, but the district court maintained its exclusion of all references to the prior conviction, including statements and photographs from the chats.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s evidentiary rulings. The court held it had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 because the government timely appealed the exclusion orders. The main holding was that the district court misapplied the interplay between Rules 403 and 414 by treating any propensity inference from prior child molestation as categorically unfairly prejudicial. The appellate court vacated the district court’s exclusion of evidence related to Zobel’s prior conviction and remanded for reconsideration under the correct legal standard. View "USA v. Zobel" on Justia Law

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In September 2012, a group of terrorists attacked the U.S. Special Mission in Benghazi, Libya, resulting in the deaths of four Americans. Ahmed Abu Khatallah, a leader of the militia Ubaydah Bin Jarrah, played a significant role in planning and executing the attack. He participated in weapons procurement, coordinated with other militants, and was present at the Mission during the assault. Surveillance footage and witness testimony linked Khatallah to key actions before, during, and after the attack, including efforts to undermine the local security force protecting the Mission.After his arrest in 2014, Khatallah was tried in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The jury convicted him on four counts, including conspiracy and material support for terrorism, but acquitted him of charges related to the deaths and the subsequent attack on a nearby compound. The district court initially sentenced him to twenty-two years in prison, a sentence the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit later found unreasonably lenient and vacated. On remand, the district court imposed a twenty-eight-year sentence, justifying its downward variance from the Guidelines based on respect for the jury’s verdict, the context of the offenses, and Khatallah’s status as a deportable alien.Upon the government’s appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit again found the sentence substantively unreasonable. The appellate court held that the district court’s justifications did not support the extent of the downward variance given the seriousness of the offenses, the need for deterrence, and public protection. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, instructing the district court to give greater weight to these considerations and not to minimize the gravity of Khatallah’s conduct. View "USA v. Abukhatallah" on Justia Law