Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After he pleaded guilty to several counts, including two violations of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g), the district court sentenced Defendant to the mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. In doing so, the court concluded that Defendant’s two prior convictions for selling cocaine in violation of Florida Statutes Section 893.13(1)(a) were “serious drug offense[s]” that Penn “committed on occasions different from one another.” Defendant appealed both determinations. Defendant contends that his sale-of-cocaine offenses were not serious drug offenses under ACCA.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that it disagreed with Defendant’s contentions. Both of his arguments for why his sale-of-cocaine offenses are not serious drug offenses fail. The court reasoned that its precedent squarely forecloses his mens rea argument about the need to prove knowledge of the controlled substance’s illicit nature. And attempted transfers of a controlled substance are “distributing,” as ACCA uses the term. Likewise, his argument that his sale-of-cocaine offenses did not occur on separate occasions fails because he committed the crimes thirty days apart. View "USA v. Keith A. Penn" on Justia Law

Pardoned felon Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to expunge the records of his criminal conviction. Defendant argued that the district court erred in concluding that (1) it lacked jurisdiction over his claim; and (2) even if it had jurisdiction, the merits of his motion did not warrant expungement. After oral argument and consideration of the record below, we conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Defendant’s motion.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that although the district court correctly noted that it lacked the requisite ancillary jurisdiction to hear Defendant’s expungement motion, it ultimately impermissibly evaluated and denied the motion on the merits. The court reasoned that no court has ever recognized ancillary jurisdiction over a constitutional expungement where the alleged constitutional violation was the natural result of an otherwise valid arrest or conviction. Thus, the court found it does not have ancillary jurisdiction over his expungement claim. View "USA v. James Batmasian" on Justia Law

The primary source of incriminating information against Taylor was “Doe,” a woman with whom Taylor and his wife were intimately involved. Law enforcement presented a warrant application to an Indiana judge, seeking to search Taylor’s residence for evidence of child pornography and bestiality. The affidavit did not disclose that two officers involved in the investigation had been competing with Taylor for Doe’s affection. The judge signed a typed warrant that authorized the search of Taylor’s residence for evidence of child pornography; it did not mention bestiality. At a time unknown and under unknown circumstances, the lead detective apparently made handwritten alterations, adding “bestiality” to the warrant’s scope. When officers executed the altered warrant, they found substantial evidence that Taylor was producing and distributing child pornography. They found no evidence relating to bestiality. Taylor's motion to suppress and request for a Franks hearing were denied. Taylor pled guilty and was sentenced to 324 months.The Seventh Circuit vacated. An evidentiary hearing is needed to determine whether the judge approved the alterations before the warrant's execution. Questions surrounding those alterations are relevant to the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule so the hearing must encompass false statements and material omissions in the affidavit and law enforcement’s subjective good faith in seeking the warrant. The affidavit did not support probable cause to search for evidence of child pornography but did support probable cause to search for evidence of crimes of bestiality. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant entered the United Stated without authorization in 2004. He was then convicted of malicious wounding in Virginia and was deported back to El Salvador. Defendant later re-entered the United States before being convicted of another crime in 2020. He was indicted for illegal entry. moved to dismiss that indictment, arguing that the five year statute of limitations on his prosecution had run and that his crime of malicious wounding was not a deportable offense. The district court rejected Defendant's claims.On appeal, Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's collateral attack of his removal order, finding that Defendant entered the United States without authorization, committed a deportable offense, re-entered again illegally, and then committed another crime. The court explained that Defendant's "case falls right at the heart of what Congress sought to criminalize and the executive branch seeks to stop with the illegal reentry statute of 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1326." View "US v. Omar Alas" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s dismissal of his motion for post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. A jury found Defendant guilty of one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin, as well as one count of attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin. At sentencing, the district court deemed these offenses “controlled substance offense[s]” under Sections 4B1.1 and 4B1.2—the career offender provisions—of the Sentencing Guidelines. Defendant also had past convictions for conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 846 and assault. The district court considered the former to be a controlled substance offense and the latter to be a crime of violence under the career offender provisions. The district court applied the career offender enhancement to his sentence. While Defendant’s appeal was pending, he moved for a new trial based on newly discovered. The district court granted the motion, and the government appealed. On remand, the government moved to reinstate the judgment of conviction and Defendant’s sentence, to which Defendant’s counsel consented. Defendant now argues that, on remand, his counsel rendered ineffective assistance.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing. The court held that Defendant’s counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to make this objection. This failure resulted in prejudice to Defendant, whose 16-year sentence far exceeded the high end of what the Guidelines range would have been without the career offender enhancement. View "US v. Germaine Cannady" on Justia Law

Defendant Dominic Hunt appealed his convictions on two charges of being a felon in possession of ammunition. The ammunition was used in two shootings in early 2019. Investigators found three spent cartridges at the scene of one shooting and one spent cartridge at the other. A firearms expert testified that all four cartridges were fired from the same (undiscovered) weapon. Defendant’s sole issue raised on appeal was that the expert testimony should not have been admitted at trial: the expert’s field of firearm toolmark examination was not scientifically valid, and that the district court failed to perform its gatekeeping role in examining the admissibility of expert testimony because it relied on prior judicial opinions rather than the most up-to-date empirical evidence when it denied his pretrial motion to exclude the testimony without conducting a hearing. The Tenth Circuit held only that the district court adequately performed its gatekeeping role and did not err in admitting the testimony in light of the material presented on the pretrial motion and the expert testimony at trial. View "United States v. Hunt" on Justia Law

Respondent Camille Pool pleaded guilty to misdemeanor DUI in 2020. In May 2020, approximately two months following the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, Pool was sentenced at a hearing conducted over Zoom which she attended remotely. The State recommended Pool be sentenced to supervised probation with suspended jail time. The magistrate court ultimately sentenced Pool to 180 days in jail with 177 days suspended, granted her a withheld judgment, and placed her on supervised probation for 18 months. The magistrate court went on to explain some of the terms Pool would need to accept in order to receive probation. The following day, the magistrate court entered a written Judgment of Conviction: a form document for DUI cases. A paragraph next to the probation check box listed possible probation terms, which included: "Defendant specifically waives his/her 4th Amendment right to warrantless search of his/her person, vehicle, or residence by any law enforcement or probation officer." The form included a line for the defendant’s signature, but Pool was not personally present in the courtroom and, therefore, did not sign the Judgment. Instead, on the signature line, someone handwrote “mailed to defendant 5/27/2020.” While on probation, Pool failed to appear for drug and alcohol testing and failed to comply with other terms of her probation. On April 14, 2021, three probation officers went to Pool’s residence to conduct a residence check. One officer spoke with Pool, mentioned the Fourth Amendment waiver, and Pool indicated that she understood. Pool’s residence was searched and drugs and drug paraphernalia were found. Pool was charged with felony possession of a controlled substance and a misdemeanor charge for possession of drug paraphernalia. Pool moved to suppress the items seized and the statements she made during the search of her home, arguing that, among other things, she had not waived her right against search and seizure under Article I, section 17 of Idaho’s Constitution and, therefore, the search violated her rights under the Idaho Constitution. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the search was lawful and reversed the district court's decision granting the motion to suppress. View "Idaho v. Pool" on Justia Law

In 2019, Defendant sought a further reduction under the First Step Act. By that time, he had completed four of the sentences—including all three marijuana-only sentences. The district court initially denied relief, holding that even Defendant’s crack-related convictions weren’t “covered offenses.” Defendant appealed, the government confessed error, and the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The district court then reduced Defendant’s sentences to time served on the eleven crack-related convictions but held that, under Denson’s interpretation of Section 404(b), it lacked authority to modify his sentences on the three non-covered powder-related offenses.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held (1) that the Eleventh Circuit’s statement in Denson that a district court “is permitted to reduce a defendant’s sentence” under the First Step Act “only on a ‘covered offense’” and “is not free . . . to change the defendant’s sentences on counts that are not ‘covered offenses,’” was a holding; (2) that Concepcion did not abrogate that holding; and (3) that the prior-panel-precedent rule obliges the court to follow it. View "USA v. Michael Jerome Files" on Justia Law

The First Circuit dismissed Appellant's appeal from the 115-month sentence imposed by the district court upon his guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine base and heroin, holding that Appellant's challenge to his sentence was barred.Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine base and heroin. As part of his plea agreement, Appellant agreed to waive his right to appeal. The district court imposed a sentence of 115 months of imprisonment. The First Circuit dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding (1) contrary to Appellant's contention, the language of the plea agreement's waiver provision covered this appeal; and (2) enforcing the waiver did not constitute a miscarriage of justice because it was entered into knowingly. View "United States v. Spinks" on Justia Law

Andre Myles was homeless when he broke into an unoccupied Oceanside house. During the 15 hours he was inside, he did not take anything of significant value. But he drank a juice box and ate ice cream belonging to the owner, and he charged the battery in the owner’s vehicle. Several months later, Myles tried to break into the house again. The only disputed issue at Myles’ trial for first degree residential burglary and attempted first degree residential burglary was whether he had the specific intent to commit theft when he entered or tried to enter the house. Myles claimed he did not have the required specific intent and presented evidence he suffered from a mental disorder that caused him to experience delusions, and at the time of each incident, these delusions caused him to believe the home belonged to him because it had been given to him by an “entity” named “Archangel Michael.” The trial court modified the pattern instruction on the definition of theft by larceny (CALCRIM No. 1800). The modified instruction also contained citations to appellate decisions involving burglary charges arising from alleged incidental use of utilities and consumption of food inside a victim’s home. The jury convicted Myles of both charges. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court committed prejudicial instructional error when it modified the definition of theft and provided the jury with citations to appellate decisions that included factual summaries of other burglary cases. Consequently, Myles’ convictions of burglary and attempted burglary were reversed and the case remanded for possible retrial. View "California v. Myles" on Justia Law