Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant, who was not the biological father but maintained a close, parental-like relationship with the minor victim, was convicted of sexual assault in the first and fourth degrees, and risk of injury to a child, based on allegations of sexual abuse spanning several years. The victim disclosed the alleged abuse to her teacher after a strong emotional reaction in class, which led to a forensic interview where she described three incidents of abuse. At trial, the defense argued that the victim fabricated the allegations after a dispute over cash gifts from her fifteenth birthday party, challenging her credibility on the basis of delayed disclosure, inconsistencies, lack of corroborating evidence, and alleged investigative deficiencies.In the Superior Court for the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, the jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. Over defense objection, the trial judge instructed the jury—relying on the then-governing precedent of State v. Daniel W. E.—that the "mere fact" of the victim’s delayed disclosure should not be considered in evaluating her credibility. The defense also objected to the admission of the full video of the victim’s forensic interview, which the court admitted on several grounds, including the rule of completeness.On direct appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court, the defendant contended that the delayed disclosure instruction was improper, violated his right to present a closing argument, and that the interview video was improperly admitted. The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the delayed disclosure instruction was erroneous under Daniel W. E., since the defense had challenged the victim’s credibility based on delay. However, the error was deemed nonconstitutional and harmless, as it was not reasonably probable the jury was misled. The court also ruled that the instruction did not infringe on the right to present a closing argument, and that the evidentiary challenge was moot since not all grounds for admitting the video were contested. Therefore, the judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Jose T." on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with felonious assault and two counts of discharging a firearm into a habitation, following an incident in which he shot at an individual inside his own house and at least one bullet struck a neighboring residence. The defendant claimed self-defense, asserting that the person he shot at was armed and threatening, although security footage revealed the alleged aggressor did not touch his weapon during the encounter. The jury acquitted the defendant of felonious assault but convicted him on both counts of discharging a firearm into a habitation.The Seventh District Court of Appeals reviewed the case after the defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on transferred self-defense, a doctrine he had not requested at trial. The appellate court found that the conviction relating to one residence was unsupported by sufficient evidence and vacated it, but reversed the other conviction, concluding that the trial court’s failure to instruct on transferred self-defense constituted plain error. The court reasoned that clearer instructions might have affected the outcome and remanded the matter for retrial on the remaining count.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio examined whether the omission of a transferred self-defense instruction amounted to plain error under Criminal Rule 52(B). The court held that such an error was not “plain” because current law did not clearly require the instruction. Furthermore, the defendant had not demonstrated that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the instruction been given. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Seventh District Court of Appeals and remanded the case for consideration of the defendant’s sentencing challenge. View "State v. Bradley" on Justia Law

The defendant, a Mexican citizen, entered the United States illegally on three separate occasions. During his first period of unlawful presence, he was convicted of driving while intoxicated and dealing cocaine for a Mexican drug cartel. After deportation, he reentered the country, was again convicted of driving while intoxicated, and was found to be an aggravated felon in the United States after removal. Despite repeated warnings and deportations, he returned a third time, remaining undetected for several years before being stopped by Michigan police for a traffic violation, which led to federal immigration authorities being notified. He was subsequently charged with illegally being found in the United States after removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan presided over his trial. Before trial, the defendant sought to present a duress defense, claiming cartel threats compelled his illegal reentry. The district court ruled that he had not provided legally sufficient evidence to support duress, barring the defense. The defendant also moved to dismiss the indictment, alleging violation of the Speedy Trial Act; the district court found the government complied with statutory time limits. After a jury convicted him, the district court imposed a within-Guidelines sentence of 48 months’ imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court properly barred the duress defense because the defendant did not show an imminent threat, had reasonable alternatives, recklessly created the risk by joining the cartel, and did not promptly surrender to authorities. The court also held that the Speedy Trial Act was not violated, as the timing calculation starts with the initial appearance in the charging district. Finally, the court found the sentence to be substantively reasonable and affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Lopez-Escarrega" on Justia Law

Walker was involved in a scheme with two others to distribute cocaine. He arranged for cocaine to be mailed from a supplier near the U.S.-Mexico border, using one co-conspirator to send the packages and a postal worker whom he paid to deliver them along his mail routes. Law enforcement intercepted two cocaine packages, observed Walker conducting drug sales from his girlfriend’s home, and later searched that residence, finding drugs, paraphernalia, and Walker’s phone. Walker confessed to drug activities after the search.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan denied Walker’s motion to suppress evidence from the residence, finding probable cause for the search warrant and, alternatively, that the good-faith exception applied. At trial, the jury convicted Walker on all counts related to the drug conspiracy, and he was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment.Walker appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, raising three main issues. First, he argued that the evidence from the search should have been suppressed. The Sixth Circuit found the warrant affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause and, even if not, that the officers' reliance on the warrant was objectively reasonable under the good-faith exception. Second, Walker challenged the admission of statements he made during a proffer session, asserting protection under Federal Rule of Evidence 410. The appellate court held that Walker, through counsel, had waived this argument by conceding that certain statements were admissible due to their inconsistency with his trial defense. Third, Walker argued a violation of his Confrontation Clause rights regarding a co-defendant’s testimony. The court found this right was also waived when Walker and his counsel agreed to a curative instruction for the jury to disregard the testimony. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

A man who served as a confidential informant for the Department of Homeland Security became involved in criminal activity by continuing to deal drugs while cooperating with law enforcement. He developed a corrupt relationship with his handler, a special agent, who was later convicted of federal corruption charges. The informant’s unauthorized criminal conduct was uncovered when he became the target of two separate narcotics sting operations. Following his arrest, law enforcement searched his home and cell phone, and he was charged with multiple drug-related crimes.In proceedings before the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the defendant moved to suppress his post-arrest statements and evidence obtained from the warrantless searches of his home and cell phone. The district court suppressed his post-arrest statements as involuntary but denied suppression of the physical evidence, holding it admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. The court also denied his motions to dismiss for vindictive prosecution, sever various counts for trial, and quash a subpoena to his former handler, who invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The case proceeded to a jury trial, where the defendant was convicted on three drug counts but acquitted on one. His post-trial motions for acquittal or a new trial were denied, and he was sentenced to 156 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in quashing the subpoena, that the inevitable discovery doctrine applied to the search evidence, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. The court also determined that the defendant’s other claims were either waived or without merit, and it found no abuse of discretion in the sentence imposed. View "USA v Howard" on Justia Law

After a physical altercation between a man and his former girlfriend, the man was charged with attempted strangulation, a felony under Idaho law. The incident involved conflicting accounts: the alleged victim reported that the defendant choked her after an argument, while the defendant claimed she was the aggressor and he did not harm her. Police observed some injuries but did not initially see marks on her neck; however, follow-up photos taken more than a day later showed signs consistent with strangulation. The defendant was also charged with violating a no-contact order, and the State alleged he was a persistent violator due to prior felony convictions.The case proceeded to a jury trial in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, Bannock County. During the trial, the court, over the defendant's objections, instructed the jury on domestic battery with traumatic injury as a lesser included offense of attempted strangulation. The jury acquitted the defendant of attempted strangulation and violation of the no-contact order, but convicted him of domestic battery with traumatic injury and found him to be a persistent violator. The district court imposed a ten-year sentence. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, reasoning that the defendant had not preserved his objection regarding the lesser included offense and found no reversible or fundamental error.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho determined that the district court erred by instructing the jury on domestic battery with traumatic injury as a lesser included offense of attempted strangulation. The Supreme Court held that this error was not harmless, as it directly affected the deliberative process and outcome. The Court vacated the conviction for domestic battery with traumatic injury and the persistent violator finding, remanding the case for entry of a judgment of acquittal on the attempted strangulation charge. View "State v. Crombie" on Justia Law

A dual Swedish-Russian national was accused of creating and operating a bitcoin “mixer” service called Bitcoin Fog, which the government alleged was designed to facilitate money laundering and conceal illegal activity. The platform enabled users to deposit and withdraw bitcoin anonymously, making it difficult to trace transactions. Evidence presented at trial included IP address analyses allegedly connecting the defendant to Bitcoin Fog, records of his interest in similar services, and his promotion of illicit darknet marketplaces. Undercover law enforcement also conducted sting operations, sending and withdrawing funds through Bitcoin Fog and communicating intentions to launder proceeds from illegal drug sales. The defendant was arrested in 2021, after which Bitcoin Fog ceased operations.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia conducted a jury trial at which the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit money laundering, substantive money laundering, operating an unlicensed money transmitting business, and conducting a money transmission business without a license. The District Court sentenced him to 150 months in prison and rejected his pre-trial and post-trial motions, including challenges to venue, expert testimony admissibility, evidence sufficiency, and access to proprietary software used in the investigation.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. It held that venue was proper in the District of Columbia for all counts, based largely on evidence that Bitcoin Fog served customers there, including undercover agents. The court found no errors in the District Court’s evidentiary rulings, including the admission of expert testimony and “Welcome to Video” evidence, and rejected arguments regarding statute of limitations, due process, and Confrontation Clause violations. The appellate court affirmed all convictions and the sentence, finding no merit in any of the defendant’s arguments. View "USA v. Sterlingov" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who, after pleading guilty to conspiring to provide material support to ISIS, was released on bail but later violated release conditions, including absconding from supervision and failing to appear at a court-ordered status conference. Her conduct included removing an electronic monitoring device and attempting to flee, resulting in her rearrest. She later entered into a plea agreement, waiving indictment and pleading guilty to failure to appear under 18 U.S.C. § 3146, as well as agreeing to an enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 3147 for committing the offense while on release. In exchange for her plea, the government agreed not to pursue additional charges carrying potentially higher penalties.After her guilty plea but before sentencing, the defendant moved to withdraw her plea, arguing her conduct did not fall within the scope of § 3146 because she was not released under the Bail Reform Act. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied her motion, finding a factual basis for her plea, rejecting her arguments, and sentencing her to 230 months’ imprisonment, including consecutive sentences for failure to appear and the § 3147 enhancement.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the defendant argued the district court erred in denying her plea withdrawal and that applying the § 3147 enhancement violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Second Circuit held that the defendant’s appellate waiver, which expressly foreclosed challenges that her conduct was outside the statute’s scope, barred her first claim. The court further held that applying the § 3147 enhancement to a § 3146 conviction does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, as Congress clearly intended cumulative punishments. The Second Circuit therefore dismissed the appeal in part and otherwise affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Ceasar" on Justia Law

The case involves a man who shot and killed his wife during an argument at her home, where he had gone to retrieve his belongings. The incident occurred after a struggle over a handgun, witnessed by the wife’s sister, resulting in the wife’s death from a gunshot wound to the chest. The defendant fled the scene and was apprehended following a high-speed police chase. He was charged with multiple offenses, including manslaughter and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony.The District Court for Sarpy County conducted a jury trial. Before trial, the State successfully moved to exclude the defendant’s proposed expert witness, a crime scene reconstructionist, finding that his methodology was unreliable and would improperly invade the jury’s role. The jury convicted the defendant of manslaughter, both counts of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and other charges. The court sentenced him to consecutive terms for each conviction. The defendant’s motion for a new trial was denied.On appeal, the Nebraska Court of Appeals upheld the exclusion of the expert witness, concluding the defense failed to prove the reliability of the expert’s methodology under the Daubert and Schafersman standards. However, the appellate court reversed the conviction for use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony as it related to the manslaughter count, vacated the sentence for that conviction, and remanded for a new trial on that charge. The court found that reckless assault, an unintentional act, could not serve as a predicate felony for the weapon charge. The manslaughter conviction itself was affirmed.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It held that the trial court properly excluded the defense expert under Daubert/Schafersman and correctly remanded only the use of a deadly weapon charge for retrial, not the manslaughter conviction. View "State v. Alexander" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted after jury trials in 2011 and 2012 of attempted murder, evading an officer, unlawfully taking a vehicle, and shooting at an inhabited dwelling. Each count included enhancements for gang involvement and firearm use, and he was sentenced to a total of 46 years and eight months to life in prison. Following direct appeal, the judgment was modified to reflect life with the possibility of parole on two counts, with a minimum parole eligibility of 15 years, and otherwise affirmed.Years later, the defendant filed a petition for recall and resentencing under California Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), arguing that as a juvenile at the time of the offense and having served over 15 years, his lengthy sentence was effectively a life without parole (LWOP) term. He relied on appellate decisions holding that juvenile offenders sentenced to de facto LWOP terms should be eligible for relief under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), on equal protection grounds. The Los Angeles County Superior Court reviewed the petition, considered recent appellate decisions and parties’ arguments, and denied the petition.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. Applying de novo review, it held that the defendant’s sentence did not constitute the functional equivalent of LWOP, as he was eligible for youthful offender parole under section 3051 at age 41. The court determined that section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) only applies to explicit LWOP sentences for juveniles and does not violate equal protection by excluding those sentenced to lengthy indeterminate terms. It affirmed the trial court’s denial of the petition. View "People v. Cortez" on Justia Law