Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

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The defendant pleaded guilty to several charges, including felony DUI, criminal endangerment, theft, and misdemeanor assault, for conduct in Mineral County, Montana. He was sentenced to concurrent terms involving the Department of Corrections and probation. After his release, he failed to comply with probation requirements, resulting in multiple alleged violations. He was arrested on July 3, 2024, in Great Falls on probation warrants, remained in custody, and appeared before a judge in Cascade County on July 5, 2024, for bail setting on the probation hold. The Mineral County Attorney filed a petition to revoke his suspended sentence on July 11, 2024, but he was not served that warrant until October 28, 2024, and did not make an initial appearance on the revocation petition until November 6, 2024—127 days after his arrest.The Fourth Judicial District Court of Montana presided over the revocation proceedings. The defendant moved to dismiss the revocation petition, arguing that the delay between his arrest and the initial appearance violated Montana Code Annotated § 46-18-203(4), which requires a probationer to be brought before a judge within 60 days of arrest. The District Court denied the motion, reasoning that the July 5 hearing satisfied statutory requirements even though the revocation petition had not yet been filed.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s interpretation and application of § 46-18-203(4). The Supreme Court held that the statute requires an initial appearance on the revocation petition within 60 days of arrest, and that such an appearance cannot occur before the petition is filed. Because the defendant’s first appearance on the revocation petition was more than 60 days after arrest, his statutory rights were violated. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s decision and remanded for dismissal of the revocation petition without prejudice. View "State v. Close" on Justia Law

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In this case, law enforcement in Wyoming relied on information from a confidential informant who was cooperating after his own arrest for methamphetamine possession and a firearm offense. The informant reported that he had purchased methamphetamine from Ronald Fox, who sourced the drugs from the defendant. The informant participated in two controlled buys from Fox and provided authorities with the defendant’s address and vehicle information, which officers corroborated through records and GPS tracking. Shortly before the defendant’s arrest, the informant stated that the defendant would borrow his Volkswagen, travel to Colorado to buy methamphetamine, and return to Wyoming. GPS trackers confirmed these movements, including the defendant’s travel patterns and mechanical issues with the vehicle.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming heard the case after the defendant was indicted for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. The defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained from the vehicle stop, arguing that the search lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause, and later challenged the sufficiency of the search warrant. The district court denied both motions, finding that the search was lawful based on the validity of the warrant, the officers’ good-faith reliance on it, and, independently, the existence of probable cause under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the denial of the suppression motions. The appellate court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, law enforcement had probable cause to search the vehicle based on the corroborated and timely information provided by the informant. The court concluded that the automobile exception justified the warrantless search and affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motions, as well as the defendant’s conviction. View "United States v. Schear" on Justia Law

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The petitioner was charged with driving under the influence and driving with a blood-alcohol content of 0.08 percent or more. After arraignment and a series of hearings, the petitioner filed a motion to suppress evidence. The prosecution requested continuances at two separate hearings, both of which the petitioner opposed. On the second occasion, after denying the prosecution’s oral request for a continuance due to lack of good cause, the Superior Court of Contra Costa County dismissed the case because the prosecution was not ready to proceed. Later that same day, the court recalled the parties, stated it had made a mistake, and retracted its dismissal, citing a belief that the dismissal was an abuse of discretion.The petitioner then sought a writ of mandate from the appellate division of the Superior Court of Contra Costa County, which was denied. The petitioner subsequently filed a writ petition with the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five. The prosecution argued that the court’s dismissal was unauthorized, interim in nature, and could be retracted, or alternatively, that their response should be construed as a writ petition challenging the denial of the continuance.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five held that the trial court had discretion to dismiss the criminal action under Penal Code section 1385, even without expressly invoking the statute. The appellate court found that once the trial court dismissed the entire criminal action, it lost jurisdiction to retract or modify that dismissal, even if the order was reached in error or constituted an abuse of discretion. The appellate court directed the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate compelling the trial court to vacate its order retracting the dismissal. View "Banuelos-Hernandez v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

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The defendant was charged with robbery after he entered a store, selected several items, and attempted to leave without paying. When confronted by a store clerk, he brandished a machete to force her out of his way before fleeing and being apprehended nearby. He had a recent history of similar offenses, many involving the use or threat of weapons such as a hammer, screwdriver, and axe, often directed at persons during thefts. The defendant was diagnosed with schizophrenia and substance use disorders, and had previously completed a court-ordered treatment program but stopped taking his medication afterward.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed his petition for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36. Although evidence showed he met the eligibility requirements for diversion, the court denied the petition. The court based its decision on findings that the defendant was unlikely to consistently take his medication and posed an unreasonable risk to public safety, given his repeated use of weapons and threats of violence during crimes. The defendant then pled no contest to robbery and was sentenced to two years in prison.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, considered whether the trial court erred in denying the mental health diversion petition. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. It found substantial evidence supported the conclusion that the defendant was highly likely to commit a “super strike” offense, such as murder or attempted murder, if not closely supervised and medicated, based on the nature and escalation of his prior offenses. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, upholding both the denial of diversion and the sentence. View "P. v. Gardner" on Justia Law

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Jason Cain was investigated after the parents of two children reported that he exposed himself to their children while they were in his care. A Pennsylvania State Trooper obtained a warrant to search Cain’s home and person for electronic devices that might contain evidence of indecent exposure and related offenses. The Trooper’s affidavit described the alleged incidents, Cain’s use of a GoPro camera to record the children, and her professional experience that people with a sexual interest in children often store images or videos on electronic devices. After executing the warrant and seizing Cain’s devices, police observed signs of Cain trying to conceal evidence. Subsequent warrants were obtained to search the seized devices and Cain’s home for hidden cameras and other electronic devices, some of which were later turned over by Cain’s wife. Evidence recovered included videos and photos of child sexual abuse.Cain was initially charged in state court and later indicted by a federal grand jury on several counts related to the production and possession of child pornography. He moved in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to suppress all evidence obtained through the four warrants, arguing that the warrants lacked probable cause and that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply. The District Court agreed, finding the first two warrants unsupported by probable cause and concluding that the subsequent warrants were tainted as a result.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decision. The appellate court held that even if probable cause was lacking for the first warrant, officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance on the magistrate’s issuance of the warrant, invoking the good faith exception. This good faith reliance extended to the subsequent warrants. The court reversed the District Court’s suppression order and remanded for further proceedings. View "USA v. Cain" on Justia Law

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The defendant pleaded guilty to two felony counts, each carrying a possible maximum sentence of thirty-two years, and received consecutive sentences totaling forty-four years. Later, he challenged his convictions and sentences through postconviction motions, raising a double jeopardy claim. The trial court initially denied his motion, but the Colorado Court of Appeals partially reversed, determining that the assault conviction was a lesser included offense of burglary and ordering the assault conviction to merge into the burglary conviction. This reduced the aggregate sentence from forty-four to twenty-two years and left only the burglary conviction and sentence intact.Following the Court of Appeals’ mandate, the trial court vacated the assault conviction and corrected the mittimus, but declined to resentence the defendant on the remaining burglary conviction, reasoning that its authority was limited to the explicit remand instructions. The People appealed, and a different division of the Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had inherent authority to resentence the defendant on the remaining conviction when a partial reversal disrupted the sentencing package and reduced the aggregate sentence, even absent express remand instructions allowing resentencing.The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that when an appellate court’s partial reversal disrupts the sentencing package, resulting in a reduced aggregate sentence, and the remand instructions are silent on resentencing, the trial court retains inherent authority to reassess the sentence on any remaining conviction. The trial court may, but is not required to, convene a new sentencing hearing and consider all relevant sentencing factors. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate division’s judgment and remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Hernandez-Escajeda v. People" on Justia Law

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The defendant was indicted for illegal reentry after previously being deported from the United States. He pleaded guilty to the offense, which stemmed from returning to New Mexico following multiple deportations and engaging in criminal conduct, including threatening a neighbor and attempting to run him over. Prior to his first deportation, the defendant had been convicted in New Mexico for armed robbery with a deadly weapon, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and bribery of a witness, for which he received consecutive sentences totaling fifteen years. The state court initially credited him with time served in presentence confinement and imposed a term of probation, later revoking probation and crediting additional probation time toward the maximum sentence per New Mexico law.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico sentenced the defendant for illegal reentry, applying a ten-level enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(2)(A) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines due to the prior felony conviction’s “sentence imposed” exceeding five years. The probation office recommended this enhancement, and the defendant requested a downward variance at sentencing, arguing that his actual incarceration was less than five years. The district court ultimately imposed a seventy-month sentence.Reviewing the appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed whether the probation credit under New Mexico law affected the calculation of “sentence imposed” for guideline purposes. The court held that the relevant calculation is the maximum sentence minus the suspended portion, not the actual time incarcerated. Because the not-suspended portion exceeded five years, the ten-level enhancement was correctly applied. The court affirmed both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the district court’s sentence, concluding there was no error in the guideline calculation or in the consideration of mitigating factors. View "United States v. Trujillo" on Justia Law

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The case concerns a defendant who was convicted and sentenced to death for the first-degree murder of Lisa Diaz, as well as for related charges stemming from the 2007 shooting death of Mendez Thomas and the later solicitation to kill Jessica Carmona. On the night of October 16, 2007, the defendant, along with two co-conspirators, orchestrated a pretextual drug deal to gain entry into Thomas’s apartment. After a confrontation, the defendant fatally shot both Thomas and Diaz, and wounded Carmona. The defendant fled but was later apprehended. While in jail awaiting retrial, he attempted to solicit the murder of Carmona through intermediaries. Evidence included eyewitness testimony, a 911 call, and testimony about his attempts to arrange Carmona’s murder from jail.After his initial conviction and death sentence, the defendant’s sentence was vacated due to late-disclosed DNA evidence. On retrial, the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County consolidated the charges from the 2007 murders and the 2021 solicitation. The jury again convicted the defendant of two counts of first-degree murder and other offenses. During the penalty phase, the defendant insisted on waiving the presentation of new mitigation evidence. The trial court struck the defense’s opening statement and prohibited counsel from arguing mitigation based on evidence already on the record, and the jury sentenced the defendant to death.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the convictions on all guilt-phase issues. However, the court held that, under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(a)(3), the defendant’s counsel must be allowed to argue against the death penalty based on existing mitigating evidence, even if the defendant waives the presentation of new mitigation. Because the trial court denied this right, the Supreme Court vacated the death sentence and remanded for a new penalty phase. View "Commonwealth v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

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A sheriff’s deputy in Meigs County, Ohio, stopped a vehicle after observing two marked-lanes violations. The deputy recognized the driver as someone rumored to be involved in drug trafficking and decided to conduct a canine sniff of the vehicle’s exterior. Before proceeding with the sniff, the deputy called for backup, citing officer safety, and waited five to ten minutes for another officer to arrive. During this wait, the deputy initiated license and warrant checks on the driver and passenger, but there were no outstanding warrants. Once backup arrived, the canine sniff was conducted, resulting in the discovery of heroin, fentanyl, and cash.The Meigs County Court of Common Pleas denied the driver’s motion to suppress the evidence, reasoning that the deputy was permitted to detain the driver long enough to complete a canine sniff and that the brief wait for backup was reasonable for officer safety. The driver subsequently entered no contest pleas to drug trafficking charges. On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the short extension of the stop to wait for backup was reasonable due to officer-safety concerns.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case to determine whether officer safety justifies prolonging a traffic stop for a canine sniff under the Fourth Amendment. The court held that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez v. United States does not recognize an officer-safety exception that allows prolonging a stop for a canine sniff when the mission of the traffic stop is otherwise complete. The state failed to prove that administrative tasks were ongoing when the canine indicated, and thus, the extension of the stop violated the driver’s Fourth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the appellate court’s judgment and remanded the case. View "State v. Kincaid" on Justia Law

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Matthew Dirig moved in with his girlfriend, Ashlee Cochrane, and her eight-year-old son, who had documented behavioral and mental health challenges, including a history of self-harm and suicidal ideation. Dirig became involved in co-parenting, including discipline and home safety decisions. Despite the child’s improved behavior following hospitalization and new medication, an incident occurred when Dirig locked the child alone in his bedroom after an outburst. During this unsupervised period, the child used a zip tie to fatally strangle himself. Evidence showed that Dirig knew about the child’s history and had signed a safety plan to remove choking hazards, yet zip ties remained accessible.Following these events, Dirig was charged in the Huntington Circuit Court with Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death. After a jury trial, he was convicted and sentenced to forty years, with two years suspended to probation. On appeal, Dirig raised several issues, including the sufficiency of evidence and the propriety of certain evidentiary admissions. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, rejecting his arguments regarding sufficiency and finding any evidentiary errors harmless. However, Dirig also challenged the jury instructions, arguing that the trial court erroneously allowed the jury to convict him based on a negligence standard rather than the required subjective “knowing” mens rea. The Court of Appeals found any instructional error harmless, reasoning that other instructions cured it.Upon review, the Indiana Supreme Court found that two of the jury instructions improperly substituted a negligence standard for the statutory requirement that Dirig must have acted “knowingly.” The Court held that this instructional error was fundamental, as it diminished the State’s burden of proof and rendered the trial unfair. Accordingly, the Indiana Supreme Court vacated Dirig’s conviction and remanded for a new trial with correct instructions, while summarily affirming the Court of Appeals on other issues. View "Dirig v. State" on Justia Law