Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant, previously convicted of serious felonies, was indicted for possessing a firearm as a felon after officers found a firearm in his vehicle during a traffic stop. He initially pleaded not guilty, but later changed his plea to guilty. While released on bond awaiting sentencing—subject to home detention and an ankle monitor—the defendant requested and received removal of the home detention condition. Shortly before sentencing, he was arrested for armed robbery. The incident involved two masked men robbing a victim at gunpoint, stealing cash, jewelry, and a cell phone. Circumstantial evidence, including location data from the defendant’s ankle monitor and a tracking device registered to him, placed him at the scene and linked him to the crime.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida held a bond revocation hearing, found probable cause the defendant violated his release conditions, revoked his bond, and later conducted a sentencing hearing. The presentence report initially recommended a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, but after the robbery charge, a revised report removed the reduction and increased the guideline range. The prosecution sought an upward variance based on the new criminal conduct. At sentencing, the district court considered testimony and evidence from both hearings, denied the reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and imposed a 96-month sentence, citing the defendant’s continued dangerous conduct.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not reversibly err in finding the defendant committed armed robbery by a preponderance of the evidence, did not plainly err in considering the robbery to deny the offense-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and did not impose an unreasonable sentence. The court affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "USA v. Lemaine" on Justia Law

On June 3, 2020, officers responded to a home after Ms. Annie Grace and her daughter saw two individuals on surveillance footage, one carrying a gas can and pouring gasoline around the property. An officer discovered a burnt paper bag near the driveway, but no structural damage occurred. Following an anonymous tip, police interrogated a juvenile who implicated Mardeontae Lee as the individual pouring the gasoline. Lee admitted his involvement, explaining he acted out of fear for his life after being pressured by gang members, specifically Kadrick Thompson, who told him the plan was retaliation for a murder involving Ms. Grace’s son. Lee stated he did not intend to harm anyone, only to feign an attempt to placate threats against him.Lee was charged in the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court with aggravated arson and three counts of attempted first degree murder. A jury found him guilty on all counts. The Court of Appeal, First Circuit, affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Louisiana determined whether the evidence supported Lee’s convictions. The Court held that the statutory definition of "movable" for aggravated arson requires a facility or enclosure for fifty or more people, which was not present. The only responsive verdict was not guilty, so the conviction was reversed. For attempted first degree murder, the Court found the State’s circumstantial evidence did not exclude Lee’s reasonable hypothesis of innocence—namely, that he lacked specific intent to kill. Therefore, the convictions for attempted first degree murder were also reversed, and judgments of acquittal entered. The Supreme Court of Louisiana remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to discharge the defendant. View "STATE VS. LEE" on Justia Law

The case involved a fatal shooting that occurred in Omaha, Nebraska, on November 8, 2023. The defendant was charged with first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon in connection with the death of a 17-year-old victim. Evidence at trial included eyewitness testimony that the defendant shot the victim after a group attack, statements allegedly made by the defendant admitting to the shooting, forensic evidence linking shell casings to a recovered handgun, DNA analysis suggesting the defendant could be a contributor to DNA found on the gun’s magazine and shell casings, and a video found on the defendant’s phone showing him with a similar firearm about a week before the shooting.The case was first tried in the District Court for Douglas County. The defendant filed pretrial motions to exclude the cell phone video and related expert comparison testimony, as well as to exclude DNA evidence analyzed using probabilistic genotyping software, arguing these were irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. The district court overruled these motions, found the evidence relevant and more probative than prejudicial, and admitted both the video and DNA evidence at trial. The jury found the defendant guilty on both counts, and the court imposed consecutive sentences of 80 years to life for murder and 40 to 50 years for the weapon offense. The defendant appealed, challenging the evidentiary rulings, sufficiency of the evidence, and the length of his sentences.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the cell phone video, the expert’s comparison testimony, or the DNA evidence, finding each relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. The Court found sufficient evidence supported the convictions and ruled that the sentences, while lengthy, were within statutory limits and considered appropriate factors, including the defendant’s age. The convictions and sentences were affirmed. View "State v. Coleman" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged in connection with a large-scale health care fraud scheme involving Arbor Homecare Services LLC, a company she controlled. Over several years, Arbor fraudulently billed Massachusetts’ Medicaid program, MassHealth, for more than $99 million. The government alleged that the defendant orchestrated the scheme, laundered proceeds through domestic and Kenyan financial accounts, and used the funds to acquire properties and businesses. After an initial mistrial, the defendant was retried and convicted by a jury on charges of conspiracy to commit health care fraud, health care fraud, and money laundering. She was sentenced to 144 months in prison, fined $250,000, and ordered to pay restitution.Prior to the retrial, the defendant cycled through numerous attorneys, at times expressing a desire to proceed without counsel and at other times seeking to hire new counsel if her assets were released from civil forfeiture. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts conducted multiple Faretta colloquies, warning her of the risks of self-representation. Ultimately, the court found her waiver of counsel to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and permitted her to proceed pro se with standby counsel. The court also denied her motion to suppress evidence obtained from her cell phone during a border search, finding the search supported by reasonable suspicion.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the defendant argued that her conviction should be reversed due to alleged violations of her right to counsel and due process, and that the cell phone evidence should have been suppressed. She also challenged the calculation of her sentence, disputing the loss amount and the application of a sophisticated-means enhancement. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions, holding that her waiver of counsel was constitutionally valid, her suppression argument was waived, and her sentencing challenges were either waived or without merit. View "US v. Newton" on Justia Law

The defendant was stopped by police in Kentucky while driving erratically. He was found wearing body armor and carrying eight firearms, knives, ammunition, drugs, and a gasoline can. He claimed he was headed to Fort Knox to discuss a security clearance. Investigation revealed that he was prohibited from possessing firearms due to a prior Missouri court adjudication of mental illness, which had resulted from an incident in St. Louis where he exhibited erratic behavior and his girlfriend reported suicidal tendencies. The Missouri court had committed him for treatment and barred him from firearm possession, and he never petitioned to restore his rights.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky reviewed the case after Laykovich was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (prohibiting firearm possession by persons adjudicated as mentally defective). Laykovich moved to dismiss the charge on Second Amendment grounds, but the district court denied the motion, reasoning that the government could disarm individuals whose mental illness posed a risk of harm. Laykovich then entered a plea agreement, reserving his right to appeal both the constitutional issue and sentencing. At sentencing, the district court found, based on circumstantial evidence, that Laykovich had induced his girlfriend to act as a straw purchaser for some firearms, and applied a sentencing enhancement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the appeal de novo. It held that § 922(g)(4) is constitutional as applied to persons adjudicated as mentally defective and dangerous, because it is “relevantly similar” to longstanding laws allowing civil detention of dangerous mentally ill persons and serves the same public safety purpose. The court affirmed the district court’s application of the sentencing enhancement and its within-guidelines sentence, finding no procedural or substantive error. The judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Laykovich" on Justia Law

After the petitioner’s adult son was terminated from a local fire department, shots were fired at the fire station, leading to an investigation by the Cabell County Sheriff's Department. Officers suspected the son due to recent statements and visited the petitioner’s property, where the son exited holding a 9mm pistol. The officers handled and photographed the firearm for safety reasons. Later, a mistaken report led officers to believe the pistol was stolen, prompting a search warrant and an arrest warrant for the son. When officers returned to execute the warrants, a confrontation ensued, resulting in injuries to officers and the petitioner, and the son’s death. It was later determined the firearm was lawfully owned by the petitioner.The Cabell County grand jury indicted the petitioner on several charges, including attempted murder and obstructing an officer. During the grand jury proceedings, officers referred to the 9mm Beretta as “stolen,” but did not disclose its lawful ownership, which had been discovered weeks after the incident. The petitioner moved to suppress evidence relating to the firearm, to dismiss the indictment due to alleged misleading grand jury testimony, and to strike two jurors for cause. The Circuit Court of Cabell County denied these motions, finding that any mistakes regarding the firearm’s status were innocent, that no prima facie showing of willful fraud by officers was made, and that the challenged jurors affirmed their impartiality.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the appeal and affirmed the circuit court’s order. The Court held that any error regarding the search and seizure of the firearm was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the conviction for obstructing an officer was based on the petitioner’s own conduct. The Court also concluded there was no basis to go behind the indictment, as no willful fraud was shown, and found no prejudice in jury selection since the petitioner removed the challenged jurors using peremptory strikes. View "State v. Pinkerman" on Justia Law

In 2006, the defendant acted as a lookout during an attempted robbery in which his associate shot and killed an off-duty Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department deputy, Maria Cecilia Rosa. The defendant and his associate were charged with first degree murder and attempted robbery. The jury convicted the defendant on both counts, finding the felony-murder special circumstance allegation not true. The defendant was sentenced to 29 years to life, later reduced to 26 years to life after the sentence on attempted robbery was stayed.Years later, following legislative changes by Senate Bill No. 1437, which restricted the felony-murder rule and created a mechanism for retroactive relief under Penal Code section 1172.6, the defendant filed a petition seeking resentencing. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing, finding that Rosa was killed in the course of her duties as a peace officer, making the defendant ineligible for relief under section 189, subdivision (f). On two prior appeals, the California Court of Appeal reviewed aspects of the evidentiary process and remanded for further hearings to determine whether Rosa was acting in the course of her peace officer duties and whether her authority extended while off duty.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the appeal. The court interpreted Penal Code section 830.1, subdivision (c), concluding it applies only to deputies hired, trained, and used for the limited purpose of working exclusively or initially in custodial assignments with modified training. The court found substantial evidence that Rosa was a fully trained deputy under section 830.1, subdivision (a), not a modified deputy, and thus had off-duty peace officer authority. Therefore, Rosa was killed in the course of her peace officer duties, and the defendant is not eligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6. The court affirmed the denial of the petition. View "People v. Flint" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute under federal law. He ultimately pled guilty and, as part of his plea agreement, he waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence, except for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. During the plea process, the defendant confirmed in open court that he had read, discussed, and understood the terms of the plea agreement, including the appeal waiver. He was sentenced to 240 months in prison. The conduct underlying the sentencing enhancements involved the defendant fleeing law enforcement by driving through residential property, which led to the district court applying certain enhancements to his sentence.Following sentencing, the defendant appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, challenging the application of sentencing enhancements and arguing his appeal waiver was not knowing and voluntary. The government argued that the appeal should be dismissed based on the waiver. The Fifth Circuit initially dismissed the appeal, enforcing the waiver. The Supreme Court of the United States then decided Hunter v. United States, establishing that appeal waivers are unenforceable if enforcing them would result in a miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration under the Hunter standard.On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that the defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary. The court further found that, under the Hunter standard, the alleged sentencing errors were not the type of egregious errors that would constitute a miscarriage of justice. As a result, the Fifth Circuit enforced the appeal waiver and dismissed the appeal. The court’s holding was that no miscarriage of justice occurred, and the appeal waiver remained enforceable. View "USA v. Harris" on Justia Law

In 1994, the petitioner was convicted of aggravated murder and first-degree robbery following a fatal shooting during a robbery. He received a life sentence with a mandatory minimum of 30 years for aggravated murder and a consecutive 72-month sentence for robbery, with additional consecutive sentences for later in-prison offenses. After nearly 27 years, he became eligible to seek release from his aggravated murder sentence under Oregon’s three-step process: a murder-review hearing, a determination of a projected release date, and an exit interview. The petitioner successfully completed these steps; the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision affirmed his release date following the exit interview.The Oregon Board of Parole first set the petitioner’s projected release date as January 5, 2022, but after applying some earned-time credits, adjusted it to November 18, 2021, the date of the exit interview. The petitioner argued that the Board should have adjusted his release date further back, to September 23, 2017, based on all available earned-time credits calculated by the Department of Corrections. The Board believed it could not set a release date before the exit interview, relying on prior Oregon Supreme Court cases. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the Board’s approach, holding that earned-time credits could not be applied to adjust the release date to a time before the exit interview, reasoning that the term of incarceration is not set until after the Board schedules and affirms the release date.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reversed the Court of Appeals and the Board’s final order. The court held that, for inmates serving consecutive sentences, once the Board affirms release after the statutory three-step process, the Board must fully apply all available earned-time credits under ORS 421.121, even if that results in a release date before the exit interview. The case was remanded to the Board for further proceedings. View "Barrett v. Board of Parole" on Justia Law

A 15-year-old girl, CZ, who has cerebral palsy and learning difficulties, accused Timothy R. Christensen, a family friend, of sexually assaulting her during a visit to his home. The incident allegedly occurred when CZ was left upstairs with Mr. Christensen while other adults and children were elsewhere in the house. CZ later reported the assault to her mother, underwent a sexual assault examination, and DNA evidence consistent with Mr. Christensen was found. The police investigated, including reviewing text messages between CZ and Mr. Christensen and conducting controlled communication with him through CZ’s phone.The District Court of Sheridan County charged Mr. Christensen with two counts of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor. During trial, the court admitted prior consistent statements made by CZ to her mother, a nurse, and a detective, overruling the defense’s hearsay objections. The defense argued that these admissions were improper because there was no express or implied charge of fabrication at that stage. The court also excluded evidence about a text message CZ sent Mr. Christensen containing a pregnancy test photo, finding it inadmissible under Wyoming’s rape shield statute and lacking relevance. The jury found Mr. Christensen guilty on one count and acquitted him on the other. He was sentenced to five to eight years in prison.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting CZ’s prior consistent statements and in excluding the pregnancy test text message. The Supreme Court held that the prior consistent statements were properly admitted under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) because the defense’s theory implied fabrication, and that the pregnancy test message was properly excluded due to lack of relevance, regardless of the rape shield statute. The conviction and rulings of the district court were affirmed. View "Christensen v. State" on Justia Law