Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2009, Sandoval was convicted of second-degree murder (Pen. Code 187) with a finding that Sandoval committed the offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang and, as a principal, personally used a firearm. He was sentenced to 40 years to life. He unsuccessfully appealed and sought habeas relief. In 2019, he filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code 1172.6. The trial court denied the petition. On remand, the case was assigned to the same judge who had previously denied Sandoval’s petition.Sandoval filed an unsuccessful peremptory challenge seeking to disqualify the judge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6(a)(2), which authorizes a motion to disqualify “following reversal on appeal of a trial court’s decision ... if the trial judge in the prior proceeding is assigned to conduct a new trial on the matter.” In a petition for mandamus relief, Sandoval argued that the remand for reconsideration of the resentencing petition constituted a “new trial.” The court of appeal rejected that argument. Although the remand did not foreclose the introduction of new evidence it contemplated that the trial court could consider evidence that had already been admitted at the Penal Code section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing. View "Sandoval v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of attempted illegal entry pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1325 and attempted illegal reentry pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1326. On appeal, he argued that the district court violated his rights to a fair trial and sentence.The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress a statement he made to a Border Patrol agent about coming to the United States to find work. Defendant argued that the statement, which he made while between border fences, should have been suppressed because he was “in custody” and was not given a Miranda warning prior to his admission. The panel held that the stop here met the requirements of Terry, and the agent’s question about Defendant’s purpose for being in the United States did not exceed the scope of allowable inquiry during such a stop. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 401 and 403, the testimony of Defendant’s only proposed witness, a Tijuana immigration attorney, whom Defendant intended to call as a lay witness to testify about the “factual situation in Tijuana in November 2019”. The panel wrote that neither the record nor the witness’s testimony could establish that Defendant knew of the long lines, and the district court’s concern about distracting the jury was reasonable. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in formulating the jury instructions on the requisite intent for a Section 1326 conviction. View "USA V. JUAN CABRERA" on Justia Law

While on patrol, Deputy Sheriff Brock Katseanes discovered an unattended car parked in the parking lot of a public boat launch. The car was unlocked, and its trunk and front windows were open. Katseanes learned the car was registered to April Ramos. Katseanes was eventually joined by five additional officers and a canine to search the surrounding area for Ramos, but they were unsuccessful in locating her. Due to his previous encounters with Ramos, Katseanes believed the car likely contained illegal drugs. The canine conducted a drug sniff; the dog did not alert during its sniff of the car’s exterior. The officers subsequently impounded the car and then conducted an inventory search of it prior to having the car towed. During the inventory search, the officers found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Ramos was charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. She moved to suppress all evidence found during the inventory search of the car. The district court denied her motion. Ramos conditionally pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance but retained her right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress. As a result of the plea agreement, the State dismissed the possession of drug paraphernalia charge. Ramos timely appealed, and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment. "Absent clear instruction from the United States Supreme Court, we decline to expand Opperman’s 'community caretaking' rationale to include potential theft or property damage to the vehicle as an acceptable reason to impound a vehicle. ... an officer’s concern that the car will be subject to theft or property damage if it is not impounded—no matter how well-founded the concern may be—is irrelevant to the analysis as to whether the decision to impound the car is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." The case was remanded to the district court to determine whether the decision to impound Ramos’s car passed constitutional muster. View "Idaho v. Ramos" on Justia Law

Corey Brown was convicted by jury of conspiracy to commit grand larceny, armed robbery, and kidnapping. In a post-trial motion, Brown moved for a new trial on several grounds, including the State's failure to disclose its negotiations with Shadarron Evans, the State's key witness. The trial court granted the motion, and the State appealed. Agreeing with the State, the court of appeals reversed the grant of a new trial, concluding that no plea offer had been extended and remanded the case to the circuit court to make specific findings as to whether the evidence was material to Brown's guilt under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Brown's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeals. After that review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the circuit court for a new trial. View "South Carolina v. Brown" on Justia Law

A jury sentenced Stephen Powers to death for the attempted rape and murder of Elizabeth Lafferty. After the Mississippi Supreme Court denied post-conviction relief, Powers sought federal habeas relief at the federal district court. The district court stayed federal habeas proceedings to give the Mississippi courts an opportunity to rule on unexhausted claims. In general, Powers argued: (1) he was mentally incompetent; (2) he was denied his right to a fair, impartial jury; (3) trial counsel was ineffective during jury selection for not challenging the prosecution’s peremptory strikes based on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); (4) as a matter of federal due process, the attempted-rape evidence was insufficient; (5) trial and post-conviction counsel were ineffective concerning the guilt phase; (6) trial counsel’s “total dereliction” at sentencing requires application of United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), not Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); (7) even if Cronic was inapplicable, trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland; and (8) cumulative error. Taking each issue raised under careful consideration, the Mississippi Supreme Court denied Powers' request for postconviction relief. View "Powers v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

While L.C. was incarcerated at Federal Medical Center, Lexington, she was repeatedly sexually assaulted by Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employee, Lee. L.C. alleges that the BOP knew or should have known of Lee’s assaults on her and other incarcerated women and failed to enforce its zero-tolerance policy for sexual assault in BOP facilities because BOP officials failed timely to report and investigate Lee’s assaults. L.C. filed a negligence claim against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).The district court dismissed the assault-and-battery claim, holding that the FTCA’s exception to sovereign immunity does not apply to torts committed by federal employees who act beyond the scope of their employment. It dismissed her negligence claim under the discretionary-function exception to the FTCA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on other grounds. The claims fall outside the discretionary-function exception; BOP policy imposes specific and mandatory directives on all BOP officials timely to report and investigate information pertaining to sexual assault by a BOP official and deciding whether to do so is not susceptible to policy considerations. The negligence claim, however, should be dismissed for failure to allege sufficiently that the BOP knew or should have known of Lee’s attacks. View "L. C. v. United States" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated Defendant's conviction for possession of a machine-gun in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and remanded the case for a new trial as to that count, holding that the jury should have been instructed about Defendant's knowledge of the characteristics of the firearm he possessed.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and possession of a machine-gun in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The First Circuit vacated the convictions in part, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (2) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims for pretrial and trial error; and (3) the district court improperly instructed the jury that the government was not required to prove that Defendant knew the firearm he possessed was a machine-gun. View "United States v. Perez-Greaux" on Justia Law

Petitioner is serving a life term for the brutal murder of a 15-year-old girl. After Petitioner served 23 years and three months, the parole board granted him parole. The Governor reversed the parole board’s decision and denied Petitioner parole on the ground that Petitioner lacks insight into his crime. The superior court granted Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The People appealed from the court’s order granting the petition.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court explained that the Governor may rely on the aggravated circumstances of the commitment offense as a basis for his decision to deny parole, but the aggravated circumstances do not in themselves provide some evidence of current dangerousness. The failure to gain insight into the cause of the crime is a factor that shows a continuing threat to public safety.   The court wrote that here, there can be no dispute that the circumstances of the murder were aggravated. Petitioner and his companions brutally murdered a 15-year-old girl. The Governor found that Petitioner remains a current risk to the safety of society because he lacks insight to the cause of the crime. Petitioner explained that at the time he committed the murder, he was hurt and angry. He thought that violence against someone who could not hurt him was an appropriate response. Nothing Petitioner said explains the brutal murder of a 15-year-old girl. The Governor could reasonably conclude that Petitioner lacks insight into his crime View "In re Casey" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Respondent Vanessa Valdiglesias LaValle of two counts of criminal solicitation after she told her minor son, S.G., that he could be with her “forever” if he poisoned his father. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on the ground that Valdiglesias LaValle’s offer to live with S.G. “forever” if S.G. killed his father did not constitute a “thing of value” within the meaning of RCW 9A.28.030(1). The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. The Court held the plain meaning of “money or other thing of value” in RCW 9A.28.030(1) unambiguously included both money and things that were not money but that, like money, possessed utility, desirability, significance, and/or economic value. "Nothing in the plain language or context of the statute indicates that 'other thing of value' must be limited to things with a traditional economic or market value." View "Washington v. Valdiglesias LaValle" on Justia Law

Respondent John McWhorter pleaded guilty in adult court to crimes he committed when he was a juvenile. He later moved for resentencing to enable the trial court to consider the mitigating qualities of his youth. The superior court granted the motion for a resentencing hearing, and the State appealed this order to the Court of Appeals. That court ruled that the superior court’s order was not appealable by the State, so it dismissed the appeal. The State filed a petition for review to the Washington Supreme Court, who reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to that court to consider the State’s appeal. View "Washington v. McWhorter" on Justia Law