Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of drugs and bribing an executive officer. During the arrest, the officer observed signs of intoxication and conducted field sobriety tests, which the defendant failed. A preliminary alcohol screening test showed no alcohol, leading the officer to suspect drug use. The defendant admitted to using cannabis and Alprazolam. At the police station, the defendant initially agreed to a blood test but later refused without a warrant. The officer obtained a warrant, and the blood test confirmed the presence of drugs. The defendant was charged and convicted of DUI and bribery.The Superior Court of California, County of Marin, handled the initial trial. The court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 2130, allowing them to infer consciousness of guilt from the defendant's refusal to submit to a blood test. The defendant was found guilty on both counts and sentenced to three years of probation and 180 days in jail. The defendant appealed, arguing that the jury instruction was improper because he had a constitutional right to refuse the blood test without a warrant.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the instruction was proper, stating that while the Fourth Amendment prohibits criminal penalties for refusing a blood test without a warrant, it does not prohibit all consequences. The court emphasized that implied consent laws can impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences for refusal. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment, concluding that the instruction did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights. View "People v. Bolourchi" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted of possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The Sentencing Guidelines recommended a sentence of 15 to 21 months for the drug charge and a consecutive 60 months for the firearm charge. However, the district court imposed an upward variance, sentencing the defendant to 96 months for the firearm charge and 18 months for the drug charge, totaling 114 months in prison. The court justified the upward variance by citing the quantity of ammunition and magazines the defendant possessed and the need for deterrence.The case was initially reviewed by the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The defendant pled guilty to the charges of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug crime and possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute. The district court dismissed the charges of possessing a machinegun and heroin by agreement. The district court then sentenced the defendant to a total of 114 months in prison, which was 33 months above the high end of the guideline range, citing the additional contraband and the need for deterrence due to Puerto Rico's high rate of firearm offenses and murders.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The defendant argued that the upward variance was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, finding that the district court provided sufficient reasons for the upward variance. The court noted that the additional contraband and the need for deterrence were valid factors for the upward variance. The court concluded that the sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable and upheld the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Rosario-Merced" on Justia Law

In 2008, the defendant was convicted by a jury of multiple counts of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle at another person. He was acquitted of murder and the jury deadlocked on two attempted murder charges, which were not retried. The jury found true the allegations that a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death during the commission of one count, and that the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. The defendant was sentenced to a combination of determinate and indeterminate terms.The defendant filed a petition for resentencing in August 2022 under section 1172.6, asserting he could not be convicted of murder or attempted murder due to changes in the law. The trial court denied the petition in April 2023, concluding he had not been convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter. The defendant filed another identical petition in July 2023, which was also denied on the same grounds.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The defendant did not challenge the denial of his petition for failing to establish a prima facie case for relief. Instead, he argued for the first time that his original sentence was unauthorized because the court imposed a full-term consecutive sentence rather than one-third of the middle term for the subordinate term, in violation of section 1170.1. The Court of Appeal concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider the unauthorized sentence claim in this appeal, as it was unrelated to the denial of the section 1172.6 petition. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed in its entirety. View "P. v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Steven Baker was charged with bank robbery and using a firearm during the robbery. The government offered him a plea deal to plead guilty to these charges and admit to two other bank robberies without being charged for them. Baker’s counsel incorrectly advised him that he faced 15-17 years if he accepted the plea and 21 years for the firearm charges if he went to trial. In reality, he faced a 57-year mandatory minimum for the firearm charges due to the statute’s “stacking” provision. Misled by this advice, Baker rejected the plea, went to trial, and was convicted on all counts, receiving a 57-year sentence for the firearm charges plus 87 months for the bank robberies.Baker appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence. He then filed a Section 2255 motion, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel due to the miscalculation of his sentence exposure. The District Court for the District of New Jersey denied relief, finding that Baker could not show prejudice from his counsel’s error.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Baker’s counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable due to the significant miscalculation of his sentence exposure. The court also determined that Baker demonstrated prejudice because there was a reasonable probability he would have accepted the plea offer if he had been correctly advised. The court noted the substantial disparity between the plea offer (15-17 years) and the actual sentence (57 years plus 87 months) and credited Baker’s testimony that he would have accepted the plea but for his counsel’s error. The court reversed the District Court’s decision and remanded with instructions to order the government to reoffer the original plea agreement to Baker. View "Baker v. United States" on Justia Law

Louis Seignious was convicted of first-degree murder, carrying a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence, and domestic breaking and entering. The incident occurred in Westerly, Rhode Island, where Seignious entered the home of his ex-partner, Dionne Johnson, and shot Vincent Sebastian, who was in a relationship with Johnson. The shooting followed a series of confrontations and a video call where Seignious saw Johnson and Sebastian together. Witnesses testified that Seignious entered the home, asked for Sebastian, and then shot him. Sebastian was found dead from a gunshot wound shortly after.In the Superior Court, Seignious was found guilty on all charges by a jury. He filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the trial justice overlooked material evidence and that there was a lack of physical evidence linking him to the shooting. The trial justice denied the motion, stating that the evidence and witness testimonies were credible and supported the jury's verdict. Seignious was sentenced to life in prison for the murder, with additional consecutive and concurrent sentences for the other charges.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment of conviction. The court found no error in the trial justice's denial of the motion for a new trial, noting that the trial justice had properly evaluated the evidence and witness credibility. The court also addressed Seignious's argument regarding the admission of fingerprint testimony without qualifying the witness as an expert. The court concluded that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion, as the testimony was within the common knowledge of an average juror and did not require expert qualification. View "State v. Seignious" on Justia Law

The defendant was prosecuted for attacking a woman who was jogging on a sidewalk. He tackled her from behind, knocked her out, and dragged her into a ditch. The victim fought back, and the defendant fled. He was charged with attempted first-degree sexual abuse, among other crimes. The state lacked direct evidence of his intent to sexually assault the victim, so it introduced evidence of sexually explicit notes the defendant had previously written to two other women, expressing a desire to forcibly sexually assault them. The trial court admitted these notes under OEC 404(3) to prove intent, and the defendant was convicted on all charges.The Court of Appeals initially held that the notes were inadmissible under OEC 404(3) because their relevance depended on a character-based propensity inference. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine if the notes were admissible under OEC 404(4), which allows for the admission of other acts evidence if relevant, subject to OEC 403 balancing. On remand, the trial court admitted the notes under OEC 404(4) and found that their probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, later ruled that the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting the notes under OEC 403.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court's decision to admit the notes under OEC 403 was within the permissible range of discretion. The court found that the notes were highly probative of the defendant's intent and that the trial court had taken steps to mitigate any unfair prejudice. The court declined to address the defendant's due process argument because it was not preserved at the trial court level. The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

The State of South Dakota charged Ronald Lee Neels with multiple sex-related offenses, including rape, sexual contact, and incest, for the sexual abuse of his adopted daughter over a 14-year period. During the trial, the prosecutor made an opening statement that asked the jury to imagine themselves in the victim's position, which is considered a "Golden Rule" argument and is generally condemned. Neels did not object to this statement at the time. Following his conviction, Neels filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting to the prosecutor's opening statement.The South Dakota Supreme Court summarily affirmed Neels's conviction on direct appeal, stating that the issues raised were without merit. Neels then filed a state habeas corpus petition, which was denied on the grounds of res judicata, as the court found that the issue of prejudice had already been decided on direct appeal. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed this decision, holding that the same standard of prejudice applied in both plain error review and ineffective assistance of counsel claims.Neels subsequently filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court granted the petition, concluding that Neels suffered prejudice from his attorneys' failure to object to the prosecutor's opening statement, despite acknowledging the overwhelming evidence of Neels's guilt. The court reasoned that the magnitude of the prosecutorial misconduct required vacating the conviction to ensure a fair trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Neels did not suffer Strickland prejudice from his counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's opening statement, given the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. The court emphasized that the jury instructions and the strength of the evidence against Neels mitigated any potential prejudice from the prosecutor's improper remarks. View "Neels v. Fluke" on Justia Law

On December 26, 2019, Officers Rozeboom and Malone responded to a shoplifting report at Dick’s Sporting Goods in Papillion, Nebraska. The suspects were described as a black male and black female in a silver four-door sedan. Malone spotted a similar vehicle and conducted a traffic stop. Storrs, a black male, was driving, and Smith, a white female, was the passenger. Despite the discrepancy in the suspect description, the officers detained Storrs and Smith. During the encounter, Storrs and Smith were uncooperative, leading to their arrest and a search of their vehicle, which allegedly smelled of marijuana.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska granted summary judgment in favor of the officers, finding they were entitled to qualified immunity on all claims. The court determined that the officers had reasonable suspicion for the initial stop and probable cause for the continued detention and search based on the alleged odor of marijuana. The court also found no evidence of excessive force or First Amendment retaliation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision in part, agreeing that the officers had probable cause to arrest Storrs and Smith for obstructing a peace officer and that there was no evidence of excessive force or First Amendment retaliation. However, the court reversed the summary judgment on the claim of unlawful continued detention, finding that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion once they saw Smith was white. The court also found a genuine dispute of fact regarding the alleged odor of marijuana, precluding summary judgment on the illegal search claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "Storrs v. Rozeboom" on Justia Law

Pedro Rosario was convicted of aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs in 2021 and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison, with ten years suspended, four years of probation, and a $25,000 fine. His conviction was affirmed by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in 2022. In April 2023, Rosario filed a motion to vacate the judgment and for a new trial, alleging that a juror was improperly seated and biased. The State accepted the allegations as true for the purposes of the motion.The trial court held a non-testimonial hearing and found that during jury selection, Rosario’s counsel wanted to voir dire Juror 23, but another juror was brought forward by mistake. Juror 23 was selected as an alternate but was mistakenly seated as a juror when another juror was dismissed. Rosario’s attorney did not object at the time. Later, Rosario’s attorney discovered that Juror 23 had attended high school with the District Attorney but had not spoken to him since. The trial court determined that this information was not newly discovered evidence and denied Rosario’s motion for a new trial.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that Rosario’s motion was untimely under M.R.U. Crim. P. 33, as the information about Juror 23 was known before the trial concluded. The court also found no evidence of juror bias or misconduct that would warrant a new trial. The court concluded that Rosario received a fair trial by an impartial jury and upheld the trial court’s judgment. View "State of Maine v. Rosario" on Justia Law

Douglas Lovell was convicted in 2015 for the murder of Joyce Yost, a crime he committed in 1985. Lovell had previously pled guilty to the murder in 1993 and was sentenced to death, but his plea was later withdrawn, leading to a new trial. During the new trial, Lovell did not contest his guilt but argued for a lesser sentence, presenting evidence of his remorse and rehabilitation.In the lower courts, Lovell's 1993 guilty plea was vacated by the Utah Supreme Court in 2011 due to procedural errors. The case was remanded for a new trial, where Lovell was again convicted and sentenced to death. Lovell appealed, arguing that the district court improperly admitted his testimony from the 1993 proceedings and that his counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court assumed, without deciding, that the district court erred in admitting Lovell's 1993 testimony but found the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming evidence of Lovell's guilt. However, the court agreed with Lovell that his counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase. The court found that counsel failed to adequately object to prejudicial testimony regarding Lovell's excommunication from the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and the Church's doctrine on repentance and remorse. This testimony improperly suggested that the jury could rely on the Church's assessment of Lovell's remorse rather than making their own determination.The Utah Supreme Court held that this ineffective assistance of counsel prejudiced Lovell's ability to have a fair sentencing hearing. As a result, the court vacated Lovell's death sentence and remanded the case for a new sentencing proceeding. View "State v. Lovell" on Justia Law