Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

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Michael Lovelace was charged with multiple felonies, including rape and aggravated kidnapping, along with special sentencing enhancements and aggravating factors under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(c). Lovelace challenged the constitutionality of the rule 4.421(c) residual clause, which allows for consideration of any other factors that reasonably relate to the defendant or the circumstances under which the crime was committed. He argued that this clause violated the separation of powers and due process principles.The trial court denied Lovelace's motion to set aside the information, leading him to seek interlocutory review by petition for a writ of prohibition. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, issued an order to show cause and held oral arguments. Following the Supreme Court's decision in People v. Lynch, which provided guidance on the interpretation and application of Senate Bill 567 amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b)(2), the court took supplemental briefing.The Court of Appeal granted writ relief, holding that the rule 4.421(c) residual clause is unconstitutionally vague and exceeds the Judicial Council’s delegated authority to adopt rules promoting uniformity in sentencing. The court found that the clause grants prosecutors and juries open-ended power to define sentencing criteria on an ad hoc basis, violating the separation of powers clause of the California Constitution. The court directed the trial court to vacate its order denying Lovelace's section 995 motion and to enter a new order sustaining the motion to the extent it seeks to invalidate the residual clause. The court prohibited the trial court from allowing a jury to consider any findings based on the rule 4.421(c) residual clause. View "Lovelace v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Kristopher Bunker filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the superior court's denial of his request for an automatic bail review hearing under Penal Code section 1270.2. At his arraignment, the superior court held a preliminary bail review hearing and ultimately decided to hold Bunker without bail, citing a substantial likelihood of great bodily injury if he were released. Bunker then requested a bail review hearing within five days, which the court denied, stating it was pending a change in circumstances.Bunker subsequently filed a writ of habeas corpus with the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, arguing that he was entitled to a bail review hearing within five days as a matter of right, without needing to demonstrate a change in circumstances. The Court of Appeal construed the petition as one seeking a writ of mandate and requested opposition, but no response was filed.The Court of Appeal held that under Penal Code section 1270.2, Bunker was entitled to an automatic bail review hearing within five days of the original bail order without needing to show a change in circumstances. The court found that the superior court erred in denying Bunker's request for such a hearing. Consequently, the Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its pretrial detention order and conduct a new bail hearing in accordance with section 1270.2. The decision was made final immediately. View "Bunker v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

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Police stopped Martin Devalois for a traffic violation. During the stop, a drug-sniffing dog alerted to narcotics in Devalois’s rental vehicle. Instead of complying with the police request to exit the car, Devalois initiated a high-speed chase that ended in a crash. Police searched the vehicle and found a small amount of marijuana and a gun. Devalois, a convicted felon, was charged with illegally possessing a firearm. He moved to suppress the gun, arguing that the police unconstitutionally prolonged the traffic stop to conduct the dog sniff. The district court denied his motion, and a jury found him guilty.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana held a suppression hearing where the court found the police officer’s testimony credible and determined that the officer did not extend the length of the stop. The district court denied Devalois’s motion to suppress the gun, and the jury subsequently found him guilty of the firearm charge. Devalois was sentenced to 92 months’ imprisonment and appealed the denial of his motion to suppress.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court’s factual finding that the officer did not prolong the traffic stop was not clearly erroneous. The court held that the officer’s actions during the stop were within the mission of the traffic stop and did not unlawfully extend its duration. The court also held that the dog sniff did not violate the Fourth Amendment as it was conducted while the officer was still diligently pursuing the stop’s mission. Consequently, the search of the vehicle and the seizure of the gun were lawful. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision denying Devalois’s motion to suppress the gun. View "United States v. Devalois" on Justia Law

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Armani Davis-Malone, while on probation for credit-card fraud, began selling prescription pills in Detroit, Michigan. Law enforcement, alerted by an informant, conducted two controlled buys where Davis-Malone sold oxycodone to an undercover agent. Subsequently, federal agents searched his car, finding a fully automatic handgun, over 100 oxycodone pills, and 200 grams of marijuana. Davis-Malone was charged with possessing a firearm as a felon and pleaded guilty. The district court sentenced him to 60 months, below the guidelines range of 70 to 87 months.The Sentencing Commission later amended the guidelines, reducing Davis-Malone’s range to 57 to 71 months. Davis-Malone sought a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), supported by a probation officer’s report and a joint stipulation from both parties recommending a 57-month sentence. Despite this, the district court denied the reduction, stating that the original 60-month sentence was near the lower end of the amended range.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. Davis-Malone argued that the district court erred legally by finding him ineligible for a reduction and abused its discretion by not providing a detailed explanation. The Sixth Circuit found that the district court did not commit a legal error, interpreting the order as a discretionary denial rather than a finding of ineligibility. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion, as it had considered the relevant factors and the simple facts of the case justified the use of a form order. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. View "United States v. Davis-Malone" on Justia Law

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George Short was observed by police driving 25 miles per hour over the speed limit and without a car hood. When officers attempted to stop him, he led them on a high-speed chase. Upon his arrest, a rifle was found in his car. Due to his prior felony convictions, Short was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and subsequently pled guilty. He was sentenced as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) due to his prior violent felonies.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Greeneville handled the initial proceedings. Short objected to the ACCA enhancement, arguing that the factual basis for his plea did not include an admission that his prior felonies were committed on separate occasions, as required by the ACCA. The district court overruled his objection, relying on Sixth Circuit precedent that allowed the court to determine whether the prior felonies were committed on different occasions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in accepting Short’s guilty plea despite the written factual basis not mentioning the separate occasions element. The court found that the indictment, presentence report (PSR), and sentencing hearing provided sufficient evidence that Short’s prior felonies were committed on separate occasions. The court emphasized that Rule 11(b)(3) does not require every element to be included in the written factual basis, and the entire record can be considered to determine if there is a sufficient factual basis for the plea. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit affirmed Short’s ACCA conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Short" on Justia Law

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Ganesa Rosales, a nurse, filed a False Claims Act (FCA) complaint against Amedisys North Carolina, LLC, Dr. Sanjay Batish, and Batish Medical Service, PLLC, alleging fraudulent practices in admitting and recertifying patients for hospice care who did not meet the requirements. Rosales claimed that these practices were widespread and systematic within the company. She also added a claim under the Anti-Kickback Statute in her amended complaint.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina dismissed Rosales's federal claims without prejudice, citing the FCA’s first-to-file rule, which bars subsequent related actions based on the same facts as a pending action. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state-law claim. Rosales appealed, arguing that her claims were distinct and that the district court should have considered her amended complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that the first-to-file rule applies claim-by-claim and defendant-by-defendant, and it should consider the most recent properly filed complaint. However, the court found that Rosales's claims against Amedisys NC, Dr. Batish, and his practice were based on the same material elements of fraud as the earlier-filed complaint by Jackie Byers against Amedisys Holding and its South Carolina subsidiary. The court also noted that Rosales failed to develop an argument distinguishing her Anti-Kickback Statute claim from the earlier complaints.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Rosales's complaint without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, adhering to its precedent that the first-to-file rule is jurisdictional. View "United States ex rel. Rosales v. Amedisys North Carolina, L.L.C." on Justia Law

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The case involves Shamond Jenkins, who was convicted of robbing a Centier Bank branch in South Bend, Indiana, in December 2020. Jenkins was identified as a suspect in three robberies in northern Indiana between December 2020 and January 2021. During a traffic stop on January 8, 2021, Jenkins was found with cash, including a bait bill from the South Bend robbery, and was wearing red-and-white Air Jordan sneakers similar to those worn by the robber. Jenkins was charged with multiple counts, including the South Bend bank robbery, to which he pleaded not guilty.In the district court, Jenkins was found guilty of the South Bend bank robbery but not guilty of the Granger Centier Bank robbery. The jury could not reach a unanimous decision on the Check Into Cash robbery. Jenkins objected to the Presentence Investigation Report's recommendations, including an enhancement for obstructing justice by presenting false testimony and the inclusion of juvenile adjudications in his criminal history. The district court overruled these objections and sentenced Jenkins to 100 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Jenkins's appeal. Jenkins argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict him, that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated due to the face mask he had to wear during the trial, and that the district court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement for perjury and in counting his juvenile convictions. The Seventh Circuit found no error in the district court's decisions. The court held that the face mask did not render the in-court identifications unduly suggestive or violate Jenkins's confrontation rights. The court also upheld the sufficiency of the evidence and the sentencing decisions, affirming Jenkins's conviction and sentence. View "USA v Jenkins" on Justia Law

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In October 2021, Gregg Alan Hoover was arrested and cited for misdemeanor domestic battery. In April 2022, the State amended the charge to a felony under Idaho Code section 18-918(5), citing Hoover’s March 2022 conviction for felony domestic battery with traumatic injury. Hoover moved to dismiss the felony enhancement, arguing that the March 2022 conviction occurred after the October 2021 incident. The district court agreed and dismissed the felony enhancement, reasoning that the enhancement could not apply because the conduct in question occurred before the March 2022 conviction.The State appealed, arguing that the enhancement provision only requires a prior felony conviction within fifteen years of the subsequent conviction, not that the criminal conduct must occur after the prior conviction. The Idaho Court of Appeals issued an unpublished decision, and Hoover petitioned for review, which the Idaho Supreme Court granted.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and concluded that the plain language of Idaho Code section 18-918(5) does not impose a timing requirement related to the criminal conduct. The statute enhances a charge if a defendant has a prior felony conviction and is found guilty of a further violation within fifteen years, regardless of when the conduct occurred. The Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the felony enhancement and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Hoover" on Justia Law

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In June 2020, fourteen-year-old K.S. reported to the Sioux City Police Department that Taylor Smith, then twenty-three, had sexually assaulted her, resulting in her pregnancy. A DNA test confirmed Smith as the father. Smith was charged with third-degree sexual abuse, a class “C” felony, under Iowa Code section 709.4(1)(b)(3)(d). After a bench trial, Smith was found guilty. At sentencing, the district court imposed a $1,370 fine, which coincided with the increased minimum fine effective after the offense, and issued a notice of firearm prohibition.The Iowa District Court for Woodbury County sentenced Smith to an indeterminate term not exceeding ten years, imposed a $1,370 fine (suspended), a 15% crime services surcharge (suspended), and a $90 sexual abuse surcharge. The court also issued a notice of firearm prohibition based on Smith’s felony conviction. Smith appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a fine based on an incorrect statutory range and challenged the firearm prohibition notice as unconstitutional.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court found that the district court misunderstood the applicable fine range, which should have been $1,000 to $10,000, not the increased range effective after the offense. This misunderstanding constituted an abuse of discretion. Consequently, the court vacated the fine portion of Smith’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. Regarding the firearm prohibition notice, the court determined it was not reviewable on direct appeal as it was not a term of Smith’s sentence but rather a collateral consequence of his felony conviction. Thus, the court did not address the constitutional challenges to the firearm prohibition. View "State of Iowa v. Smith" on Justia Law

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Gerry Greenland was convicted of attempted murder, assault on a peace officer with intent to cause serious injury while using a dangerous weapon, and simple assault. The incident occurred on May 23, 2019, when Greenland, after a series of confrontations with family members on a farm, used a tractor equipped with bale spears to attack Sheriff Ben Boswell's vehicle. Greenland's actions included ramming the sheriff's car, causing significant damage and endangering the sheriff's life.The Iowa District Court for Decatur County found Greenland guilty of all charges and sentenced him to concurrent terms of incarceration, totaling a maximum of twenty-five years. Greenland appealed, arguing insufficient evidence for his convictions and that the assault conviction should merge with the attempted murder conviction. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions and that the convictions did not merge because they were based on separate and distinct actions.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether the convictions for assault on a peace officer and attempted murder should merge under Iowa Code section 701.9. The court held that the convictions did not merge because the assault involved alternative theories, including the use or display of a dangerous weapon, which was not an element of attempted murder. The court disavowed a previous statement in State v. Braggs that suggested it is impossible to commit attempted murder without also committing an assault, clarifying that assault is not always a lesser included offense of attempted murder. The court affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the District Court. View "State of Iowa v. Greenland" on Justia Law