Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Between December 2017 and February 2018, Derby Clerfe purchased nine 9mm handguns from a Pennsylvania sporting goods store. Federal authorities, finding this purchasing pattern suspicious, interviewed Clerfe, who admitted arranging for the guns to be shipped to Haiti through a third party, without declaring them as required by law. He acknowledged the guns may have been concealed and had not yet arrived in Haiti. Clerfe was charged with conspiracy to violate U.S. laws prohibiting the export of firearms without proper filing, as well as transferring firearms to an unlicensed out-of-state resident.The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania reviewed the charges. Clerfe moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the laws he was charged under violated the Second Amendment, constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the executive branch, and were unconstitutionally vague. The District Court denied his motion. Clerfe then pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion on Second Amendment and non-delegation grounds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the laws prohibiting Clerfe from exporting handguns to Haiti did not violate the Second Amendment because the right to “keep and bear Arms” does not encompass sending firearms abroad in violation of export laws. The court further held that the Arms Export Control Act’s delegation to the President to designate “defense articles” for export control satisfies the constitutional “intelligible principle” standard, and thus does not violate the non-delegation doctrine. Accordingly, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s denial of Clerfe’s motion to dismiss the indictment. View "USA v. Clerfe" on Justia Law

A citizen of Mexico who entered the United States as a child was convicted in California in 2012 for violating a statute that prohibits distributing harmful material to a minor with the intent to seduce. Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings. The individual sought cancellation of removal, arguing that his conviction should not disqualify him for relief.An Immigration Judge found that the conviction constituted both a crime involving moral turpitude and a crime of child abuse under federal immigration law, pretermitting his application for cancellation of removal. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision, holding specifically that the conviction under California Penal Code § 288.2(b) was categorically a crime of child abuse, and dismissed the appeal. The Board declined to address whether the offense was a crime involving moral turpitude.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo, applying the categorical approach as articulated in its recent precedent, Leon-Briviesca v. Blanche. The court considered the petitioner’s arguments that the California statute was overly broad compared to the generic definition of a crime of child abuse, including claims about actual harm, consensual conduct between minors, mistaken belief about the victim’s age, and communications not received by a minor. The Ninth Circuit found each argument unpersuasive, concluding that the statute requires conduct that meets the federal definition of child abuse and that there was no realistic probability California would apply the statute as broadly as petitioner claimed. The court held that a conviction under California Penal Code § 288.2(b) is categorically a crime of child abuse for immigration purposes, and therefore denied the petition for review. View "ADAME GARCIA V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

Federal agents discovered that an individual in San Antonio, Texas had accessed a website on the dark web featuring child sexual abuse material. Upon executing a search warrant, investigators found thousands of illicit images and videos on the suspect's devices. The defendant subsequently pled guilty to receipt of child pornography under federal law. Because the defendant had a prior Texas state conviction for possession of child pornography, federal prosecutors sought a statutory sentencing enhancement that significantly increased the minimum and maximum prison terms.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas rejected the defendant’s argument that the enhancement was inapplicable, finding the prior Texas conviction sufficiently related to the federal offense. The district judge sentenced the defendant to the enhanced minimum of fifteen years and ordered him to pay $94,000 in restitution to fourteen victims. The defendant’s objections to both the enhancement and the restitution order were overruled.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation issue de novo and the restitution issues for plain error. The court held that the phrase “relating to” in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1) should be given its ordinary, broad meaning, affirming the district court’s application of the sentencing enhancement. The court also affirmed the restitution order for eleven victims, finding the district court had an adequate basis for proximate-cause analysis as required by Paroline v. United States. However, the court vacated the restitution order for three victims, concluding the record lacked sufficient evidence of proximate-cause analysis for those individuals, and remanded for further proceedings. View "USA v. Mendoza" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, admitting to prior felony convictions in California, including robbery and a drug offense. The presentence report assigned him a higher base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines, finding he had two qualifying prior convictions: the California robbery and the California drug conviction. The report also added two criminal history points for the drug conviction, noting that attorney representation was unknown but citing California law requiring counsel or a valid waiver for felony defendants. After reductions for acceptance of responsibility, the Guidelines range was set at 77 to 96 months.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas adopted the presentence report’s findings and sentenced the defendant to 77 months imprisonment. The defendant objected to the classification of his California robbery conviction as a crime of violence under the newer Guideline definition and to the inclusion of criminal history points for the drug conviction, arguing it was uncounseled. The district court overruled his objections, relying on precedent and the record’s presumption of lawful procedure.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted the defendant’s motion to supplement the record. It reviewed de novo whether California robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the amended Guidelines. The court held that California robbery is a categorical match for the Guidelines’ definition of robbery, which does not require a specific mens rea, thus qualifying as a crime of violence. The court also reviewed the addition of criminal history points for the drug conviction for plain error and found no clear or obvious error, given the presumption of regularity for state convictions and insufficient evidence of a constitutional violation. The court affirmed the judgment and sentence of the district court. View "USA v. Williams" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty in 2014 to multiple offenses, including two counts of attempted murder and a firearm enhancement, as part of a plea deal. He agreed to a stipulated sentence of 25 years in prison, which included the upper term for attempted murder. He also admitted a prior prison term enhancement. Years later, after legislative changes invalidated certain prison prior enhancements and amended sentencing rules for upper terms, the defendant was resentenced under Penal Code section 1172.75. The trial court dismissed the prison prior enhancement and reduced his controlled substance conviction to a misdemeanor, lowering his overall sentence to 23 years and 4 months.At the Orange County Superior Court, the judge imposed the upper term for attempted murder during the original sentencing pursuant to the plea agreement. During resentencing under section 1172.75, the court removed the prison prior enhancement but reimposed the upper term for attempted murder without requiring a jury finding or defendant stipulation regarding aggravating factors. The defendant appealed, arguing that recent amendments to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)—requiring a jury finding or stipulation for upper term sentencing—should apply retroactively at resentencing.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4), allows reimposition of the upper term at resentencing if it was originally imposed, even without a jury finding or stipulation. The court also found no Sixth Amendment violation because no new judicial factfinding occurred, and rejected the defendant’s Equal Protection claim, concluding that the Legislature had rational reasons to treat resentencing under section 1172.75 differently from other statutes. The judgment was affirmed. View "People v. McAlister" on Justia Law

Law enforcement in Maryland began investigating a suspicious FedEx package suspected to contain marijuana. After a controlled delivery, officers observed Andrew Campbell Founds retrieving the package and tracked him to his apartment. Upon arrival, officers noticed the odor of marijuana and, after detaining Founds, conducted a protective sweep of the apartment based on his claim that another person was inside. During the sweep, they observed drugs, firearms, and a bulletproof vest in plain view. Officers then secured a warrant to search the apartment, relying on both their prior investigative steps and observations from the sweep. The subsequent search uncovered over fifty pounds of marijuana, psilocyn mushrooms, drug paraphernalia, cash, and body armor.The Circuit Court for Worcester County denied Founds’ motion to suppress, finding that although the officers created the exigency justifying the protective sweep, excision of the tainted observations from the warrant affidavit left sufficient untainted information to establish probable cause. The court also denied a motion for reconsideration and found Founds guilty of three possessory offenses based on an agreed statement of facts. Founds appealed to the Appellate Court of Maryland, which affirmed both the denial of the suppression motion and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and, assuming without deciding that the protective sweep violated the Fourth Amendment, held that the independent source doctrine applied. After excising the tainted information, the remaining facts in the warrant affidavit established probable cause, making the subsequent search lawful. The Court also held that the evidence was sufficient for a rational factfinder to conclude that Founds constructively possessed the contraband and body armor, using the four-factor framework from Smith v. State. The judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland was affirmed. View "Founds v. State" on Justia Law

The case centers on a drug-related shootout in Orlando, Florida, in which Cristian Ponce, a convicted felon, was involved. On November 2, 2022, Ponce was a passenger in a vehicle with his co-conspirator, Savier Hernandez, when two rival drug dealers approached. A gunfight ensued, resulting in the deaths of Hernandez and one of the rivals, Eminem Esquilin. Evidence, including drugs and firearms, linked Ponce to ongoing drug distribution. After the incident, additional searches recovered more drugs, firearms, and communications indicating Ponce’s involvement in drug sales and awareness of rival territories.A grand jury indicted Ponce on four counts related to drug distribution and firearms offenses, but not murder. He pleaded guilty to all counts. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, during sentencing, applied the murder cross-reference under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(d)(1), which increased Ponce’s offense level by referencing the guideline for second-degree murder. The court found that the shooting, as part of a drug conspiracy, was reasonably foreseeable and that Ponce had negligently placed himself in a situation requiring criminal conduct. Ponce objected, arguing the shooting was in self-defense and that he was not the aggressor. The district court overruled his objections and sentenced him to 240 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the murder cross-reference was properly applied because Ponce was accountable for the actions of his co-conspirator under the relevant conduct guidelines. The court also concluded that Ponce could not claim self-defense, as he negligently placed himself in a dangerous situation by bringing firearms to sell drugs on a rival’s turf, thereby failing to meet the requirements for a justification defense. View "USA v. Ponce" on Justia Law

Terry Ferguson was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. In January 2023, he pleaded guilty to both counts under a written plea agreement that included a broad waiver of his appellate rights, except for challenges to the validity of the plea or his sentence. During the investigation, federal agents solicited Ferguson's cooperation against his attorney, Beau Brindley, suggesting possible misconduct by Brindley. Ferguson initially expressed interest but ultimately declined to cooperate and retained Brindley as his counsel throughout the proceedings.After pleading guilty, Ferguson filed motions in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, to dismiss the indictment on grounds of selective or vindictive prosecution, alleging he was singled out due to personal animus from investigating agents. The district court denied these motions, finding no evidence of improper prosecutorial motive and determining that Ferguson had waived such defenses by pleading guilty. Ferguson also sought to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel due to an alleged conflict of interest arising from the government's inquiry into Brindley. The district court rejected this claim, concluding there was no actual conflict or adverse effect on Brindley’s representation.On consolidated appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Ferguson’s § 2255 motion, holding there was no actual conflict of interest or adverse effect on counsel’s performance. The court also dismissed Ferguson’s appeal of the denial of his motions to dismiss, enforcing the appellate waiver in his plea agreement, which barred such claims. Thus, the district court’s judgment was affirmed in part and the remaining appeal was dismissed. View "Ferguson v USA" on Justia Law

A suspect was interviewed by police regarding a homicide after being advised of his Miranda rights. He stated he understood those rights and initially agreed to speak with the officers, but during the interview, he made an ambiguous comment about whether he should continue without an attorney. Rather than clarifying whether the suspect actually wanted counsel, the officers continued questioning without pause. The suspect made admissions during the interview, and evidence from that interview was later used to convict him at trial for first-degree murder and tampering with evidence.Prior to trial in the Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Kodiak, the defendant moved to suppress his statements from the interview, arguing that his ambiguous reference to counsel required the officers to stop and clarify whether he wanted an attorney. The superior court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the defendant had knowingly waived his Miranda rights and that the ambiguous statement did not require clarification. The defendant was convicted by a jury. On appeal, the Alaska Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that under the Alaska Constitution, police are required to stop and seek clarification when a suspect makes an ambiguous post-waiver reference to counsel.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case after the State petitioned for hearing, asking the court to adopt the federal standard from Davis v. United States, which does not require a “stop and clarify” rule. The Alaska Supreme Court held that, under article I, sections 9 and 11 of the Alaska Constitution, law enforcement officers must stop questioning and clarify any ambiguous request for counsel—even after a suspect has waived Miranda rights. The court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, reversed the conviction, and required suppression of the defendant’s statements made after the ambiguous request. View "State v. Ridenour" on Justia Law

Federal authorities investigated a defendant beginning in 1999 for drug and firearm offenses, and during a search of his home, discovered evidence of sexual abuse of minors. A grand jury indicted him on sixteen counts including sexual exploitation of minors, interstate transportation and possession of child pornography, and distribution of controlled substances with intent to commit a crime of violence. He pleaded guilty to several counts, including sexual exploitation and distribution of controlled substances, and received a lengthy prison sentence. In exchange, the government dismissed multiple serious charges. The definition of “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) was central to the controlled substances counts.After conviction, the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico denied his initial habeas motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed that denial. Years later, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, which held § 16(b)’s residual clause unconstitutionally vague, the defendant sought permission to file a second or successive § 2255 motion raising this new rule. The Tenth Circuit allowed him to file the motion, but the district court dismissed it as untimely and ruled against his Dimaya claim on the merits, finding the challenged statute could have been classified under § 16(a)’s elements clause. The district court also determined he was not entitled to the actual innocence exception to AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations because he had not shown innocence of equally or more serious charges dismissed in the plea deal.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the defendant’s motion relied on a new, retroactive rule of constitutional law, but affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court ruled the motion was untimely and that the miscarriage-of-justice exception required him to show actual innocence of equally or more serious dismissed charges, which he had not done. View "United States v. Hahn" on Justia Law