Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

James Mason Heaps, a gynecological oncologist at UCLA, was prosecuted for multiple charges arising from medical examinations involving seven former patients. The allegations included sexual battery by fraud, sexual exploitation, and sexual penetration of an unconscious person during gynecological exams. The jury ultimately convicted Heaps on several counts involving two victims, acquitted him on others, and was unable to reach verdicts on some charges. Sentencing followed with an aggregate prison term of 11 years.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County presided over the trial and subsequent jury deliberations. During deliberations, a note was sent by the jury foreperson expressing concerns that Juror No. 15 lacked sufficient English proficiency to participate and had prematurely decided the case. The judicial assistant, rather than the judge, addressed the note directly with the jurors—speaking in both English and Spanish—without notifying counsel or making a record of the exchanges. Defense counsel was not informed of the note or these communications, and the trial proceeded to verdict. On appeal, the settled statement process included testimony and declarations clarifying the sequence of events, but key details remained unclear.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court’s failure to notify counsel about the jury’s note and the judicial assistant’s ex parte communications with the jury during deliberations deprived the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a critical stage. The appellate court found that the prosecution had not met its burden to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that this constitutional error was harmless. As a result, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. View "P. v. Heaps" on Justia Law

Police officers discovered two debit cards in Garry Allen Hudson’s possession during a contact at a motel room and subsequent arrest. Each card was issued in a different person’s name, and Hudson denied knowing either individual. The detective who testified at trial was unable to determine whether the cards were active, whether Hudson knew the named individuals, or whether there was any money in the accounts. At least one of the cards had not been reported stolen in Colorado.Hudson was charged with criminal possession of two or more financial devices. At trial in the District Court, the jury convicted him of one count of criminal possession of a financial device, but did not specify which card formed the basis for conviction. The trial court sentenced Hudson to eighteen months’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals, in a divided unpublished opinion, vacated Hudson’s conviction and sentence for criminal possession of a financial device. The majority held that the prosecution was required to prove the debit card could be used to obtain a thing of value at the time Hudson possessed it and found the evidence insufficient on that point.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that, under sections 18-5-903(1) and 18-5-901(6), the prosecution is not required to prove that a debit card was capable of use at the time of possession to support a conviction for criminal possession of a financial device. The Court concluded that the statutory inclusion of debit cards as financial devices is sufficient and no further qualification regarding usability is required. The case was remanded to reinstate Hudson’s conviction. View "People v. Hudson" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers from a drug task force conducted several undercover drug transactions with a defendant, exchanging cash (“buy money”) for controlled substances over the course of nearly a year. After the defendant’s eventual arrest, officers were unable to recover any of the buy money used in these operations. The defendant was charged in multiple cases and ultimately pleaded guilty to two counts of distribution of a controlled substance. The district court sentenced him to prison and, following a restitution hearing, ordered him to pay $1,640 in restitution to the drug task force for the unrecovered buy money.On appeal, a division of the Colorado Court of Appeals vacated the restitution order. The appellate court reasoned that the buy money was not “money advanced by law enforcement agencies” within the meaning of Colorado’s restitution statute, since the agency was not a statutory “victim” and did not suffer a pecuniary loss in the relevant sense. The court also found that the buy money did not qualify as “extraordinary direct public investigative costs,” because such expenditures are routine, budgeted expenses for law enforcement, not unusual or irregular costs. The division explicitly declined to follow a prior decision, People v. Juanda, which had permitted restitution for buy money under similar circumstances.The Supreme Court of Colorado granted certiorari to resolve whether law enforcement is entitled to restitution for unrecovered buy money under the relevant statute. The court held that buy money used in undercover drug transactions is neither “money advanced by law enforcement agencies” nor “extraordinary direct public investigative costs” as defined by statute. Therefore, law enforcement agencies cannot recover buy money as restitution from defendants in these circumstances. The judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals vacating the district court’s restitution order was affirmed. View "People v. Hollis" on Justia Law

Andrew Burgess Gregg was charged with aggravated robbery, attempt to influence a public servant, false reporting, and four habitual criminal counts in Mesa County, Colorado. After a jury convicted him of the substantive offenses, the trial court discharged the jury and scheduled a hearing to determine his habitual criminal status under Colorado’s prior sentencing statute, which required the judge to make such findings. Before that hearing, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Erlinger v. United States, holding that facts increasing a sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act—specifically, whether prior convictions arose from separate criminal episodes—must be determined by a jury, not solely by a judge.Gregg moved to dismiss the habitual criminal counts, arguing that Erlinger rendered Colorado’s statute unconstitutional and that empaneling a new jury would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The People opposed, asserting that jeopardy had not yet attached to the habitual counts and that a second jury could properly decide the matter. The Mesa County District Court granted Gregg’s motion, finding it could not empanel a new jury for the habitual counts because jeopardy had attached.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case in an original proceeding. The court held that Colorado’s former habitual criminal sentencing statute is not facially unconstitutional and can be constitutionally applied by allowing a jury to determine whether prior convictions arose out of separate and distinct episodes, with a judge then reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence. The court also held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar empaneling a second jury to decide habitual criminal counts when the first jury was discharged after adjudicating only the substantive offenses. The Supreme Court made the order to show cause absolute and reinstated Gregg’s habitual criminal charges for jury assessment. View "People v. Gregg" on Justia Law

A teenager, S.G.H., was accused of using generative artificial intelligence to create explicit composite images of three underage female classmates by digitally blending their actual faces and clothed bodies with computer-generated images of naked intimate body parts. These manipulated images were discovered on S.G.H.’s school email account during a police investigation prompted by an automated alert regarding inappropriate content. The images made it appear as though the classmates were nude, but the explicit portions were entirely computer-generated and not derived from actual photographs of the victims.In the Morgan County District Court, the People of the State of Colorado filed a delinquency petition charging S.G.H. with six counts of sexual exploitation of a child under section 18-6-403(3)(b) and (3)(b.5), C.R.S. (2024). S.G.H. moved to dismiss, arguing that the images did not constitute “sexually exploitative material” under the law then in effect, since they did not depict actual naked children and the explicit body parts were computer-generated. The District Court denied the motion, interpreting the statute as encompassing digitally manipulated images bearing a child’s actual features combined with simulated intimate parts, and found probable cause for all charges.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case under its original jurisdiction. The Court held that, as of December 2023, the statutory definition of “sexually exploitative material” did not cover images created or altered using generative AI to fabricate explicit content. The Court found that recent legislative amendments expanding the definition to include such computer-generated images represented a change, not a clarification, of the law. Concluding that the District Court erred in finding probable cause, the Supreme Court made absolute its order to show cause and remanded with instructions to dismiss all charges against S.G.H. View "People ex rel. S.G.H." on Justia Law

Law enforcement authorities investigating a graduate student at a university for rape served a search warrant on a major electronic service provider seeking data linked to the student’s university email account. Along with the warrant, the authorities obtained a nondisclosure order (NDO) that prohibited the provider from disclosing the existence of the warrant or the investigation to the target, the university, or others for 90 days. The provider did not contest the restriction as it applied to the target, but sought to modify the NDO so it could inform a trusted contact at the university about the warrant, arguing that doing so would not compromise the investigation and was required under state law and the First Amendment.In the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the provider’s motion to modify the NDO was denied. The court based its decision on a sealed affidavit supporting the warrant and NDO, finding that several statutory criteria justifying nondisclosure were satisfied. The court also rejected the provider’s proposal to notify a university contact, expressing concern about its lack of jurisdiction over the university and the possibility of unauthorized disclosure. The NDO was later extended, but ultimately lifted after the student was arrested.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the provider’s petition for a writ of mandate. The court held that the trial court complied with the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act by making the required findings before issuing the NDO, and that the NDO satisfied strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. The court reasoned that the NDO served a compelling governmental interest in protecting an ongoing criminal investigation and was narrowly tailored, as allowing disclosure to a university contact posed unacceptable risks. The petition for writ of mandate was denied, and each party was ordered to bear its own costs on appeal. View "Microsoft Corp. v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who corresponded online with an undercover police officer posing as a girl under fifteen years old and offered or solicited sexual conduct. Based on this interaction, the defendant was indicted for luring a minor for sexual exploitation under Arizona law. The State sought an enhanced sentence under the Dangerous Crime Against Children (DCAC) statute, arguing that the enhancement applied even though the “minor” was fictitious.The Superior Court in Pima County granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the DCAC allegation, agreeing with the defendant that the sentencing enhancement required the victim to be an actual minor, not a fictitious one. The State sought review through a special action. The Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, accepted jurisdiction and affirmed the superior court’s decision, holding that the DCAC enhancement under A.R.S. § 13-705 could not apply when the victim was not an actual minor.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case to resolve whether a conviction for luring a minor for sexual exploitation qualifies for the DCAC sentencing enhancement when the victim is fictitious. The court held that neither A.R.S. § 13-3554(C) nor § 13-705 requires the victim to be an actual minor for the DCAC sentencing enhancement to apply. The court found that the relevant statutes make clear that it is not a defense that the “minor” is fictitious at either the prosecution or sentencing stage. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ opinion, reversed the superior court’s dismissal of the DCAC allegation, and remanded the case for resentencing. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v MARNER" on Justia Law

The defendant was originally convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and illegal reentry after deportation. He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms and supervised release. After serving his sentence, he was released and removed from the United States. Several years later, he was found in Virginia in possession of over six kilograms of cocaine and charged with a new federal drug offense, to which he pled guilty. The United States Probation Office filed a petition alleging violations of his supervised release: committing a new crime and reentering the country. At his sentencing and revocation hearing, the defendant admitted to both violations and argued that his actions had been influenced by fear of cartel reprisals, seeking a sentence within the advisory guideline range and concurrent with his new sentence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia imposed a 36-month sentence for the supervised release violation, the statutory maximum, to run consecutively to the new sentence. The district court cited the defendant’s prior similar conviction and the large quantity of drugs but did not address the defendant’s arguments regarding coercion or mitigating circumstances.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court’s revocation sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the court failed to sufficiently explain its reasons for imposing the statutory maximum, particularly by not engaging with the defendant’s nonfrivolous argument that his conduct was influenced by coercion. The Fourth Circuit concluded that this error was not harmless and that the sentence was plainly unreasonable under clearly established law. Accordingly, the appellate court vacated the revocation sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. View "US v. Celedon" on Justia Law

Myelicia Rodgers, a clerk at a United States post office in Crestview, Florida, was accused of tampering with and stealing mail while working alone during early morning shifts. After suspicions arose due to complaints about opened mail, the Office of Inspector General conducted an investigation. Rodgers was observed via video and in person engaging in suspicious activities, including taking greeting cards into restricted areas, opening packages, and removing mail. Test letters with cash and gift cards were used in the investigation, some of which went missing, and Rodgers was caught taking and hiding one such letter. Upon being confronted, Rodgers admitted to opening some letters but denied stealing their contents.A grand jury indicted Rodgers on counts of mail tampering and theft by a postal employee. She waived her right to a jury and opted for a bench trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. At trial, the government presented multiple witnesses and video evidence. Rodgers did not testify or call any witnesses in her defense. After the prosecution rested, Rodgers moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the district court denied. The district court explicitly informed Rodgers of her right not to testify and assured her that her silence would not be considered in determining guilt. Rodgers’s counsel argued that her silence should not be taken as evidence against her, and the court reiterated that it would base its decision solely on the evidence presented.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether the district court drew an adverse inference from Rodgers's decision not to testify. The court held that the district court did not consider Rodgers’s silence as evidence of guilt and properly respected her Fifth Amendment rights. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Rodgers’s conviction. View "USA v. Rodgers" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers responded to a report of an open door at Chad Taylor’s townhouse in Boone County, Kentucky. Inside, they found signs of recently fired gunshots, including bullet holes and spent shell casings. After obtaining search warrants, officers found ammunition and methamphetamine in Taylor’s possession. Taylor admitted to using methamphetamine and exhibited paranoid, erratic behavior, claiming people were watching him. The following day, Taylor was found at his home with a loaded Glock 19, and ballistics matched it to the earlier gunfire. Taylor had prior felony convictions for drug trafficking, intimidation, and misdemeanor domestic battery.A grand jury indicted Taylor for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky initially detained Taylor but later released him on conditions due to his history of substance abuse and the risk he posed. Taylor moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional both facially and as applied. The district court denied the motion, finding Taylor dangerous based on his prior convictions, and subsequently sentenced him to 30 months’ imprisonment after he pled guilty but reserved his right to appeal the constitutional issue.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as applied to Taylor in light of recent circuit precedent. The appellate court held that the dangerousness assessment required for firearm disqualification is distinct from the assessment for pretrial detention. Applying the standard set forth in United States v. Williams, the court found that Taylor’s offense conduct and criminal history—including felony drug trafficking, intimidation, and domestic battery—demonstrated that he was dangerous. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Taylor. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law