Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was convicted after jury trials in 2011 and 2012 of attempted murder, evading an officer, unlawfully taking a vehicle, and shooting at an inhabited dwelling. Each count included enhancements for gang involvement and firearm use, and he was sentenced to a total of 46 years and eight months to life in prison. Following direct appeal, the judgment was modified to reflect life with the possibility of parole on two counts, with a minimum parole eligibility of 15 years, and otherwise affirmed.Years later, the defendant filed a petition for recall and resentencing under California Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), arguing that as a juvenile at the time of the offense and having served over 15 years, his lengthy sentence was effectively a life without parole (LWOP) term. He relied on appellate decisions holding that juvenile offenders sentenced to de facto LWOP terms should be eligible for relief under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), on equal protection grounds. The Los Angeles County Superior Court reviewed the petition, considered recent appellate decisions and parties’ arguments, and denied the petition.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. Applying de novo review, it held that the defendant’s sentence did not constitute the functional equivalent of LWOP, as he was eligible for youthful offender parole under section 3051 at age 41. The court determined that section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) only applies to explicit LWOP sentences for juveniles and does not violate equal protection by excluding those sentenced to lengthy indeterminate terms. It affirmed the trial court’s denial of the petition. View "People v. Cortez" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted after he broke into a high school barn at night and killed a goat and a pig owned by students participating in an agricultural program. Surveillance footage showed someone entering the barn, carrying an axe, and later leaving with a wheelbarrow containing the dead pig. The next day, the deceased goat was found in the barn and the pig’s carcass was discovered hanging from a tree near the defendant’s living area at a nearby homeless encampment. The students who owned the animals testified to their emotional attachments and the distress caused by the incident.The Superior Court of San Benito County found the defendant guilty of two counts of animal cruelty, vandalism, burglary, unlawful possession of ammunition, possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia, and two counts of misdemeanor child abuse for causing emotional harm to the student animal owners. The defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 11 years and six months in prison. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the statutory exception permitting the killing of animals used for food, that his counsel was ineffective for not requesting such an instruction, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for animal cruelty related to the pig and for child abuse.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, affirmed the judgment. The court held that the Penal Code section allowing the “right to kill all animals used for food” does not apply to killing another person’s animal without the owner’s consent. The defendant’s conduct fell outside the statutory exception, and the evidence was sufficient to support all convictions. The court also found no instructional error or ineffective assistance of counsel. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "People v. Madruga" on Justia Law

A licensed bail bondsman posted two bonds for an individual, who subsequently failed to appear in court multiple times, resulting in the issuance of several warrants. The bondsman located the individual at a residence owned by a third party and, after unsuccessful attempts to apprehend him alone and with law enforcement assistance, recruited others to help. The group entered the residence, leading to a confrontation during which the bondsman and an associate struggled with the fugitive. During the altercation, the associate obtained the bondsman’s pistol and fatally shot the homeowner. The bondsman called 911, remained at the scene, and cooperated with police.The Montana Second Judicial District Court denied the bondsman’s pretrial motion to dismiss the aggravated burglary charge, rejecting his claim that his status as a bondsman privileged his entry and arrest. The court prohibited him from arguing a legal right to enter the residence based on his bondsman status, though it allowed evidence regarding his authority, the bonds, warrants, and motives. At trial, a jury acquitted him of deliberate homicide under the felony-murder theory but convicted him of deliberate homicide by accountability and aggravated burglary. He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms and appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed four issues: mental-state instructions, ineffective assistance of counsel, sufficiency of evidence, and the bondsman authority rulings. The court held that although the trial court erred by using a conduct-based definition of “purposely” instead of a result-based definition, the error did not warrant reversal under plain-error review. Counsel’s acceptance of the flawed instruction was deficient but not prejudicial under Strickland. The evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. The court affirmed the trial court’s rulings regarding the bondsman’s asserted authority and refused instructions, concluding that the developed arguments did not establish reversible error. The convictions were affirmed. View "State v. Hubber" on Justia Law

A group of Riverside County residents, having voted in the November 2025 special election on Proposition 50, challenged the actions of the county sheriff’s department. The sheriff, responding to claims by a community group of a significant discrepancy between unofficial poll worker ballot intake logs and the Registrar of Voters’ final certified count, obtained search warrants and seized approximately 650,000 voted ballots. The Registrar of Voters maintained any discrepancy was minimal and within normal bounds, and no party disputed that the alleged discrepancy could not have changed the election outcome.After the sheriff’s department seized and began examining the ballots, the voters filed a petition for a writ of mandate directly in the Supreme Court of California. They argued the sheriff’s actions violated the Elections Code’s strict rules regarding the custody of ballots and requested the court order the immediate return of the ballots to the Registrar. The Registrar did not oppose this relief, and both the Secretary of State and Attorney General supported the petitioners’ position. The sheriff argued his actions were lawful as part of a criminal investigation supported by search warrants.The Supreme Court of California held that the seizure and removal of the ballots from the Registrar’s custody was unlawful under Elections Code section 15551, subdivision (d). The Court explained that the Elections Code specifically requires that voted ballots remain in the custody of the elections official at all times and that this rule applies even during criminal investigations. The Court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the sheriff to return all packages containing voted ballots to the Registrar and to refrain from further handling of the ballots, but denied the request for additional relief regarding non-ballot election materials and chain-of-custody reporting. The Court’s order superseded the previously issued superior court search warrants to the extent of any conflict. View "Cervantes v. Bianco" on Justia Law

The City of Los Angeles received millions in federal housing grants over a period of years, certifying compliance with federal housing accessibility laws as a condition of those funds. Mei Ling and the Fair Housing Council of the San Fernando Valley (FHC) brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), alleging that the City had falsely represented its compliance with accessibility requirements. The United States later intervened in the case. Separately, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) investigated the City for noncompliance and, after its own findings, entered into a Voluntary Compliance Agreement (VCA) with the City. Under the VCA, the City agreed to spend at least $200 million over ten years to remediate or build accessible housing, but the VCA explicitly excluded the FCA claims at issue in the litigation.The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over years of discovery and litigation. Eventually, the United States, FHC, and the City agreed to settle the FCA claims for $38,266,989. The district court approved the settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable, and dismissed all claims against the City, with relators entitled to a statutory share of the settlement proceeds. Mei Ling appealed, arguing that the VCA constituted an “alternate remedy” under the FCA, which would entitle her to a share of the VCA’s value.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the VCA was not an alternate remedy within the meaning of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5) because it did not take the place of the FCA suit or settlement. The VCA addressed the City’s civil rights violations, not the alleged fraud underlying the FCA action, and expressly carved out the FCA claims. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s approval of the FCA settlement. View "LING V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES" on Justia Law

Police discovered methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in Jeremy Lucero’s vehicle, and his urine tested positive for methamphetamine. Lucero was charged with possession of a controlled substance, ingestion of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. He entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to possession of a controlled substance in exchange for the dismissal of the other charges. Both sides were free to recommend any sentence. At sentencing, the State emphasized Lucero’s extensive criminal history and risk assessment score, arguing for a penitentiary sentence. Lucero’s counsel sought probation, highlighting the statutory presumption of probation and arguing that criminal history alone should not justify a departure.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit considered the arguments. The court noted Lucero’s cooperation and remorse but found aggravating circumstances due to his 17 prior felony charges, seven felony convictions, high-risk assessment score, and continued methamphetamine use while on bond. The court concluded that these factors created a significant risk to the community and sentenced Lucero to five years in prison with three years suspended, departing from the statutory presumption of probation. The court made the required findings of aggravating circumstances both on the record and in the dispositional order.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed Lucero’s appeal, in which he contended that the circuit court needed to cite specific circumstances beyond prior convictions and personal drug use to support its departure. The Supreme Court held that Lucero had preserved the issue for appeal and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, holding that the circuit court’s findings were supported by the record and that the departure from presumptive probation was appropriate under the statutory requirements. View "State v. Lucero" on Justia Law

A man residing in a Lexington, Kentucky apartment complex was accused of setting fire to his own apartment unit, which spread and endangered several occupants in the building. On the night of the fire, multiple residents and visitors were present, including a minor who was awakened by the blaze and helped alert others. Several people were forced to escape by jumping from a balcony, resulting in serious injuries. When emergency services arrived, the accused was found nearby, barefoot and in pajamas, observing the fire. Witnesses described his behavior as odd, noting that he was smiling and uncooperative with authorities. Investigators determined the fire was intentionally set and discovered a threatening note in his apartment. During the investigation, authorities obtained a recorded jail phone call where he admitted to being inside his apartment sleeping when the fire began.The case proceeded in Fayette Circuit Court, where a jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree arson and multiple counts of first-degree wanton endangerment. He was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. At trial, an issue arose regarding the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose the inculpatory jail phone call during discovery, which the defense argued impaired their trial strategy. The trial judge held a hearing on this issue, but ultimately denied both a mistrial and a request to admonish the jury, finding that the error was harmless because other evidence clearly placed the defendant at the scene.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case on direct appeal. The Court found that the Commonwealth did commit a discovery violation by failing to disclose the recorded phone call. However, it held that the error was harmless given the overwhelming circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s presence and involvement. The Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial and affirmed the convictions and sentence. View "JORDAN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

The case centers on an individual who was arrested on an outstanding warrant and left his cellphone in a car he co-owned with his ex-girlfriend. The ex-girlfriend discovered the phone, accessed its contents, and found sexually explicit photos and videos involving young girls, including her daughter and the defendant’s stepdaughter. She recognized one of the victims by distinctive features and the bedroom background. After notifying another parent and the police, law enforcement secured the phone as evidence. Forensic analysts extracted data from the device using specialized software, producing reports that were then reviewed by an investigating detective. The detective identified further incriminating digital evidence stored in an associated Google Photos account.The Kenton Circuit Court conducted a jury trial where the defendant faced multiple charges, including possession of child sexual abuse material, promoting a sexual performance by a minor, sexual abuse, and rape. The defendant objected to the investigating detective’s testimony regarding the digital evidence reports, arguing that he was not qualified as an expert in digital forensics. The trial court denied motions to exclude this testimony, finding that the detective, with his training and experience, could present such evidence as a lay witness. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts, recommending a total sentence of 189 years, which the court capped at 70 years.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, the central issue was whether the trial court erred by permitting the detective’s lay testimony about the digital extraction report. The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that such testimony did not require expert qualification because interpreting the extracted report fell within the capabilities of a reasonably tech-savvy layperson and did not involve specialized or scientific knowledge. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the conviction and the lower court’s evidentiary ruling. View "MCBRIDE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged in multiple cases in McLean County, Illinois, primarily involving possession of child pornography and violations of the Sex Offender Registration Act. He pleaded guilty to several charges and was sentenced to probation, jail time, and ordered to pay significant assessments, fines, and fees. Throughout several subsequent probation violation proceedings and new charges, the defendant remained represented by an assistant public defender. Despite this representation, he was assessed various court costs and fees without a waiver being requested or granted under the provisions applicable to indigent defendants represented by public defenders.After sentencing, the defendant appealed. The Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District, consolidated his appeals and considered, among other issues, his claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to seek an assessment waiver under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 404(e). The defendant argued that, as he was represented by a public defender, he was entitled to an automatic waiver of certain assessments, and his counsel’s failure to file the required certificate constituted ineffective assistance. The State responded that claims regarding assessment errors must first be raised in the circuit court via a motion under Rule 472, which governs corrections of certain sentencing errors. The appellate court agreed with the State and remanded the case to the circuit court for the defendant to pursue his claim through a Rule 472 motion.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court’s judgment. The Court held that when a defendant alleges being improperly assessed costs despite being entitled to a waiver under Rule 404(e), the claim must be first raised in the trial court with a motion under Rule 472. Such claims cannot be raised for the first time on appeal by asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court clarified that Rule 472’s broad remedial purpose encompasses such errors and allows correction at any time following judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "People v. Nibbelin" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged in Cook County with two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and two counts of aggravated kidnapping after he kidnapped a victim and, during the course of that kidnapping, committed two separate acts of sexual assault. At trial, the jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. The circuit court then sentenced him to consecutive terms for each sexual assault conviction and imposed two concurrent sentences for the aggravated kidnapping convictions, resulting in a total prison term of 40 years.On appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, the defendant argued that entering two convictions for aggravated kidnapping based on a single kidnapping violated the one-act, one-crime rule. Although the appellate court agreed that only one kidnapping occurred, it affirmed the convictions, holding that each aggravated kidnapping conviction was based on a separate act of sexual assault that occurred during the kidnapping, and thus multiple convictions were permissible.Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois reviewed whether multiple aggravated kidnapping convictions could stand when there was only one kidnapping but multiple predicate felonies. The State conceded error, agreeing that only one conviction should be entered under these circumstances. The Supreme Court held that the unit of prosecution for aggravated kidnapping is limited to one conviction per single kidnapping, regardless of the number of aggravating circumstances present during that kidnapping. It therefore found the trial court erred in entering two convictions and sentences for aggravated kidnapping. The Supreme Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions and sentences for aggravated criminal sexual assault but reversed in part, remanding for the trial court to vacate the less serious aggravated kidnapping conviction and sentence. View "People v. Wade" on Justia Law