Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

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Three defendants met two victims under the pretense of purchasing marijuana, but evidence showed the defendants planned to rob them. During the encounter, one defendant fatally shot one victim and wounded the other. The prosecution charged two defendants with murder under a felony murder theory, alleging the killing occurred during a robbery. All three defendants were convicted by a jury of multiple counts, including murder, robbery, and assault with a firearm. Sentences ranged from life without parole to determinate terms. The surviving victim testified under use immunity, and both surveillance and forensic evidence corroborated the sequence of events. Social media and prior conduct evidence supported the prosecution's theory that the defendants had prior experience with robberies.Following trial in the Santa Clara County Superior Court, the defendants appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, raising violations under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (RJA). Their primary argument was that the prosecutor used racially discriminatory language during jury selection and arguments, analogizing the defendants to a pit bull and ocean predators and prey. Although defense counsel had not objected to these statements at trial, the appellate court determined that the issue was sufficiently preserved because a prospective juror objected, and the trial court rejected the objection.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, held that the prosecutor's animal comparisons constituted racially discriminatory language under the RJA, as an objective observer would understand them as appealing to racial bias. The court found this to be a violation of the RJA and vacated the convictions and sentences, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with Penal Code section 745(a). The court also found sufficient evidence to support the felony murder and robbery convictions for two defendants. The judgment was reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court. View "People v. Diaz" on Justia Law

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In December 2019, the People charged the petitioner with assault with a deadly weapon after he allegedly threw large rocks at another individual during an altercation. The Superior Court of San Diego County found him incompetent to stand trial in early 2020 and committed him to a state hospital for up to two years. After his commitment expired and medical professionals determined he was not likely to regain competency, the trial court ordered his release in February 2022 but did not dismiss the charges from the 2019 case.More than three and a half years later, in November 2025, the petitioner was charged with a new, unrelated assault with a deadly weapon. After a competency evaluation was conducted in the new case, the court found him competent to stand trial. The prosecution then asked the trial court to use this competency finding to reinstate proceedings in the unresolved 2019 case. Over defense objection, the trial court agreed and reinstated the old charges. Defense counsel moved for reconsideration, arguing that the court lacked statutory authority to revive the 2019 case in this manner, but the trial court denied the request.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the matter on a petition for writ of mandate. The court held that, under California’s statutory scheme for mental competency in criminal proceedings, there is no authority for a trial court to reinstate a previously suspended criminal case based solely on a finding of competence in a different, later case. Instead, the prosecution must dismiss and refile the charges to restart competency proceedings. The appellate court ordered the trial court to vacate its order reinstating the 2019 case and to deny the prosecution’s request to reinstate those proceedings. View "Pratt v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

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An individual became the subject of an FBI investigation after law enforcement discovered his online activities promoting violent jihadist materials and expressing a desire to attack the United States. Undercover FBI agents corresponded with him, leading him to plan a terrorist attack on a Chicago restaurant, though the bomb provided was inert due to the FBI’s involvement. After his arrest, while in custody, he solicited the murder of an undercover FBI agent and later attacked a fellow inmate with improvised weapons over a religious dispute.Following these events, he was found incompetent to stand trial due to mental health issues but was later deemed competent after treatment. As his cases proceeded in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, he entered an Alford plea to all charges. The district court initially sentenced him to 16 years, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that sentence substantively unreasonable and remanded for resentencing. During post-remand proceedings, he changed attorneys multiple times, ultimately choosing to represent himself at sentencing, a decision the district court permitted after a thorough inquiry. The district court then imposed a 27-year sentence.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, he challenged the denial of his motion to withdraw his Alford plea, the validity of his waiver of counsel at sentencing, and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the plea, found his waiver of counsel to be knowing and voluntary, and determined that the 27-year sentence was substantively reasonable. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "USA v Daoud" on Justia Law

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Police in Tennessee found a firearm under the driver’s seat of a vehicle during an investigation into aggravated assault involving the defendant. He was indicted by a federal grand jury for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, with an enhanced penalty under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on three prior convictions: robbery (2010), aggravated robbery (2012), and aggravated assault (2022). The defendant pleaded guilty but reserved the right to challenge whether his 2010 robbery conviction qualified as a violent felony under the ACCA.The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee considered a presentence report that classified all three prior convictions as violent felonies under the ACCA, resulting in a recommended sentencing range of 188–235 months. The defendant objected to the inclusion of the 2010 robbery conviction, citing the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Curry, arguing that Tennessee robbery no longer categorically required the use or threatened use of physical force. The district court rejected this argument, adopted the presentence report, and sentenced the defendant to 194 months in prison. He appealed this ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s determination de novo. The appellate court held that the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Curry did not reinterpret the statutory definition of robbery or its “fear” element as previously articulated in State v. Taylor. The court reaffirmed its prior holding in United States v. Mitchell that Tennessee robbery remains categorically a violent felony under the ACCA, as it requires the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Bobo" on Justia Law

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The case centers on Denny Obermiller, who pleaded guilty in Ohio state court to multiple counts of murder and rape involving his grandparents. Following his guilty plea, a three-judge panel conducted a thorough evidentiary hearing, found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and sentenced him to death after Obermiller waived his right to present mitigating evidence at sentencing. Obermiller later sought to challenge his conviction and mitigation waiver, arguing that his mental illness, specifically bipolar disorder, prevented his plea and waiver from being knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.After sentencing, Obermiller appealed his conviction and sentence. The Ohio Supreme Court reviewed his direct appeal, but Obermiller did not raise issues related to his guilty plea or his mitigation waiver at that stage. Subsequently, he pursued post-conviction relief in state court, attaching new evidence regarding his mental health. The Ohio Court of Appeals, the highest state court to rule on his post-conviction petition, held that Ohio’s res judicata law barred Obermiller from raising these claims because he failed to present them in his direct appeal, even though they could have been raised with the information available at the time.Obermiller then filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The district court found his claims procedurally defaulted and rejected them on the merits. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the denial de novo. The Sixth Circuit held that Obermiller’s claims were barred by Ohio’s res judicata rule as an independent and adequate state ground. Obermiller failed to show cause or prejudice to overcome the procedural default. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief, holding that federal review was precluded due to procedural default. View "Obermiller v. Shoop" on Justia Law

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A defendant was charged with one count of rape and two counts of forcible sodomy. The jury acquitted him of the sodomy charges but convicted him of rape. After the trial, the defendant argued that a juror—Juror 21—had been dishonest during jury selection by failing to disclose material information about her affiliations and relationships, which he claimed would have supported a challenge for cause. Specifically, the defendant asserted that Juror 21 misrepresented her involvement in a victim support group, her advocacy for victims’ rights legislation, and her relationships with prosecuting attorneys.The Third District Court of Salt Lake County reviewed the defendant’s post-verdict motion to arrest judgment or, alternatively, for a new trial. The district court agreed with the defendant, finding that Juror 21 had omitted or misstated information in voir dire that was material and that, had it been disclosed, would have led to her being stricken for cause. The court based its ruling on her failure to accurately describe the nature and scope of her involvement in victim advocacy, the length and title of her position on the relevant board, and her relationships with prominent prosecutors. The district court therefore granted a new trial.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case on direct appeal. It held that, under the applicable standard, a party seeking a new trial based on juror dishonesty must show both a false answer to a material question on voir dire and that a correct answer would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. The court determined that most of Juror 21’s answers were not objectively false given the general nature of the questions posed, and that her two inaccuracies—misstating the name and duration of her board service—were not material enough to justify a challenge for cause. The Supreme Court of Utah reversed the district court’s order granting a new trial and reinstated the defendant’s conviction. View "State v. Bowcut" on Justia Law

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In this case, a sixteen-year-old was indicted, along with another teenager, for robbery and related offenses after participating in the theft of a cellphone, which resulted in the victim’s injury and subsequent death months later. The accused pleaded guilty to first-degree robbery and received a sentence of ten years’ imprisonment. Both the prosecution and defense agreed during the plea that the sentence would be imposed without considering youthful offender status. The sentencing court did not make the mandatory youthful offender determination required by statute.Following the expiration of his time to appeal, the defendant filed a pro se motion in New York Supreme Court under Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 440.20, seeking to set aside his sentence as unlawful due to the failure to make a youthful offender determination. The Supreme Court acknowledged the sentencing error but denied the motion, reasoning that the issue should have been raised on direct appeal, not through a CPL 440.20 motion.The defendant appealed, and the Appellate Division, Second Department, unanimously reversed the Supreme Court’s decision. The People were granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.The New York Court of Appeals held that the failure to make a youthful offender determination rendered the sentence unauthorized, illegally imposed, or otherwise invalid as a matter of law under CPL 440.20. The Court concluded that a Rudolph claim—alleging failure to make a required youthful offender determination—can properly be raised in a CPL 440.20 motion even after the time for direct appeal has expired. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed, with the Court clarifying that vacatur of the sentence under CPL 440.20 does not disturb the underlying conviction but remits the matter for resentencing, at which point the required youthful offender determination must be made. View "People v Jaleel S." on Justia Law

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The defendant was charged under two indictments with several crimes stemming from three residential burglaries that occurred in the same neighborhood over the course of one week. The incidents involved burglary, larceny, and, in one case, rape. Evidence included eyewitness accounts, surveillance footage, recovered stolen property, and crucially, fingerprint analysis linking the defendant to one of the burglaries. During trial, the prosecution belatedly disclosed fingerprint comparison materials relied upon by their expert, prompting the defense to request more time to review the new evidence or, alternatively, other remedies. The trial court denied these requests, instead granting a brief recess and issuing an adverse inference instruction to the jury regarding the late disclosure.The Supreme Court, Monroe County, presided over the trial, and after conviction, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed the judgments. The appellate court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing only an adverse inference instruction for the discovery violation and deemed the issue of an out-of-sequence peremptory challenge to be moot since no alternates participated in jury deliberations. One Justice dissented, arguing that the trial court’s failure to grant reasonable time for review of late-disclosed materials was not harmless error. The dissenting Justice granted leave to appeal.The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by not providing the defendant with reasonable time to prepare and respond to the newly disclosed fingerprint evidence, as required by CPL 245.80(1)(a). The court found this error was not harmless regarding the burglary and grand larceny convictions from the November 24 incident, requiring reversal and a new trial on those counts. However, the error was deemed harmless concerning the rape and burglary convictions from the November 27 incident, so those convictions were affirmed. The court also found the out-of-order peremptory challenge error to be harmless. View "People v Everson" on Justia Law

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The defendant was indicted on multiple charges, including aggravated assault, domestic violence assault, and criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon. Pursuant to an agreement with the prosecution, he pleaded guilty to domestic violence assault and agreed to comply with certain conditions—such as completing a certified intervention program and undergoing a substance abuse evaluation—over a two-year deferment period. If he complied, he would be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea and plead guilty to a lesser charge; if he did not, he would be convicted as charged. During the deferment period, the defendant suffered significant physical and cognitive injuries that prevented him from fulfilling the requirements. He did not seek a modification of the deferment terms during this period.After the deferment period, the Piscataquis County Unified Criminal Docket conducted a final hearing. The court found that the defendant had not met the deferment requirements but that his failure was excusable due to his injuries. Nevertheless, the court concluded, based on contract principles, that excusable noncompliance was not sufficient to entitle the defendant to the benefits of the agreement. The court entered judgment for domestic violence assault and imposed a sentence. The defendant appealed, arguing that excusable noncompliance should have allowed him to withdraw his plea as originally contemplated.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. It did not reach the merits of the defendant’s argument. Instead, it held that under 17-A M.R.S. § 1904, appellate review is only available in deferred disposition cases when a court finds that failure to comply was inexcusable. Because the trial court found the defendant’s noncompliance was excusable, the statute barred appellate review. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "State of Maine v. Reardon" on Justia Law

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The appellant was convicted and sentenced to death for the 1994 first-degree murder of Michael Finken, in addition to conspiracy to commit murder, auto theft, and petit theft. The murder involved severe violence and was committed after the appellant learned that the victim had slept with his wife. The sentencing court found aggravating circumstances, including that the murder was heinous and premeditated, and also identified several mitigating factors, such as the appellant’s learning disability and deprived childhood.Following the initial conviction, the appellant pursued multiple postconviction motions under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of his initial postconviction claims and habeas petition, and subsequently denied relief on his first and second successive motions. The second motion was denied based on precedent set in Hall v. Florida, and the first on Hurst v. State. In the third successive motion, the appellant raised newly discovered evidence claims related to the Dozier School for Boys and the Okeechobee School Victim Compensation Program, arguing both for a disproportionate death sentence and for a new penalty phase.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the summary dismissal of the appellant’s third successive postconviction motion de novo. The Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the claims were untimely and procedurally barred, as the Dozier Act did not constitute newly discovered evidence and the facts underlying the claims had previously been available or could have been discovered with due diligence. The Court relied on prior decisions, including Cole v. State and Jones v. State, to conclude that the appellant’s claims could have and should have been raised earlier. The dismissal by the postconviction court was affirmed, and the procedural bars were found dispositive, with no need to reach the merits of the claims. View "Lawrence v. State of Florida" on Justia Law