Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

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The case at hand involves Bradley Lane Croft, who owned and operated Universal K-9, a school primarily training handlers and dogs for police work. Seeking to expand his business, he applied for certification from the Texas Veterans Commission (TVC) to receive G.I. Bill funds for veteran students. The certification required that the organization employed qualified dog trainers, and Croft submitted an application listing four instructors. However, three instructors testified at trial that they had not given permission to be named in the application and had not served as instructors. The fourth instructor had died two years before the application. Croft was convicted of several counts, including four counts of aggravated identity theft, under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A.The case was remanded from the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of its decision in United States v. Dubin, which clarified the meaning of "during and in relation to" in § 1028A. The Court held that a defendant "uses" another person's means of identification "in relation to" a predicate offense when this use is central to the criminality of the conduct.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, upon reconsideration, affirmed Croft's convictions under § 1028A. The court found that Croft's misrepresentations about "who" was teaching courses were the basis of his wire fraud convictions. Croft's fraudulent conduct lied in misrepresenting who would be teaching the classes, not in who received the services. Thus, there was a direct link between the use of the four men's names and information and the predicate felony of wire fraud. Consequently, the court also affirmed the district court's denial of Croft's motion for a new trial and denied his motion for release pending appeal. View "USA v. Croft, No. 21-50380 (5th Cir. 2023)" on Justia Law

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In this case, the petitioner, Cedrick Conway, is awaiting trial on a petition to commit him as a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). In preparation for the trial, he requested a court order directing a Department of State Hospitals (DSH) evaluator to update a previous evaluation of Conway which was done several years earlier and concluded that he did not meet the criteria for commitment as an SVP. The trial court denied the request, believing that the pertinent statute only allows the prosecution (the party seeking commitment) to request an updated evaluation—not the defense. Conway challenged this ruling, leading to the present case.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Five concluded that the trial court had misunderstood the statute. While the SVPA does allow the prosecution to request an updated evaluation from DSH, the court found nothing in the statute that would prohibit the defense from obtaining an updated evaluation if authorized by a court order. The court therefore held that the trial court erred in denying Conway’s request for an updated evaluation based on a mistaken understanding of the statute.The court also rejected the defense’s claim that the prosecution was not entitled to oppose the defense motion for an updated evaluation. The court determined that the trial court has discretion to decide whether to entertain opposition from the prosecution. The court therefore issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to reconsider Conway’s request for an updated evaluation, taking into account the court's discretion to authorize such an evaluation for the defense. View "Conway v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

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In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the defendant, Brent Brewbaker, appealed from his conviction of a per se antitrust violation under § 1 of the Sherman Act, as well as five counts of mail and wire fraud. Brewbaker had asked the district court to dismiss the Sherman Act count for failure to state an offense, but the court denied his motion. The court of appeals reversed Brewbaker’s Sherman Act conviction, finding that the indictment failed to state a per se antitrust offense as it purported to do. The court, however, affirmed his fraud convictions and remanded the case for resentencing.The legal basis for the case was Brewbaker's argument that the indictment should have been dismissed because it did not state a per se Sherman Act offense, a claim that the appellate court agreed with. The court explained that the indictment alleged a restraint that was both horizontal and vertical in nature, which does not fit neatly into either category as per existing case law. The court further noted that the Supreme Court had not yet clarified how to analyze an agreement between two parties with both vertical and horizontal aspects. The court concluded that the indictment did not allege a restraint that has been previously held to be per se illegal, nor one that economics showed would invariably lead to anticompetitive effects, and thus failed to state a per se violation of the Sherman Act.The court also rejected Brewbaker's claim that the jury instructions on the Sherman Act count "infected" the jury’s consideration of the fraud counts, noting that the fraud counts were not dependent on finding Brewbaker guilty under the Sherman Act. It further cited the presumption that juries follow instructions, and found no extraordinary situation to overcome this presumption. Therefore, the fraud convictions were affirmed. View "US v. Brent Brewbaker" on Justia Law

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In this case, the defendant, Jaime Veleta, was convicted of willful and deliberate first-degree murder, felony murder in the first-degree, kidnapping, conspiracy, and tampering with evidence. However, he was acquitted of second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. Veleta appealed his conviction arguing that the district court made several evidentiary errors, improperly instructed the jury, permitted the entry of inconsistent verdicts, and violated his double jeopardy rights by allowing the inconsistent verdicts to stand.The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico disagreed with Veleta's arguments and affirmed the district court's decision. The court emphasized that only inconsistent convictions, not inconsistent verdicts, are reviewed. It also clarified that when the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict of conviction, the court will not speculate as to why the jury acquitted a defendant of other charges.The Court further ruled that there was no error in the district court's admission of evidence of Veleta's flight from New Mexico following the murder to demonstrate consciousness of guilt, and it also found no abuse of discretion in the district court's limitation on cross-examination of witnesses.The court also found no error in the stepdown instruction given to the jury, which directed the jury to consider each of the crimes in a certain order but also allowed the jury discretion to choose the manner and order in which they deliberated on these offenses.In regards to Veleta's double jeopardy claim, the court found that the double jeopardy clause was not implicated because there was neither multiple punishments nor successive prosecutions. The court concluded that in light of its conclusion that the district court did not err, there could be no cumulative error. View "State v. Veleta" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico affirmed a lower court's decision denying a defendant's motion to suppress evidence. The case involves Hugo Vasquez-Salas, a passenger in a car that was pulled over for a broken rear license-plate light. Upon approaching the vehicle, Officer Stacy noticed a partially open backpack containing bolt cutters, protective eyeglasses, gloves, and a face mask. After determining that the driver was an unlicensed minor, Officer Stacy asked Vasquez-Salas for his identifying information. Vasquez-Salas provided inconsistent answers about his age and was later found to have given a false name.The court held that the officer's inquiry into Vasquez-Salas's identifying information was permissible under both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. The court found that Officer Stacy had reasonable suspicion to expand the investigation beyond the initial traffic stop based on the totality of the circumstances, which included the time of the stop, the items found in the backpack, the driver's and Vasquez-Salas's unusual behavior, the driver's status as an unlicensed minor, and Vasquez-Salas's false identifying information.The court further clarified that the primary inquiry under the Fourth Amendment in cases where the legality of the initial stop is uncontested is whether the officer's questions extended the time that a driver was detained, regardless of the questions’ content. The court also overruled a previous case, State v. Affsprung, which held that an officer's questions about a passenger's identifiers violated the Fourth Amendment because the officer had no reasonable suspicion that the passenger was engaged in criminal activity. The court stated that this holding no longer aligns with current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. View "State v. Vasquez-Salas" on Justia Law

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This case arises from an incident in which Ricky Anthony Ayon was stopped by police while walking on the street. The police officer, recognizing Ayon from past encounters and knowing he had a warrant, immediately handcuffed Ayon and later discovered a small bag of a substance that tested positive for opiates. During a preliminary hearing, Ayon successfully argued that the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him, leading the district court to refuse to bind Ayon over for trial on a heroin possession charge. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico held that a district court judge presiding over a preliminary hearing does not have the authority to decide whether evidence was obtained from an unconstitutional search or seizure. The Court remanded the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. The Court reasoned that even though preliminary hearings and grand jury proceedings have different procedures and afford different rights to the defendant, they share a common goal of providing a neutral evaluation of whether the state has demonstrated probable cause to prosecute a serious crime. Additionally, the Court noted that allowing suppression of evidence at the preliminary hearing stage would be largely duplicative and not necessary for effective screening, as a motion to suppress evidence could still be utilized to gain a pretrial ruling excluding the evidence and precluding a trial. The Court also held that the New Mexico Constitution does not provide the right at a preliminary hearing to exclude evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search or seizure. View "State v. Ayon" on Justia Law

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In the case at hand, the appellant, Melissa Lowe, was convicted for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon involving an incident with her ex-husband's girlfriend. Lowe appealed her conviction, arguing that the district court should have instructed the jury on simple assault, a misdemeanor, as a lesser included offense. The Supreme Court of Kansas agreed with Lowe that the district court erred by failing to give a lesser included offense instruction, as there was evidence which could have justified a conviction for simple assault.However, the court noted that under Kansas law, Lowe bore the burden to firmly convince the court that the jury would have reached a different verdict had the district court not failed to give the lesser included offense instruction. Looking at the entire record, the Supreme Court of Kansas concluded that there was nothing to establish that the jury would have reached a different result. The jury had rejected Lowe's version of events, finding the witnesses' accounts that Lowe swerved her car towards the victim credible enough to convict her of aggravated assault. Consequently, the court held that the failure to give the lesser included offense instruction was not reversible error. The court affirmed both the judgment from the district court and the Court of Appeals. View "State v. Lowe" on Justia Law

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In this case decided by the State of Vermont Supreme Court, the defendant, Walter Taylor, III, appealed his convictions for aggravated assault, attempted domestic assault, assault and robbery, and obstruction of justice, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his request for a voluntary intoxication instruction and his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the obstruction-of-justice charge. The court affirmed the convictions.The case centered around an event in July 2021 where the defendant had an argument with his ex-girlfriend, which escalated into physical assault, and subsequently attacked a neighbor who was recording the incident on her phone. The defendant claimed that he was intoxicated at the time of the incident and argued that this should have been considered in his defense, as it could have affected his ability to form the necessary mental state for the charged crimes.However, the court held that the evidence did not establish a nexus between alcohol consumption and an effect on the defendant’s mental state. The court noted that there was no evidence regarding the size of the containers of the beverages that defendant had consumed, the timeframe in which they were consumed, or their alcohol concentration. The court found that the evidence of intoxication was insufficient to call into question whether defendant was capable of forming the required intent or whether he actually formed the required intent.On the charge of obstruction of justice, the defendant argued that his conduct could not be considered obstruction as there was no ongoing investigation at the time of the alleged assault. The court disagreed, ruling that the existence of a pending judicial proceeding is not required to prove obstruction of justice. The court concluded that the defendant's conduct, which included assaulting a person who appeared to be recording his conduct after being informed that the police were on their way, fell within the language of the obstruction of justice statute.Therefore, the court affirmed the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault, attempted domestic assault, assault and robbery, and obstruction of justice. View "State v. Walter Taylor, III" on Justia Law

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In a case before the Supreme Court of Iowa, the defendant, Robert Clark Geddes, was charged with trespass as a hate crime. The defendant had trespassed onto various properties, leaving behind anonymous notes that urged the residents to "Burn that gay flag." The homes targeted by the defendant were displaying LGBTQ+ flags or decals. Geddes appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient and that his convictions violated his rights to free speech and due process.The court rejected the defendant's arguments and affirmed his convictions. The court ruled that Geddes was not being punished for his speech, but rather for his conduct—trespassing onto properties with the intent to commit a hate crime. The court found that the statute under which Geddes was convicted does not criminalize speech, but rather conduct with a specific intent—namely, trespassing on property because of the property owner or possessor's association with persons of a certain sexual orientation. The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to support Geddes's conviction.The court held that the defendant's conduct of surreptitiously entering onto properties to post his harassing notes was not protected under the First Amendment rights. The court noted that hate crime laws are designed to punish conduct, not expression, and Geddes's motive or intent led to the more serious criminal consequence. The court also rejected the defendant's argument that the trespass law was vague or overbroad, finding that it provides sufficient guidance to those enforcing it and does not intrude on protected freedoms. View "State of Iowa v. Geddes" on Justia Law

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In the case before the Supreme Court of Iowa, the court reviewed the trial and conviction of Robert Krogmann for attempted murder and willful injury causing serious injury. This was Krogmann's second trial after his initial conviction was overturned on appeal due to an improper asset freeze that interfered with his defense rights. In the second trial, Krogmann appealed his conviction on multiple grounds.The court held that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the trial court should have admitted a video recording of Krogmann's interview with law enforcement. Although the video was not hearsay and should have been admitted, the court held that the exclusion of the video did not affect Krogmann’s substantial rights and was therefore harmless error. The video would not have materially aided Krogmann's diminished capacity defense.The court further held that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that assault, an element of the crimes charged against Krogmann, is a specific-intent crime, and that diminished responsibility can negate the intent element of assault.The court also upheld the trial court's decision to exclude evidence of a $1.5 million civil settlement between Krogmann and the victim, finding that the evidence was not relevant to the issues in the case.However, the court found that the trial court erred in allowing a witness to testify to the ultimate issue of intent, stating that it is the job of the court, not a paid expert, to explain criminal law to the jury.Lastly, the Supreme Court of Iowa agreed with Krogmann's contention that the court erred in awarding him to pay an expert witness’s fees and expenses in excess of the $150 per day cap in Iowa Code section 622.72.The Supreme Court of Iowa vacated the decision of the court of appeals, affirmed the district court judgment, granted and sustained in part the writ of certiorari, and remanded the case for redetermination of costs. View "Iowa v. Krogmann" on Justia Law