Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Law enforcement suspected Andrew Campbell Founds of possessing a large quantity of marijuana after a FedEx package was intercepted and found to contain drugs. Officers conducted surveillance and a controlled delivery, observed Mr. Founds pick up the package, and tracked him to an apartment he rented. After detaining Mr. Founds, officers performed a protective sweep of his apartment, where they observed drugs and other contraband in plain view. These observations, along with other investigative information, were included in an affidavit for a search warrant. Upon executing the warrant, police seized marijuana, psilocyn mushrooms, firearms, cash, drug paraphernalia, and body armor.The Circuit Court for Worcester County denied Mr. Founds’ motion to suppress, finding that although the officers unlawfully created an exigency for the protective sweep, excising the tainted observations from the warrant affidavit still left sufficient untainted information to establish probable cause. Mr. Founds was convicted on three possessory offenses after pleading not guilty to an agreed statement of facts. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed both the denial of the suppression motion and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the convictions, concluding that the independent source doctrine applied and that Mr. Founds constructively possessed the contraband found in Bedroom 2 and the body armor.The Supreme Court of Maryland assumed, without deciding, that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, but held that the independent source doctrine permitted admission of the evidence. Applying an objective excision methodology, the Court found that, with the tainted information removed, the remaining facts established probable cause for the search warrant. The Court also determined that, under the four-factor framework for constructive possession, there was sufficient evidence for a rational factfinder to find Mr. Founds possessed all the contraband. The judgment of the Appellate Court was affirmed. View "Founds v. State" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, federal relief programs such as the EIDL and PPP were implemented to assist small businesses. In Puerto Rico, a scheme led by Manfred Pentzke-Lemus fraudulently obtained such loans using fabricated documents and kickbacks. Jayson Pastrana-Román, owner of a food kiosk, became involved after Pentzke contacted him and assisted with loan applications. Pastrana allowed co-conspirators to alter his documents and apply for loans in his name, resulting in approved loans and kickbacks paid to Pentzke. Pastrana also recruited his brother and friends into the scheme, relaying instructions and collecting their kickback payments, though he did not retain these funds.A federal grand jury indicted Pastrana on ten counts, including wire fraud, money laundering, and conspiracy. He initially planned to go to trial but later pleaded guilty to all counts. At sentencing in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, the court determined Pastrana acted as a "manager" in the conspiracy, applying a three-level upward adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). The court declined to grant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, finding his acceptance was not timely and he had not admitted to his full role as recruiter and intermediary. The court imposed a 33-month concurrent sentence for all counts, below the calculated Guidelines range.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Pastrana challenged the sentencing enhancements and denial of the acceptance reduction. The First Circuit held the district court did not err in applying the managerial role adjustment but did clearly err in denying the reduction for acceptance of responsibility, as Pastrana had admitted relevant conduct and timely notified the government of his intent to plead guilty. The court vacated Pastrana’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "US v. Pastrana-Roman" on Justia Law

The case involves an incident in which Alberto Jorge Barraza confronted Nikko G., a man known for his long hair and pride in his Native American heritage. Nikko had expressed plans to sell his hair to a company making wigs. After Barraza and associates perceived Nikko had stolen from them, they discussed cutting off his hair as punishment. Barraza approached Nikko while he was asleep in a car, attempted to cut off his hair with a knife, and when Nikko resisted, stabbed him in the leg, resulting in Nikko’s death due to a severed artery.Following these events, a jury in the Superior Court of San Diego County convicted Barraza of first degree felony murder, with the underlying felony being robbery, as well as assault with a deadly weapon. The jury found several enhancements true, including personal use of a deadly weapon and infliction of great bodily injury. The trial court sentenced Barraza to 25 years to life for murder, plus a consecutive term for the weapon enhancement, while staying the sentence for the assault conviction and related enhancements.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed whether the evidence supported the felony murder conviction, specifically whether forcibly cutting attached hair constitutes robbery under Penal Code section 211. The court held that growing human hair, still attached to a person’s head, is part of the human body and not personal property as required for robbery. Therefore, forcibly cutting attached hair does not satisfy the legal definition of robbery, and the evidence did not establish robbery or attempted robbery. The court reversed Barraza’s conviction for first degree felony murder. View "People v. Barraza" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who committed a series of crimes at a rural single-family residence. Early one morning, the defendant confronted the victim in her backyard at gunpoint, restrained her, and moved her into the house. He tied her hands and feet, left her immobilized in the master bedroom for over an hour, and continued to search for valuables throughout the home. Later, he moved her to the living room and proceeded to search the house and garage. When the victim’s family arrived and intervened, the defendant fled in the victim’s vehicle, abandoning it and the stolen property a few miles away.A jury in the Superior Court of Lassen County convicted the defendant of multiple offenses, including kidnapping for robbery, first degree robbery, first degree burglary, grand theft of a firearm, false imprisonment, unlawful possession of a firearm, and unlawful taking of a vehicle. The court sentenced him to a lengthy prison term, including consecutive and concurrent sentences for the various convictions. The defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of evidence for the kidnapping for robbery and robbery convictions, and argued that certain convictions were lesser included offenses and should be vacated.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District reviewed the case. It held that the evidence was insufficient to support the kidnapping for robbery conviction because the victim’s movement was merely incidental to the robbery and did not meet the asportation requirement. However, the court affirmed the first degree robbery conviction, ruling that actual removal of stolen goods to a place of temporary safety is not required for robbery completion. The court vacated the grand theft of a firearm conviction as a lesser included offense of robbery and remanded the case for full resentencing, but allowed the false imprisonment conviction to stand. View "People v. Atencio" on Justia Law

In December 2001, a 21-year-old man and his two younger brothers planned and carried out the murders of a woman, Chrissie Williams, and her three-year-old daughter, Katelyn, in Georgia. The crime involved home invasion, use of weapons, and acts of extreme violence and sexual assault. After fleeing the state and being apprehended, the brothers entered plea agreements: the two younger brothers received life sentences with parole eligibility, while the petitioner, after initially negotiating for a similar deal, ultimately rejected a plea offer and decided to plead guilty, influenced by religious beliefs that demanded confession and acceptance of the death penalty.The Superior Court of Paulding County accepted the petitioner’s guilty plea and, following a bench sentencing trial at his request, imposed the death penalty. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences on direct appeal. After a failed “next friend” habeas attempt by a brother, the petitioner filed his own state habeas petition, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and other constitutional violations. While the state habeas court initially granted relief on the sentencing, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the death sentence. The petitioner then pursued federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, which denied relief but granted a certificate of appealability on selected claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and held that the Georgia Supreme Court’s denial of the petitioner’s claims was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court found that trial counsel’s recommendation to waive a jury for sentencing was reasonable, that no prejudice resulted from counsel’s alleged failure to investigate mitigating evidence due to the petitioner’s own instructions, and that the prosecution’s use of alternative theories in codefendants’ proceedings did not violate constitutional rights. The district court’s denial of habeas relief was affirmed. View "Tate v. Warden GDCP" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between the principal members of a defense contracting company after Martin Kao, who had become the CEO and major owner, was charged with crimes related to fraudulent misuse of Paycheck Protection Program funds. The company, which relied on government contracts requiring strict security clearance, suffered significant harm when Kao’s actions led to the invalidation of its facility security clearance and placed it at risk of suspension from federal contracting. The original owner and another entity sought Kao’s disassociation and damages, citing breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and gross negligence. The parties were bound by an operating agreement requiring arbitration for disputes.After a civil complaint was filed in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, an amended operating agreement and voting trust limited Kao’s control, but the company continued to face loss of contracts and financial harm. Arbitration proceedings began, but Kao, citing pending federal criminal charges, unsuccessfully moved to stay the arbitration, arguing his rights against self-incrimination would be prejudiced. The arbitrator denied the stay and ultimately awarded significant damages, including punitive damages, to the plaintiffs.Kao moved to vacate the arbitration award in circuit court, arguing the arbitrator erred in refusing to postpone and in awarding punitive damages. The circuit court denied the motion, finding no “sufficient cause” for postponement and affirming the arbitrator’s authority. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA”) largely affirmed, holding the arbitrator did not abuse discretion and the punitive damages award was within authority.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i held that the proper standard for “sufficient cause for postponement” under Hawai‘i law is “good cause,” and articulated three factors for courts to consider, grounded in the Hawai‘i Constitution. Applying these, the court found Kao had not met the standard, and affirmed the ICA’s judgment. View "Navatek Capital Inc. v. Kao" on Justia Law

A man committed two murders in Alameda County in 1976 when he was 17 years old, resulting in two concurrent life sentences. Nearly two decades later, while incarcerated in Kern County, he was convicted by a jury of possessing marijuana in prison. Under California’s Three Strikes Law at that time, the Kern County Superior Court imposed a consecutive sentence of 25 years to life for the drug offense, making his total sentence significantly longer. Although Proposition 36 later amended the Three Strikes Law to exclude non-serious, non-violent offenses from third-strike punishment, it did not benefit him due to his prior murder convictions.In July 2024, the defendant requested resentencing under newly expanded Penal Code section 1172.1, which allowed courts to recall sentences on their own motion if sentencing laws had changed. The Alameda County Superior Court, considering his age, rehabilitation, and lack of current dangerousness, recalled his sentences and resentenced him for voluntary manslaughter, imposing reduced consecutive sentences. For the Kern County offense, the court dismissed his strikes and imposed a four-year term to run concurrently, resulting in a total sentence less than the time he had already served and ordering his immediate release. The Alameda County District Attorney and Attorney General did not appeal this ruling. However, the Kern County District Attorney, who had not participated in the resentencing proceeding, filed a notice of appeal regarding the Kern County conviction.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. It held that the Kern County District Attorney lacked authority to exercise the People’s right to appeal the Alameda County Superior Court’s resentencing order. The court further concluded that the Kern County District Attorney could not seek writ relief to circumvent this lack of authority. As a result, the appeal was dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "P. v. Toussaint" on Justia Law

Three defendants were involved in a drive-by shooting in Springfield, Massachusetts, resulting in the death of Gabriel Irizarry. On the night of the incident, the defendants—two brothers and their cousin—left a restaurant, met another friend, and traveled together in a blue Honda Accord. Surveillance footage and witness testimony established that the Honda followed Irizarry's white Ford F-150, ultimately drawing alongside the victim's vehicle on Interstate 91. Multiple firearms were discharged from the Honda, with ballistic evidence showing twenty bullets struck the Ford. Physical evidence linked the defendants to the vehicle and the firearms used. After the shooting, the Honda crashed during a police pursuit, and the defendants fled, further supporting consciousness of guilt.The Hampden County Superior Court indicted the defendants for murder in the first degree, unlawful possession of a firearm, unlawful possession of a loaded firearm, and resisting arrest. After a joint jury trial, the defendants were convicted of murder in the first degree and related firearm offenses. Two defendants were convicted of murder in the first degree on both deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty theories, while the third was convicted on deliberate premeditation only. Motions for required findings of not guilty were denied for the murder and firearm counts, and all defendants appealed their convictions.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the appeals, addressing sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions regarding intent, and the denial of an involuntary manslaughter instruction for one defendant. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to prove each defendant knowingly participated in the murder with the requisite lethal intent. Although the trial judge erred by conflating knowing participation with intent to kill in jury instructions, the error did not result in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. The denial of an involuntary manslaughter instruction was upheld, and the convictions were affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Cotto" on Justia Law

The defendant, who was not the biological father but maintained a close, parental-like relationship with the minor victim, was convicted of sexual assault in the first and fourth degrees, and risk of injury to a child, based on allegations of sexual abuse spanning several years. The victim disclosed the alleged abuse to her teacher after a strong emotional reaction in class, which led to a forensic interview where she described three incidents of abuse. At trial, the defense argued that the victim fabricated the allegations after a dispute over cash gifts from her fifteenth birthday party, challenging her credibility on the basis of delayed disclosure, inconsistencies, lack of corroborating evidence, and alleged investigative deficiencies.In the Superior Court for the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, the jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. Over defense objection, the trial judge instructed the jury—relying on the then-governing precedent of State v. Daniel W. E.—that the "mere fact" of the victim’s delayed disclosure should not be considered in evaluating her credibility. The defense also objected to the admission of the full video of the victim’s forensic interview, which the court admitted on several grounds, including the rule of completeness.On direct appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court, the defendant contended that the delayed disclosure instruction was improper, violated his right to present a closing argument, and that the interview video was improperly admitted. The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the delayed disclosure instruction was erroneous under Daniel W. E., since the defense had challenged the victim’s credibility based on delay. However, the error was deemed nonconstitutional and harmless, as it was not reasonably probable the jury was misled. The court also ruled that the instruction did not infringe on the right to present a closing argument, and that the evidentiary challenge was moot since not all grounds for admitting the video were contested. Therefore, the judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Jose T." on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with felonious assault and two counts of discharging a firearm into a habitation, following an incident in which he shot at an individual inside his own house and at least one bullet struck a neighboring residence. The defendant claimed self-defense, asserting that the person he shot at was armed and threatening, although security footage revealed the alleged aggressor did not touch his weapon during the encounter. The jury acquitted the defendant of felonious assault but convicted him on both counts of discharging a firearm into a habitation.The Seventh District Court of Appeals reviewed the case after the defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on transferred self-defense, a doctrine he had not requested at trial. The appellate court found that the conviction relating to one residence was unsupported by sufficient evidence and vacated it, but reversed the other conviction, concluding that the trial court’s failure to instruct on transferred self-defense constituted plain error. The court reasoned that clearer instructions might have affected the outcome and remanded the matter for retrial on the remaining count.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio examined whether the omission of a transferred self-defense instruction amounted to plain error under Criminal Rule 52(B). The court held that such an error was not “plain” because current law did not clearly require the instruction. Furthermore, the defendant had not demonstrated that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the instruction been given. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Seventh District Court of Appeals and remanded the case for consideration of the defendant’s sentencing challenge. View "State v. Bradley" on Justia Law