Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

David Koan pled guilty in federal court to two counts of producing child pornography, offenses that arose from the same conduct underlying his prior Texas state conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child. For the state offenses, Koan had already been sentenced to 35 years in prison and had served nearly 40 months in custody by the time of his federal sentencing. The federal presentence report recognized that the state and federal offenses were related and recommended that Koan's federal sentence be adjusted under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) to account for the time already served on his undischarged state term.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Koan was sentenced to 60 years in prison—30 years on each count, to run consecutively—but the court ordered the federal sentence to run concurrently with the remaining state sentence. When defense counsel requested that Koan be given credit for the time already served in state custody, the district court stated it lacked authority to do so and deferred the issue to the Bureau of Prisons. The district court did not address the relevant Guideline provision or make clear reference to the statutory sentencing factors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Koan had properly preserved his challenge concerning the application of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b). The court held that the district court erred by failing to consider its authority under § 5G1.3(b) to adjust Koan’s sentence to account for time served on the related state conviction, mistakenly believing that only the Bureau of Prisons could award such credit. The Fifth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing so that the district court could properly consider and apply § 5G1.3(b). View "USA v. Koan" on Justia Law

In 2006, the defendant acted as a lookout during an attempted robbery committed by his associate, who shot and killed an off-duty Los Angeles County Sheriff’s deputy. The defendant was charged with first degree murder and attempted robbery. At trial in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the jury was instructed on the felony-murder rule and convicted him on both counts. The court sentenced him to 29 years to life, later reduced to 26 years to life after the sentence for attempted robbery was stayed.Years later, following legislative changes to the felony-murder rule under Senate Bill No. 1437, the defendant petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, which allows relief for certain felony-murder convictions. However, the statute excludes defendants if the victim was a peace officer killed in the course of duty and the defendant knew or should have known the victim’s status. After a series of appeals, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, directed the trial court to hold evidentiary hearings to determine whether the slain deputy was acting as a peace officer within the meaning of the statute at the time of her death.After further hearings, the trial court found that the deputy was not a “modified” custodial deputy with limited authority but rather a fully trained deputy sheriff under section 830.1, subdivision (a), who retained peace officer authority, including while off duty. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed this finding, holding that section 830.1, subdivision (c) applies only to deputies hired, trained, and utilized exclusively or initially as modified custodial deputies, not to regular deputies assigned to custodial duties. Substantial evidence supported that the victim was a regular deputy with full peace officer authority. Therefore, the defendant was ineligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6, and the trial court’s order denying the petition was affirmed. View "People v. Flint" on Justia Law

A group of medical students attended the University of Science, Arts and Technology (USAT), an international medical school based in Montserrat. USAT was licensed in Montserrat and, for years, was listed in the International Medical Education Directory, allowing its graduates to seek U.S. medical licensure. After a volcanic eruption in 2007, USAT began offering classes online and at alternative sites in the United States and Puerto Rico. In 2018, the Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates (ECFMG) changed its policy, restricting certification to students educated in the country where the school was authorized. USAT students who took courses outside Montserrat after 2018 were no longer eligible for ECFMG certification, affecting their ability to obtain U.S. medical licenses. The students alleged that USAT misrepresented its accreditation and educational legitimacy, leading them to pay substantial tuition under false pretenses.The students filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, asserting federal RICO claims, as well as Puerto Rico law claims for fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that the students failed to establish a “pattern of racketeering activity” as required under RICO, and dismissed the federal claims with prejudice. The court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the Puerto Rico law claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that the students did not present sufficient evidence of closed- or open-ended continuity to establish a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO. As a result, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the RICO claim and its decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims. View "Pena-Torres v. University of Science, Arts and Tech" on Justia Law

The case involves William Castillo, who was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of Isabelle Berndt in Las Vegas, Nevada. Castillo used a key he found while working as a roofer at Berndt’s home to later enter her residence with an accomplice, steal items, and fatally attack Berndt with a tire iron. Subsequently, he returned to the home to set it on fire. Evidence recovered from Castillo’s apartment linked him to the crime. He confessed to the robbery, murder, and arson during police interrogation and was convicted by a jury on multiple counts, including first-degree murder. The penalty phase included testimony regarding his abusive childhood and mental health, but the jury imposed a death sentence.After his conviction, Castillo appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, which affirmed both the conviction and sentence. His state post-conviction relief (PCR) petition was denied by the trial court and affirmed by the Nevada Supreme Court. Castillo then filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. He voluntarily dismissed the petition, but later moved to reopen it. His subsequent amended petitions were dismissed by the district court as untimely or procedurally defaulted. The district court granted a certificate of appealability for four claims and denied it for two others.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that Castillo’s first and second amended habeas petitions were untimely and equitable tolling was not warranted. The court affirmed denial of relief on most claims, including ineffective assistance of trial counsel and the as-applied Eighth Amendment challenge to Nevada’s lethal injection protocol. However, the court reversed the district court’s ruling on two claims, finding that attorney error in state PCR proceedings could excuse procedural default under Martinez v. Ryan and Hogan v. Bean. Those claims were remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed denial of certificates of appealability for the remaining claims. View "CASTILLO V. BEAN" on Justia Law

Federal agents suspected that an individual was using his auto garage as a front for narcotics distribution. After two controlled purchases of cocaine and ongoing surveillance, agents obtained a warrant to search his house and the surrounding grounds for evidence of drug crimes. The warrant did not specifically list vehicles among the items to be seized. Upon executing the warrant, agents found a blue minivan and a red truck parked in the driveway. Although a search of the vehicles initially revealed no contraband, the agents seized them for civil asset forfeiture, believing the minivan was used to facilitate drug sales and the truck was purchased with drug proceeds. Later, after receiving a tip, agents obtained a separate warrant to search the minivan and discovered cocaine and a firearm hidden in a secret compartment.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence found in the minivan. The court reasoned that, under Florida v. White, law enforcement does not need a warrant to seize forfeitable vehicles from places where officers are lawfully present, even private driveways. The defendant subsequently pleaded guilty while preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The Court held that the warrantless seizure of the minivan from the private driveway was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment since the agents had a warrant authorizing them to be present on the property and search its grounds. The Court explained that such a seizure did not constitute an invasion of privacy. The Court distinguished this case from United States v. Lasanta, finding Lasanta inapposite because the agents here had a search warrant for the property, unlike in Lasanta. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Acevedo" on Justia Law

The defendant was transporting a large mobile home on a rural county road in Gage County, Nebraska, when an axle broke and the mobile home became stuck, obstructing the roadway for nearly a week. Despite attempts to remove the obstruction, the defendant was unsuccessful, and the Gage County sheriff’s office ultimately hired an excavation company to clear the road, incurring a $15,000 expense. The obstruction did not cause any physical damage to the road, and the expense was solely for removal and disposal. The defendant pled no contest to obstructing a public road under Nebraska law, and the county court ordered him to pay $15,000 in restitution to the sheriff’s office.Upon appeal to the District Court for Gage County, the defendant challenged the restitution order, arguing that the relevant Nebraska statute did not authorize criminal restitution for such expenses and that the county court had not considered his ability to pay. The district court affirmed the county court’s determination that restitution was authorized under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2280, reasoning that the expenses incurred were a loss sustained by the victim as a direct result of the offense. However, it found merit in the argument regarding ability to pay, vacated the restitution order, and remanded for a hearing on that issue.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the statutory authority for criminal restitution de novo, holding that the restitution statutes must be strictly construed and only authorize restitution for actual physical injury or property damage or loss, as defined by Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-2280 and 29-2282. The Court concluded that the expenses incurred by the sheriff’s office did not constitute property damage or loss within the meaning of the statutes. As a result, the Court affirmed the district court’s vacation of the restitution order, but on the grounds that restitution was not authorized by statute, and remanded with directions to vacate the order in its entirety. View "State v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Edward Robinson, Jr. was convicted by a jury in 2004 of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, stemming from the shooting of Herbert Fant outside a fast-food restaurant. The prosecution relied heavily on the testimony of Joe Lockett, the sole eyewitness who identified Robinson as the shooter. Lockett’s credibility was challenged at trial, particularly regarding his criminal history and possible motives for cooperating with the State. Despite these attacks on Lockett’s credibility, Robinson was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, with an additional consecutive sentence for the weapons charge.Robinson appealed his convictions to the Nebraska Supreme Court twice, first on direct appeal and then following denial of postconviction relief by the District Court for Douglas County. Both times, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, finding sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdicts. In 2019, Robinson filed a pro se motion for a new trial based on affidavits, including one from Lockett recanting his trial testimony. In 2023, Robinson, now represented by counsel, filed an amended motion for a new trial, again relying on Lockett’s recantation and additional affidavits attacking Lockett’s credibility. The District Court for Douglas County denied the amended motion without holding an evidentiary hearing.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the District Court’s denial de novo. It held that Robinson was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because his motion and supporting materials failed to satisfy the statutory requirements. Specifically, the recantation and supporting affidavits were found unreliable and unsubstantial, and the court determined that, even absent Lockett’s testimony, the verdict would likely have been the same. Accordingly, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s ruling. View "State v. Robinson" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant convicted of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The defendant was part of a group that planned to purchase marijuana but instead decided to rob the victim, resulting in the victim’s death. At trial, the prosecution’s key witness testified that the defendant was the shooter. Another witness identified the perpetrators as three black males, while the defendant is white. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment and 25 to 30 years for the respective convictions. His direct appeal, handled by the same attorney as at trial, was unsuccessful.Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief in the District Court for Douglas County, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel relating to a juror who allegedly exhibited bias during voir dire and was not removed by peremptory challenge or on appeal. He also claimed that the State failed to disclose implied plea agreements with two witnesses, violating his constitutional rights. The district court denied all claims without an evidentiary hearing, finding the juror claims were refuted by the record and the plea agreement claims were either procedurally barred, unsupported by facts, or harmless error.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing regarding all claims about the juror and the claim concerning an implied plea agreement with one witness, finding the record did not support allegations of juror bias, ineffective assistance, or an undisclosed agreement. However, the court reversed in part, holding that the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the claim that the State failed to disclose an implied plea agreement with another witness. The court directed that the case be remanded for this limited evidentiary hearing. Thus, the judgment was affirmed in part and in part reversed and remanded with directions. View "State v. Elseman" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant allowed two sixteen-year-old girls who had run away from a treatment facility to stay in his home for ten days. During that period, he provided them with drugs and made repeated sexual advances, subjecting one girl to sexual contact. He later pleaded guilty to attempted sexual assault and distributing a controlled substance to a minor. A Sex Offender Management Board evaluator determined, using the Sexually Violent Predator Assessment Screening Instrument, that the defendant met the criteria of a sexually violent predator (SVP), largely based on his risk assessment score. The district court designated him as an SVP and sentenced him to fifteen years in prison, finding that the SVP designation was not punishment but rather intended to protect the community.The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate division held that the SVP designation was not “punishment” under the Eighth Amendment, relying on prior precedent and distinguishing a recent case involving juvenile sex offender registration. The division noted some tension between the precedents, but concluded that the previous holding that SVP designation was not punishment remained controlling, as the juvenile case did not expressly overrule it.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed whether the SVP designation constitutes criminal punishment under the Eighth Amendment and, if so, whether it is cruel and unusual as applied. The court held that the Colorado General Assembly did not intend the SVP designation to be punitive, and that its effects do not, by the “clearest proof,” outweigh this nonpunitive intent. After analyzing statutory intent and applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors, the court concluded that the SVP designation and its accompanying requirements do not amount to punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Beagle v. People" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with three counts of sexual assault and pleaded not guilty. During the jury trial, the prosecution submitted instructions for lesser-included attempt offenses, and the court accepted them over the defense’s objection. The jury received verdict forms allowing them to find the defendant not guilty of both the completed and attempted offenses, or guilty of one or the other, but could not indicate acquittal on the main charge while deadlocked on the lesser charge. After several days of deliberation, the jury notified the court in writing that it had reached a unanimous verdict on the main charges but was deadlocked on the lesser-included attempt offenses. The court confirmed the jury’s meaning through clarifying questions.Defense counsel requested revised verdict forms to allow the jury to separately indicate its decisions on the completed and attempted offenses, and also asked to poll the jury. The Larimer County District Court denied both requests and declared a mistrial on all charges. The defendant sought review under Colorado Appellate Rule 21, arguing that an ordinary appellate remedy was inadequate and he would otherwise suffer irreparable harm.The Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc, reviewed the trial court’s decision for abuse of discretion. It found that the jury’s communication constituted a spontaneous and unequivocal partial verdict—namely, acquittal on the charged offenses. The trial court’s order for a complete mistrial violated the defendant’s right against double jeopardy under the Colorado Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to accept the partial verdict and instead declared a mistrial as to all offenses. On remand, the defendant may be retried only for the attempt offenses, not for the completed sexual assault charges. View "People v. Mena" on Justia Law