Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In this matter, the defendant, who was nearly 18 years old at the time of the offense, participated in the fatal shooting of a fellow gang member and the wounding of another during an ongoing conflict within their gang. The events occurred after an initial altercation escalated, with the defendant and his co-defendant leaving the scene, retrieving firearms, and returning to ambush the victims. Following the shooting, both defendants were convicted of first-degree murder, attempted premeditated murder, and assault with a semi-automatic firearm, with various firearm and gang enhancements.After their convictions in the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, both defendants received sentences of 90 years to life. Appeals followed, raising issues including the admissibility of testimony, sentencing as juveniles, and sufficiency of evidence. The California Court of Appeal initially affirmed the convictions but remanded the case for resentencing of the defendant due to his juvenile status. The case underwent multiple rounds of appellate review, including consideration of evolving legal standards regarding juvenile sentencing (such as People v. Franklin, People v. Canizales, and Senate Bill No. 620), as well as the retroactive application of Proposition 57, which required a fitness hearing to determine if the defendant should be tried as a juvenile or adult.Upon remand, the juvenile court conducted a transfer hearing, weighing statutory criteria, expert testimony, and the defendant’s history. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was not amenable to rehabilitation under juvenile court jurisdiction, citing ongoing violent conduct, persistent gang affiliation, and the inability of available programs to address his needs within the limited timeframe. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the juvenile court’s decision and held that substantial evidence supported the transfer to adult court. The order was affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with prior appellate directions regarding resentencing and the opportunity to present mitigating evidence. View "In re H.J." on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant whose probation officer discovered internet-capable devices at his residence, despite his prohibition from possessing such devices. On these devices, authorities found searches for terms like “young naked teen boys” and “boys,” as well as cache images depicting young-looking individuals engaged in sexual acts. The defendant had previous convictions for possession of child pornography and sexual exploitation of a minor.After these discoveries, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa admitted evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions at trial. The court also allowed testimony from a detective regarding typical search patterns of people seeking child pornography. The exhibits containing cache images were handled under special procedures, kept in a red binder and only accessed at the court’s direction. The defendant did not object to the handling of the exhibits or the language used in reference to them during trial.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed several challenges: the sufficiency of the evidence supporting conviction, the admissibility of prior convictions under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), the admission of the detective’s testimony under Rule 704(b), and the court’s handling of the exhibits under Rule 403. The Eighth Circuit held that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s findings as to intent and substantial step toward attempted receipt of child pornography. The court concluded the prior convictions were properly admitted for intent, motive, and knowledge, and were not unfairly prejudicial. The detective’s testimony was found not to violate Rule 704(b) because it did not opine directly on the defendant’s mental state. The handling of the exhibits was not erroneous or unduly prejudicial. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Baker" on Justia Law

A police officer initiated a traffic stop to take an individual into custody for a psychiatric hold following her doctor’s emergency-medical-admission form, which indicated she posed a substantial risk of harm to herself or others. The individual refused to comply with the officers’ instructions to exit her vehicle and resisted being handcuffed, requiring officers to use force to place her in a cruiser. The encounter lasted 15 to 20 minutes. She was charged with obstructing official business and resisting arrest.The Hamilton County Municipal Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss both charges, finding her actions did not meet the statutory definition of obstruction because she was not under arrest and could legally refuse to accompany police. The State appealed, and the First District Court of Appeals reversed. The appellate court held that an affirmative act, not necessarily an illegal one, suffices for obstruction under the statute, and that physically resisting officers provided probable cause for both obstruction and resisting arrest charges.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case on discretionary appeal and as a certified conflict between appellate districts regarding whether obstructing official business requires an illegal act. The court held that under R.C. 2921.31, the State need only allege an unprivileged, voluntary act, whether legal or illegal, that obstructed police officers from performing their lawful duties. The court clarified that Ohio’s civil-commitment statute does not confer a privilege to obstruct official business. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals and answered the certified conflict, stating that a charge of obstruction does not require an allegation of an illegal act. View "State v. Dowell" on Justia Law

A police officer stopped a car after it ran a red light and found three occupants, all under the age of twenty-one. There was marijuana in the car, and none of the occupants was wearing a seat belt. When asked if anyone had a weapon, the defendant, seated in the front passenger seat, did not respond. The officer asked him to exit the car, at which point the defendant pushed the officer and fled, discarding a loaded handgun during the pursuit. The defendant was charged with assault and battery on a police officer and unlawful possession of a firearm without a license.The charges were brought in the Dorchester Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department. A jury found the defendant guilty on both counts. The defendant appealed his convictions, raising no challenge to the assault and battery conviction. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts transferred the appeal from the Appeals Court on its own initiative to address the defendant's challenge to his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm without a license. Specifically, the defendant argued that the statutory minimum age requirement of twenty-one for obtaining a license to carry a firearm violated his Second Amendment rights, both facially and as applied to him, even though he had never applied for a license and was only twenty years old at the time of the offense.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that while the defendant lacked standing to bring an as-applied challenge because he had not applied for a license, he did have standing to bring a facial challenge. The court found that the Commonwealth’s licensing age restriction—requiring individuals to be at least twenty-one years old to obtain a license to carry a firearm—was consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation and did not violate the Second Amendment. The court affirmed the defendant’s convictions. View "Commonwealth v. Thomson" on Justia Law

In 2012, Michael Martin Clark was convicted of first-degree murder for a 1994 crime and sentenced to life without parole. Clark appealed, but his conviction and sentence were affirmed. In 2019, he sought postconviction relief, which the district court denied. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for an evidentiary hearing on two claims. While this was pending, allegations of misconduct surfaced regarding Yvonne Woods, a DNA analyst involved in Clark’s case. Clark supplemented his postconviction motion, arguing the new information about Woods’s alleged misconduct entitled him to a new trial. The prosecution agreed to a new trial, and Clark’s conviction was vacated by stipulation.Awaiting retrial, Clark served a subpoena on the Colorado Bureau of Investigation (CBI), seeking records from all cases handled by Woods that met certain DNA-related criteria. CBI moved to quash the subpoena, arguing it was overly broad, burdensome, and failed to satisfy the required legal standard. The district court denied the motion, finding the materials could be relevant to Clark’s anticipated motion to dismiss for outrageous governmental conduct. The court later narrowed the scope of the subpoena in response to a motion to reconsider. CBI then sought relief from the Colorado Supreme Court.The Colorado Supreme Court held that the district court erred in denying CBI’s motion to quash. It concluded that Clark’s subpoena did not meet the requirements set by People v. Spykstra, including the need for clear relevance and avoidance of fishing expeditions. Additionally, the court found that Clark had not complied with the procedural requirements of the Colorado Forensic Science Integrity Act for obtaining such discovery. The court made the order to show cause absolute and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "People v. Clark" on Justia Law

On April 14, 2023, a neighbor reported a disturbance involving Douglas Pierre and his then-girlfriend, Danielle Dalke. Police responded and found Dalke visibly injured and in pain, repeatedly naming Pierre as her assailant. Dalke was taken to the hospital, where she again accused Pierre of punching her multiple times. Medical staff diagnosed her with a rib contusion. Pierre was arrested and later released to attend court-ordered treatment but had his bond revoked for contacting Dalke in violation of release conditions. Dalke later recanted her accusations, claiming she was under the influence and angry at Pierre at the time of the incident.After a jury trial in the Twentieth Judicial District Court, Pierre was convicted of Partner Family Member Assault and felony tampering with witnesses. At trial, Dalke testified she could not remember the incident and had lied previously. The State presented body cam footage, medical testimony, and the testimony of Pierre’s minor daughter, who witnessed the assault. Pierre’s defense focused on undermining Dalke’s credibility, emphasizing her substance use and alleged motivations for fabricating the story. During trial, Dalke made gestures toward Pierre, which she later denied. The State introduced rebuttal testimony from Officer Doyle to contradict her denial.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, Pierre challenged the admissibility of Officer Doyle’s rebuttal testimony and sought credit for time spent in court-ordered treatment. The Supreme Court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Officer Doyle’s testimony, finding it proper rebuttal evidence to impeach Dalke’s credibility. The court also held that Pierre is entitled to credit for his time in treatment and remanded for the District Court to determine the specific credit. The conviction was affirmed, and the sentencing credit issue was remanded. View "State v. Pierre" on Justia Law

Two victims were robbed at gunpoint and had their personal items and vehicle stolen by two suspects, one of whom drove away in the victims’ car while the other fled in a different vehicle. Police responded shortly after, locating the victim’s vehicle and monitoring the suspect’s vehicle at an address associated with one of the suspects, Marcos Andres Andrade. During the investigation, officers obtained cell site location information (CSLI) from Andrade’s phone carrier without a warrant by submitting an emergency disclosure request. This data assisted in acquiring search and arrest warrants, leading to Andrade’s arrest and recovery of some stolen items.The Santa Clara County Superior Court reviewed Andrade’s motion to suppress evidence derived from the warrantless CSLI request. The trial court denied the motion, finding exigent circumstances justified the search because the suspects were outstanding, armed, and there was potential for destruction of evidence or public danger. Andrade subsequently entered a no contest plea to second degree robbery and admitted a prior strike, receiving a four-year sentence. He appealed, arguing the exigent circumstances exception did not apply.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, considered whether the warrantless acquisition of both historical and real-time CSLI was a Fourth Amendment search, and if exigent circumstances justified the search. The court held that law enforcement’s request for historical and real-time CSLI constituted a Fourth Amendment search, requiring a warrant unless a valid exception applied. The court found that no exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search in this case and directed suppression of the CSLI data. The judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings, with instructions for the trial court to permit Andrade to withdraw his plea and to determine whether other evidence should be suppressed as fruits of the illegally obtained CSLI. View "People v. Andrade" on Justia Law

A defendant was investigated after a private investigator discovered a memory card containing surreptitious recordings of his stepdaughter undressing in her bedroom. Law enforcement executed a search warrant at the defendant’s home, uncovering a hidden camera disguised as a charger in the victim’s room and multiple explicit videos and images of the minor, recorded over a period of several years. The defendant had organized these materials and stored them in a concealed media vault on his phone.The defendant was indicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California for sexual exploitation of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing it was insufficiently specific and did not provide adequate notice of the charges. The district court denied the motion, finding the indictment adequately alleged the essential elements. After a jury trial resulted in a guilty verdict, the district court imposed a 252-month sentence, ordered restitution to the victim, and entered a personal forfeiture money judgment representing the proceeds from the sale of the defendant’s house, where the offense occurred.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed three main issues. First, it affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, holding that the indictment sufficiently tracked the statutory language and included all necessary elements. Second, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the forfeiture order, concluding that even if the district court erred by not inquiring whether the jury should determine forfeitability, any error was harmless because the use of the house to commit the offense was uncontested and indisputable. Third, the Ninth Circuit vacated the restitution order due to a mathematical error and remanded for recalculation and clarification regarding certain housing expenses. The judgment was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "USA V. MUMMA" on Justia Law

The defendant entered the residence of his ex-girlfriend, violating a criminal protective order, and assaulted her, causing significant injuries that required surgery. After law enforcement arrived, the defendant resisted arrest and assaulted a correctional officer. He was charged with several felonies, including corporal injury to a cohabitant with a prior conviction, false imprisonment by violence, resisting an executive officer, and other misdemeanors. The charging document also alleged two prior strikes—first degree burglary and criminal threats—and two serious felony enhancements.After a preliminary hearing, the defendant filed a motion under People v. Superior Court (Romero) to dismiss one of the prior strikes. The People opposed this motion. Judge Catherine Swysen initially denied the Romero motion. Later, before Judge Barry LaBarbera, the defendant pleaded guilty to all charges and admitted both strikes, with the understanding that the renewed Romero motion would be considered at sentencing. At sentencing, Judge LaBarbera granted the motion and dismissed the burglary strike, citing the defendant’s age at the time of the offense, his background, mental illness, and rehabilitative efforts. The defendant was sentenced to 27 years and eight months in prison.The People appealed to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Six, arguing for the first time that the trial court erred in allowing a renewed Romero motion and abused its discretion in dismissing the strike. The appellate court held that the People forfeited their claim regarding the renewed Romero motion by failing to object at trial and declined to review the forfeited claim. The court further held that Judge LaBarbera did not abuse his discretion in granting the Romero motion. The judgment was affirmed. View "P. v. Perkins" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with inflicting corporal injury on his girlfriend, along with possessing drug paraphernalia and a controlled substance. The incident occurred when the defendant, under the influence and agitated, choked his girlfriend with a guitar amp cord while she was driving, endangering both her and their unborn child as well as others on the freeway. After being arrested, the defendant sought pretrial mental health diversion, submitting evidence of his participation in a residential treatment program and a forensic psychological evaluation diagnosing multiple mental health and substance use disorders.In the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the trial judge determined that the defendant met the eligibility criteria for mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, but found him unsuitable for diversion. The court concluded that the defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community, citing both the facts of the charged offense—specifically, the use of a weapon in a dangerous manner—and a pattern of domestic violence in the defendant’s past, including a prior conviction and an uncharged incident. The defendant pleaded no contest to the corporal injury charge pursuant to a negotiated plea, was placed on formal probation with a treatment requirement, and appealed the denial of diversion.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the trial court’s denial for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the defendant posed an unreasonable risk of committing a violent felony (a “super strike”) if treated outside custody. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying mental health diversion. View "People v. Henn" on Justia Law