Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In this case from the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the defendant, Joshua Richard Larson, appealed the revocation of his suspended sentence by the Fourth Judicial District Court. Larson argued that the revocation proceeding should have been dismissed with prejudice due to his first appearance in court occurring sixty-six days after his arrest, exceeding the statutory 60-day limit. The District Court acknowledged the delay but dismissed the revocation petition without prejudice, leading to the State refiling the petition, Larson admitting the allegations, and the court revoking his suspended sentence.The Supreme Court of Montana sided with the lower court, affirming its decision. It held that Larson’s initial appearance before the Justice Court on the same day he was served with the warrant fulfilled the requirements of the statute. Although this appearance was not before the District Court, the justices ruled that this didn't materially affect Larson's substantial rights. Therefore, the delay in his appearance before the District Court didn't violate his due process rights. The Supreme Court also concluded that Larson wasn't prejudiced by the delay, and so the District Court didn't err in refusing to dismiss the petition with prejudice. View "State v. Larson" on Justia Law

This case involves Rolando Villarreal who pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. His sentence was enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) due to a prior burglary and two prior aggravated assaults. Villarreal challenged the enhancement under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that his sentence was improperly enhanced under the ACCA's elements or force clause based on the predicate offense that allowed conviction for reckless conduct, a claim subsequently termed a "Borden claim."The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that Villarreal did assert a Borden claim in his § 2255 motion and that his sentence was "in excess of the maximum authorized by law." This was due to the fact that, after the ruling in Borden v. United States, the convictions under the relevant aggravated assault statute could not constitute predicate offenses under the ACCA as they do not require the "physical use of force against the person of another."As a result, the Court of Appeals vacated Villarreal’s sentence and remanded the case back to the district court with instructions to resentence Villarreal without consideration of the ACCA. View "USA v. Villarreal" on Justia Law

A traffic stop conducted by Pennsylvania State Trooper Galen Clemons resulted in the arrest of Jamar Hunter after a loaded Glock-45 semi-automatic handgun was discovered in Hunter's waistband. This discovery followed a routine license and warrant check and an additional computerized criminal history check on Hunter and his passenger, Deshaun Davis. Hunter was later indicted for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. Hunter moved to suppress the firearm evidence claiming that the computerized criminal history check extended the traffic stop beyond its constitutional authority.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted Hunter's motion to suppress. The court reasoned that the computerized criminal history check was unrelated to the traffic stop's mission and, without reasonable suspicion, prolonged the stop, therefore violating the Fourth Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision, finding that the lower court had applied a subjective standard of review, thereby erring as a matter of law. The appellate court held that the criminal history check, which lasted approximately two minutes, was an objectively reasonable safety precaution related to the mission of the traffic stop under Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015) and the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals found the check to be a negligibly burdensome officer safety precaution that fell within the stop's mission. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "USA v. Hunter" on Justia Law

In June 2021, Kenneth Bernard Kimbley, III, was convicted on four counts of lewd and lascivious conduct and sentenced to four concurrent sentences, each for a determinate period of not less than fifteen years and an indeterminate period of not more than fifteen years, for a total unified sentence not to exceed thirty years. Kimbley appealed his conviction, presenting multiple arguments to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho.The court rejected Kimbley's argument that his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated when his trial was livestreamed due to COVID-19 restrictions. The court determined that Kimbley had not objected to the livestreaming at the time and had therefore waived his right to object to it on appeal.Kimbley also argued that his right to counsel was violated as he was unable to communicate with his attorney during pretrial hearings in which his attorney appeared remotely. However, the court noted that Kimbley hadn't raised this issue at the lower court, nor had he demonstrated how this alleged violation affected the outcome of his trial.Kimbley further contended that the lower court erred by admitting evidence of his flight from prosecution and his firearm possession. The Supreme Court found that evidence of Kimbley's flight was relevant and admissible as it indicated a consciousness of guilt. Evidence of Kimbley's firearm possession was also deemed admissible as it was introduced by Kimbley's own counsel for the purpose of impeachment.Lastly, Kimbley argued that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing arguments by discrediting a witness who had invoked her Fifth Amendment right. However, the court declined to consider this argument as Kimbley hadn't objected to the prosecutor's comments at the time and had not adequately argued that these comments constituted a fundamental error on appeal.In conclusion, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the judgment of the lower court, rejecting all of Kimbley's arguments on appeal. View "State v. Kimbley" on Justia Law

In 2004, Azad Abdullah was convicted and sentenced to death for the first-degree murder of his wife. He also received consecutive prison sentences for first-degree arson, three counts of attempted first-degree murder, and felony injury to a child. In this appeal, Abdullah challenged the summary dismissal of his second successive petition for post-conviction relief. He claimed that the state suppressed material impeachment information related to its lead investigator, and that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to discover and use this information against the investigator at trial.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court's summary dismissal of both claims in Abdullah’s petition. The court determined that the claims were time-barred under Idaho Code section 19-2719(5) because Abdullah’s prior counsel reasonably could or should have known about the claims Abdullah now raises. The court also found that even if the factual allegations in the petition were true, the information could have been used to impeach the lead investigator at trial or sentencing, but it was neither material to the guilt or penalty phase, nor was trial counsel’s alleged failure to investigate the information prejudicial. Therefore, Abdullah’s challenge to the district court’s discovery ruling was moot. View "Abdullah v. State" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a lower court decision that the defendant, Felipe Lorthridge, could be involuntarily medicated to restore his competency to stand trial. Lorthridge was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, a crime carrying a maximum sentence of ten years. After being diagnosed with schizophrenia and found incompetent to stand trial, the government moved to medicate him involuntarily to restore his competency, as allowed under Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). The court found that bringing an individual accused of a serious crime to trial is an important governmental interest and that the involuntary medication of Lorthridge would significantly further that interest. The court also found that the medication was necessary to further that interest and was medically appropriate. Lorthridge appealed the decision, challenging the lower court's conclusions on the first, second, and fourth elements of the Sell test. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no clear error in its judgement. View "United States v. Lorthridge" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Sterling Robinson, was convicted by a jury on one count of possessing a firearm or ammunition as a convicted felon and one count of attempted obstruction of a federal proceeding. He appealed these convictions on the grounds of sufficiency challenges, errors relating to evidence admitted at trial, the trial court's jury instructions, and the prosecutor's remarks during opening and closing arguments. Robinson also appealed his sentence, arguing that the district court misunderstood its authority to order that his sentence run concurrently with another federal sentence.The case originated from an incident where Robinson's ex-girlfriend, Candace Anderson, accused him of shooting at her car while her nine-year-old son was inside. After the incident, Robinson repeatedly urged Anderson to change her story during phone calls from jail.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed Robinson's convictions, stating that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Robinson was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the stated charges. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its admission of evidence, the failure to give an impeachment instruction, or any improper remarks by the prosecutor.However, the court agreed with Robinson's argument that the district court misunderstood its sentencing authority. The district court initially stated that Robinson’s sentence would run concurrently with a sentence imposed upon his revocation of supervised release, but later retracted this after the government pointed out that another judge had ordered the sentences to run consecutively. The appellate court clarified that one district court has no authority to instruct another district court on how to impose its sentence for a different offense in a different case. As a result, the court vacated Robinson’s term of imprisonment and remanded the case for a narrow resentencing limited to the sole issue of whether Robinson’s prison sentence in this case should run concurrently or consecutively with his other federal sentence. View "USA v. Robinson" on Justia Law

The case involves a man named James Wilder II who was convicted for possession of a firearm as a felon and attempted witness tampering. While on patrol, Officer Meric Whipple observed Wilder walking beside the road with a visible firearm. When Wilder noticed the police car, he ran, dropped the gun, picked it back up, and entered a house. Upon searching the house, the officers found a gun that matched the one Wilder had dropped and arrested him. While in jail, Wilder called a friend and directed her to bribe the residents of the house to falsely claim that they owned the gun. A jury found him guilty of both charges.Wilder appealed his conviction on the grounds that the trial testimony regarding the officer's training and experience was unfairly admitted and that there was insufficient evidence supporting his conviction for attempted witness tampering. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the officer's training and experience in identifying weapons were relevant to the case, and the testimony did not pose a risk of unfair prejudice. In regards to the second ground, the court found that Wilder's instructions to his friend to bribe the residents of the house to claim the gun was theirs demonstrated a substantial step towards witness tampering and was sufficient evidence for the conviction. View "United States v. Wilder" on Justia Law

In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, a state pretrial detainee, Rashaud L. Robinson, scheduled for a second trial, sought a writ of habeas corpus. Robinson claimed that when a poll of jurors at his 2021 trial showed ten of its members would acquit on four of five counts, retrial on those counts became barred under then-existing Louisiana law. The state trial court judge declared a mistrial instead, and the federal district court denied any relief.On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that that Robinson's claim was not about his release from or reduction in length or level of custody. Once it became clear that the arguments about acquittals did not apply to all counts, the suit was not about a release from or reduction in length or level of custody. The question was whether nonunanimous verdicts of acquittal prevented Robinson’s retrial on four counts. He was not requesting release from detention as he awaits trial on only one charge. Therefore, the court concluded that this Section 2241 habeas proceeding must be dismissed. The court did not evaluate the district court’s finding that when the state courts held Robinson had not been acquitted, those courts had relied at least in part on state law. The decision was based only on the unavailability of any relief appropriate in a habeas proceeding for Robinson’s claims. That was the only issue the court considered, and, solely for that reason, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. Though the court could not rule on the merits of Robinson’s arguments, nothing in this opinion should be interpreted as preventing Robinson from presenting similar arguments in the future as appropriate. View "Robinson v. Lopinto" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the second federal habeas corpus petition by Jaime Dean Charboneau, who sought to overturn his conviction for the 1984 shooting death of his ex-wife in Idaho. Charboneau alleged that Idaho officials violated their obligations under Brady v. Maryland by encouraging his ex-wife's daughter, Tira, to provide false statements and testimony regarding her mother’s death and to dispose of potentially exculpatory evidence. In support of these allegations, Charboneau relied on a letter written by Tira in 1989. However, the court held that Charboneau failed to meet the threshold requirement of showing actual innocence as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) for consideration of second or successive federal habeas petitions. The court held that, even if the letter was genuine, the statements in the letter, viewed in light of all the evidence, were not sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have convicted Charboneau of first-degree murder. The court concluded that Charboneau’s new materials did not suffice to make the requisite showing of actual innocence. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed his petition without reaching the merits of his Brady claim. View "CHARBONEAU V. DAVIS" on Justia Law