Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was charged with organized retail theft and grand theft. He sought pretrial mental health diversion, providing documentation that he had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and substance use disorder. The prosecution requested that the defendant submit to an examination by a prosecution-retained mental health expert, arguing this was needed to assess the connection between the mental health diagnosis and the alleged criminal conduct.After a hearing, the Stanislaus County Superior Court denied the prosecution’s request for a compelled examination under Penal Code section 1054.3, subdivision (b), and subsequently denied their motion for reconsideration. Later, the court granted the defendant’s motion for pretrial mental health diversion. The prosecution then petitioned the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, seeking a writ of mandate and/or prohibition to overturn the superior court’s denial of their request for a compelled mental health examination.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed whether trial courts have authority under Penal Code section 1054.3, subdivision (b)(1), to order a defendant seeking pretrial mental health diversion under section 1001.36 to submit to an examination by a prosecution-retained mental health expert. The court held that such authority does not exist in the diversion context because a defendant moving for diversion does not place their mental state at issue through proposed testimony of a mental health expert at any phase of the criminal action. The court reasoned that diversion eligibility is determined at an informal hearing, not at trial, and does not involve the defendant’s criminal intent as an element of the offense. The petition for a writ of mandate and/or prohibition was therefore denied. View "People v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon, with several sentencing enhancements, following a 2012 shooting in an apartment parking lot. The evidence included witness testimony, forensic findings, and the defendant’s own statements, including admissions of gang affiliation and multiple inconsistent accounts of the incident. The victim was killed at close range, and there was no evidence supporting the defendant’s claims regarding the victim’s alleged prior threats or possession of a weapon. The defendant was originally sentenced to 50 years to life, plus a determinate term, which was later slightly reduced after the elimination of a prior prison term enhancement.After sentencing, the defendant pursued multiple petitions and motions under the California Racial Justice Act (CRJA), alleging racial bias by a juror, discriminatory language by a prosecutor, and statistical disparities in sentencing enhancements for Black defendants. These filings included habeas petitions in both the San Bernardino County Superior Court and the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District, as well as CRJA motions during resentencing proceedings. Each claim was rejected by the courts, with findings that the defendant had not established a prima facie case under the CRJA and that no evidentiary hearing was warranted.The California Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, conducted an independent review of the record and the defendant’s supplemental brief, as requested by appellate counsel pursuant to People v. Delgadillo. The court held that the defendant failed to meet the CRJA’s prima facie burden for any of his claims. The court affirmed the trial court’s orders denying the CRJA motions, and declined to further review the entire record for unraised issues. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law

A software company managing cloud storage accounts detected that a user had uploaded material suspected to be child sexual abuse content. As required by federal law, the company reported this to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), which in turn forwarded a CyberTip containing the information, including the suspect’s phone number, to law enforcement. A detective from the Tallahassee Police Department reviewed the CyberTip and submitted an affidavit to a Florida state court judge to obtain a warrant to search the suspect’s cloud account. The affidavit referenced the reliability of NCMEC’s processes and the detective’s experience, but did not describe the alleged illicit images. The warrant was granted, and the subsequent search uncovered child sexual abuse images. Further investigation led to the identification of a victim and the arrest of the suspect, who was later charged federally.The defendant moved in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search warrant affidavit lacked probable cause and that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply. The district court agreed, finding that the affidavit was too vague and conclusory, lacking sufficient details to support probable cause or reasonable reliance. As a result, the court suppressed all evidence obtained from the searches.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered whether the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied, assuming without deciding that the affidavit was deficient in establishing probable cause. The court held that the affidavit contained enough indicia of probable cause, particularly due to the general trustworthiness of NCMEC’s CyberTip program and the detective’s reasonable reliance on established procedures. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s suppression order and remanded for further proceedings. View "USA v. Gibbs" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with several serious crimes, including second-degree murder and aggravated assault, following an incident in which he allegedly attacked his parents with a baseball bat, killing his father and injuring his mother, before fleeing in a vehicle and colliding with a game warden's truck. After his arrest, the court ordered a neutral psychiatric examiner to conduct a competency examination to determine whether the defendant was fit to stand trial. The examiner interviewed the defendant multiple times but concluded that further psychometric testing was necessary. The examiner stated that defense counsel must be excluded from the testing, citing copyright and professional ethics concerns, and warned that she would otherwise submit a report without a competency finding.The defendant objected, asserting that his attorney had a constitutional right to be present during the competency examination, referencing both the Sixth Amendment and Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution. The State argued that the competency examination was not a critical stage of the prosecution, and thus the right did not attach. The Superior Court, Franklin Unit, Criminal Division denied the defendant's motion, holding there was no constitutional right to counsel’s presence during the examination. The defendant sought and was granted an interlocutory appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s decision de novo for constitutional questions and for abuse of discretion on procedural rulings. The Court held that a competency examination is not a critical stage of criminal proceedings where the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, citing United States Supreme Court precedent and the practices of numerous jurisdictions. The Court further held that Vermont law and the Fifth Amendment adequately protect defendants’ rights during such examinations. Finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to exclude counsel, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling. View "State v. Lawyer" on Justia Law

A man was accused of sexually inappropriate conduct with his biological daughter, R.S., who was under eighteen at the time. On May 15, 2020, after R.S. reached out to her father following an argument with her boyfriend, the two spent time together at the father’s mother’s house, where they drank alcohol and smoked marijuana. The man then attempted to initiate sexual contact with R.S., including kissing, touching her breasts, and touching her genitals, all of which R.S. resisted. Afterward, R.S. reported the incident to her family and authorities, leading to her father’s arrest.Initially, the man was charged with both sexual assault and sexual performance of a child in the 66th District Court of Hill County, Texas. Before trial, the State sought to introduce evidence of the man’s prior conviction for indecency with a child. The trial court ruled that the prior conviction was inadmissible for the sexual assault charge but admissible for the sexual performance charge. The State dismissed the sexual assault charge and proceeded solely on the sexual performance charge. The jury convicted the man and sentenced him to sixty years in prison.On appeal, the Seventh Court of Appeals found that while there was sufficient evidence of sexual assault, there was not sufficient evidence to support the conviction for sexual performance of a child. The appellate court held that the statute required proof that R.S. engaged in sexual conduct as a result of inducement, which did not occur, and rendered a judgment of acquittal.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case. It agreed the evidence was insufficient for the charged offense but found that the record clearly supported a conviction for the lesser-included offense of attempted sexual performance of a child. The court reformed the conviction accordingly, reversed the court of appeals’ judgment, and remanded the case for a new punishment hearing. View "TRACY v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The case involved a defendant who killed her two young daughters by asphyxiation, believing she was protecting them from imagined abuse and exploitation by family members. The defendant had a documented history of severe mental illness, including schizoaffective disorder with both schizophrenic and bipolar symptoms, and had experienced increasing paranoia and delusions in the months before the offenses. After the killings, she drove to the police station, called 911, and confessed. Prior to the incident, she had made several reports to police, which were investigated and determined to be unfounded, and she was involuntarily hospitalized months before the offenses. The children were returned to her care following her treatment, and the killings occurred two months later.Following her arrest, questions arose regarding her competency to stand trial and potential insanity at the time of the offense. A defense-retained expert initially found her incompetent, but after further evaluation, both the defense and a State-retained expert agreed she was competent. The trial court later appointed the State’s expert as a “disinterested” expert for the insanity evaluation. At trial, the defense challenged the admissibility of the State’s expert’s testimony, arguing that the expert violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights during the competency exam by inquiring about her mental state at the time of the offense, and that the expert was not a disinterested party as required by statute. The trial court overruled the objection. The jury found the defendant guilty of capital murder, and she was sentenced to life without parole.The Fifth District Court of Appeals initially held the defendant had failed to preserve her complaints for review but alternatively found that, even if error occurred, there was no substantial harm. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that the defendant had preserved her claims. However, it held that even if the appointment of the expert was error, it did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights because the expert’s testimony did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict. The court also concluded there was no constitutional error under the Fifth Amendment, as none of the allegedly improper statements were introduced by the State at trial. The judgment of the court of appeals was affirmed. View "MCDONALD v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The case centers on a home invasion and murder that occurred in Lakeland, Florida in 2013. Mark Wilkerson, residing with his family, encountered two men outside his home, one of whom, Benjamin Davis Smiley, Jr., pointed a gun at him and demanded information about a safe. After robbing Wilkerson and forcing him into the house, Smiley entered the bedroom of Clifford Drake, Wilkerson’s stepfather, and shot Drake fatally after demanding money. Smiley and his accomplice, Casey Bisbee, fled, leaving behind a backpack. The investigation went cold until DNA evidence from the backpack and a discarded sweatshirt matched Smiley nearly two years later. Wilkerson later identified Smiley in a photographic lineup, and phone records showed Smiley’s involvement. Testimony from associates further implicated Smiley in planning and carrying out the robbery.Following these events, Smiley was charged with first-degree murder and related crimes. The State sought the death penalty. The Circuit Court in Polk County admitted limited evidence connecting the murder weapon to another homicide for which Smiley was also charged. At trial, the jury found Smiley guilty on all counts. During the penalty phase, mitigating evidence about Smiley’s brain injuries was presented, but the jury unanimously recommended death, and the court imposed a death sentence after finding aggravating factors outweighed mitigation.Smiley appealed, raising numerous claims, most alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the circuit court’s denial of his postconviction motion, finding counsel’s performance was not deficient or prejudicial under the standards set by Strickland v. Washington. Additionally, the Court denied Smiley’s habeas petition, concluding that any alleged errors by appellate counsel were harmless and did not undermine confidence in the outcome. The main holding is that neither Smiley’s conviction nor his sentence were affected by ineffective assistance of counsel, and no grounds for postconviction or habeas relief were established. View "Smiley v. Secretary, Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Three individuals kayaking on the Provo River were approached by a Utah State Park Ranger who observed them without life jackets, which is required by law. The ranger, in uniform, identified himself and ordered them to exit the river, warning that failure to comply could result in jail. Despite repeated commands and warnings, the kayakers continued downstream, ultimately stopping at an unusual spot behind bushes. When the ranger and backup confronted them, the kayakers said they thought they would just receive a ticket, not be arrested. Nelson admitted he was ignoring the officer but did not believe the offense could lead to jail.The State charged Nelson with misdemeanor failure to stop at the command of a peace officer. At trial in the Fourth District Court, evidence included testimony from both officers and video footage. The jury was instructed to give “arrest” its ordinary meaning and convicted Nelson. Nelson appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for not seeking a directed verdict based on insufficient evidence that he intended to avoid “arrest,” as wearing no life jacket is only punishable by a fine. The appellate court agreed, viewing the evidence in Nelson’s favor and reversing the conviction without addressing Nelson’s argument about intent to flee.On certiorari review, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah held that even under the ordinary meaning of “arrest” (being taken to jail), sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict. The court explained that the appellate court erred by not viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and by relying heavily on Nelson’s self-serving testimony. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision and remanded for consideration of Nelson’s remaining argument about intent to flee. View "State v. Nelson" on Justia Law

In this case, a man was charged after two sisters, aged thirteen or fourteen and sixteen, reported that he engaged in various sexually inappropriate acts during the summer of 2023. The younger sister alleged that, while she was asleep at the man’s home after a family barbecue, he touched her in a sexual manner and exposed himself. The man was also accused of exposing himself and masturbating in front of both sisters by the river and showing them sexually explicit images and videos. The younger sister did not voluntarily remain at his home, was partially asleep during the incident, and did not consent to the touching. The sisters testified that they ignored his prior inappropriate behavior.The State charged the man with six offenses, including two counts of unlawful sexual touching and four counts of indecent conduct. During trial in the Piscataquis County trial court, the State disclosed sexually explicit images from the defendant’s phone late, just before the man was expected to testify. The court permitted the State to use these images for impeachment purposes if the man testified, denying his motion to exclude them as a discovery sanction. At trial’s end, the jury convicted him of unlawful sexual touching of the younger sister and two merged counts of indecent conduct but could not reach a verdict on the charge related to the older sister, which was then dismissed.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the conviction and the trial court’s handling of the late-disclosed evidence. The Court held that sufficient evidence supported the unlawful sexual touching conviction, including the lack of the younger sister’s acquiescence and the defendant’s criminal negligence regarding her lack of acquiescence. The Court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the State to use the late-disclosed evidence for impeachment only. The judgment was affirmed, except for a clerical error in the judgment and commitment, which was remanded for correction. View "State of Maine v. Bradbury" on Justia Law

On October 1, 2021, Heather Marichal was involved in a car accident in Auburn, Maine, after driving on the wrong side of the road and crashing into another vehicle, then striking a snowplow. Marichal admitted to an officer that she had consumed alcohol at a brew fest and was the sole driver. She submitted to an Intoxilyzer test that showed a blood-alcohol content of .21 grams per 210 liters of breath. Marichal was charged with criminal operating under the influence (OUI), a Class D offense.The Androscoggin County Unified Criminal Docket handled the case, with multiple continuances throughout 2022, 2023, and 2024. Marichal sought to secure the appearance of a defense witness who allegedly would testify that someone else was driving. She served a subpoena and moved for a writ of capias ad respondendum when the witness ignored the subpoena. The court issued a civil warrant for the witness, but he did not appear for the December 2024 trial. Marichal filed motions in limine to admit hearsay statements from the witness and requested another arrest warrant. The trial court denied both the motion to continue and the motion in limine, finding Marichal had not demonstrated due diligence or likelihood of securing the witness, and that the hearsay exception was not met.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the appeal following Marichal’s conditional guilty plea. The Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to continue, as Marichal had not shown due diligence in securing the witness nor a likelihood that a continuance would procure the witness’s attendance. The Court also determined that Marichal’s constitutional rights to compulsory process and due process were not violated, as the witness’s absence was not attributable to State action or omission. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State of Maine v. Marichal" on Justia Law