Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Benedict Dale Fredericks was involved in an altercation in the parking lot of the Bourbon Street Hotel in Billings, Montana, on January 25, 2022. Hotel clerk Marion Ackerman confronted Fredericks, suspecting him of trying to enter a car that did not belong to him. After a verbal exchange, Fredericks shoved Marion, who shoved him back. During the ensuing scuffle, Fredericks stabbed Marion three times. Marion's brother, Trevor, restrained Fredericks until law enforcement arrived. Fredericks was charged with Felony Assault with a Weapon and claimed he acted in self-defense.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, presided over the case. During the trial, the defense requested a jury instruction on justifiable use of force, which the court denied, stating there was insufficient evidence to support this defense. The jury subsequently convicted Fredericks of Felony Assault with a Weapon, and he was sentenced to twenty years in prison, with five years suspended.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The main issue on appeal was whether the District Court abused its discretion by not instructing the jury on justifiable use of force. The Supreme Court found that although the District Court erred in its reasoning for denying the instruction, the refusal was ultimately correct. The evidence showed that Fredericks initiated the physical altercation and had opportunities to escape but chose to escalate the situation by using a knife. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's judgment, concluding that the justifiable use of force instruction was not warranted based on the evidence presented. View "State v. Fredericks" on Justia Law

Christian Michael Smith was involved in a motorcycle accident on September 2, 2023, in Cascade County, Montana. Montana State Trooper Perry Woodland responded to the scene and found Smith injured and already being attended to by paramedics. Smith admitted to drinking the previous evening but could not perform a field sobriety test due to his injuries. Woodland followed Smith to the hospital, where Smith initially consented to a blood test but later refused after consulting with his mother. Consequently, Smith's driver's license was suspended under Montana's implied consent statute.Smith petitioned the Eighth Judicial District Court to reinstate his license, arguing that Trooper Woodland lacked particularized suspicion to request the blood test and that he did not refuse the test. The State contended that Woodland had probable cause to believe Smith was involved in an accident resulting in serious bodily injury, justifying the request for a blood test. The District Court found that while Woodland did not have particularized suspicion of DUI, he had probable cause to believe the accident resulted in serious bodily injury, thus upholding the request for the blood test. The court also found that Smith refused the test when he said, "I don’t want that," after speaking with his mother.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Court held that Woodland had probable cause to believe Smith's injuries were serious, as defined by Montana law, and that Smith's statement constituted a refusal to submit to the blood test. The Court also declined to consider Smith's argument that he was incapable of refusing the test due to pain medication, as this argument was raised for the first time on appeal. The suspension of Smith's driver's license was upheld. View "Smith v. State" on Justia Law

In February 2018, Joseph Fuchs, a special agent with the U.S. Postal Service’s Office of the Inspector General, traveled to the Philippines to engage in sexual activity with a 14-year-old girl, referred to as MV-1. Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) was alerted by the Illinois Attorney General’s office in March 2019, following a tip from Facebook about Fuchs’s explicit messages to MV-1. HSI confirmed Fuchs’s trip and examined his Facebook messages, which revealed his belief that MV-1 was 14 or 15 years old and detailed their sexual encounters. A photograph and MV-1’s birth certificate confirmed her age.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois tried the case without a jury. Fuchs contested the admissibility of MV-1’s birth certificate, arguing insufficient proof of its authenticity. The court admitted the birth certificate, along with other evidence, including Fuchs’s Facebook messages, a recorded interview, and financial records of payments to MV-1. The court found Fuchs guilty of using a facility of foreign commerce to coerce a minor, traveling with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct, and engaging in illicit conduct in a foreign country. He was sentenced to 126 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Fuchs challenged the admissibility of the birth certificate and the recorded interview, and argued insufficient evidence for his conviction. The court upheld the district court’s decision, finding the birth certificate properly admitted and the evidence sufficient to establish MV-1’s age and Fuchs’s guilt. The court affirmed Fuchs’s conviction. View "U.S. v. Fuchs" on Justia Law

In September 1995, the body of a young woman, later identified as the defendant's daughter, was found in New Britain, Connecticut. The body was wrapped in trash bags and sleeping bags, and the police collected hairs and palm prints from the scene. Around the same time, the defendant told a family member he was leaving the country for a job and that his wife and daughter had already left. In October 1995, the body of the defendant's wife was found in Massachusetts. Both were reported missing later that year. In 2014, law enforcement collected DNA and prints from the defendant, linking him to the crime scene. The defendant was convicted of his wife's murder in Massachusetts and later charged with his daughter's murder in Connecticut.The trial court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of territorial jurisdiction, applying a presumption that the murder occurred where the body was found. The court also denied the defendant's request for a jury instruction that his palm prints on the trash bags could not establish his connection to the crime unless they were impressed at the time of the crime. The jury found the defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to sixty years in prison.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the presumption that a murder occurred where the body was found was valid and did not violate due process. The court also found sufficient evidence to establish the defendant's identity as the murderer, including consciousness of guilt evidence and physical evidence linking him to the crime scene. The court further held that the trial court properly declined to provide the requested jury instruction on fingerprint evidence, as the palm prints were not the only or principal evidence against the defendant. View "State v. Honsch" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant, Cletus Rivera, was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for the killing of Reading Police Officer Scott Wertz. The incident occurred when Officers Wertz and Eddinger, working in plainclothes, responded to a disturbance and gunfire in a parking lot. Rivera, identified as the shooter, was pursued by Officer Wertz, who was subsequently shot and killed by Rivera. Rivera claimed self-defense, stating he did not know Wertz was a police officer. The jury convicted Rivera, and the death sentence was imposed based on aggravating circumstances, including the victim being a peace officer on duty.Rivera's conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 2009, and his petition for a writ of certiorari was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2010. Rivera's first Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition was also denied, with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court finding no merit in his claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady violations related to a jailhouse informant, Jason Ott.In 2017, Rivera filed a second PCRA petition, citing newly discovered evidence from federal court proceedings that allegedly supported his previous claims about Ott's credibility and the existence of an undisclosed agreement between Ott and the Commonwealth. The PCRA court denied this petition, concluding that the new evidence was not material to Rivera's guilt or punishment and that his trial counsel's performance did not prejudice the outcome.The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, currently reviewing the case, vacated the PCRA court's order and remanded the case for further analysis. The Court directed the PCRA court to independently determine whether Rivera's claims met the newly discovered facts or governmental interference exceptions to the PCRA's time bar and whether they complied with the filing requirements. The Supreme Court emphasized that jurisdictional issues must be independently assessed, regardless of the parties' agreement on the timeliness of the petition. View "Commonwealth v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Christopher Goins challenged the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits firearm possession by individuals convicted of crimes punishable by imprisonment for over a year. Goins, with multiple felony convictions, argued that the Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle and Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen rendered this statute unconstitutional as applied to him. In December 2021, Goins had an associate purchase a firearm for him, which he then took possession of, despite being on probation with a condition prohibiting firearm possession.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky denied Goins's motion to dismiss the indictment, holding that § 922(g)(1) was constitutional as applied to him. Goins pled guilty but reserved the right to appeal the district court's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and upheld the district court's decision. The court found that Goins's probation condition, his relatively short probation sentence for a dangerous crime, and his repeated dangerous conduct justified his disarmament under the Second Amendment. The court emphasized that historical traditions support the temporary disarmament of individuals who have engaged in dangerous conduct, such as Goins. Therefore, the court held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Goins and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Goins" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was charged with possessing a stolen firearm and receiving a firearm while under felony indictment. Law enforcement found the stolen firearm in a vehicle owned by another individual, who later revealed that the defendant had left the gun in his car. The defendant admitted to touching the gun and knowing it was stolen. He was under felony indictment for other firearms offenses at the time.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, which argued that the statutes under which he was charged violated the Second Amendment. During jury selection, the defendant raised a Batson challenge against the prosecutor's peremptory strike of the last black juror on the panel. The district court found the prosecutor's reasons for the strike to be race-neutral and allowed it. The jury convicted the defendant on both counts, and he was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss, finding that the statutes in question were consistent with historical firearm regulations and did not violate the Second Amendment. The court also affirmed the district court's rejection of the Batson challenge, concluding that the prosecutor's race-neutral explanation for the peremptory strike was credible and not pretextual. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the defendant's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Gore" on Justia Law

Frank Moseley was charged with murder after he killed his fiancé, who had told him she might be pregnant with another man's child. Moseley, a combat veteran diagnosed with PTSD, testified that his condition contributed to the crime. The jury found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter (heat of passion) and a weapon enhancement.The Superior Court of Orange County sentenced Moseley to 11 years in state prison, striking the additional punishment for the weapon use. The court acknowledged Moseley’s PTSD as a mitigating factor but did not explicitly consider the relevant service-related statutes (Penal Code §§ 1170.9 and 1170.91) when denying probation. Moseley’s counsel mentioned these statutes at the sentencing hearing but stated they were not "directly applicable." The probation department’s report and the sentencing briefs from both parties also failed to cite these statutes.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court did not expressly consider Moseley’s service-related PTSD as required by §§ 1170.9 and 1170.91. These statutes mandate that a trial court must consider a defendant’s service-related PTSD as a factor in mitigation when deciding on probation and sentencing. The appellate court determined that the record was ambiguous regarding whether the trial court was aware of its statutory obligations under these sections.The appellate court reversed Moseley’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, directing the trial court to comply with its statutory obligations under §§ 1170.9 and 1170.91. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Moseley" on Justia Law

Reginald Elmore was convicted in 2019 for using or possessing a firearm during a murder in aid of racketeering, violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1). The predicate crime for this conviction was a VICAR (Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering) murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1), which itself required a violation of state or federal law. Elmore challenged his conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that the VICAR murder did not qualify as a crime of violence under the elements clause of § 924(c)(3)(A).The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied Elmore’s motion to vacate his conviction. The court held that VICAR murder is categorically a crime of violence under the elements clause and thus a valid predicate for Elmore’s § 924(j)(1) conviction. The court did not address the government’s procedural arguments and granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of the proper mode of analysis for determining whether a VICAR offense constitutes a crime of violence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the VICAR statute is divisible, requiring the application of the modified categorical approach to determine the elements of Elmore’s charged VICAR offense. The court concluded that Elmore was charged with VICAR murder predicated on California murder. The Ninth Circuit determined that courts should look through to the elements of the state-level predicate violation to decide if the VICAR offense constitutes a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A). The case was remanded to the district court to consider whether California murder involves the requisite force to be a valid predicate for a § 924(j)(1) conviction and to address the government’s procedural arguments. View "USA V. ELMORE" on Justia Law

In 2008, Charles Anthony Giovinco pleaded guilty to enticement of a minor and possession of child pornography. He received concurrent sentences of 235 months for enticement and 120 months for possession. The First Step Act of 2018 (FSA) allows eligible prisoners to earn time credits for participating in certain programs, but excludes those serving sentences for specific offenses, including possession of child pornography.Giovinco argued that he should be eligible for FSA time credits after completing the sentence for the ineligible offense. The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) denied his request, stating that his entire term of imprisonment must be considered as a single, aggregated sentence, making him ineligible for FSA time credits. Giovinco filed a habeas petition, which the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut denied, deferring to the BOP's interpretation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that under 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c), multiple terms of imprisonment must be treated as a single, aggregate term for administrative purposes, including the administration of FSA time credits. Therefore, a prisoner serving any part of an aggregated sentence for an ineligible offense is not eligible to earn FSA time credits. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, agreeing that the BOP correctly aggregated Giovinco's sentences and determined his ineligibility for FSA time credits. View "Giovinco v. Pullen" on Justia Law