Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Wisconsin law requires certain sex offenders, including those convicted of two or more sex offenses, to wear a GPS tracking device for life, even after completing probation or supervised release. The GPS device transmits real-time location data to law enforcement, which is regularly reviewed to ensure offenders avoid designated exclusion zones, such as schools and victims’ residences. While the monitoring is lifelong, offenders can petition to end the requirement after 20 years or if they become permanently incapacitated. Alton Antrim, who has multiple convictions for child sexual assault, challenged this law, alleging it violated the Fourth Amendment by subjecting repeat sex offenders to a lifelong, unreasonable search without regard for individual risk.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin initially denied Antrim’s request for a preliminary injunction, relying on Seventh Circuit precedent which upheld the constitutionality of Wisconsin’s GPS monitoring program for sex offenders. The district court later certified a class of similarly situated offenders and granted summary judgment to the Secretary of Corrections, reasoning that Antrim’s arguments amounted to criticisms of established circuit precedent and that the statute’s breadth did not render it unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Wisconsin’s lifetime GPS monitoring program is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, balancing the state’s strong public safety interest in monitoring repeat sex offenders and their diminished privacy expectations. The court rejected the argument that the Fourth Amendment requires individualized risk assessments for monitoring, emphasizing that categorical policies are permissible when the government’s interest outweighs privacy concerns. The court’s decision was grounded in its prior rulings and relevant Supreme Court precedent. View "Antrim v Hoy" on Justia Law

The case concerns Thomas Overton, who was convicted and sentenced to death for the 1991 murders of Susan MacIvor, who was eight months pregnant, and her husband, Michael MacIvor. Investigators found evidence of sexual battery, ligature strangulation, and signs of struggle at the crime scene. DNA evidence linked Overton to the crime, and testimony from witnesses, including a former inmate, described Overton’s actions and statements regarding the murders. Overton was indicted on multiple counts, including first-degree murder, killing an unborn child, burglary, and sexual battery. He was found guilty by a jury and received death sentences, which were affirmed on direct appeal.Overton’s subsequent efforts to challenge his convictions and sentences included initial and successive motions for postconviction relief in the Circuit Court for Monroe County, requests for DNA testing, and petitions for habeas corpus in both state and federal courts. All were denied, with appellate and supreme courts consistently rejecting his claims. After a new death warrant was signed, Overton filed public records requests under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852, which were objected to by state agencies and sustained by the circuit court. He then filed a third successive postconviction motion, which was summarily denied following a hearing.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed Overton’s appeal from the summary denial and his separate habeas petition, applying de novo review to the postconviction claims and abuse of discretion standard to the denial of public records requests. The court held that Overton’s public records demands lacked legal basis, his claim of actual innocence was not cognizable absent newly discovered evidence, and challenges to Florida’s clemency and death warrant process were legally insufficient. The court affirmed the circuit court’s summary denial and denied habeas relief and a stay of execution. View "Overton v. State" on Justia Law

In 2011, a fourteen-year-old named R.C. reported to her school counselor that she had been sexually abused by her adoptive uncle and biological brother, the respondent in this case. Following the report, a civil abuse and neglect petition was filed, but no criminal charges were brought at that time. In 2023, the respondent’s biological daughter made similar allegations of sexual abuse spanning 2018 to 2023. In 2024, a grand jury indicted the respondent on thirty-one counts, with the first sixteen counts concerning R.C. Thirteen years had elapsed between R.C.’s initial report and the indictment. During that time, R.C.’s grandparents (the respondent’s adoptive parents and her custodians during the relevant period) both died. Before her death, the grandmother gave a video deposition in which she had significant memory problems.The respondent moved to dismiss the counts related to R.C., arguing that the lengthy preindictment delay caused actual prejudice because critical witnesses—his parents—were now unavailable. The State conceded it could not explain the delay but argued that the loss of these witnesses did not constitute substantial prejudice. The Circuit Court of Fayette County held an evidentiary hearing and ultimately granted the motion, dismissing the first sixteen counts. The circuit court found that the unavailability and questionable reliability of the grandparents’ testimony caused actual, non-speculative, substantial prejudice that impaired the respondent’s defense.On the State’s petition for extraordinary relief, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed whether the circuit court exceeded its legitimate powers. The court found that the respondent failed to show actual prejudice as required under the standard set forth in State ex rel. Knotts v. Facemire. The court concluded that the mere loss of witnesses who might have provided exculpatory testimony was insufficient and that the potential testimony was not shown to be material or unavailable from other sources. The Supreme Court of Appeals granted the writ of prohibition, vacating the circuit court’s dismissal of the counts related to R.C. View "State ex rel. State v. Fast" on Justia Law

On September 12, 2019, the defendant drove his truck across the center line on a Logan County road, colliding head-on with another vehicle driven by Brittany Duty. The crash resulted in both vehicles catching fire, causing severe injuries to Brittany Duty and the death of her passenger, Beverly Duty. First responders noted the defendant exhibited signs of intoxication, including slurred speech, combative behavior, and the smell of alcohol. Blood samples were taken at two hospitals: one within two hours of the collision, showing a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .263 percent, and another six to seven hours later, showing a BAC of .131 percent. The defendant was indicted for causing death and serious bodily injury while driving in an impaired state.The Circuit Court of Logan County denied the defendant’s pre-trial motions to exclude the BAC test results, finding the first sample was drawn within two hours of the collision and would be admissible if analyzed according to state health standards. The court also ruled the second sample, taken pursuant to a warrant and outside the statutory two-hour window, would be admissible, with its timing affecting its weight, not its admissibility. The defendant entered conditional guilty pleas, reserving the right to appeal these evidentiary rulings.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the circuit court’s decisions de novo for legal conclusions and under a clearly erroneous standard for factual findings. The Court held that the blood test taken within two hours of the collision was admissible as presumptive evidence of impairment, and the second test, though not qualifying for statutory presumptions, was admissible under the Rules of Evidence. The Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the motions in limine and upheld the defendant’s convictions. View "State v. Conley" on Justia Law

Following the fatal shooting of her husband, Carli R. Reed was indicted for first-degree murder in West Virginia. At trial, the prosecution argued Reed acted intentionally, while Reed claimed the shooting was accidental, asserting she was suicidal and the gun discharged unintentionally. The circuit court refused to instruct the jury on accident, and Reed was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to forty years. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed and remanded, finding the failure to instruct on accident was reversible error.Upon release pending retrial, Reed was placed on strict home confinement as a condition of bond. Venue was transferred to Taylor County. Eventually, Reed entered an Alford/Kennedy plea to voluntary manslaughter, agreed to a firearm sentencing enhancement, and accepted a condition regarding parole eligibility. The Circuit Court of Taylor County sentenced her to fifteen years, denied credit for both pre-trial and post-conviction home confinement, and denied an alternative sentence. Reed appealed, arguing the denial of credit for home confinement violated constitutional protections and that the court relied on an impermissible factor in sentencing.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the sentencing order under an abuse of discretion standard. The court held that when a defendant is placed on post-conviction home confinement under terms meeting statutory requirements and fully complies, credit for time served must be applied to the sentence. It found the statutory grant of discretion to deny such credit unconstitutional as applied. However, the court affirmed the denial of credit for pre-trial home confinement, maintaining it is not penal. It also found no impermissible factor in sentencing, concluding the prior conviction reference did not render the sentence illegal. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions to credit Reed’s post-conviction home confinement. View "State v. Reed" on Justia Law

The case centers on criminal charges against an adult, Mr. B-Smith, who was accused of committing multiple sex offenses against a minor, R.C., in Berkeley County, West Virginia. The allegations included two counts of first-degree sexual assault, one count of first-degree sexual abuse, and three counts of sexual abuse by a person in a position of trust, with the events occurring in November 2021. R.C.’s mother had employed Mr. B-Smith as a babysitter, and disclosures by R.C. and his younger brother led to the investigation. The State sought to allow R.C., who was ten years old and reportedly fearful of Mr. B-Smith, to testify outside the defendant’s presence, citing emotional harm. A court-appointed expert supported this request.The Circuit Court of Berkeley County held a pretrial hearing and ultimately ordered that R.C. would testify in the courtroom, but both the defendant and the jury would be absent during his testimony. The defendant’s attorney objected generally to the use of closed-circuit television, citing confrontation clause concerns, but did not specifically object to the jury’s absence. After trial, the jury convicted Mr. B-Smith on all counts. The circuit court denied his post-trial motions for acquittal and a new trial, sentencing him to consecutive prison terms totaling between eighty-five and two hundred eighty-five years, followed by supervised release.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. The Court found that the circuit court plainly erred in removing the jury from the courtroom during the child’s testimony, violating statutory procedures. However, because the defendant failed to show that this error substantially prejudiced his rights or affected the outcome, the error did not warrant reversal. The Court also held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment and sentence. View "State v. B-Smith" on Justia Law

A man was stopped by law enforcement in Marion County, West Virginia, while driving a Jeep with an inoperable brake light and a mismatched license plate. During the stop, he appeared nervous, admitted to not having a valid license, and refused consent to search the vehicle. A drug-sniffing dog alerted to the presence of narcotics. The subsequent search revealed a loaded firearm in the center console, a substantial quantity of methamphetamine and fentanyl, drug trafficking paraphernalia, and $1,863 in cash on the driver. The vehicle had recently been purchased by the man from an acquaintance, but the title was still in the seller’s name. Both the driver and his passenger were arrested.After indictment on eight counts, a jury in the Circuit Court of Marion County found the man guilty of six felony offenses, including conspiracy and possession with intent to deliver controlled substances, and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. The jury acquitted him of one firearm-related offense and one drug charge was dismissed. Following the convictions, the State filed a recidivist information based on two prior felony convictions—strangulation and fleeing in a vehicle with reckless indifference. At a recidivist trial, the jury found the defendant had committed the prior felonies. The circuit court imposed several concurrent sentences on the substantive offenses and a life sentence with parole eligibility, pursuant to the recidivist statute, for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the constitutionality of his life recidivist sentence. The court held that the evidence, when viewed most favorably to the prosecution, was sufficient for a rational jury to convict on all counts. Additionally, the court found that the triggering and predicate felonies met the statutory and constitutional requirements for a life recidivist sentence. The sentencing order was affirmed. View "State v. Valentine" on Justia Law

The defendant and the complainant were in a dating relationship from 2022 to 2023, during which the complainant lived with the defendant and brought her dog to his residence. In late September 2023, the complainant alleged that the defendant strangled her and twice threatened her dog—once by pressing a handgun into the dog’s side and threatening to kill it, and once by threatening to kill the dog and feed it to her. The defendant was indicted for second degree assault, criminal threatening with a deadly weapon, and criminal threatening.Prior to trial in the Coos County Superior Court, the State moved to admit evidence under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 404(b) regarding the defendant’s prior acts toward the complainant’s dog, which included threatening, pointing guns at, and physically contacting the dog. The State argued the evidence was relevant to the defendant’s intent to terrorize the complainant. The defendant objected, claiming the evidence was not relevant to intent and was unfairly prejudicial, as the remarks were taken as jokes and not serious threats. The trial court ruled the prior acts evidence was admissible, finding it relevant to intent and not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. At trial, testimony regarding both the charged and prior acts was presented, and the defendant was convicted of criminal threatening with a deadly weapon, but acquitted on the other charges.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the admissibility of the prior bad acts evidence under Rule 404(b) using the unsustainable exercise of discretion standard. The court held that the defendant’s intent was actually in dispute, and the prior acts were relevant for a non-propensity purpose—proving intent to terrorize. The court further found that the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Accordingly, the conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Covill" on Justia Law

Jonathan López-Díaz pleaded guilty in 2014 to bank robbery and illegal possession of a firearm, serving ninety-three months in prison. After release, he began supervised release but repeatedly violated its conditions, including multiple positive drug tests for cocaine and marijuana and admitted drug use. The United States Probation Office reported additional violations, such as failing to follow instructions, not reporting law enforcement contacts, and missing treatment appointments. After these repeated violations, the district court revoked his supervised release twice, ultimately sentencing him to twelve months’ imprisonment with no further supervised release following his second revocation.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico originally handled López’s supervised release and revocation proceedings. After López’s second revocation, his counsel argued at the revocation hearing that his violations should be classified as Grade C rather than Grade B under the Sentencing Guidelines, which would result in a lower advisory sentencing range. Counsel also argued for leniency and additional supervision with rehabilitative conditions rather than incarceration. The government contended that López’s conduct constituted a Grade B violation, given his admissions and repeated positive drug tests, and requested imprisonment without further supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed López’s appeal. Applying abuse-of-discretion review, the court held that the district court correctly classified López’s violation as a Grade B violation based on his admissions and corroborating evidence. The First Circuit further found the district court’s sentencing rationale did not improperly rely on retributive factors barred by Esteras v. United States, and that the imposed sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The court affirmed López’s twelve-month sentence with no term of supervision to follow. View "US v. Lopez-Diaz" on Justia Law

The State charged an individual with gross sexual assault of a child under twelve, based on allegations that the victim, a relative, was assaulted on two occasions during visits to the defendant’s home between May 2023 and May 2024. The victim was eight or nine years old at the time. At trial, the State presented a recording of a forensic interview with the victim and allowed her to testify remotely via Zoom, in addition to testimony from a police officer and the victim’s mother. The defendant did not present any witnesses or evidence.Prior to trial, the State successfully moved to introduce the forensic interview recording and sought permission for the victim to testify remotely under Maine law, specifically 15 M.R.S. § 1321. The defendant conceded the statutory requirements for remote testimony were satisfied but argued that the statute’s “positive identification” exception applied, and that remote testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. After an evidentiary hearing, the Washington County Unified Criminal Docket denied these challenges and permitted remote testimony. Following the jury’s guilty verdict, the defendant was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment and lifetime supervised release, and timely appealed.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the statutory and constitutional arguments. It held that section 1321’s “positive identification” exception only applies when the State seeks to prove identity through an in-court identification by the victim. Because the State did not ask the victim to identify the defendant in court, the exception was not implicated. The Court further held that permitting remote testimony in this case did not violate the Confrontation Clause, as the procedure preserved necessary safeguards of oath, cross-examination, and witness observation. The judgment was affirmed. View "State v. Polches" on Justia Law