Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The robbery conviction in this case may be affirmed based on constructive possession of an immediate family member's property. The Court of Appeal affirmed defendant's conviction of five counts of first degree residential robbery and five counts of home invasion robbery. The court held that substantial evidence supported the determination that one of the victims in the house constructively possessed the stolen property under the special relationship doctrine even if she was in neither actual nor constructive possession of any property that was taken at the residence. In this case, she lived at the residence, was present inside the home during the entire robbery, and, as with the other victims, was physically assaulted and restrained in order to prevent her from interfering with the crime's commission. Furthermore, her familial relationship with the stolen property's owners (her parents and siblings) expressly fell within the special relationships set forth in Civil Code section 50. The court reversed counts 1-5, however, because the "in-concert" allegations appended to count 6-10 were sentencing enhancements, not separate offenses. Moreover, multiple convictions may not be based on necessarily included offenses based on one criminal act. View "People v. Hutchinson" on Justia Law

In 1991, Valerio, a citizen of Costa Rica, entered the U.S. without inspection. She was apprehended and placed in deportation proceedings but failed to appear. Valerio's then-boyfriend purchased her a birth certificate and social security card in the name of Rosa Hernandez, a U.S. citizen who lived in Puerto Rico. From 1995-2007, Valerio used Hernandez's identity to secure employment, open lines of credit, purchase cars and a home, and defraud the government of over $176,000 in housing assistance, food stamps, and other welfare benefits. In 2006, Hernandez learned about the fraud. Valerio was apprehended and was found guilty of aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A and three counts of mail fraud. 18 U.S.C. 1341. After Valerio served her sentence, DHS reopened Valerio’s deportation proceeding but mistakenly stated that she was subject to removal. An IJ denied her applications for asylum and withholding of removal, finding the conviction for aggravated identity theft a "particularly serious crime" under section 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). Following a remand, the BIA concluded that in deportation and removal proceedings alike, its longstanding multi-factor "Frentescu" framework for determining whether a nonaggravated felony qualifies as a "particularly serious crime" remains the same, and again found Valerio ineligible for withholding. The First Circuit agreed. The nature and circumstances of Valerio's crime were fully and properly considered." View "Valerio-Ramirez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Defendant Corey Franklin pled guilty to one count of first-degree, willful and deliberate murder, the only offense currently designated as a “capital felony,” in exchange for life in prison with a possibility of parole. Due to his first-degree murder conviction, Defendant was subject to sentencing pursuant to Section 31-18-14. See § 30-2-1(A). Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of a five-year period of parole after serving thirty years in prison. Prior to sentencing, Defendant filed a motion seeking the opportunity to present mitigating evidence which could eventually shorten his sentence. While Defendant acknowledged that Section 31-18-14 did not expressly provide an opportunity to present mitigating evidence at the time of sentencing to those convicted of first-degree murder, he argued that this violated his due process rights under Article II, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution and his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under Article II, Section 13 of the New Mexico Constitution. In his motion, Defendant noted that persons convicted of a lesser offense are provided with an opportunity to present mitigating circumstances at sentencing, which places them in a stronger position for parole than first-degree murderers. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to declare Section 31-18-14 7 unconstitutional and concluded that it was within the Legislature’s authority to decline to provide the opportunity to present evidence of mitigating circumstances to the most serious offenders. The district court entered final judgment and sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment with the possibility of a five-year 11 period of parole after he served thirty years in prison. On appeal, Defendant abandoned his constitutional arguments, and instead challenged the sentencing distinction on equal protection grounds. The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that defendants convicted of first-degree murder and those convicted of lesser offenses are not similarly situated, and consequently, Section 31-18-14 did not violated Defendant’s constitutional right to equal protection. View "New Mexico v. Franklin" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal dismissed defendant's appeal because of the absence of an appealable order. In this case, defendant sent a letter to the superior court and asked for a list of all the violent felony charges that had been changed to nonviolent offenses under Proposition 57, and whether that included second degree robbery. The superior court filed an order that treated defendant's letter as an ex-parte request for resentencing, modification of sentence, reclassification, or recalculation of credits pursuant to Proposition 57. The superior court then denied defendant's request for relief. The court held that the superior court's order that denied defendant's ex-parte request did not involve a final judgment of conviction. Furthermore, it did not affect defendant's substantial rights since the superior court lacked jurisdiction to modify his sentence in the first instance. View "People v. Dynes" on Justia Law

The trial court found that Oscar Lopez's lawyer was "fairly obvious[ly]" "severely handicapped" by depression during the pretrial and trial phases of Lopez's case. That finding was supported by the trial court's own observations. Based on that evidence, the trial court concluded that Lopez was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel and granted Lopez's motion for a new trial. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding amongst other things, defendants had no right to counsel free from mental illness. Lopez petitioned the Washington Supreme Court for review, which agreed with the trial court that Lopez was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, and reversed the Court of Appeal which reversed the trial court. View "Washington v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Eddie Arnold challenged his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender, in violation of ROW 9A.44.130. He argued he was not required to register because his 1988 conviction of statutory rape in violation of a statute amended in 1979, was not a "sex offense" within the meaning of the current sex offender registration statute. The Washington Supreme Court disagreed: the prior sex offense of which Arnold was convicted met the two critical prerequisites to a countable "sex offense" listed in former RCW 9.94A.030(46)(b) (2012): (1) that prior conviction was based on a statute that was 'in effect . . . prior to July 1, 1976" and (2) that prior conviction was based on a statute that is "comparable" to a current "sex offense" as defined in former RCW 9.94A.030(46)(a) (2012). The Court of Appeals felt bound by prior decisions of the two other divisions of the Court of Appeals, labeling this deference to a prior out-of-division decision a rule of "horizontal stare decisis." The Supreme Court rejected this rule, finding it conflicted with the statutes establishing the powers and duties of the Court of Appeals and the Washington Supreme Court itself: “it conflicts with court rules on those topics, it conflicts with prior decisions, and it would tend to diminish the robust, adversarial development of the law that is the gem of our current approach. We therefore reverse.” View "In re Pers. Restraint of Arnold" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s summary denial of Eric Scott Branch’s second successive motion for postconviction relief filed under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851 and denied Branch’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Branch was not entitled to relief on his claims. Specifically, the court held (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Branch’s requests for public records pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.852; (2) the circuit court did not err when it summarily denied Branch’s claim that he was ineligible for the death penalty; (3) the circuit court properly rejected Branch’s claim that the length of time that he has spent on death row amounted to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment; and (4) Branch’s habeas claims were both procedurally barred and without merit. View "Branch v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court’s summary denial of Appellant’s postconviction motion to vacate his sentence of death under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that any Hurst error during Appellant’s penalty phase proceedings was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.Appellant was convicted of attempted robbery and first-degree murder and sentenced to death. This appeal was from Appellant’s successive postconviction motion in which he claimed that his death sentence was unconstitutional under Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) and that his death sentence violated the Eighth Amendment under Hurst v. Florida. The postconviction court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the postconviction court properly denied relief on Appellant’s claims. View "Franklin v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court’s summary denial of Appellant’s postconviction motion to vacate his sentence of death under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that any Hurst error during Appellant’s penalty phase proceedings was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.Appellant was convicted of attempted robbery and first-degree murder and sentenced to death. This appeal was from Appellant’s successive postconviction motion in which he claimed that his death sentence was unconstitutional under Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) and that his death sentence violated the Eighth Amendment under Hurst v. Florida. The postconviction court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the postconviction court properly denied relief on Appellant’s claims. View "Franklin v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court treated Petitioner’s pro se motion for rule on clerk and for belated appeal as a motion for belated appeal and denied the motion, holding that Petitioner’s petition was wholly without merit.Petitioner sought to appeal the trial court’s denial of his pro se petition to correct an illegal sentence filed under Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-111. The trial court addressed the petition as one for postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 and under Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-111 and then denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the denial of Petitioner’s claim for relief under section 16-90-111 was not error; and (2) Petitioner was not entitled to relief under Rule 37.1. View "Latham v. State" on Justia Law