Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Alabama Supreme Court
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The State petitioned the Supreme Court for review of a Court of Criminal Appeals' decision to reverse Curtis Maurice Sanders's conviction for third-degree burglary. Sanders entered a guilty plea. As a matter of first impression, the issue in this case before the Court was whether an unoccupied house that was scheduled for demolition constituted a "building" as defined in 13A-7-1(2), Ala. Code 1975, for purposes of 13A-7-7(a), Ala. Code 1975. "If the legislature had intended to exclude an abandoned building awaiting demolition from the purview of the statute, it could have included express language to that effect in the statute. However, it did not do so, and this Court will not read such language into the statute." Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Sanders v. Alabama" on Justia Law

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In petitions for a writ of mandamus, two juvenile offenders sought dismissal of capital-murder indictments based on "Roper v. Simmons," (543 U.S. 551 (2005)), and "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)). Both juveniles argued that Alabama's capital-murder statute was unconstitutional as applied to them because the mandatory sentencing structure provides that all defendants charged with a capital offense, including juveniles, must receive either a sentence of death or a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the juveniles failed to show that the holding in Miller required it to dismiss the capital-murder indictments against them. Accordingly, their petitions for a writ of mandamus were denied. View "Alabama vs. Henderson " on Justia Law

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The State sought certiorari for review of a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals that reversed the Juvenile Court's decision to deny G.M.'s motion to suppress evidence that G.M. argued was obtained pursuant to an illegal search. The matter was one of first impression for the Supreme Court: whether evidence of a public-school student's association with an individual known to be involved in criminal activity and suspected of being affiliated with a gang, without more, constituted reasonable grounds for a search of the student by a school official under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court concluded that it did not. Therefore, the Court affirmed the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment. View "G. M. v. Alabama " on Justia Law

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Joseph Lester Pate petitioned the Supreme Court Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Criminal Appeals' affirmance by unpublished memorandum of the circuit court's denial of his motion for reconsideration of his sentence imposed pursuant the Habitual Felony Offender Act ("the HFOA"). The trial court dismissed Pate's "Kirby" motion because it erroneously believed that it lacked jurisdiction to consider it. The Court of Criminal Appeals, on remand from the Supreme Court's decision in "Ex parte Pate," affirmed the trial court's order because it determined that Pate was not entitled to review (on the merits) of a second "Kirby" motion because, it said, there was no indication that Pate's first "Kirby" motion had not properly been considered. The Supreme Court concluded that there was indeed no indication in the record that Pate's first "Kirby" motion was considered on the merits. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Pate v. Alabama" on Justia Law

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Defendant Reginald Tyrone Lightfoot challenged his conviction for trafficking in cocaine and his sentence of 15 years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review to determine, as a matter of first impression, whether an Apprendi error in applying a sentence enhancement was automatically harmless when the erroneous application of the enhancement did not increase the sentence beyond the statutory maximum for the underlying offense. The Court held that it was not, and reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals. View "Lightfoot v. Alabama " on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that Defendant's Rule 32 petition should not have been dismissed on the grounds that his claim for relief under Rule 32.1 lacked allegations to negate the preclusive bars of Rule 32.1(a)(3) and (5). Defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. He filed a Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief, alleging in part that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence. The State asserted in response that defendant's claims were procedurally barred by Rule 32.2(a)(3) and (5) because defendant could have, but did not, raise the issue at trial. The trial court dismissed defendant's application and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Beckworth v. Alabama" on Justia Law

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Luther Pate, IV sought review of the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision to affirm his conviction for menacing. In a matter of first impression, the issues before the Supreme Court were: (1) whether lawfully arming oneself was a "physical action" as defined in the state menacing statute; and (2) whether defense-of-premises was applicable in this case. Finding that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in its analysis of the menacing statute, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court held that its reversal on the menacing issue pretermitted discussion of the defense-of-premises issue. View "Pate IV v. City of Tuscaloosa" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Tonya Cate sought a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to vacate its order requiring her to submit for a mental examination. She was indicted for capital murder and did not use the not-guilty-by-reason-of-mental-defect defense. At the onset, a mitigation expert was concerned Petitioner had not been subjected to the exam to determine her competency to stand trial. Petitioner's attorney filed a motion for a continuance for his client to be examined, but did not specify that the exam was only to determine competence. The State filed a motion to have Petitioner examined for both current mental condition and competency to stand trial. Petitioner claims to have not been served with a copy of the trial court's order that granted the State's motion, and objected. In her motion to avoid the exam, Petitioner asked in the alternative that if the exam took place, her attorney be present to advise her of her constitutional rights. Before the court ruled on the motion, Petitioner withdrew her original motion, citing the mitigation expert's concerns had been allayed. The court entered its order requiring Petitioner to submit to the examination for then-current mental state and at the time of the alleged crime. Petitioner argued that after withdrawing her own motion for an examination, she could not be compelled to submit for examination. Because Petitioner did not use the mental-defect defense, the Supreme Court concluded that she could not be compelled to submit to the examination. Accordingly the Court granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Cate v. Alabama " on Justia Law

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Roosevelt Upshaw appealed a circuit court's decision to deny his petition for habeas relief. In his petition, Upshaw alleged that the Alabama Department of Corrections ("ADOC") had erred in calculating the term of his sentence after he was arrested while on parole in that ADOC unlawfully denied him credit under 15-22-32(a), Ala. Code 1975, for the time he was incarcerated in Georgia. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Upshaw v. Alabama" on Justia Law

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Jermaine Parker was convicted of conspiracy to commit a controlled-substance crime (the unlawful distribution of cocaine), and of obstructing governmental operations. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review to consider whether the decision of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed the convictions in an unpublished memorandum, conflicted with "Ex parte Williams," (468 So. 2d 99, 101 (Ala. 1985)) regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support Parker's conviction for conspiracy to commit a controlled-substance crime. The Court denied certiorari review with regard to Parker's conviction for obstructing governmental operations. After review of the trial court record and the unpublished appellate court opinion, the Supreme Court concluded that the evidence presented in this matter "speculative" in nature: "Such proof is always insufficient, unless it excludes, to a moral certainty, every other reasonable hypothesis, but that of the guilt of the accused. No matter how strong the circumstances, if they can be reconciled with the theory that some other person may have done the act, then the defendant is not shown to be guilty, by that full measure of proof which the law requires...." The Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ex parte Parker" on Justia Law