Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Derrick Ervin appealed a summary judgment in favor of the City of Birmingham seeking the return of $178,858. The money was taken pursuant to a search of a vehicle impounded by police in connection with suspected drug activity. During the search, officers found a black bag containing thirty-two bundles of cash, and a shoe box in the back seat containing six more bundles in U.S. currency. Officers also found assorted documents bearing Ervin's name inside the passenger compartment. Ervin did not contest those facts in federal district court. In this action, however, Ervin contended that the cash was initially seized by the Birmingham Police Department (BPD), not by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and that the cash was subsequently transferred by "unknown Birmingham police officers ... to the DEA to commence forfeiture or condemnation proceedings" in the federal court. The federal district court entered a final judgment forfeiting the $178,858 to the United States. Ervin did not appeal that judgment and did not seek any postjudgment relief from it in the federal court itself. Pursuant to "equitable sharing" of the seizure, the City received the majority of the cash for its role in the operation, and the DEA kept a small percentage. Ervin alleged that, because such forfeiture proceedings had never been instituted, he was entitled to the return of the subject property. "Even if all these contentions were correct, they amount only to an attack on the authority of the federal district court to exercise jurisdiction over the res in an in rem action, not an attack on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal court over a forfeiture action brought under federal law. As such, they come too late and are being advanced in the wrong court." The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the forfeiture. View "Ervin v. City of Birmingham " on Justia Law

The State through the Alabama Attorney General, sought a writ of mandamus to direct the presiding judge of the Macon Circuit Court to issue a search warrant as to "certain allegedly illegal gambling devices and related items" at a facility known as "Quincy's 777 Casino at Victoryland" in Shorter. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition and issued the writ under seal until the execution of the warrant. The execution having been accomplished, the Supreme Court removed the seal from this matter and in this opinion, addressed the reasons for issuing the writ. Upon careful consideration of the case law and statutes pertaining to this matter, the Supreme Court expounded on eight points of contention it had with the circuit court for denying the warrant. The Court concluded that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying the warrant, and as such, the State was entitled to an order directing the court to grant the warrant application. View "Ex parte State of Alabama (In re: Sealed Case)" on Justia Law

Anthony Haywood and Daniel Hall appealed a circuit court judgment that dismissed claims against Sheriff Dorothy "Jean Dot" Alexander, which were filed as part of a counterclaim in an action filed against Phillip Eugene Green, Haywood, and Hall by Scott Cotney, an administrator at the Clay County jail. In 2010, Cotney sued Green, a former correctional officer at the jail, and Haywood and Hall, former inmates at the jail, alleging defamation, slander, libel, invasion of privacy, negligence, and wantonness. The claims resulted from a report filed by Green, Haywood, and Hall with the Alabama Department of Corrections, claiming that Cotney had used his position as an administrator at the jail to sexually abuse and/or to assault Haywood and Hall while they were incarcerated in the jail. Haywood and Hall argued that the circuit court erred in granting Sheriff Alexander's motion to dismiss the claims against her. Specifically, they argued: (1) that their failure to identify Sheriff Alexander as a third-party defendant rather than a counterclaim defendant was not fatal to their complaint; (2) that Haywood and Hall were convicted felons, not pretrial detainees, during the relevant period and therefore had certain rights under the Eighth Amendment; (3) that Haywood's and Hall's rights pursuant to Fourth Amendment were violated because they were subject to "numerous acts of unlawful strip searches and bodily invasion perpetrated upon them by Cotney while he was the administrator of the [jail]"; (4) that Sheriff Alexander was not entitled to immunity under the State or Federal constitutions. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Haywood and Hall did not demonstrate any error in the circuit court's decision to dismiss the federal claims against Sheriff Alexander in her official capacity or the state-law claims against her in both her official and individual capacities. Therefore, the circuit court's judgment was affirmed insofar as it dismissed those claims. However, at this stage of the proceedings Sheriff Alexander was not entitled to a dismissal of the federal claims against her in her individual capacity. View "Haywood v. Alexander " on Justia Law

Petitioners Hope Ankrom and Amanda Kimbrough each petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the Court of Criminal Appeals' decisions in their respective cases. The Court granted their petitions and consolidated the cases because both presented the same issue of first impression for the Court's consideration: whether the term "child" as used in section 26-15-3.2, Ala. Code 1975 (the chemical endangerment statute), included an unborn child. The appellate court concluded that it did, and the Supreme Court agreed. The Court of Criminal Appeals judgments was affirmed in both cases. View "Ankrom v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Anthony Ray Hinton petitioned the Jefferson Circuit Court for relief under Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., arguing that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to provide a qualified expert in his defense at his capital-murder trial. The circuit court denied Hinton's Rule 32 petition on the basis that Andrew Payne, the expert retained by defense counsel, was qualified to testify as a firearms-identification expert at Hinton's trial. Hinton appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals; the Court of Criminal Appeals, after remanding twice for the circuit court to address the issue, affirmed the circuit court's denial of Hinton's petition. Hinton then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court did indeed base its determination that Payne was qualified to testify as an expert upon the "cold trial record." As a result, it was in no better position than was an appellate court to make the determination it made. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in applying the abuse-of-discretion standard of review. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and remanded the case to the Court of Criminal Appeals for it to apply a de novo standard of review in reviewing the circuit court's judgment that Payne was qualified to testify as a firearms-identification expert. View "Hinton v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Christopher Anthony Floyd petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming his capital-murder conviction and his subsequent death sentence. The Court granted certiorari review to consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals, following its plain-error review, failed to recognize as prejudicial any plain error it found in the proceeding in the trial court. Specifically, the Court granted certiorari review to consider: (1) whether the State used its peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner in violation of "Batson v. Kentucky," (476 U.S. 79 (1986)); (2) whether the trial court properly excluded certain statements to police as inadmissible hearsay; and (3) whether the trial court properly denied Floyd's motion for a new trial based on allegedly newly discovered evidence. The Court reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision based on the Batson issue and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Floyd v. Alabama " on Justia Law

Mark Allen Jenkins was convicted in March 1991 of two counts of capital murder which was committed during the course of a robbery and during the course of a kidnapping. By a vote of 10-2, the jury recommended that Jenkins be sentenced to death. The trial court accepted the jury's recommendation and sentenced Jenkins to death. In early 2012, the Supreme Court granted Jenkins's petition for a writ of certiorari only as to the ground challenging the Court of Criminal Appeals' affirmance of the trial court's order dismissing Jenkins's Rule 32 petition on the bases that the trial court adopted verbatim the State's proposed order, and the Court held in abeyance the other grounds raised in Jenkins's petition pending resolution of this issue. The Court affirmed the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment insofar as it upheld the trial court's adoption of the State's proposed order denying Jenkins's Rule 32 petition; as to the remaining grounds the Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari. View "Jenkins v. Alabama " on Justia Law

While represented by counsel, Defendant Stanford Earl Pritchett pled guilty to murder. Defendant then filed a pro se motion to set aside his guilty plea, asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court denied Defendant's motion without conducting a hearing and without making a determination that he had validly waived his right to counsel with respect to the motion. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's order denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari as to that decision, asserting that it conflicted with "Berry v. Alabama," (630 So. 2d 127, 129 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993)). The Court granted the petition, and reversed the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remanded the case.

John Woodruff appealed a circuit court order dismissing his malicious-prosecution, false imprisonment, and tort-of-outrage claims against the City of Tuscaloosa ("the City") and several of its employees. On October 16, 2006, Woodruff went to the Tuscaloosa Police Department headquarters to resolve a warrant that had been sworn against him for harassing communications. After presenting himself, Woodruff was arrested and handcuffed by a Tuscaloosa police officer and told to wait until another officer could arrive to complete the booking process. While waiting in the public lobby of police headquarters, Woodruff became involved in a verbal altercation with an off-duty Tuscaloosa police officer, and he was subsequently charged by Officer Canterbury with disorderly conduct, another Class C misdemeanor. Woodruff was thereafter booked and transported to the county jail, where he was released on bond later that night. On October 19, 2006, Woodruff returned to the Tuscaloosa Police Department to file a written complaint regarding the events surrounding his arrest and booking on October 16. The Tuscaloosa Police Department ultimately determined that Woodruff's complaint was without merit. On November 15, 2006, Woodruff was convicted of disorderly conduct. He thereafter sought a trial de novo on the charge in Circuit Court; however, in December 2008, while the matter was still pending, Woodruff and the City apparently reached an agreement to nol-pros the charge if Woodruff would undergo counseling. On January 2, 2009, the disorderly conduct charge was formally dropped. On January 3, 2011, Woodruff filed the this action. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that it was "evident" that Woodruff did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court affirmed the circuit court in denying his claims.

This appeal arose from a circuit court's dismissal of Brandon Johnson's action against Gary Hetzel, warden of the Donaldson Correctional Facility; Sean Carlton, a correctional officer trainee at the facility; and correctional officers Dennis Johnson and Joe Binder. Johnson was serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole following a conviction for murder. He was seen fighting with another inmate and placed under "house arrest" pending a disciplinary hearing. Johnson argued that the defendants "deliberately plac[ed] him in 'house arrest' two cells from [another inmate with whom he had the fight], and [that] the defendants were responsible for the protection of both inmates, but instead opened the door to both cells at which time [Johnson] and [the other inmate] got into another fight," in which, Johnson argued, he was injured. Johnson filed an affidavit of substantial hardship, requesting that the initial docket fee for his case be waived. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, for a summary judgment. The circuit court granted the defendants' motion and dismissed Johnson's complaint. Johnson has appealed the circuit court's judgment of dismissal, arguing, in pertinent part, that the circuit court never had jurisdiction over his case because he did not pay the necessary filing fee and the circuit court never approved either of the affidavits of substantial hardship he had filed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the filing of a court-approved verified statement of substantial hardship was not met in this case. Therefore, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to enter its judgment dismissing Johnson's complaint. The Court ruled the circuit court's judgment void. "[B]ecause a void judgment will not support an appeal," the Court vacated the trial court's judgment and dismissed the appeal.