Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Melvin Gene Hodges petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted for the limited purpose of determining whether the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment insofar as it affirmed the trial court's summary denial of Defendant's petition for post-conviction relief (alleging juror misconduct during the voir dire examination) conflicted with the Court's decision in "Ex parte Burgess." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that it did: "The rule of 'Burgess' is that a petitioner seeking relief under Rule 32 for the alleged failure of jurors to respond accurately or truthfully to voir dire questioning is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim, unless it appears on the face of the record that he knew or reasonably should have known of the inaccuracy in time to raise it on appeal." When the State sought a summary dismissal of the claim, Defendant replied that his counsel could not have known about the alleged juror misconduct in time to raise the issue at trial or on appeal. The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to address whether an indigent defendant, who has no right to initially choose a particular court-appointed attorney, had a right to continued representation by a particular court-appointed counsel. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that an indigent defendant had such a right. The Supreme Court granted the petition and issued the writ because the trial court, when it considered the State's motion, did not evaluate the evidence regarding the question of disqualification and did not weigh the constitutional rights at issue. Upon review of the applicable legal authority and the record of Defendant Thomas Lane's case, the Supreme Court concluded "an indigent defendant is not entitled to legal counsel of his choice, when counsel is to be paid by public funds, but rather is entitled to competent legal representation." The Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

A circuit court judge petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Court of Criminal Appeals to quash a writ of mandamus it issued to the circuit court through an unpublished order. Kevin Byrd pled guilty to first-degree assault. He was sentenced to 10 yearsâ imprisonment. That sentence was suspended, and Mr. Byrd was ordered to serve 180 days in âboot campâ followed by years on probation. The Mobile County District Attorneyâs office began collecting unpaid restitution from Mr. Byrd. In 2007, the DAâs office requested a hearing for Mr. Byrd to show cause why he should not have been held in contempt for failing to pay restitution. The trial court held hearings in January and October 2008, and May and September 2010. In October 2010, Mr. Byrd petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to set aside all orders respecting restitution since December 2000, the date which Mr. Byrd said his probation expired. In February 2011, the court granted Mr. Byrdâs petition and issued the writ. In its unpublished decision, the court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Byrd. Upon careful consideration of the trial court and appellate court records, the Supreme Court found that nothing in the state restitution act prevented the trial court from taking the action it took in this case. "The Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding otherwise." Accordingly, the Court issued the writ of mandamus to quash its decision.

Defendant Wakilii Brown was convicted on three counts of capital murder. The jury returned a death sentence. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Defendantâs convictions and sentence. On appeal, Defendant challenged the admissibility of the testimony of a child witness and alleged that there was an error in the trial courtâs instructions to the jury. Upon careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the record did not support the conclusion that the childâs testimony should have been excluded. Furthermore, the Court did not commit plain error when instructing the jury. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial courtâs conviction and Defendantâs sentence.

In this case, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether sufficient evidence on the element of "serious bodily injury" for the purposes of a first-degree assault offense could be established by the testimony of a lay witness, or, as a matter of law, it could be presented only through medical testimony or the victimâs testimony. The appeals court held that a motherâs testimony concerning her childâs suffering "serious and protracted disfigurement" was not sufficient evidence of the serious-bodily-injury element of first-degree assault to present the question to the jury. Defendant Timothy Reck was intoxicated when he drove his vehicle into the vehicle of Donna Loving. Her sons were passengers in the vehicle. She explained that her sonâs face sustained numerous little scars caused by shattered glass that nicked his face. Upon careful review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that "serious bodily injury" in the form of "serious and protracted disfigurement" could be established by the testimony of a lay witness. The Court reversed the appellate courtâs holding and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In 1991, Defendant Carl Ward was convicted on murder charges and sentenced to life in prison. Acting pro se, Defendant challenged his conviction to the Supreme Court, alleging that recently discovered material facts warranted his conviction to be vacated. Central to Defendant's "newly-discovered facts" were the results of forensic tests performed on the key evidence that convicted him. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that "the newly discovered facts at issue here relate[d] not to some procedural violation, but to [Defendant's] actual guilt or innocence." The evidence against Defendant was largely circumstantial; the only physical evidence in the record tying Defendant to the crime scene was the evidence subject to the forensic tests. Accordingly, the Court found that Defendant sufficiently pled a claim of newly discovered material facts, and that he was entitled to an opportunity to prove his allegations. The Court reversed the lower courts' decisions in this case, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Barbara Roberts sued Steve Lanier and his firm Steve Lanier, PC, and Rodney Stallings and his firm Coggin & Stallings, LLC. In 2006, Ms. Roberts was arrested on murder charges and sent to the Cherokee County jail. She contacted Attorney Lanier, who then met with her and agreed to represent her in her criminal proceedings. The contract between them provided that Ms. Roberts would pay a "nonrefundable retainer" of $50,000. At that time, Ms. Roberts executed a power-of-attorney authorizing Mr. Lanier to withdraw the retainer from her bank accounts. Ms. Roberts testified at trial that she first learned that Mr. Lanier was not licensed to practice law in Alabama when she appeared for her first hearing at the district court. It was then that she was introduced to Mr. Stallings, who "associated" on her case. Seeing no need for two lawyers, she tried to terminate Mr. Lanier's representation. Mr. Stallings eventually managed Ms. Roberts' case, having all her mail sent to his office so that he could "oversee every aspect" of her personal life, including payment of all outstanding bills and expenses. Ms. Roberts alleged that instead of using her money for the purposes she intended, Mr. Stallings misappropriated approximately $100,000 of her funds. Ms. Roberts was eventually convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life without parole. She later learned that the "nonrefundable retainer" language in her contract with Mr. Lanier was unenforceable under Alabama law, and sued her former lawyers for legal malpractice. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the lawyers. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the lawyers only with respect to employment contract and the "nonrefundable retainer" and the misappropriation of Ms. Roberts' money for expenses while she awaited trial. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

In 1993, Defendant James Knight was convicted on theft and burglary charges. He was sentenced under the state Habitual Felony Offender Act (HFOA) to life in prison for theft and to fifteen years for burglary, both sentences served concurrently. In 2000, the legislature amended the HFOA to make certain sentences less severe. In 2009, Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of his life sentence under the new HFOA. The judge who sentenced Defendant had since left office. Another judge was assigned pursuant to a standing administrative order that was entered in 2007. Without requiring an answer from the State, the court summarily dismissed Defendantâs motion. Defendant appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals contending, among other things, that the judge was not the "sentencing judge" and that the administrative order did not appoint the judge to decide his motion as required by law. The appellate court was not persuaded by Defendantâs argument and affirmed the lower courtâs decision. The issue for review by the Supreme Court was whether the administrative order gave the judge who decided Defendantâs reconsideration motion authority over his case. Upon review of the administrative order, the Court found that the order does not select the judge for any given case. The order provided that motions for reconsideration would be assigned to the judge holding the sentencing judgeâs seat. The circuit clerk did not assign a judge to hear Defendantâs motion. Therefore, the judge that dismissed Defendantâs motion acted without authority. The Court reversed the lower courtâs decision and remanded the case for further consideration.