Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Loren J. Larson, Jr. was incarcerated at the Spring Creek Correctional Center in Seward. Acting pro se, he filed two separate complaints alleging violations of his constitutional rights. In his first complaint, he alleged that he suffers from paruresis, a condition that makes it impossible for him to urinate in the presence of others, and the correctional facility had violated state and federal constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment by failing to accommodate his condition with alternative urinalysis testing procedures. His second complaint alleged that the correctional facility's revised visitor application form for minors violates his state constitutional right to rehabilitation because it is more restrictive than the administrative regulation governing visitation rights. Both complaints were dismissed for failure to state a claim under Alaska Civil Rule 12(b)(6). The Supreme Court consolidated the two appeals to address an issue common to both: the procedure for properly evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint of a pro se prisoner alleging constitutional violations. The Court took the opportunity to emphasize that a complaint must be liberally construed and a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is viewed with disfavor and should rarely be granted. Because both of Larson's complaints alleged facts which, if proven, were sufficient to entitle him to some form of relief, and because the Court found no merit in the arguments that Larson lacked standing or was otherwise barred from bringing a direct cause of action for these alleged constitutional violations, the Court reversed the dismissal of both of Larson's complaints.

Dennis Davison was convicted of sexually abusing his fourteen-year-old daughter, R.D. At trial, the doctor who performed a Sexual Assault Response Team (SART) examination of R.D. testified to statements R.D. had made during the examination. Davison argued on appeal that the doctor’s testimony regarding R.D.’s statements was not admissible under Alaska Evidence Rule 803(4), because the examination was conducted primarily to gather evidence against him and not for purposes of medical treatment. Davison also argued that the trial court erroneously included in his presentence report statements R.D. had made during the sexual assault exam that pertained to offenses he was charged with but acquitted of at trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the doctor’s hearsay testimony was not admissible under Rule 803(4), but held that this error was harmless with respect to Davison’s conviction. The Court remanded the sentencing issue to the court of appeals to consider whether the hearsay statements were sufficiently verified for inclusion in Davison’s presentence report.

A man was arrested for misdemeanor crimes after an altercation arising from a business dispute. He brought civil claims against a police officer and the officer's municipal employer based on the arrest. The superior court granted a motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims against them. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision because: (1) the police officer had probable cause to make a felony arrest, and, therefore, any perceived deficiencies in the misdemeanor arrest process are irrelevant; and (2) no municipal policy deprived the arrestee of property, and, therefore, the municipality did not violate the arrestee's constitutional rights.

Petitioner Izaz Khan was indicted on one count of perjury based on four allegedly false statements made in a financial affidavit. At trial, the court instructed the jury, without objection from Petitioner, that they did not need to be unanimous regarding which statements were false. The jury convicted Petitioner. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that even assuming the instruction was erroneous, the error would not rise to the level of plain error. The court of appeals reasoned that any error was not prejudicial because Petitioner had presented a single defense that applied to all four statements. Petitioner filed a petition for hearing, which the Supreme Court granted on the following questions: "(1) whether a unanimous jury verdict is a right under the Alaska Constitution, and (2) if so, the appropriate plain error analysis for reviewing the effect of a contrary jury instruction given without any objection by the defendant." The parties disagreed about the proper plain error analysis for constitutional errors. Last year, in a case decided after the Court granted this petition, it clarified its constitutional plain error analysis in "Adams v. Alaska." Petitioner argued that the Court should depart from "Adam"s to adopt the analysis of the Supreme Court of Hawai'i in "Nichols v. Hawai'i" in analyzing erroneous jury instructions. The State argued that the Court should have departed from "Adams" and adopt the federal plain error standard from the United States Supreme Court's decision in "United States v. Olano." The Alaska Supreme Court declined both parties' invitations to reconsider "Adams," and reaffirmed its decision in that case. Because the court of appeals did not apply the correct standard for constitutional plain error, the Court remanded this case for a determination whether, if the challenged jury instruction was erroneous, reversal was required under the proper plain error analysis.

M.K. is a 34-year-old mentally ill Alaska Native woman who lived in a rural village. In 1999, when M.K. was 22, her father A.K. sexually assaulted her. M.K. reported the crime to police, but soon changed her story and A.K. was not tried at that time. A.K. continued to live with the family for four years until advances in DNA evidence led to his case being reopened, and to A.K. being charged and convicted in 2003 of the sexual assault. M.K.'s mother remained married to A.K., who has since been released from prison and was on probation and prohibited from living with M.K. M.K.'s mother had no plans to divorce A.K., and testified that she is not sure whether A.K. will return to live with the family when his probation ends. The Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) petitioned for guardianship of M.K. in July 2008 based on M.K.'s mental illness and her inability to manage her own care. The court visitor completed a report, and a hearing was held over several days, following which the superior court appointed the Office of Public Advocacy (OPA) as M.K.'s full guardian. M.K. objected to this decision. The superior court treated her written objection as an implicit motion for reconsideration and denied it. M.K. appealed, arguing that the superior court erred in its application of the guardianship statutes in her case, in its best interest finding that OPA should be appointed in place of M.K.'s mother, and in appointing OPA as a full (as opposed to partial) guardian. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision.

Petitioner Sven Rofkar grew a substantial quantity of marijuana in a house he rented. After state troopers searched the house, Petitioner was charged with four felonies, all brought under separate subsections of AS 11.71.040, designated as "misconduct involving a controlled substance in the fourth degree." A jury found Rofkar guilty on all charges. The superior court merged two possession charges into the manufacturing charge, but refused to merge the "maintaining" charge. Petitioner therefore stood convicted of two felonies. The double jeopardy clause of the Alaska Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense." The underlying question in this case was whether two convictions have been imposed on Petitioner for the "same offense" within the meaning of this clause or whether he committed two crimes. Petitioner raised this issue on appeal to the court of appeals. But the court of appeals declined to consider it. Instead, the court held that its opinion in "Davis v. State" was controlling authority. Petitioner did not argue that "Davis" should be overruled in his opening brief, although he did so in his reply brief, the court gave the double jeopardy issue no further consideration. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that this case should be reviewed by the court of appeals on the merits for two reasons: first, the double jeopardy issue was raised and not waived; second, it was not clear that "Davis v. State" was decided in accordance with the applicable test for deciding double jeopardy claims set out in the Court's opinion in "Whitton v. State."

Petitioner Daniel Nelson applied for post-conviction relief, alleging 35 claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. At a deposition, trial counsel asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination regarding his representation of Petitioner. The superior court ultimately dismissed all but one post-conviction relief claim for failure to establish a prima facie case, and the court of appeals affirmed. Petitioner petitioned for the Supreme Court's review to determine whether the ordinary presumption of defense counsel's competence applied when counsel invokes the Fifth Amendment regarding the representation. The Court determined that it does, but noted that an adverse inference may be drawn in the petitioner's favor on specific disputed factual issues if warranted in an appropriate case. With this clarification, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision because this was not an appropriate case warranting such an inference.

Two correctional officers allegedly injured inmate Respondent Paul Heisey within the jail. Respondent filed a complaint asserting several tort claims against the State and the two officers. Pursuant to a statute allowing the State to substitute as defendant for any State employee that is certified as acting within the scope of employment, the Attorney General certified the officers as acting within the scope of their employment and substituted the State as the Defendant. The State then filed a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds. While the motion was pending, Respondent moved to amend his complaint to substitute state constitutional claims for the tort claims. The superior court granted the motion to amend, ruling that Respondent may have a damages claim for violation of his state constitutional rights under the circumstances of the case. In the same order, the superior court partially granted and partially denied the motion to dismiss. The State petitioned for review of the superior court's legal conclusions. The Supreme Court accepted the petition and requested briefing on three issues: (1) whether the Attorney General's certification was subject to judicial review; (2) whether the inmate's claims arose out of an assault or battery for which the State is immune; and (3) whether a state constitutional claim for damages exists under the circumstances of this case. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Attorney General's certification was subject to judicial review, that some of the inmate's claims arose out of an assault or battery for which the State is immune, and that a damages claim under the state constitution does not exist under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the Court vacated the superior court's order on the motion to amend and motion to dismiss, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

David S. appealed the termination of his parental rights to his daughter Hannah, who is an Indian child. Hannah was taken into the custody by the Office of Children's Services (OCS) while David was incarcerated. David remained in jail for the first 20 months of Hannah's life. David was released from prison and was on parole for five months, during which time he had regular visits with Hannah. David then became a fugitive for nine months, before being recaptured and reincarcerated. While David was a fugitive, OCS petitioned for termination of his parental rights, and two months after David was returned to prison, the superior court held a termination trial. The superior court found that Hannah was a child in need of aid due to David’s abandonment, incarceration, and substance abuse. The superior court also concluded that OCS had engaged in active efforts to help David's rehabilitation, as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act, and that it was in Hannah's best interests for David's parental rights to be terminated. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's ruling because OCS established all requirements necessary for termination.

The Bethel Superior Court entered an order terminating an incarcerated father's parental rights to three of his five children. The father appealed, arguing that the superior court erred by finding that the State made active efforts to prevent the breakup of his family and finding that it was in the children's best interests for his parental rights to be terminated. Because the superior court's active efforts and best interests findings were supported by the record and not clearly erroneous, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's ruling terminating the father's parental rights.