Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Preston Strong was convicted of six counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Strong had a history of financial troubles and was friends with one of the victims, Luis Rios, who often loaned him money. An argument between Strong and Luis occurred about a month before the murders, with Luis refusing to loan Strong more money. On the day of the murders, Luis and Adrienne Heredia, along with her four children, were found dead in their home. Evidence included Strong’s fingerprints on plastic bags found at the scene and his DNA on the steering wheel of Luis’s vehicle.The Superior Court in Yuma County denied Strong’s motions to change the venue, suppress evidence, and dismiss the case due to preindictment delay. The jury found Strong guilty and determined that the State had proved the alleged aggravating circumstances. The trial court later instructed the jury to disregard one of the aggravating factors during the penalty phase. Strong’s motions for a new trial and to vacate the judgment, based on alleged juror misconduct and other grounds, were denied.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed Strong’s convictions and sentences. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s rulings on preindictment delay, change of venue, and the admission of evidence. The court also concluded that the trial court did not err in its handling of juror misconduct allegations, the admission of DNA evidence, and the consideration of victim impact statements. The court held that the erroneous instruction regarding the cold-and-calculating aggravating factor did not constitute fundamental error, as the jury was instructed to disregard it. The court also found that the jury’s findings of aggravating circumstances and the imposition of the death penalty were supported by reasonable evidence and did not violate constitutional standards. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v STRONG" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant, Christopher Montoya, was convicted of first-degree murder, second-degree burglary, kidnapping, aggravated identity theft, unlawful use of means of transportation, theft, and two counts of animal cruelty. Montoya was sentenced to death for the murder charge. The crimes occurred after Montoya's relationship with the victim, A.R., ended, leading him to break into her house, attack, and ultimately kill her. Montoya also used A.R.'s personal information and belongings for his benefit after her death.The Superior Court in Maricopa County handled the initial trial, where Montoya pleaded guilty to all charges and admitted to two capital aggravators: committing previous serious offenses and murdering A.R. in an especially cruel and heinous manner. Despite his guilty plea, Montoya waived the presentation of most mitigation evidence, allowing only the records of his guilty pleas and mitigation waiver hearings to be submitted as evidence of his acceptance of responsibility. The jury returned a death verdict, and the court sentenced Montoya to death for the murder and to a combined 103 years in prison for the other charges.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case. The court affirmed Montoya’s convictions and sentences, including the death penalty. The court found no fundamental errors in the trial process, including the handling of voir dire, the admission of autopsy photographs, and the acceptance of Montoya’s waiver of mitigation evidence. The court also determined that the jury instructions were adequate and that the victim impact statements did not fundamentally prejudice Montoya’s right to a fair trial. The court conducted an independent review of the death sentence and concluded that a reasonable jury could have found the mitigating circumstances insufficient to warrant leniency. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v MONTOYA" on Justia Law

Marcos Martinez killed his grandmother and subsequently pleaded guilty except insane (GEI) to first-degree murder. Under his plea agreement, he was committed to the Arizona State Hospital and will remain under the jurisdiction of the superior court for life. However, unlike a standard guilty plea, Martinez’s GEI plea did not include restitution for the victims of his crime. Lisa Gilpin, claiming to be a victim, sought approximately $18,300 in restitution from Martinez under Arizona’s Victims’ Bill of Rights (VBR). The superior court denied her request, citing the precedent set in State v. Heartfield, which held that GEI defendants are not responsible for restitution.The superior court ruled that a GEI judgment is not a “conviction” for restitution purposes, thus making restitution unavailable. Gilpin sought special action review from the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, but the court declined jurisdiction. The Arizona Supreme Court granted review due to the recurring statewide importance of whether crime victims are entitled to restitution from GEI defendants.The Arizona Supreme Court overruled Heartfield, concluding that the legislature intended to assign criminal responsibility to GEI defendants. The court held that a GEI verdict results in criminal responsibility, and therefore, victims are entitled to restitution from GEI defendants who cause or threaten to cause death or serious bodily injury. The court remanded the case to the superior court to determine Gilpin’s eligibility for restitution, the amount owed, and whether Martinez is liable for restitution payments while suffering from a mental disease or defect. View "GILPIN v MARTINEZ" on Justia Law

In 2016, Bennett Laquan Williams was charged with fourteen felonies, including sex trafficking and various misdemeanors. The State alleged he was on probation and had seven prior felony convictions, including a 2004 Arizona marijuana conviction. Williams entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to two counts of sex trafficking as a repeat offender, in exchange for a twelve-year sentence and the dismissal of other charges and allegations.The Superior Court accepted the plea and sentenced Williams to twelve years. In 2020, Arizona voters passed Proposition 207, allowing for the expungement of certain marijuana convictions. Williams successfully expunged his 2004 marijuana conviction and subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, arguing that his sentence was invalid without the prior marijuana conviction. The Superior Court dismissed his petition, but the Court of Appeals reversed, vacated the plea agreement, reinstated the original charges, and remanded the case.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed that Williams was entitled to post-conviction relief due to the expungement of his marijuana conviction, which invalidated the factual basis for his enhanced sentence. However, the Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in voiding the plea agreement entirely. Instead, the Supreme Court held that the plea agreement is voidable, not void, if Williams is resentenced to a term different from the agreed twelve years. If resentenced to less than twelve years, the State may withdraw from the agreement; if resentenced to more, Williams may withdraw his plea.The Supreme Court vacated parts of the Court of Appeals' opinion, affirmed the remainder, reversed the Superior Court's order, and remanded the case for resentencing. The State cannot allege a different prior conviction under the existing plea agreement. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v WILLIAMS" on Justia Law

In 2018, Kevin Moninger, a Nevada resident, posted classified ads on a website for sexual encounters. He received a response from "Sabrina," a fictional 13-year-old girl created by an undercover officer. Over several days, Moninger exchanged explicit messages with Sabrina, discussing sexual activities and planning to meet. On October 5, Moninger drove to Kingman, Arizona, to meet Sabrina but was arrested upon arrival. He was charged with three counts of luring a minor for sexual exploitation and one count of attempted sexual conduct with a minor.The Superior Court in Mohave County convicted Moninger on all charges, sentencing him to four consecutive prison terms totaling 31 years. Moninger appealed, and the Arizona Court of Appeals vacated two of his three luring convictions, ruling that his conduct constituted a single violation of the statute, thus subjecting him to double jeopardy. The court remanded the case for resentencing on the remaining luring conviction and held that it should be considered probation eligible. A dissenting judge argued that each request for sexual conduct was a separate harm and that Moninger's convictions were not probation eligible.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case to clarify the allowable unit of prosecution under A.R.S. § 13-3554. The court held that luring a minor for sexual exploitation is based on a course of conduct defined by offers or solicitations of separate and distinct sexual conduct or to separate and distinct victims. The court found that Moninger's actions constituted a single course of conduct involving one type of sexual conduct with one victim, thus supporting only one luring conviction. The court vacated Moninger's second and third luring convictions and remanded the case for resentencing on the remaining conviction, which was deemed not probation eligible under A.R.S. § 13-705(H) (2018). View "STATE OF ARIZONA v MONINGER" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Kevin Dunbar, who was convicted of multiple felonies. Dunbar requested to represent himself during the final stages of his resentencing, but the trial court denied his request. Dunbar appealed this decision, arguing that his right to self-representation had been violated. The court of appeals agreed with Dunbar, concluding that the trial court's denial constituted structural error and remanded the case back to the trial court for reconsideration of Dunbar's request.Previously, the court of appeals had upheld Dunbar's convictions but remanded for resentencing on different grounds. The court had found that Dunbar had forfeited his right to self-representation due to his inconsistent positions and his signed waiver of the right to self-representation.The Supreme Court of Arizona was tasked with deciding whether the denial of the right to self-representation at sentencing is subject to harmless error or structural error review. The court held that erroneous denials of the right to self-representation at sentencing constitute structural error. However, the court also clarified that not all denials of self-representation requests are erroneous and provided guidance on the analysis a trial court must employ in determining whether it should grant a defendant’s untimely self-representation request.The court vacated parts of the court of appeals’ decision and remanded the case back to the trial court for reconsideration of Dunbar's request to represent himself. The trial court was instructed to consider whether denying Dunbar's request would substantially undermine his right to present his case at sentencing. If the trial court determines Dunbar's motion should have been granted, structural error has occurred, and Dunbar is entitled to resentencing. If the trial court again determines that Dunbar's motion should not have been granted, Dunbar's sentences stand. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v DUNBAR" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Manuel Perez-Gutierrez, who was convicted on eight counts of sexual conduct with a minor. The trial court sentenced Perez-Gutierrez to two twenty-year terms of imprisonment for the first two counts and one-year sentences for the remaining six counts, all to be served consecutively. The court had discretion to impose the remaining sentences consecutively or concurrently but failed to state on record the reason for its determination, as required by A.R.S. § 13-711(A). Perez-Gutierrez appealed this omission.The Court of Appeals agreed with Perez-Gutierrez and remanded the case, instructing the trial court to record the reasons for its sentencing determination. The court of appeals' decision was based on the precedent set in cases like State v. Anzivino and State v. Harrison, which established a limited-remand practice for such violations. However, a dissenting judge argued that the violation should be reviewed for fundamental error, not requiring a remand.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona held that a violation of A.R.S. § 13-711(A) is neither a structural error nor a trial error. Instead, it is akin to an administrative error that a trial court can correct without affecting the disposition. Therefore, the court concluded that a remand for the limited purpose of statutory compliance is appropriate. The court also clarified that the remedy for such a violation does not require resentencing but merely a statement on record explaining the sentencing determination. The court vacated the Court of Appeals' opinion and remanded the case with instructions to suspend the appeal and revest jurisdiction in the trial court to comply with § 13-711(A). View "State v. Perez-Gutierrez" on Justia Law

Larry Dean Anderson was convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of release for twenty-five years. Anderson filed a post-conviction relief (PCR) petition, claiming that his attorney erroneously advised him that he was eligible for parole, which led him to reject a plea agreement. The issue was whether this claim for PCR based on ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) was either precluded or untimely.The Superior Court in Pima County initially dismissed Anderson's request for an evidentiary hearing and denied relief. The court determined that Anderson's IAC claim was not precluded or untimely, but it also determined that Anderson's IAC claim was not colorable. The court of appeals denied relief, determining Anderson's IAC claim was untimely and his delay unexcused. It also held his claim was precluded because he failed to raise it in his previous petitions for PCR.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reversed and remanded the case. The court held that Anderson's PCR claim was neither untimely nor precluded and he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he had been offered a plea agreement before his trial. The court found that Anderson's attorney's performance was deficient under Strickland because his error constituted incorrect advice on a significant issue relating to Anderson's potential sentence if convicted. The court also found that Anderson had presented enough evidence for an opportunity to establish the existence of an offered plea agreement at an evidentiary hearing. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v ANDERSON" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Tamira Durand, who was indicted for several fraud-related offenses, including illegally obtaining a credit card in the name of Scott Blum, a prosecutor with the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office (MCAO), the agency responsible for prosecuting Durand. Durand argued that her due process rights would be violated if she was prosecuted by an agency with a conflict of interest, given that Blum, one of the victims in her case, was a prosecutor with MCAO. The trial court granted Durand’s motion, disqualifying MCAO from the case. The State appealed this decision.The trial court's decision to disqualify MCAO was appealed to the Court of Appeals, which accepted jurisdiction but denied relief. The State then petitioned for review by the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reversed the trial court's decision, stating that the trial court had erred by not considering the Gomez factors, a set of considerations established in a previous case, Gomez v. Superior Court, when deciding whether to disqualify MCAO. The court held that the trial court should have considered these factors, which include whether the motion is being made for the purposes of harassing the defendant, whether the party bringing the motion will be damaged in some way if the motion is not granted, whether there are any alternative solutions, and whether the possibility of public suspicion will outweigh any benefits that might accrue due to continued representation. The case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings, with instructions to apply the Gomez factors and consider Durand’s due process rights. View "State ex rel Mitchell v. Palmer" on Justia Law

In 2011, Daniel Santillanes was convicted of a felony charge for facilitating the sale or transportation of marijuana in Arizona. In 2020, Arizona voters passed Proposition 207, which permitted the expungement of certain marijuana-related offenses. Following this, Santillanes sought to have his felony marijuana conviction expunged and his civil rights restored, including his right to possess a firearm. The trial court granted his request. The state then appealed the decision, questioning whether they had the right to do so.The main issue under consideration by the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona was whether the state had the right to appeal the trial court's decision to expunge Santillanes's record and restore his civil rights. The court concluded that the state did indeed have the right to appeal this expungement order under A.R.S. § 13-4032(4). The court found that an order expunging records of a felony conviction affects the substantial rights of the state, and therefore, the state has the right to appeal such a decision.The Supreme Court vacated parts of the lower court's opinion and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings, consistent with the remainder of the appellate court's opinion. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v SANTILLANES" on Justia Law