Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2018, Kevin Moninger, a Nevada resident, posted classified ads on a website for sexual encounters. He received a response from "Sabrina," a fictional 13-year-old girl created by an undercover officer. Over several days, Moninger exchanged explicit messages with Sabrina, discussing sexual activities and planning to meet. On October 5, Moninger drove to Kingman, Arizona, to meet Sabrina but was arrested upon arrival. He was charged with three counts of luring a minor for sexual exploitation and one count of attempted sexual conduct with a minor.The Superior Court in Mohave County convicted Moninger on all charges, sentencing him to four consecutive prison terms totaling 31 years. Moninger appealed, and the Arizona Court of Appeals vacated two of his three luring convictions, ruling that his conduct constituted a single violation of the statute, thus subjecting him to double jeopardy. The court remanded the case for resentencing on the remaining luring conviction and held that it should be considered probation eligible. A dissenting judge argued that each request for sexual conduct was a separate harm and that Moninger's convictions were not probation eligible.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case to clarify the allowable unit of prosecution under A.R.S. § 13-3554. The court held that luring a minor for sexual exploitation is based on a course of conduct defined by offers or solicitations of separate and distinct sexual conduct or to separate and distinct victims. The court found that Moninger's actions constituted a single course of conduct involving one type of sexual conduct with one victim, thus supporting only one luring conviction. The court vacated Moninger's second and third luring convictions and remanded the case for resentencing on the remaining conviction, which was deemed not probation eligible under A.R.S. § 13-705(H) (2018). View "STATE OF ARIZONA v MONINGER" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Kevin Dunbar, who was convicted of multiple felonies. Dunbar requested to represent himself during the final stages of his resentencing, but the trial court denied his request. Dunbar appealed this decision, arguing that his right to self-representation had been violated. The court of appeals agreed with Dunbar, concluding that the trial court's denial constituted structural error and remanded the case back to the trial court for reconsideration of Dunbar's request.Previously, the court of appeals had upheld Dunbar's convictions but remanded for resentencing on different grounds. The court had found that Dunbar had forfeited his right to self-representation due to his inconsistent positions and his signed waiver of the right to self-representation.The Supreme Court of Arizona was tasked with deciding whether the denial of the right to self-representation at sentencing is subject to harmless error or structural error review. The court held that erroneous denials of the right to self-representation at sentencing constitute structural error. However, the court also clarified that not all denials of self-representation requests are erroneous and provided guidance on the analysis a trial court must employ in determining whether it should grant a defendant’s untimely self-representation request.The court vacated parts of the court of appeals’ decision and remanded the case back to the trial court for reconsideration of Dunbar's request to represent himself. The trial court was instructed to consider whether denying Dunbar's request would substantially undermine his right to present his case at sentencing. If the trial court determines Dunbar's motion should have been granted, structural error has occurred, and Dunbar is entitled to resentencing. If the trial court again determines that Dunbar's motion should not have been granted, Dunbar's sentences stand. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v DUNBAR" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Manuel Perez-Gutierrez, who was convicted on eight counts of sexual conduct with a minor. The trial court sentenced Perez-Gutierrez to two twenty-year terms of imprisonment for the first two counts and one-year sentences for the remaining six counts, all to be served consecutively. The court had discretion to impose the remaining sentences consecutively or concurrently but failed to state on record the reason for its determination, as required by A.R.S. § 13-711(A). Perez-Gutierrez appealed this omission.The Court of Appeals agreed with Perez-Gutierrez and remanded the case, instructing the trial court to record the reasons for its sentencing determination. The court of appeals' decision was based on the precedent set in cases like State v. Anzivino and State v. Harrison, which established a limited-remand practice for such violations. However, a dissenting judge argued that the violation should be reviewed for fundamental error, not requiring a remand.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona held that a violation of A.R.S. § 13-711(A) is neither a structural error nor a trial error. Instead, it is akin to an administrative error that a trial court can correct without affecting the disposition. Therefore, the court concluded that a remand for the limited purpose of statutory compliance is appropriate. The court also clarified that the remedy for such a violation does not require resentencing but merely a statement on record explaining the sentencing determination. The court vacated the Court of Appeals' opinion and remanded the case with instructions to suspend the appeal and revest jurisdiction in the trial court to comply with § 13-711(A). View "State v. Perez-Gutierrez" on Justia Law

Larry Dean Anderson was convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of release for twenty-five years. Anderson filed a post-conviction relief (PCR) petition, claiming that his attorney erroneously advised him that he was eligible for parole, which led him to reject a plea agreement. The issue was whether this claim for PCR based on ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) was either precluded or untimely.The Superior Court in Pima County initially dismissed Anderson's request for an evidentiary hearing and denied relief. The court determined that Anderson's IAC claim was not precluded or untimely, but it also determined that Anderson's IAC claim was not colorable. The court of appeals denied relief, determining Anderson's IAC claim was untimely and his delay unexcused. It also held his claim was precluded because he failed to raise it in his previous petitions for PCR.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reversed and remanded the case. The court held that Anderson's PCR claim was neither untimely nor precluded and he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he had been offered a plea agreement before his trial. The court found that Anderson's attorney's performance was deficient under Strickland because his error constituted incorrect advice on a significant issue relating to Anderson's potential sentence if convicted. The court also found that Anderson had presented enough evidence for an opportunity to establish the existence of an offered plea agreement at an evidentiary hearing. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v ANDERSON" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Tamira Durand, who was indicted for several fraud-related offenses, including illegally obtaining a credit card in the name of Scott Blum, a prosecutor with the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office (MCAO), the agency responsible for prosecuting Durand. Durand argued that her due process rights would be violated if she was prosecuted by an agency with a conflict of interest, given that Blum, one of the victims in her case, was a prosecutor with MCAO. The trial court granted Durand’s motion, disqualifying MCAO from the case. The State appealed this decision.The trial court's decision to disqualify MCAO was appealed to the Court of Appeals, which accepted jurisdiction but denied relief. The State then petitioned for review by the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reversed the trial court's decision, stating that the trial court had erred by not considering the Gomez factors, a set of considerations established in a previous case, Gomez v. Superior Court, when deciding whether to disqualify MCAO. The court held that the trial court should have considered these factors, which include whether the motion is being made for the purposes of harassing the defendant, whether the party bringing the motion will be damaged in some way if the motion is not granted, whether there are any alternative solutions, and whether the possibility of public suspicion will outweigh any benefits that might accrue due to continued representation. The case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings, with instructions to apply the Gomez factors and consider Durand’s due process rights. View "State ex rel Mitchell v. Palmer" on Justia Law

In 2011, Daniel Santillanes was convicted of a felony charge for facilitating the sale or transportation of marijuana in Arizona. In 2020, Arizona voters passed Proposition 207, which permitted the expungement of certain marijuana-related offenses. Following this, Santillanes sought to have his felony marijuana conviction expunged and his civil rights restored, including his right to possess a firearm. The trial court granted his request. The state then appealed the decision, questioning whether they had the right to do so.The main issue under consideration by the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona was whether the state had the right to appeal the trial court's decision to expunge Santillanes's record and restore his civil rights. The court concluded that the state did indeed have the right to appeal this expungement order under A.R.S. § 13-4032(4). The court found that an order expunging records of a felony conviction affects the substantial rights of the state, and therefore, the state has the right to appeal such a decision.The Supreme Court vacated parts of the lower court's opinion and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings, consistent with the remainder of the appellate court's opinion. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v SANTILLANES" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed a case involving Jose Agundez-Martinez, who was prosecuted as an adult for sexual assault and child molestation offenses he committed as a child between the ages of ten and twelve. The crimes came to light after Agundez-Martinez turned eighteen, and he was indicted at the age of twenty-three. Agundez-Martinez argued that the juvenile court lost jurisdiction over him once he turned eighteen, thereby depriving the superior court of its only mechanism for obtaining jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Arizona held that Proposition 102, known as the "Juvenile Justice Initiative," and the legislation implementing it did not prohibit the state from prosecuting adults for crimes committed when they were juveniles. The court stated that a crime is a crime, regardless of the age of the offender at the time of the offense, and the determination of whether it is adjudicated as a "delinquent act" or prosecuted as a criminal charge depends entirely on the status of the offender at the time the state initiates proceedings.Consequently, the court held that the superior court had jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence Agundez-Martinez for his criminal offenses since he was an adult when indicted. However, the court expressed concern about the lengthy adult prison sentences initially imposed for acts committed by a young child and urged the legislature to provide statutory directives for such situations. The case was remanded to the superior court for resentencing. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v AGUNDEZ-MARTINEZ" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner's petition seeking post-conviction relief (PCR), holding that Petitioner's natural life sentence was not mandatory within the meaning of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Petitioner was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.Petitioner was sixteen when he shot and killed two people. He was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to natural life for one murder and life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years for the other murder. Petitioner later filed the PCR petition at issue, claiming that his natural life sentence violated Miller and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016). The PCR court determined that a colorable claim existed and that and that a Valencia evidentiary hearing was warranted. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's ruling and dismissed the PCR petition, holding that Petitioner did not present a colorable claim for relief under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g) because his natural life sentence was not mandatory within the meaning of Miller and there had not been a significant change in the law that, if applied to Petitioner's case, would probably overturn his sentence. View "State ex rel. Mitchell v. Honorable Cooper" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a county attorney's prior representation of Defendant, who was charged with the crime of possession of methamphetamine for sale, did not create an appearance of impropriety in the current prosecution warranting disqualification of the entire county attorney's office.While still in private practice, Attorney represented Defendant in a marriage annulment matter, and Attorney eventually obtained a default annulment. Attorney was subsequently elected county attorney. The county attorney's office later charged Defendant with a drug-related crime. Defendant moved to disqualify the county attorney's office based upon an appearance of impropriety. The trial court granted the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the order disqualifying the county attorney's office, holding that there was no appearance of impropriety in the current prosecution because there was no substantial relationship between the annulment matter and the current matter upon which to conclude that Defendant would be prejudiced by the county attorney's office's continued prosecution. View "State v. Honorable Chambers" on Justia Law

In this murder case, the Supreme Court established a standard a defendant must satisfy to compel extraction of GPS data by a defendant's third-party agent from a crime victim's automobile for the trial court's in camera inspection and held that remand was required in the instant case.Defendant was charged with the second-degree murder of Grant Draper, making his brother Lane Draper a victim by virtue of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-4401(12), a statute that implements the Arizona Constitution's Victims' Bill of Rights. During plea negotiations and without notice to Lane, Defendant obtained a court order to access GPS data to support his third-party defense identifying Lane as the possible killer and for cross-examination regarding the time Defendant argued he was asleep. The trial court allowed the data to be extracted for a limited in camera interview. Lane filed a petition for special action, which the court of appeals denied. The Supreme Court held (1) a defendant is entitled to discovery from a victim if the defendant seeks evidence of a constitutional dimension and the defendant establishes that the requested discovery is very likely to contain such evidence; and (2) remand was required in this case. View "Draper v. Honorable Gentry" on Justia Law