Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner's petition seeking post-conviction relief (PCR), holding that Petitioner's natural life sentence was not mandatory within the meaning of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Petitioner was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.Petitioner was sixteen when he shot and killed two people. He was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to natural life for one murder and life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years for the other murder. Petitioner later filed the PCR petition at issue, claiming that his natural life sentence violated Miller and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016). The PCR court determined that a colorable claim existed and that and that a Valencia evidentiary hearing was warranted. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's ruling and dismissed the PCR petition, holding that Petitioner did not present a colorable claim for relief under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g) because his natural life sentence was not mandatory within the meaning of Miller and there had not been a significant change in the law that, if applied to Petitioner's case, would probably overturn his sentence. View "State ex rel. Mitchell v. Honorable Cooper" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a county attorney's prior representation of Defendant, who was charged with the crime of possession of methamphetamine for sale, did not create an appearance of impropriety in the current prosecution warranting disqualification of the entire county attorney's office.While still in private practice, Attorney represented Defendant in a marriage annulment matter, and Attorney eventually obtained a default annulment. Attorney was subsequently elected county attorney. The county attorney's office later charged Defendant with a drug-related crime. Defendant moved to disqualify the county attorney's office based upon an appearance of impropriety. The trial court granted the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the order disqualifying the county attorney's office, holding that there was no appearance of impropriety in the current prosecution because there was no substantial relationship between the annulment matter and the current matter upon which to conclude that Defendant would be prejudiced by the county attorney's office's continued prosecution. View "State v. Honorable Chambers" on Justia Law

In this murder case, the Supreme Court established a standard a defendant must satisfy to compel extraction of GPS data by a defendant's third-party agent from a crime victim's automobile for the trial court's in camera inspection and held that remand was required in the instant case.Defendant was charged with the second-degree murder of Grant Draper, making his brother Lane Draper a victim by virtue of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-4401(12), a statute that implements the Arizona Constitution's Victims' Bill of Rights. During plea negotiations and without notice to Lane, Defendant obtained a court order to access GPS data to support his third-party defense identifying Lane as the possible killer and for cross-examination regarding the time Defendant argued he was asleep. The trial court allowed the data to be extracted for a limited in camera interview. Lane filed a petition for special action, which the court of appeals denied. The Supreme Court held (1) a defendant is entitled to discovery from a victim if the defendant seeks evidence of a constitutional dimension and the defendant establishes that the requested discovery is very likely to contain such evidence; and (2) remand was required in this case. View "Draper v. Honorable Gentry" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the pre-trial orders of the trial court precluding Defendant from presenting at trial expert and lay witness testimony about his intellectual disability, holding that the trial court properly precluded the evidence but that Defendant could introduce admissible "behavioral-tendency evidence" through expert and lay witness testimony.Defendant was charged with child abuse, kidnapping, and first-degree felony murder for his daughter's death in the course of committing child abuse. Defendant was originally found incompetent to stand trial but, after restoration treatment, was determined competent to stand trial. At issue was certain pre-trial rulings made by the trial court. The Supreme Court held (1) the trial court properly precluded Defendant's proffered expert and lay witness testimony about his intellectual disability; (2) Defendant, however, may introduce what is sometimes referred to as "observation evidence" through expert and lay witness testimony; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reducing Defendant's proposed list of lay witnesses from eleven to two. View "Cruz v. Honorable Blair" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that felony resisting arrest constitutes a single unified offense, thus affirming the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of felony resisting arrest and other offenses and sentencing him accordingly.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court's instruction regarding the elements of resisting arrest under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-2508(A)(2) improperly conflated subsections (A)(1) and (A)(2). The court of appeals rejected the argument and affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 13-2508 is ambiguous because it may be reasonably read as setting forth a single unified offense or distinct crimes, and this Court concludes that subsections (A)(1) and (A)(2) are alternative means of committing one offense; (2) this Court's interpretation of section 13-2508 comports with the Sixth Amendment; and (3) because the two subsections set forth a single unified offense the jury instruction regarding this crime did not constitute error. View "State v. Luviano" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that legislative amendments to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-751(F)(5) enacted in 2019 did not provide a basis for post-conviction relief under Ariz. R. Cim. P. 32.1(a), (c), (g), or (h) for a sentence of death imposed in 1996 because the amendments were prospective only and the death sentence was constitutional.In 1996, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder - felony and premeditated. The trial court sentenced him to death. In 2020, Defendant filed this successive post-conviction relief (PCR) petition alleging that his death sentence was now unconstitutional as a consequence of 2019 legislative amendments. The superior court granted relief and vacated Defendant's death sentence. The Supreme Court reversed and affirmed Defendant's sentence, holding that the sentence was lawfully imposed and did not violate Defendant's constitutional rights under either the United States or Arizona Constitutions. View "State v. Greene" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded these cases to the court of appeals dismissing these appeals for lack of jurisdiction, holding that these were direct appeals over which the court of appeals had jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-4033(A).Petitioners were both sentenced to natural life for murders they committed when they were under the age of eighteen. After the Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) Petitioners filed postconviction relief (PCR) petitions to vacate their sentences. The trial court resentenced Petitioners. Thereafter, the court vacated the resentencings, concluding that Miller did not apply. Petitioners appealed pursuant to section 13-4033(A)(3). The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for failure to comply with the petition for review procedures set forth in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.16(a)(1). The Supreme Court remanded the cases, holding that the court of appeals had jurisdiction over the appeals. View "State v. Purcell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the post-conviction relief (PCR) court determining that Appellant raised a colorable claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel and ordering him to disclose certain materials, holding that the PCR court did not err in ordering the disclosure of the records.Appellant was found guilty of two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to death. In these PCR proceedings, the PCR court determined that Appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim in III(A)-III(E) of the PCR petition was colorable. The court then ordered Appellant to disclose materials associated with trial counsel's interviews of three of Appellant's family members who did not testify during the penalty phase of trial. Appellant filed a petition for special action, claiming that he should not have to disclose the records at issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was good cause for the disclosure of materials associated with the interviews under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.6(b)(2). View "Naranjo v. Honorable Sukenic" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the justification defense provided in Arizona's self-defense statute, Arizona. Rev. Stat. 13-404(A), does not extend to both the defendant and the victim but only applies to a defendant's conduct. Section 13-404(A) states that "a person is justified in threatening or using physical force against another when and to the extent a reasonable person would believe that physical force is immediately necessary to protect [one]self against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force." However, Rev. Ariz. Jury Instr. (Crim.) Justification for Self-Defense 4.04, at 63-65 (4th ed. 2016), states that the justification defense applies not to a "person" but to a "defendant." The court of appeals vacated Defendant's convictions and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the justification presumptions were not intended to apply to the victim's conduct. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) the term "person" in section 13-404(A) applies to a defendant in a criminal prosecution; and (2) therefore, the trial court erred when it modified the standard Revised Arizona Jury Instruction to incorporate a victim's use of force. View "State v. Ewer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order granting preliminary injunctive relief in this case, holding that courts lack authority to enter a nunc pro tunc order absent clerical error or mistake in the record rendering such an order void and subject to collateral attack.In 1994, Nevada Freeman was convicted of first-degree murder. In 2020, after disagreement about whether Freeman was parole eligible, Freeman and the State entered into a stipulation regarding Freeman's sentence. The stipulation stated that, at the time of Freeman's sentencing, the parties intended that after twenty-five years' imprisonment Freeman would be eligible for parole. The parties thus requested that Freeman's sentencing order be corrected to include the word "parole" as a form of release. The judge entered a nunc pro tunc order making the requested amendment. Freeman then filed claim for injunctive relief arguing that his sentence, as amended, clearly conferred parole eligibility. The trial judge granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court exceeded its authority under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.4 because it did not remedy a clerical error, omission, or oversight in the record. View "Shinn v. Ariz. Bd. Of Executive Clemency" on Justia Law