Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

On its face, Ariz. Const. art. II, 22(A)(2), the so-called On-Release provision, satisfies heightened scrutiny under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.The On-Release provision precludes bail for felony offenses committed when the person charged is already admitted to bail on a separate felony charge and where “the proof is evident or the presumption great” as to the present charge. Defendant was arrested and held without bail pursuant to the On-Release provision. Defendant moved to modify his release conditions, arguing that the On-Release provision was facially invalid because it deprived him of constitutional right to a pre-detention individualized determination of future dangerousness. The superior court denied the motion. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the On-Release provision and affirmed the superior court’s order denying Defendant bail, holding that the On-Release provision meets constitutional standards. View "Moreno v. Honorable Nicole Brickner" on Justia Law

Under Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987), in determining if a defendant acted with “reckless indifference to human life” while he was a major participant in a felony, thus making him eligible for the death penalty, the fact-finder may consider evidence of the defendant’s diminished capacity.The postconviction relief (PCR) court in this case granted Defendant relief by commuting his death sentence to a life sentence. The PCR court ruled (1) Defendant was ineligible for the death penalty under Tison because reasonable doubt existed whether he acted with the requisite reckless mental state; and (2) even if Defendant were death-eligible under Tison, he would be entitled to resentencing because he sufficiently demonstrated that the sentencing court would not have imposed the death penalty had it known of his mental health deficiencies. The Supreme Court affirmed the PCR court’s ruling that Defendant was ineligible for the death penalty under Tison, holding that the PCR court did not err by admitting diminished-capacity and voluntary-intoxication evidence in the Tison inquiry. View "State v. Miles" on Justia Law

Pursuant to Ariz. R. Evid. 609(a)(2), evidence of a shoplifting conviction is admissible to impeach a witness only when the court can readily determine that the conviction turned on proof of a dishonest act or false statement.During Defendant’s criminal trial, the prosecution called Witness to testify. Defendant told the court that he intended to impeach Witness with a 2015 misdemeanor shoplifting conviction. The trial court refused to admit the impeachment evidence. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that shoplifting is not categorically a “dishonest act or false statement” for purposes of Rule 609(a)(2). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a conviction for shoplifting is not automatically admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) because the crime does not necessarily require the prosecution to prove “a dishonest act or false statement” within the meaning of Rule 609(a)(2). View "State v. Winegardner" on Justia Law

Pursuant to Ariz. R. Evid. 609(a)(2), evidence of a shoplifting conviction is admissible to impeach a witness only when the court can readily determine that the conviction turned on proof of a dishonest act or false statement.During Defendant’s criminal trial, the prosecution called Witness to testify. Defendant told the court that he intended to impeach Witness with a 2015 misdemeanor shoplifting conviction. The trial court refused to admit the impeachment evidence. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that shoplifting is not categorically a “dishonest act or false statement” for purposes of Rule 609(a)(2). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a conviction for shoplifting is not automatically admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) because the crime does not necessarily require the prosecution to prove “a dishonest act or false statement” within the meaning of Rule 609(a)(2). View "State v. Winegardner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court disavowed the approach of the state’s courts prohibiting a defendant from simultaneously claiming self-defense and asserting a misidentification defense, holding that if some evidence supports a finding of self-defense, and even if the defendant asserts a misidentification defense, the prosecution must prove the absence of self-defense and the trial court must give a requested self-defense jury instruction.The court of appeals in this case reversed Defendant’s murder convictions and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the trial court erred in refusing to give a self-defense instruction on the grounds that Defendant had denied he had shot the victims. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals and reversed Defendant’s convictions and sentences, holding (1) at least the “slightest evidence” existed that Defendant shot the victims in self-defense; and (2) therefore, the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense. View "State v. Carson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court disavowed the approach of the state’s courts prohibiting a defendant from simultaneously claiming self-defense and asserting a misidentification defense, holding that if some evidence supports a finding of self-defense, and even if the defendant asserts a misidentification defense, the prosecution must prove the absence of self-defense and the trial court must give a requested self-defense jury instruction.The court of appeals in this case reversed Defendant’s murder convictions and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the trial court erred in refusing to give a self-defense instruction on the grounds that Defendant had denied he had shot the victims. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals and reversed Defendant’s convictions and sentences, holding (1) at least the “slightest evidence” existed that Defendant shot the victims in self-defense; and (2) therefore, the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense. View "State v. Carson" on Justia Law

At issue was the procedure for evaluating a capital defendant’s intellectual disability (ID) status before trial.Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-753(B) provides that the trial court shall order a pretrial ID evaluation in every capital case unless the defendant objects, and if the defendant objects, the defendant waives the right to a pretrial evaluation. In the instant case, more than two years after filing his objection to an ID evaluation and four months before the scheduled trial, Defendant moved to withdraw his objection to court-ordered testing. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that section 13-753(B) permitted Defendant to reinstate his right to a pretrial ID evaluation by withdrawing his objection. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the case for consideration of Defendant’s request for an ID evaluation, holding (1) a defendant cannot void his waiver under section 13-753(B) by later withdrawing his objection; but (2) a defendant’s waiver does not deprive the court of its discretionary authority to order a pretrial ID evaluation if the defendant later requests or consents to one. View "State v. Honorable Pamela S. Gates" on Justia Law

At issue was the procedure for evaluating a capital defendant’s intellectual disability (ID) status before trial.Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-753(B) provides that the trial court shall order a pretrial ID evaluation in every capital case unless the defendant objects, and if the defendant objects, the defendant waives the right to a pretrial evaluation. In the instant case, more than two years after filing his objection to an ID evaluation and four months before the scheduled trial, Defendant moved to withdraw his objection to court-ordered testing. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that section 13-753(B) permitted Defendant to reinstate his right to a pretrial ID evaluation by withdrawing his objection. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the case for consideration of Defendant’s request for an ID evaluation, holding (1) a defendant cannot void his waiver under section 13-753(B) by later withdrawing his objection; but (2) a defendant’s waiver does not deprive the court of its discretionary authority to order a pretrial ID evaluation if the defendant later requests or consents to one. View "State v. Honorable Pamela S. Gates" on Justia Law

When a defendant possesses an item that is statutorily defined contraband, the State need prove only that the defendant knowingly possessed the item, not that the defendant knew it was contraband, to convict the defendant under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-2505(A) of knowingly possessing contraband while being confined in a correctional facility or transported to it.Defendant was convicted of promoting prison contraband for possessing a cellphone at the relevant times. The court of appeals ruled that it was necessary for the State, in addition to proving that Defendant knew he had a cellphone, to also prove he knew it was contraband. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and held that the trial court correctly ruled that the State did not have to prove that Defendant knew the cellphone was contraband. View "State v. Francis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of the first degree murder of an on duty police officer and attempted first degree murder of another on duty peace officer but vacated Defendant’s death sentence and remanded for new penalty phase proceedings in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Lynch v. Arizona, 578 U.S. __ (2016). The court held (1) no prejudicial error occurred during the pretrial proceedings; (2) no prejudicial error occurred during the guilt phase proceedings; but (3) during the penalty phase proceedings, the trial court’s order precluding discussion of parole ineligibility was error and not harmless. View "State v. Hulsey" on Justia Law