Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the postconviction court’s grant of relief to Appellant. The postconviction court set aside Defendant’s death sentence for the murder of Holly Iler, finding ineffective assistance of counsel and a due process violation. The court ordered a new aggravation and penalty phase sentencing trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the evidence did not establish ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) on any of Defendant’s multiple IAC claims, and no aggregate IAC occurred here; and (2) the postconviction court erred in finding a due process violation based on testimony by the State’s medical expert because the expert did not present objectively false or misleading testimony. View "State v. Pandeli" on Justia Law

Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-707(B) does not require a repeat class one misdemeanor conviction to be both classified and sentenced as a class six felony.Defendant was convicted of the same class 1 misdemeanor of disorderly conduct in both 2012 and 2013. The trial court classified Defendant’s two 2013 convictions as class six felonies pursuant to section 13-707(B) and sentenced him as a category three repetitive felony offender. The Supreme Court modified Defendant’s disorderly conduct convictions and designated them as class one misdemeanors, holding that the trial court committed fundamental error when it classified Defendant’s 2013 disorderly conduct convictions as class six felonies and sentenced him as a category three repetitive felony offender. View "State v. Gulley" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of second degree murder. Defendant moved for a new trial under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.1(c)(1). The trial court granted the motion for a new trial, concluding that the guilty verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. After independently examining the evidence, the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the jury properly weighed the evidence and the verdict was not a miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order granting a new trial, holding (1) the court of appeals exceeded the proper scope of deferential appellate review by independently reweighing the evidence rather than determining if substantial evidence supported the trial judge’s ruling; and (2) substantial evidence existed to support the trial court’s determination. View "State v. Fischer" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of second degree murder. Following the guilty verdict, Defendant moved for a new trial under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.1(c)(1). The trial court granted the motion for a new trial, determining that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. After independently examining the evidence, the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the jury properly weighed the evidence and its verdict was not a miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court vacated in part the opinion of the court of appeals and affirmed the order granting a new trial, holding (1) the court of appeals exceeded the proper scope of appellate review by independently reweighing the evidence rather than determining if substantial evidence supported the trial judge’s ruling; and (2) substantial evidence existed to support the trial court’s determination. View "State v. Fischer" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possession or use of marijuana. At a settlement conference, Defendant agreed to participate in a drug treatment program through the Treatment Assessment Screening Center (TASC) in return for the State deferring the prosecution. Defendant then made a set of statements to TASC regarding his offense. The State later resumed the prosecution because Defendant had failed to attend TASC seminars and had tested positive for alcohol and marijuana while in the TASC program. Defendant moved to suppress the statements he gave to TASC, arguing that they were made during plea discussions and were therefore protected by Ariz. R. Evid. 410(a)(4). The trial court denied the motion. The court then found Defendant guilty. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Defendant’s statements were not protected by Rule 410(a)(4). The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals and affirmed Defendant’s conviction, holding that Rule 410(a)(4) does not apply to deferred prosecution agreements and that a knowing waiver of its provisions does not require specifically referencing the rule. View "State v. Gill" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of first degree murder and one count of first degree burglary. The jury sentenced Defendant to death for each murder. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences, holding (1) the trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion alleging that Arizona’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional without holding an evidentiary hearing; (2) the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument at the penalty phase did not constitute fundamental error; (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked Defendant’s self-representation after Defendant refused to proceed with jury selection on the scheduled trial date; (4) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s request for new counsel without holding an evidentiary hearing; and (5) Defendant’s death sentence was appropriate. View "State v. Hidalgo" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the constitutionality of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 28-1321(C), which allows law enforcement officers to make or direct nonconsensual blood draws from unconscious DUI suspects. Defendant was driving an SUV that was involved in a two-vehicle collision in Arizona. Defendant was airlifted to a Nevada hospital for treatment. Without seeking a warrant, a law enforcement officer instructed Department of Public Safety dispatch to request that Las Vegas police officers obtain a blood sample from Defendant. Defendant was unconscious when the blood sample was taken. Defendant was subsequently charged with numerous offenses, including aggravated driving under the extreme influence of intoxicating liquor with a suspended license. Defendant moved to suppress the results of his blood test, arguing that the statute authorizing his blood draw while unconscious violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, holding (1) section 28-1321(C) is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case; and (2) under Arizona law, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule would not apply in this case. Remanded to the trial court to determine whether Nevada or Arizona law applies and, if it is Nevada law, whether it supports application of the good-faith exception. View "State v. Havatone" on Justia Law

The Arizona Constitution and related laws forbid bail for defendants accused of sexual conduct with a minor under the age of fifteen when the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant committed such a crime. Defendant in this case was charged with multiple sexual offenses. Defendant petitioned to be released on bail, but the trial court concluded that the proof was evident and the presumption great that Defendant committed sexual conduct with a minor under the age of fifteen, rendering him ineligible for bail. Defendant challenged the facial constitutionality of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3961(A)(3) and the corresponding provision of the Arizona Constitution, article 2, section 22(A)(1). The trial court denied relief. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the provisions were unconstitutional because an individualized determination of dangerousness is necessary to withhold bail. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and vacated the court of appeals’ opinion, holding that the provisions at issue are unconstitutional on their face because they are not narrowly focused to protect public safety. Remanded. View "Simpson v. Hon. Phemonia Miller" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of reckless manslaughter. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress an involuntary blood sample taken for medical purposes when medical personnel rendered treatment against Defendant’s will. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion, holding that, to invoke the medical blood draw exception to the warrant requirement set forth in Ariz. Rev. Stat. 28-1388(E), the state must establish that a suspect expressly or impliedly consented to medical treatment or that medical personnel acted when the suspect was incapable of directing his or her own medical treatment. Remanded with directions that the trial court apply the standards set forth in this opinion. View "State v. Nissley" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first degree murder, sexual assault, and first degree burglary. Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder and to consecutive sentences of fifteen and twenty years’ imprisonment for the sexual assault and burglary counts, respectively. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and non-death sentences but vacated the death sentence and remanded for a new penalty phase, holding that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Lynch v. Arizona, the trial court erred by refusing to tell the jury that Defendant was ineligible for parole, and the error was not harmless. View "State v. Escalante-Orozco" on Justia Law