Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was arrested for operating a motorized watercraft while under the influence of alcohol or drugs (OUI) and transported to an aid station used by the sheriff’s office. Defendant read an “OUI Admonishment” form, which provided that “Arizona law requires you to submit” to breath, blood, or other bodily substance tests chosen by law enforcement. Defendant agreed to submit to a blood draw and was subsequently charged with two counts of OUI and one count of extreme OUI. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the test results, arguing that the warrantless search violated his Fourth Amendment rights because he did not voluntarily consent to the test. The justice court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. A jury subsequently found Defendant guilty. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant did not consent to giving blood samples in this case. Remanded. View "Brown v. Hon. Crane McClennen" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of ten counts of sexual exploitation of a minor and one count of conspiracy to commit sexual exploitation of a minor. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences on appeal. Appellant later filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and juror misconduct. The trial court summarily dismissed Appellant’s petition for post-conviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) neither Appellant’s trial counsel nor his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance; and (2) even if Appellant properly raised his juror misconduct claim, he failed to show prejudice. View "State v. Kolmann" on Justia Law

In 1993, Defendant, who was seventeen years old at the time, pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and other charges. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison. Defendant later filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32, claiming that recent scientific findings concerning juvenile psychology and neurology were newly discovered material facts that entitled him to post-conviction relief. The trial court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to present a colorable claim because the advancements in juvenile psychology and neurology offered by Defendant merely supplement then-existing knowledge of juvenile behavior that was considered at the time of Defendant’s sentencing. View "State v. Amaral" on Justia Law

After a second jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder. The State’s evidence supporting the conviction included testimony by a firearms examiner that a certain pistol had fired six shell casings found at the murder scene. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding Defendant from offering expert testimony that firearms examiners use subjective rather than scientifically rigorous methods in drawing conclusions from indentations on shell casings. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the trial court in part and remanded, holding that the trial court erred in excluding the expert testimony where Defendant’s expert witness was qualified and his testimony would have been helpful to the jury in understanding the evidence. View "State v. Romero" on Justia Law

In this capital case, Defendant was indicted on two counts of first degree murder. Defendant indicated that he would accept a plea offer to natural life it were offered to him, but the State did not extend a plea offer. Defendant later filed a motion in limine seeking permission to introduce evidence of his willingness to accept a natural life plea offer at the penalty phase of his trial if he is convicted and becomes eligible for the death penalty. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Defendant’s proposition did not evidence a true acceptance of responsibility for his actions. The Supreme Court vacated the order denying Defendant’s motion to permit introduction of evidence of his pretrial offer to plead guilty, holding that a capital defendant’s pretrial offer to plead guilty in exchange for a natural life sentence is admissible to demonstrate the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility for the murder, a non-statutory circumstance. View "Busso-Estopellan v. Hon. Rosa Morz" on Justia Law

Petitioners were each charged with two counts of driving under the influence (DUI). Count two alleged a violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 28-1381(A)(3), which prohibits driving a vehicle while there is cannabis (marijuana) or its metabolite in the defendant’s body. Both petitioners were medical marijuana cardholders. Petitioners were each convicted. At issue on appeal was whether the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act (AMMA) immunizes a medical marijuana cardholder from DUI prosecution under section 28-1381(A)(3). The Supreme Court affirmed Petitioners’ conviction, holding (1) the AMMA does not shield a medical marijuana cardholder from prosecution under section 28-1381(A)(3); but (2) the AMMA does but does afford an affirmative defense for those patients who can show that the marijuana or its metabolite was in a concentration insufficient to cause impairment. View "Dobson v. Hon. Crane McClennen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted review in this case to resolve the conflict between Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-116, which requires that concurrent sentences be imposed on a defendant whose convictions stem from a single act, and Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-705(M), which requires that sentences imposed on a defendant convicted of certain dangerous crimes against children run consecutively even when the underlying convictions arise from a single act. Defendant was convicted of reckless child abuse (Count 1), child abuse (Count 2), and first degree murder (Count 3). The trial court convicted her to terms of imprisonment on all counts, with Count 2 to be served consecutively to the other sentences. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions but modified the sentence to make Count 2 concurrent, rather than consecutive, to the other sentences. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) under the rule that when statutes conflict and cannot be harmonized, the more recent statute applies, section 13-705(M) should govern in this case because it is more recent; and (2) therefore, the trial court properly ordered Defendant’s sentence on Count 2 to be served consecutively to her other sentences. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

While executing a warrant authorizing the search of a home, police found Defendant, who was not named in the warrant, in the home. Police proceeded to search Defendant’s purse. Defendant was subsequently charged with possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence found in her purse, arguing that the search of her purse was unlawful because she was not named in the warrant. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that police were permitted to search the purse. The Supreme Court affirmed after adopting the possession test, under which officers may search personal items that are not in their owners’ possession when police find them in executing a premises search warrant, holding that because Defendant did not physically possess her purse when the officers found it, they were authorized to search it for the items listed in the warrant. View "State v. Gilstrap" on Justia Law

After a police officers had a consensual encounter with Defendant, they asked Defendant if he had any firearms. Defendant replied that he had a gun. The officers then frisked Defendant, removed the gun, and arrested Defendant as a prohibited possessor of a firearm. Defendant moved to suppress the gun as the fruit of an unconstitutional search. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that once the officers became aware that Defendant had a gun, they were allowed to remove the gun and conduct a pat down for safety purposes. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s conviction and sentence, holding that, during an initially consensual encounter with an individual, an officer must have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot before frisking the individual. View "State v. Serna" on Justia Law

Defendant was tried for three counts of child molestation. At trial, Defendant requested a Willits instruction regarding the destruction of of Tuscon Police Department and Child Protective Services recordings of an earlier interview with the alleged victim, arguing that the recordings would have been useful in impeaching the alleged victim's current testimony. The trial court denied the request on the grounds that the recordings had not been maliciously destroyed and that Defendant had not shown that they contained exculpatory evidence. A jury convicted Defendant on two counts. On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court erred in refusing to give a Willits instruction but reversed only the conviction and sentence on one count of which Defendant was convicted. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals, reversed the convictions and sentences, and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to give a Willits instruction, and the error was not harmless. View "State v. Glissendorf" on Justia Law