Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was tried for three counts of child molestation. At trial, Defendant requested a Willits instruction regarding the destruction of of Tuscon Police Department and Child Protective Services recordings of an earlier interview with the alleged victim, arguing that the recordings would have been useful in impeaching the alleged victim's current testimony. The trial court denied the request on the grounds that the recordings had not been maliciously destroyed and that Defendant had not shown that they contained exculpatory evidence. A jury convicted Defendant on two counts. On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court erred in refusing to give a Willits instruction but reversed only the conviction and sentence on one count of which Defendant was convicted. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals, reversed the convictions and sentences, and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to give a Willits instruction, and the error was not harmless. View "State v. Glissendorf" on Justia Law

Appellant was placed on probation. Appellant’s appointed counsel filed a notice of appeal. The Office of the Public Defender assigned the case to an attorney. Appellant informed the trial court, as well as her attorney, that she wished to represent herself on appeal, but her requests were ignored. Appellant’s counsel then filed a motion with the court of appeals seeking leave for Appellant to represent herself. The court of appeals denied the motion, concluding that although there was no constitutional right to self-representation on appeal, self-representation was permitted if the request was timely, and Appellant’s request was untimely. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ decision, holding (1) the Arizona Constitution provides a defendant with a right to self-representation on appeal, and (2) the request for self-representation on appeal must be made no later than thirty days after the filing of the notice of appeal. Remanded. View "Coleman v. Hon. Johnsen" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on multiple counts of child molestation and sexual conduct with a minor under age fifteen, and the case proceeded to trial. An expert witness for the State testified during trial, explaining in general how children perceive sexual abuse and describing behaviors involving disclosure of abuse. The jury found Defendant guilty on all but two counts. Defendant appealed the admission of the testimony, arguing that the testimony was barred by Ariz. R. Evid. 702 because it was “cold” in that it educated the jury about general principles but was not tied to the particular facts of the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the expert testimony, as Rule 702(d) does not bar the admission of “cold” expert testimony that educates the trier of fact about general principles without considering the particular facts of the case. View "State v. Salazar-Mercado" on Justia Law

After field sobriety tests revealed that Defendant had Carboxy-Tetrahydrocannobinol (“Carboxy-THC”) in his blood while driving, the State charged Defendant with violating Ariz. Rev. Stat. 28-1381(A)(3), which prohibits driving a vehicle while there is any drug defined in Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3401 or its metabolite in the person’s body. The justice court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge, reasoning that, although Carboxy-THC is a marijuana metabolite, the legislature did not intend to include all possible byproducts, particularly those that are inactive and cannot impair the driver. The court of appeals disagreed, holding that section 28-1381(A)(3)’s language prohibiting driving with a proscribed drug or its metabolite included the metabolite Carboxy-THC. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the “metabolite” reference in section 28-1381(A)(3) is limited to any of a proscribed substance’s metabolites that are capable of causing impairment; and (2) therefore, drivers cannot be convicted of violating section 28-1381(A)(3) based merely on the presence of a non-impairing metabolite, such as Carboxy-THC. View "State ex rel. Montgomery v. Shilgevorkyan" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was when “entry” occurs under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.3, which requires that a notice of appeal be filed within twenty days after the “entry” of judgment and sentence. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of four counts of aggravated DUI. Defendant filed his notice of appeal twenty-one days after his sentencing but only nineteen days after the clerk of court filed the minute entry memorializing Defendant's sentence. The State challenged the notice as untimely. The court of appeals held that the timeliness of Defendant’s appeal could be measured from the date the minute entry was filed. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals and dismissed the appeal, holding that entry occurs when the sentence is pronounced, and defendants have twenty days from that date to file a notice of appeal. View "State v. Whitman" on Justia Law

James Koontz was charged with one count of aggravated assault and a domestic violence offense, and Robert Gill was charged with three counts of theft of a means of transportation. The prosecutor in both cases unilaterally redacted the victims’ birth dates from law enforcement reports disclosed to the defense. In both cases, defense counsel filed motions to compel disclosure, which the trial courts granted. The State subsequently petitioned for special action. The court of appeals consolidated the cases and granted relief to the State. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ decision and remanded with regard to Gill, as Koontz did not participate in the petition for review, holding that a prosecutor must obtain a court order to authorize redacting victims’ birth dates from law enforcement reports that must be disclosed to defense counsel. View "State ex rel. Montgomery v. Hon. Chavez" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Appellant for first degree murder, among other offenses. The grand jury also found probable cause to support three aggravating circumstances to support the imposition of the death penalty. Appellant filed a motion to remand for a new finding of probable cause, arguing that the grand jury was precluded from considering the aggravating circumstances and that the State’s presentation of the issue denied him the opportunity to request a Chronis hearing. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that a capital case defendant is not entitled to a Chronis hearing if a grand jury has found that probable cause supports the existence of alleged aggravating circumstances. The Supreme Court vacated the lower courts’ judgments and directed the trial court to grant Appellant’s request and hold a Chronis hearing, holding that the grand jury lacks authority to determine whether probable cause supports the existence of aggravating circumstances alleged in a capital case, and any grand jury findings concerning aggravating circumstances cannot deprive a defendant of a timely requested Chronis hearing. View "Sanchez v. Hon. Ainley" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of two counts of first degree murder for stabbing his pregnant girlfriend, killing her and the unborn baby. Appellant was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions and death sentences, holding that the trial court did not (1) err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress his post-arrest confession; (2) err in striking a juror for cause; (3) err in screening and limiting questions used in a written questionnaire sent to prospective jurors; (4) err in precluding or limiting the testimony of three defense witnesses; (5) commit fundamental error by allowing evidence of statements Appellant made four years before the murders; (6) abuse its discretion in finding that the State’s mental health expert qualified as an expert in intellectual disability and in therefore allowing the expert to testify on the issue of Appellant’s intellectual ability; and (7) violate Appellant’s right to counsel by not declaring a mistrial based on the alleged ineffectiveness of Appellant’s trial attorneys. In addition, the jury did not abuse its discretion in finding aggravating circumstances and in determining that death was the appropriate sentence. View "State v. Naranjo" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree felony murder and six other felonies for offenses committed during a home invasion. The trial court imposed death sentences for the murders and prison sentences totaling seventy-five years for the non-capital counts. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences but ordered that her sentences for armed robbery and aggravated robbery run concurrently, holding, among other things, that (1) the trial court did not commit reversible error in granting Defendant’s motion for a change of venue based on extensive media coverage of the crimes, deciding its rulings regarding jury selection, and instructing the jury; (2) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct; and (3) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences for robbery and aggravated robbery because these crimes were based on a single act by Defendant. View "State v. Forde" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of five counts of first degree murder, among other charges, and sentenced to death for each murder. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences, holding (1) Defendant was not deprived of his right to a speedy trial; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by consolidating the murder and solicitation of first degree murder charges; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting into evidence certain victims’ recorded statements; (4) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for mistrial; (5) the trial court did not err in admitting a forensic firearms expert’s testimony; (6) substantial evidence supported the solicitation convictions; (7) the trial court did not err in its jury instructions; (8) and substantial evidence supported the jury’s findings of aggravating circumstances and the imposition of the death sentences. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law