Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Patrick Ferrero was charged with three counts of sexual conduct with a minor. The trial court admitted evidence of "other uncharged acts" with the minor. The judge did not screen the evidence under Ariz. R. Evid. 404(c), which permits "other act" evidence to prove the defendant's propensity to commit the charged offense, but only if the court makes specific findings. The court of appeals reversed Ferrero's convictions on two counts, holding that the trial judge erred in failing to screen the evidence of Ferrero's prior sexual conduct with the minor - State v. Garner evidence - under Rule 404(c). At issue before the Supreme Court was whether evidence of similar sexual contact with the same minor victim is "intrinsic evidence" that is not governed by Rule 404(c). The Court vacated the court of appeals and remanded the case for a new trial on the first two counts, holding (1) Rule 404(c) does not apply to truly intrinsic evidence, but Garner evidence is not inherently intrinsic; and (2) because the evidence in this case was offered to prove Ferrero's propensity to commit the charged act, the trial court erred in admitting evidence of that act without screening it under Rule 404(c).

After a jury trial, Pete VanWinkle was found guilty of attempted murder and other offenses. VanWinkle appealed, arguing that the trial court violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by admitting evidence of his post-custody, pre-Miranda silence, and the prosecutorial comment on it. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Miranda did not apply because there was no police interrogation. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals but affirmed VanWinkle's convictions and sentences, holding (1) the admission of post-custody, pre-Miranda silence and prosecutorial comment on such silence violates a defendant's constitutional right to remain silent; but (2) the error in this case was harmless.

Granvil Wallace pleaded guilty and was sentenced to death by the trial judge for three murders. The Supreme Court subsequently reduced the death sentence for one murder count to life in prison because the evidence was insufficient to prove an aggravating circumstance as to that murder. In this appeal the Supreme Court vacated Wallace's remaining two death sentences and sentenced him to consecutive life terms of imprisonment, holding that the State had no established beyond a reasonable doubt that Wallace inflicted gratuitous violence on the two victims, and thus, the murders were not heinous or depraved under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-751(F)(6), the sole aggravating factor alleged in this case.

A jury found Benjamin Cota guilty of two counts of first degree murer, two counts of armed robbery, one count of possession of narcotics, and one count of unlawful flight. Cota was sentenced to death on one first degree murder count and to prison terms for the other counts. The trial judge stated that he believed Arizona law "required" him to make the sentences on the "non-capital" counts consecutive, and he did so on all but the flight count. The Supreme Court affirmed Cota's convictions and death sentence but remanded for resentencing on the non-capital counts, holding that although the judge here imposed one concurrent sentence, the Court was not convinced the judge was aware of his discretion to do the same with all other sentences under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-708.

After Petitioner was indicted on child abuse, the State extended a plea offer in May 2009 without imposing a deadline for its acceptance. A new prosecutor was assigned to the case in August 2009 and notified Petitioner that the offer was no longer available. Petitioner moved under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.8, which authorizes sanctions if a prosecutor imposes a plea deadline and fails to disclose certain information to the defense at least thirty days before the offer lapses, to preclude any evidence disclosed after July 29, 2009. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals granted relief to Petitioner, holding that rule 15.8 applied because the State effectively imposed a deadline on the offer by withdrawing it. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals, holding (1) rule 15.8 does not apply when a prosecutor withdraws an open-ended plea offer; and (2) in such a situation, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.7 governs the imposition of sanctions for any failure to make required disclosures. Remanded.

A jury found James Styers guilty of the 1989 murder, conspiracy to commit first degree murder, kidnapping, and child abuse of a four-year-old. After finding three aggravating factors and no mitigating circumstances, the trial judge sentenced Styers to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence. Styers then filed a habeas corpus petition, which the district court denied. The court of appeals reversed and granted relief, finding that in independently reviewing Styers' death sentence, the Supreme Court erroneously refused to consider as a mitigating circumstance the PTSD Styers suffered from as a result of military service in Vietnam. The Supreme Court granted the state's request to conduct a new independent review. On review, the Court affirmed Styers' sentence, holding that Styers' PTSD, in combination with all other mitigating evidence previously considered by the Court, was not sufficient to warrant leniency in light of the aggravating factors proven in this case.

Michael Hummons agreed to speak with a police officer on the sidewalk. During the encounter the officer discovered an outstanding warrant for Hummons' arrest. The officer arrested Hummons, and in a search incident to that arrest discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia in Hummons' backpack. At trial Hummons moved to suppress the evidence, arguing it was obtained as the result of an illegal detention. The trial court denied the motion, finding the officer's encounter with Hummons consensual. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the appellate court, holding that the court overemphasized the importance the warrant as an intervening circumstance in dissipating the taint of any prior illegality and that the court should have applied the third Brown v. Illinois factor, i.e., the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. The Court held the totality of the circumstances militated against suppressing the evidence and upheld the judgment of the trial court.

In May 2006, Mesa police responded to an aggravated assault call. Officers went to the apartment complex where Appellant Laquinn Fisher lived. Officers knocked and announced their presence. Appellant and two others came to the door. None had weapons, and all there were cooperative. Appellant matched a description given by the alleged assault victim. Despite having this information, officers thought further investigation was necessary because a gun used in the assault was still "unaccounted for. Without asking whether anyone else was inside, police entered the apartment to see if anyone else was there. Inside, officers smelled marijuana and observed open duffle bags containing drugs. After the sweep, officers obtained written consent from Appellant's roommate to search the apartment, and then seized the drugs. Appellant was charged with various crimes, including possession of marijuana. Appellant moved to suppress evidence of the marijuana that was seized. The trial court denied the motion, and a jury subsequently found Appellant guilty on the possession charge. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court centered on whether the police lawfully conducted a protective sweep of a suspect's home when the suspect and the only other occupants were detained outside. The Court held that the protective sweep in Appellant's case violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court vacated Appellant's possession conviction, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Appellees Randall and Penny West were charged with child abuse after an infant in their foster care died from severe head trauma. During their joint trial, each moved for an acquittal at the close of the Stateâs case and after the close of evidence. The trial court denied those motions. The jury found both guilty on child abuse charges. After the trial, Appellees renewed their motions for acquittal which this time was granted by the trial court. The court held that there was no evidence to prove who injured the child. The appellate court reversed the trial courtâs decision granting Appelleesâ motions. The appellate court used the Supreme Courtâs holding in the âHyderâ case. Upon review of this case, the Supreme Court overturned its holding in âState ex rel. Hyder v. Superior Courtâ (âHyderâ), which placed conditions on trial courtsâ granting of post-verdict motions for acquittal. The Court held that the âHyderâ case was now inconsistent with state law. In this case, the trial judge thoroughly explained his reasons for granting defendantsâ post-verdict motions. Because the appellate court reviewed the trial courtâs ruling under âHyderâ conditions, it did not determine whether the trial courtâs record reflected substantial evidence to warrant the convictions. The Supreme Court vacated the appellate courtâs decision, remanded the case for the lower court to address the sufficiency of the evidence and the merits of the trial courtâs decision.

Appellant Wayne Prince, Jr. was convicted of first degree murder for the death of his step-daughter and for the attempted murder of his wife. The jury found Appellant guilty, and the trial judge sentenced Appellant to death. The sentence was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court. Under the law in effect when Appellant killed his step-daughter, the trial judge decided whether to impose the death penalty, but a jury needed to determine whether there were mitigating circumstances from the case that might warrant life imprisonment. A penalty-phase was impaneled, and it found no mitigating factors to spare Appellant from the death sentence. The second jury sentenced Appellant to death. Appellant appealed, citing among other issues that the second juryâs sentence gave the State a second chance to seek a death sentence thus violating the ex post facto clauses of the U.S. and Arizona Constitutions. Upon re-review, the Supreme Court was not persuaded by Appellantâs ex post facto argument, and affirmed the trial courtâs death sentence.