Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the pre-trial orders of the trial court precluding Defendant from presenting at trial expert and lay witness testimony about his intellectual disability, holding that the trial court properly precluded the evidence but that Defendant could introduce admissible "behavioral-tendency evidence" through expert and lay witness testimony.Defendant was charged with child abuse, kidnapping, and first-degree felony murder for his daughter's death in the course of committing child abuse. Defendant was originally found incompetent to stand trial but, after restoration treatment, was determined competent to stand trial. At issue was certain pre-trial rulings made by the trial court. The Supreme Court held (1) the trial court properly precluded Defendant's proffered expert and lay witness testimony about his intellectual disability; (2) Defendant, however, may introduce what is sometimes referred to as "observation evidence" through expert and lay witness testimony; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reducing Defendant's proposed list of lay witnesses from eleven to two. View "Cruz v. Honorable Blair" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that felony resisting arrest constitutes a single unified offense, thus affirming the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of felony resisting arrest and other offenses and sentencing him accordingly.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court's instruction regarding the elements of resisting arrest under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-2508(A)(2) improperly conflated subsections (A)(1) and (A)(2). The court of appeals rejected the argument and affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 13-2508 is ambiguous because it may be reasonably read as setting forth a single unified offense or distinct crimes, and this Court concludes that subsections (A)(1) and (A)(2) are alternative means of committing one offense; (2) this Court's interpretation of section 13-2508 comports with the Sixth Amendment; and (3) because the two subsections set forth a single unified offense the jury instruction regarding this crime did not constitute error. View "State v. Luviano" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that legislative amendments to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-751(F)(5) enacted in 2019 did not provide a basis for post-conviction relief under Ariz. R. Cim. P. 32.1(a), (c), (g), or (h) for a sentence of death imposed in 1996 because the amendments were prospective only and the death sentence was constitutional.In 1996, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder - felony and premeditated. The trial court sentenced him to death. In 2020, Defendant filed this successive post-conviction relief (PCR) petition alleging that his death sentence was now unconstitutional as a consequence of 2019 legislative amendments. The superior court granted relief and vacated Defendant's death sentence. The Supreme Court reversed and affirmed Defendant's sentence, holding that the sentence was lawfully imposed and did not violate Defendant's constitutional rights under either the United States or Arizona Constitutions. View "State v. Greene" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded these cases to the court of appeals dismissing these appeals for lack of jurisdiction, holding that these were direct appeals over which the court of appeals had jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-4033(A).Petitioners were both sentenced to natural life for murders they committed when they were under the age of eighteen. After the Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) Petitioners filed postconviction relief (PCR) petitions to vacate their sentences. The trial court resentenced Petitioners. Thereafter, the court vacated the resentencings, concluding that Miller did not apply. Petitioners appealed pursuant to section 13-4033(A)(3). The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for failure to comply with the petition for review procedures set forth in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.16(a)(1). The Supreme Court remanded the cases, holding that the court of appeals had jurisdiction over the appeals. View "State v. Purcell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the post-conviction relief (PCR) court determining that Appellant raised a colorable claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel and ordering him to disclose certain materials, holding that the PCR court did not err in ordering the disclosure of the records.Appellant was found guilty of two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to death. In these PCR proceedings, the PCR court determined that Appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim in III(A)-III(E) of the PCR petition was colorable. The court then ordered Appellant to disclose materials associated with trial counsel's interviews of three of Appellant's family members who did not testify during the penalty phase of trial. Appellant filed a petition for special action, claiming that he should not have to disclose the records at issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was good cause for the disclosure of materials associated with the interviews under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.6(b)(2). View "Naranjo v. Honorable Sukenic" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the justification defense provided in Arizona's self-defense statute, Arizona. Rev. Stat. 13-404(A), does not extend to both the defendant and the victim but only applies to a defendant's conduct. Section 13-404(A) states that "a person is justified in threatening or using physical force against another when and to the extent a reasonable person would believe that physical force is immediately necessary to protect [one]self against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force." However, Rev. Ariz. Jury Instr. (Crim.) Justification for Self-Defense 4.04, at 63-65 (4th ed. 2016), states that the justification defense applies not to a "person" but to a "defendant." The court of appeals vacated Defendant's convictions and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the justification presumptions were not intended to apply to the victim's conduct. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) the term "person" in section 13-404(A) applies to a defendant in a criminal prosecution; and (2) therefore, the trial court erred when it modified the standard Revised Arizona Jury Instruction to incorporate a victim's use of force. View "State v. Ewer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order granting preliminary injunctive relief in this case, holding that courts lack authority to enter a nunc pro tunc order absent clerical error or mistake in the record rendering such an order void and subject to collateral attack.In 1994, Nevada Freeman was convicted of first-degree murder. In 2020, after disagreement about whether Freeman was parole eligible, Freeman and the State entered into a stipulation regarding Freeman's sentence. The stipulation stated that, at the time of Freeman's sentencing, the parties intended that after twenty-five years' imprisonment Freeman would be eligible for parole. The parties thus requested that Freeman's sentencing order be corrected to include the word "parole" as a form of release. The judge entered a nunc pro tunc order making the requested amendment. Freeman then filed claim for injunctive relief arguing that his sentence, as amended, clearly conferred parole eligibility. The trial judge granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court exceeded its authority under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.4 because it did not remedy a clerical error, omission, or oversight in the record. View "Shinn v. Ariz. Bd. Of Executive Clemency" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions on two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, two counts of aggravated assault causing temporary but substantial disfigurement, and one count of attempted second degree murder, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.At issue on appeal was whether the trial court committed fundamental error by instructing the jury that a conviction for attempted second degree murder may be based not only on intent to kill but on recklessness or the defendant's knowledge that serious injury would result. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) the trial court's instruction on second degree murder was erroneous, and a new instruction is necessary, which the Court adopts in this opinion; and (2) based on the evidence, the nature of the charged offense, and other factors, Defendant fell short of meeting his burden of persuading the Court that he suffered prejudice. View "State v. Fierro" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's motion seeking remand to the grand jury for a redetermination of probable cause pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 12.9, holding that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's Rule 12.9 motion.A grand jury indicted Defendant for attempted second degree murder and other crimes. Defendant subsequently filed the motion at issue, arguing that the State withheld clearly exculpatory evidence of a justification defense that it was obligated to present despite the evidence not being requested by the defense. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Arizona Constitution guarantees a person under grand jury investigation a due process right to a fair and impartial presentation of clearly exculpatory evidence, and a prosecutor has a duty to present such evidence to a grand jury even in the absence of a specific request; (2) where there is evidence relevant to a justification defense that would deter a grand jury from finding probable cause the prosecutor has an obligation to present such evidence; and (3) the State failed to present clearly exculpatory evidence in this case, denying Defendant a substantial procedural right. View "Willis v. Honorable Bernini" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of two counts of sexual conduct with a minor under age fifteen and other charges, holding that contributing to the delinquency of a minor, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3613, is not a lesser-included offense of sexual conduct with a minor, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-1405.The court of appeals vacated Defendant's conviction of committing sexual conduct with a minor under age fifteen, holding that contributing to the delinquency of a minor is a lesser-included offense of sexual conduct with a minor under age fifteen. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion and remanded to the court of appeals for further proceedings, holding that contributing to the delinquency of a minor is not a lesser-included offense of sexual conduct with a minor. View "State v. Agueda" on Justia Law