Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Raymond Lovett was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment plus a fifteen-year firearm enhancement by a Pulaski County Circuit Court jury. The conviction stemmed from the shooting death of Leighton Whitfield at St. Vincent North Hospital in Sherwood. Lovett shot Whitfield multiple times after a confrontation. Lovett then turned himself in at a nearby gas station. Lovett testified that he shot Whitfield because he felt threatened when Whitfield stood up after Lovett had shown him a gun.The Pulaski County Circuit Court jury found Lovett guilty of capital murder and imposed the sentence. Lovett appealed, challenging the prosecution’s statements during closing arguments. He argued that the prosecutor’s comments violated the “golden rule” by asking jurors to put themselves in the position of a party or victim. However, Lovett did not obtain a ruling on this objection at trial, nor did he make the golden-rule argument below, leading the court to decline to consider this argument on appeal. Lovett also argued that the circuit court’s failure to give an admonition or curative instruction constituted an abuse of discretion, but the court found no manifest abuse of discretion.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that Lovett’s arguments regarding the prosecutor’s statements were not preserved for review because he failed to obtain a ruling at trial and did not develop the arguments below. The court also found no reversible error upon reviewing the record for all errors prejudicial to Lovett. View "Lovett v. State" on Justia Law

Clarence Turnbo was convicted of rape by a Pulaski County jury, and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. Turnbo subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1. He argued that his trial counsel failed in several areas, including impeaching a witness, challenging DNA evidence, seeking expert testimony, objecting to the prosecutor's opening statement, calling him to testify, investigating the victim's prior sexual history, and "federalizing" his arguments.The Pulaski County Circuit Court denied Turnbo's petition, finding that he did not demonstrate entitlement to relief. The court noted that many of Turnbo's claims were either conclusory or addressed strategic decisions by counsel, which are generally not grounds for postconviction relief. The court also found that Turnbo failed to show prejudice resulting from his counsel's actions, as required under the Strickland v. Washington standard for ineffective assistance of counsel.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Turnbo did not meet the burden of proving that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. The court also noted that many of Turnbo's arguments were raised for the first time on appeal and could not be considered. Additionally, the court found that the trial court did not err in denying an evidentiary hearing, as the record conclusively showed that Turnbo was not entitled to relief.In conclusion, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Turnbo's petition for postconviction relief, holding that he failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel and was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. View "Turnbo v. State" on Justia Law

A twelve-year-old child disclosed to a school counselor that she had been communicating with a twenty-six-year-old man, later identified as Eric Overton, via Snapchat. The child’s mother confirmed the communication, obtained evidence from the phone, and contacted law enforcement. The investigation revealed that Overton and the child had exchanged nude photographs and sexually explicit messages, and that Overton had picked up the child from her home on three occasions, during which they engaged in sexual intercourse. The child provided detailed testimony at trial regarding these encounters.The Hot Spring County Circuit Court presided over the trial, during which Overton objected to the prosecutor’s voir dire questioning about whether a conviction could be based on the testimony of a single credible witness. The court overruled the objection and denied a subsequent motion for mistrial, emphasizing that the jury would be instructed on the law at the end of the case. The jury was later instructed on the presumption of innocence and the State’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury found Overton guilty of rape and internet stalking of a child, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment on each count.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed whether there was substantial evidence to support the rape conviction and whether the circuit court erred in its handling of voir dire and jury instructions. The court held that the evidence, including the victim’s testimony, was sufficient to support the conviction, and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mistrial. The court affirmed the convictions, finding no prejudicial error in the proceedings. View "Overton v. State" on Justia Law

Ronald Russell was charged with internet stalking of a child after engaging in online conversations with a police detective posing as a fourteen-year-old girl. The detective, using the Whisper social media app, arranged a meeting with Russell, who was subsequently arrested. During discovery, it was revealed that the State did not possess earlier communications between Russell and the detective, as they had been deleted by the detective. Russell filed a motion in limine to exclude the preserved communications, arguing that without the context of the deleted messages, the evidence would be misleading and prejudicial.The Benton County Circuit Court granted Russell’s motion in limine, ruling that the preserved messages were inadmissible. The court did not find a Brady violation but analyzed the issue under due process principles from California v. Trombetta and Arizona v. Youngblood. The court concluded that the State failed to show the deleted messages had no exculpatory value, were available by other means, or were deleted in good faith according to standard procedures.The State of Arkansas appealed to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, arguing that the circuit court erred in its ruling. However, the Supreme Court of Arkansas dismissed the appeal, stating that it lacked jurisdiction under Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure–Criminal 3(a). The court determined that the appeal was from an order granting a motion in limine, not a motion to suppress seized evidence as required by Rule 3(a)(1). Consequently, the appeal did not meet the criteria for interlocutory review, and the motion to dismiss the appeal was granted. View "STATE OF ARKANSAS v. RUSSELL" on Justia Law

Terry Break was convicted in 2021 of multiple child sexual abuse offenses, including rape, second-degree sexual assault, and sexual indecency with a child, involving three minor victims. He received six life sentences plus 488 years in prison and $425,000 in fines. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Break then filed a Rule 37 petition for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on several grounds.The Boone County Circuit Court denied Break's petition. The court found that the State had provided sufficient evidence of "sexual gratification or desire" for the offenses, and thus, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge this element. The court also found that the prosecutor's comment during closing arguments, referring to Break as a "proven liar," was based on Break's own admissions and was not improper. Additionally, the court determined that the prosecutor's opening statement did not shift the burden of proof, as it referred to Break's demeanor during a recorded interview rather than his silence at trial. Lastly, the court acknowledged that the prosecutor's biblical reference during closing arguments was improper but concluded that Break failed to show that trial counsel's failure to object constituted ineffective assistance.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that Break failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance was deficient or that any alleged deficiencies prejudiced the outcome of his trial. The court emphasized that Break did not provide sufficient evidence to support his claims of ineffective assistance and that the decisions made by his trial counsel fell within the range of reasonable professional judgment. View "BREAK v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

Lavoyce Wilder was convicted of two counts of rape, three counts of first-degree sexual assault, and two counts of sexual indecency with a child. He was sentenced to two life terms, three thirty-year terms, and two six-year terms, all to run concurrently. Wilder appealed, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences. Wilder then filed a petition for postconviction relief under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1, which was denied and dismissed by the Pike County Circuit Court.In his petition, Wilder argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for various reasons, including failing to preserve the record, provide witness statements, and introduce evidence. He also claimed prosecutorial misconduct, denial of a fair trial, and a violation of his right to a speedy trial. The trial court found that most of Wilder’s claims were related to trial strategy and did not demonstrate entitlement to relief. The court specifically addressed two claims: the inability of a witness to testify due to a stroke and the alleged impact of trial counsel’s hearing-aid malfunction, finding neither would have changed the trial's outcome.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court noted that most of Wilder’s claims on appeal were not raised in the lower court and thus could not be addressed. The court also found that Wilder’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel were either not substantiated or were matters of trial strategy. The court concluded that Wilder failed to demonstrate he was entitled to postconviction relief and affirmed the denial of his Rule 37.1 petition. View "WILDER v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

Aaron Spencer was charged with second-degree murder and a firearm enhancement for the shooting death of Michael Fosler. Fosler had been charged with sexual offenses against Spencer’s daughter and was out on bond. On the night of the incident, Spencer found his daughter in Fosler’s truck and forced it off the road, resulting in an altercation where Spencer shot Fosler, who died at the scene. The case garnered significant media attention, leading the State to request a gag order to preserve the integrity of the jury pool and ensure a fair trial.The Lonoke County Circuit Court granted the State’s motion for a gag order without holding a hearing. The order restricted various parties, including attorneys, public officials, and Spencer’s family, from making public statements about the case. Spencer opposed the gag order, arguing it violated his constitutional rights to a fair and public trial and free speech. He filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Arkansas Supreme Court, seeking to vacate the gag order.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the gag order was overly broad, vague, and lacked a factual basis. The court held that the order constituted a plain, manifest, clear, and gross abuse of discretion. The court emphasized that gag orders should be a last resort and must be narrowly tailored based on specific factual findings. The court granted Spencer’s petition for writ of certiorari, issued the writ, and vacated the circuit court’s gag order. The court did not preclude the possibility of a subsequent, more narrowly tailored gag order after an evidentiary hearing. View "SPENCER v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

Deric Smith was convicted by a jury in the Jefferson County Circuit Court of capital murder for the shooting death of Emmanuel Foster and first-degree battery for wounding Jason Anderson. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for the murder and fifteen years for the battery, with additional firearm enhancements. Smith appealed, arguing insufficient evidence for the capital murder conviction and that the State failed to disprove his justification defense.Smith was charged with premeditated and deliberate capital murder and first-degree battery, with firearm enhancements. He claimed justification as a defense. Smith and his girlfriend, Lamiesha Toney, were tried together. The victims were shot while in Smith’s car, and Smith and Toney later surrendered to the police. Toney initially claimed she shot the victims in self-defense, but other witnesses suggested Smith was the shooter. Smith testified that he shot Anderson and Foster in self-defense during a struggle over a gun.The circuit court denied Smith’s motion for a directed verdict, and the jury convicted him. Smith argued on appeal that the circuit court erred in denying his directed-verdict motion and that there was insufficient evidence of premeditation. The Arkansas Supreme Court declined to consider the directed-verdict argument because Smith presented evidence in his defense after the State rested. The court found substantial evidence supporting premeditation, noting Smith’s testimony and the nature of Foster’s fatal wound.Smith also argued that the State failed to disprove his justification defense. The court held that the jury was instructed on justification and was within its authority to reject Smith’s self-defense claim. The jury could reasonably conclude that shooting Foster in the back of the head was not justified. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. View "SMITH v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

Amber Dawn Waterman was charged in Benton County, Arkansas, with two counts of premeditated and deliberated capital murder for the deaths of Ashley Bush and her unborn child, Valkyrie Grace Willis. Waterman had previously pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri to kidnapping resulting in death and kidnapping resulting in the death of an unborn child. She was sentenced to two life sentences in federal court.In the Benton County Circuit Court, Waterman entered pleas of not guilty and former jeopardy, and filed a motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-114 and the Arkansas Constitution. The circuit court denied her motion, finding that the state charges were not barred by double jeopardy.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that the federal and state charges each required proof of different facts and were intended to prevent substantially different harms or evils. The federal charges required proof of kidnapping and interstate transport, while the state charges required proof of premeditated and deliberated intent to cause death. Therefore, the prosecution in Arkansas was not barred by Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-114.Additionally, the court declined Waterman's request to interpret the Arkansas Constitution's double jeopardy provision more broadly than the federal provision, thereby upholding the dual sovereignty doctrine. The court concluded that the Arkansas Constitution does not prohibit Waterman’s state prosecution under these circumstances. The decision of the Benton County Circuit Court was affirmed. View "WATERMAN v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

In 2018, Jodeci K. Norvel entered a negotiated guilty plea and received an eighteen-year sentence for battery in the first degree and possession of firearms by certain persons. His sentencing order included a note that he had two prior residential burglaries and should serve flat time. Norvel later filed a petition for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and a writ of mandamus, arguing that under Act 683 of 2023, he was eligible for parole because his sentencing order did not expressly designate that he was sentenced under the relevant statute.The Pulaski County Circuit Court granted Norvel’s petition, finding that Act 683 applied to him and that he was eligible for parole. The court determined that Norvel’s sentencing order did not contain an express designation under Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-609(b)(2)(B), as required by the statute.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the notation on Norvel’s sentencing order did not constitute an express designation that he was sentenced under section 16-93-609. The court emphasized that the statute requires a clear and unmistakable reference to the specific section, which was not present in Norvel’s sentencing order. The court also rejected the appellants’ argument that the circuit court’s interpretation of Act 683 led to absurd results contrary to legislative intent, citing its previous decision in Rodgers v. Arkansas Parole Board. Consequently, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s order, granting Norvel the relief he sought. View "ARKANSAS POST-PRISON TRANSFER BOARD v. NORVEL" on Justia Law