Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A jury found defendant Tommie Lee Kindall guilty of felony battery causing serious bodily injury, misdemeanor assault, and misdemeanor domestic violence. After the verdicts, but before a court trial on the prior prison term enhancements, another trial court reduced three of defendant’s alleged prior convictions to misdemeanors under Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (the Act). The trial court presiding over defendant’s case subsequently found after a court trial that defendant had served seven separate prior prison terms, three of which were based on the three drug convictions that had already been reduced. The court sentenced defendant to the upper term of four years for the felony battery count, and enhanced the sentence by seven years for the seven prior prison terms. The court ordered defendant to serve nine years in county jail, followed by two years of supervised release. Defendant appealed, arguing: (1) his trial attorney was ineffective because he did not object to prosecutorial misconduct in argument; (2) the three prior prison term enhancements based on sentences for felonies previously reduced to misdemeanors should have been stricken; and (3) the restitution fine is incorrectly set forth in the abstract of judgment. The State and the Court of Appeal agreed that the fine was incorrectly listed in the abstract of judgment. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal also agreed with defendant’s second point, that the three prior convictions were no longer previous felony convictions at the time the trial court adjudicated them as such in order to find the prior prison term allegations true. The Court modified the judgment and affirmed, directing the trial court to amend and correct abstract of judgment. View "California v. Kindall" on Justia Law

Defendant Scott Relkin appealed his sentence following entry of pleas in case numbers CM040863 and CM041966. He contended the sentence exceeded the maximum to which he specifically agreed. He further contended the trial court erred by imposing certain conditions of mandatory supervision that were vague, overbroad, unconstitutional, and unrelated to rehabilitation. After review, the Court of Appeal remanded the matter to the trial court to modify probation condition No. 13. The Court also modified the judgment to correct an unauthorized sentence on count 2 in case No. CM041966, and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "California v. Relkin" on Justia Law

Juan Ramon Meraz, Juan M. Chambasis, and Victor Bibiano separately appeal their convictions and sentences for murder, attempted murder, and discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling following a gang-related shooting that killed two victims and seriously injured a third. This case is before the court for reconsideration of defendants' confrontation clause challenges to the gang expert's testimony in light of People v. Sanchez. In the published portion of the opinion, the court concluded that reversal is not warranted under Sanchez. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgments as modified. View "People v. Meraz" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to charges of cocaine possession while armed with a loaded operable semiautomatic handgun and having a concealed firearm in a vehicle. On appeal, defendant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. The court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress. However, the court modified the order granting probation with respect to assessments under Penal Code section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1) and Government Code section 70373, subdivision (a)(1). In the published portion of the opinion, the court held that no Health and Safety Code section 11372.5, subdivision (a)(1) criminal laboratory analysis fee could be imposed. View "People v. Myles" on Justia Law

After defendant Kyle Brown and victim Rebekka Chartier broke up, he demanded that she “get friendly and get over it,” or he would “pop [her] tires.” She refused, so he punctured her tires with a knife. This violated a restraining order then in effect. About two weeks later, defendant phoned Chartier; he threatened to “take [her] life” unless she went to the police and recanted. This violated the same restraining order. After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of witness intimidation, a serious felony; vandalism, a misdemeanor; and two counts of violation of a court order, a misdemeanor. Defendant was ultimately sentenced to a total of 35 years to life in prison, along with the usual fines, fees, and miscellaneous sentencing orders. Defendant appealed, arguing only that his conviction for witness intimidation under Penal Code section 136.1 was actually properly punishable as a different form of witness intimidation under Penal Code section 137. The Court of Appeal rejected defendant’s contentions. However, the Court found that the sentence had be modified in one minor respect that did not affect the aggregate term. Hence, the Court affirmed the judgment as modified. View "California v. Brown" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the judgment upholding the decision of the state’s Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board to deny defendant compensation for wrongful imprisonment after the Board found that defendant had not proven he was factually innocent of attempted murder. Defendant's petition for habeas corpus was granted based on the ineffective assistance of counsel. The court held that the Board erred when it refused to be bound by the findings in the federal district court’s order granting defendant's habeas corpus petition. The court reversed and remanded for a new hearing before the Board because it was reasonably probable that consideration of those findings would have caused the Board to award compensation. View "Madrigal v. Victim Compensation & Government Claims Board" on Justia Law

Defendant Michelle Franske and the State both appealed a resentencing proceeding pursuant to Proposition 47, which created a new resentencing provision, Penal Code section 1170.18. The trial court granted defendant's request under Proposition 47 to reduce her November 2010 conviction for felony second degree commercial burglary to misdemeanor shoplifting and reduced her punishment for that offense only. In doing so, the court rejected the State's argument that defendant's conduct actually did not constitute shoplifting and also rejected defendant's additional request to strike the associated on-bail enhancement. Defendant and the State appealed these rulings. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court got it right on both rulings and affirmed. View "California v. Franske" on Justia Law

Defendant Craig Danny Gonzales, in custody in state prison, filed a petition in January 2015 to recall his sentence pursuant to "Proposition 47." The petition simply recited the statutes defendant violated without any further information about the convictions in a consolidated 2003/2005 case for which he was sentenced in February 2008. After receiving opposition from the prosecutor, the trial court denied the petition without elaboration beyond checking a box on its form order that defendant was ineligible for relief based on his "[c]urrent convictions." Defendant contended, inter alia, that the only basis on which the trial court could have determined that he was entirely ineligible for any relief was the prosecutor's claim (as opposed to the petition) that defendant's conviction for identity theft in a transactionally independent 2006 case (that was part of the same sentencing proceeding in February 2008) disqualified him from relief, because this would exclude his convictions from misdemeanor status under Penal Code section 473(b). The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that section 473(b) was ambiguous about the manner in which its exclusion applied, and the voter materials referencing section 473(b) made it clear that an identity theft conviction had to be transactionally related to other counts in order to exclude them from misdemeanor treatment under section 473(b). The Court accordingly reversed the order denying relief (except as to one conviction) and remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Gonzales" on Justia Law

After the trial court found defendant violated the terms of her postrelease community supervision (PRCS), she was ordered to serve 120 days in custody. The trial court then immediately granted her petition for Proposition 47 relief under Pen. Code 1170.18. The court dismissed the appeal as moot because defendant served her time in custody. Because this is a matter of interest to defendants, practitioners of criminal law, and the public, the court discussed the issue. The court explained that there is no PRCS for misdemeanors. Thus, once defendant's Proposition 47 petition is granted, PRCS terminates by operation of law, and any punishment attendant to its violation ends. Therefore it makes no difference in what order the petitions were decided. In this case, because the trial court granted defendant's Proposition 47 petition, the trial court's prior finding that she violated PRCS and the attendant sentence of 120 days in jail were rendered moot. View "People v. Elizalde" on Justia Law

Alexander pled no contest to forcible rape; kidnapping; injuring a spouse, cohabitant, partner, or parent of child; and attempted murder. Additional charges and sentencing enhancement allegations were dismissed. The court accepted his plea as freely and voluntarily made. At the sentencing hearing, Alexander moved to withdraw his plea on the ground his medication rendered him incapable of understanding its consequences. The trial court denied the request, imposed a total sentence of 13 years and eight months, and ordered a $6,000 victim restitution fine, a $6,000 parole revocation fine to be imposed and suspended, and court fees. The court of appeal rejected an argument the trial court violated an implicit term of the plea agreement that the restitution fine would be the statutory minimum of $300 as not cognizable under Penal Code 1237.2. Effective January 1, 2016, section 1237.2 provides: “An appeal may not be taken … on the ground of an error in the imposition or calculation of fines, penalty assessments, surcharges, fees, or costs unless the defendant first presents the claim in the trial court at the time of sentencing, or if the error is not discovered until after sentencing, the defendant first makes a motion for correction in the trial court.” View "People v. Alexander" on Justia Law