Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The trial court recused the entire Orange County District Attorney's (OCDA) office from prosecuting Scott Dekraai's penalty phase after he pled guilty to eight counts of murder. The court did so after two evidentiary hearings where it heard from 39 witnesses over six months. The court concluded the OCDA had a conflict of interest with the Orange County Sheriff's Department (OCSD or deputy sheriff) that prevented the OCDA from fairly prosecuting the penalty phase. The Attorney General appealed that ruling, arguing OCSD was to blame for the misconduct and the OCDA did not have a conflict of interest. The sole issue for the Court of Appeal's review was whether the trial court erred by recusing the entire OCDA's office from prosecuting Dekraai's penalty phase. After that review, the Court concluded it was well within the court's discretion to recuse the entire OCDA's office from prosecuting the penalty phase because the OCDA indeed had a disqualifying conflict of interest. Accordingly, the Court affirmed recusal. View "California v. Dekraai" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Philip Mejia appealed his conviction for torture, spousal rape, spousal abuse, and criminal threats. The Court of Appeal rejected his contention that the court should have conducted a hearing pursuant to "California v. Marsden," (2 Cal.3d 118 (1970)) based on defendant's statements during a hearing on his request to represent himself and his contentions concerning the improper admission of evidence. The Court agreed, however, that the trial court erred in imposing an unstayed sentence on count 3. Accordingly, the case was remanded with directions to stay imposition of that sentence. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. Mejia" on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty to possession for sale of a controlled substance. On appeal, defendant challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence made pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in ruling that the vehicle inventory search was reasonable and incident to a lawful arrest for driving under the influence. The court concluded that the trial court reasonably concluded that it was a lawful inventory search aimed at securing the car and its contents. In the alternative, the trial court did not err in finding that the search was incident to a lawful arrest and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The court held that a person arrested for driving under the influence, like the defendant in this case, may not defeat a “search incident to arrest” by locking incriminating evidence inside his vehicle. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Quick" on Justia Law

Lambirth is serving a life term at the Soledad Correctional Training Facility. He claims that he learned during his 2013 pre-annual interview that he was subject to a “child visiting restriction.” He complained to his counselor, Miley, that it was unwarranted. Miley promised to investigate and to remove the restriction if it was without basis. He raised the issue again at his 2014 review; the classification committee assured him that Miley would investigate and take appropriate action. Lambirth sent Miley a follow-up note, asking for a copy of the action removing the restriction. Lambirth received from Miley “a single-page copy” of the classification chrono from his 2009 program review, which noted his “sex offense history” and, under “Sex Offenses,” referred to “Sexual Perversion.” It stated that Lambirth acknowledged his understanding [of] and agreement with [the] committee’s actions.” Lambirth denied every being charged with any sexual crime against a child. The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) cancelled his administrative appeal, which was timely submitted but was received after expiration of the 30-day period, and declined to consider it on the merits. The court of appeal granted habeas relief and directed the Department to consider the appeal on the merits. View "In re: Lambirth" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty by a jury of making criminal threats. He chose to represent himself and, prior to opening statements, the trial court removed him from the courtroom for disruptive conduct. The court agreed with defendant that the trial court violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it involuntarily excluded him from the courtroom without appointing substitute counsel; and (2) the error requires automatic reversal. The court concluded that the denial of counsel during the testimony of a key witness is a per se Sixth Amendment violation that requires reversal without analysis for prejudice or harmless error. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "People v. Ramos" on Justia Law

After defendant was charged with three misdemeanors, his motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (a)(1), was granted. The People appealed. The appellate division summarily reversed the trial court’s ruling in a minute order and defendant then filed an application to certify the matter for transfer to the appellate court, pursuant to the California Rules of Court, rule 8.1005(b). The application was denied by operation of law under rule 8.1005(b)(5) and defendant filed a petition to transfer to this court under rule 8.1006(a). Defendant's petition was granted. The court found that the People had the right to appeal the trial court’s ruling on defendant’s motion to suppress pursuant to section 1538.5, subdivision (j). In an issue of first impression, the court found that (1) the appellate division was required by Code of Civil Procedure section 77, subdivision (d), to issue a brief statement of the reasons for its judgment and (2) this statutory requirement does not conflict with rule 8.887(a), which relieves appellate divisions from having to issue written opinions. Given these findings, the court remanded to the appellate division to issue an amended order that complies with Code of Civil Procedure section 77, subdivision (d). In light of this disposition, the court did not reach the remaining issues related to the motion to suppress. View "People v. Guerra" on Justia Law

By text messaging, defendant communicated with several girls under 14 years of age, sending them sexually explicit photographs of himself and asking them to send him nude photographs of themselves. He was convicted of multiple counts of attempted violation of Penal Code section 288(a). The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that conviction under section 288(a) requires either a physical encounter with the victim or a constructive touching in which the defendant induces the victims to touch themselves or another, with a concurrent sexual intent at the time of the touching. The court also rejected a claim that his prosecution for attempted violation of section 288(a) violated the rule against prosecution under a more general statute when the conduct at issue is prohibited under section 288.3, a later, more specific statute. A defendant may commit the crime of attempted lewd and lascivious acts on a child under 14 by communicating with the victim via text messaging; the sexual intent and the touching required by section 288(a) need not occur simultaneously. Convictions under section 288(a) are not prohibited under the special versus general doctrine, because section 288(a) contains an element not contained on the face of section 288.3. View "People v. Cruz-Villagran" on Justia Law

Following his conviction on four felony counts of second degree burglary (Pen. Code 459, 460(b)), based on incidents that occurred in 1996-1997, Colbert was sentenced to 32 months in prison, consecutive to a six-year prison term he incurred due to a robbery he committed while out on bail on the burglary charges. In 2015, Colbert petitioned the trial court to redesignate certain of his felony convictions as misdemeanors pursuant to Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act. The trial court denied Colbert’s petition, finding that he was not eligible for the relief requested. The court noted, and the court of appeal agreed, that, in each case, “[Colbert] and an accomplice entered an establishment and, while one of them distracted the cashier . . . , the other snuck into the non-public areas of the building to commit the intended thefts,” so that the offenses were based “upon entry into a private . . . office area and not a commercial establishment that was open during business hours” and could not qualify as “shoplifting” under section 459.5. View "People v. Colbert" on Justia Law

A San Francisco police officer investigated a report of a person asleep behind the wheel of a vehicle parked in a lane of travel. Defendant, the vehicle’s sole occupant, was in the driver’s seat, slouched forward with his seat belt fastened. The vehicle was not running but the keys were in the ignition. The officer noticed an odor of alcohol. Defendant denied having had anything to drink. He agreed to take a breath test, which showed blood-alcohol levels of 0.260 percent and 0.266 percent. In addition to DUI charges, defendant was charged with providing false information to a peace officer (Vehicle Code 31, Count 3). At trial, defendant testified that on the night of his arrest he was returning from a party at which he “drank a few beers.” He had departed with a friend, who drove defendant’s vehicle and left him inside with the keys in the ignition. Defendant moved to the driver’s seat, fastened the seat belt, and fell asleep. A jury found defendant guilty of count 3, and not guilty of other counts. The appellate division reversed, finding section 31 facially invalid under the First Amendment because it criminalizes the giving of any false information without regard to materiality, citing the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision, United States v. Alvarez. The court of appeal reinstated the conviction, reasoning that the statute may be construed to include a materiality provision, curing any constitutional deficiencies, and that the error in failing to instruct the jury on materiality was harmless. View "People v. Morera-Munoz" on Justia Law

Defendant challenged the orders denying his petition for resentencing/application to redesignate his 1988 and 1989 felony convictions for possession of a controlled substance as misdemeanors pursuant to Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, Pen. Code, 1170.18, subds. (a)–(i). The trial court denied the petition because it found that defendant is ineligible for Proposition 47 relief due to a disqualifying 1992 conviction for first degree murder. The court found no merit to defendant's contention that he was eligible for Proposition 47 relief because his murder conviction occurred after the drug possession convictions, and thus the trial court erroneously denied his petition to reclassify his felony convictions as misdemeanors. The court concluded that within the context of Proposition 47, a prior disqualifying conviction is a super strike conviction suffered any time before the court’s ruling on an application to have a felony conviction reclassified as a misdemeanor. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Walker" on Justia Law