Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendants Yevgeny “Eugene” Selivanov and Tatyana Berkovich were convicted of financial crimes stemming from their founding of a charter school, Ivy Academia. The court concluded that the trial court erred in making the public funds finding but affirmed defendants’ convictions because the error was harmless. However, the court directed the trial court to strike from Selivanov’s restitution order the joint and several obligation to pay $22,396.60 in restitution to Ivy Academia in connection with his embezzlement conviction in count 2, and strike from Berkovich’s restitution order any language making Selivanov jointly and severally liable for it. As modified, the court otherwise affirmed the judgments. The court declined the People's challenge and affirmed the trial court's order granting defendants' new trial motions. View "People v. Selivanov" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of grand theft after stealing a $200 bicycle and street terrorism. The crime of “street terrorism” requires, inter alia, that a person actively participate in criminal street gang activity and willfully promote, further or assist in any felonious criminal conduct of the gang. The court held that, after the passage of Proposition 47, that a conviction for street terrorism survives after a felony conviction that is based upon the same conduct has been reduced to a misdemeanor. The court explained that, unlike with a gang enhancement, a street terrorism conviction does not require a felony conviction; it requires only that the conduct that resulted in the conviction was felonious at the time it was committed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order denying resentencing on defendant's street terrorism conviction. View "People v. Valenzuela" on Justia Law

Defendant Arthur Perkins appealed his convictions arising from the kidnapping and rape of a 17-year-old girl and the rape and sodomy of his 11-year-old former stepdaughter. He challenged: (1) his one-strike sentences on his sex crimes on numerous grounds; (2) the joinder of the two cases; (3) the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress DNA evidence; (4) the lack of instructions on his out-of-court admissions; (5) the lack of a "Marsden" hearing; and (6) cumulative error. He also sought a stay of one of his sentences and corrections to the abstract of judgment. After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeals reversed the life without parole sentences imposed as enhancements under the one-strike rule for lack of substantial evidence. The Court affirmed the judgment in all other respects and remanded the case for resentencing only. View "California v. Perkins" on Justia Law

In 2011, Eslava fatally stabbed his roommate in a San Francisco single room occupancy hotel. The court of appeal affirmed his conviction for voluntary manslaughter with a weapons use enhancement, but reversed Eslava‘s 18-year prison sentence and remanded for determination of whether a 2009 conviction for battery resulting in serious bodily injury qualified as a sentence-enhancing strike and serious felony. To determine whether the record proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Eslava personally inflicted serious bodily injury on the battery victim, the trial court examined the complaint, the transcript of the plea colloquy, and a police report. During the plea colloquy, Eslava‘s counsel had stipulated that the police report—which describes Eslava hitting the victim with a wooden stick, injuring him seriously enough to require hospitalization—supplied a factual basis for the conviction. The court reimposed the 18-year sentence. The court of appeal reversed and remanded for a jury trial on the issue of personal infliction of serious bodily injury unless Eslava waives his constitutional right to a jury determination. Since personal infliction of serious bodily injury is not inherent to the conviction, it was improper for the court—rather than a jury—to make that finding. The court noted that the law has evolved significantly since it decided the first appeal. View "People v. Eslava" on Justia Law

While driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs, defendant-appellant David Doyle swerved into oncoming traffic and hit Mark Norton (victim) who was riding a motor scooter. The victim died immediately. Defendant drove away from the scene with the scooter lodged under his vehicle. He was apprehended one mile from the scene of the accident. Defendant was found guilty after a court trial of vehicular manslaughter, driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs causing great bodily injury, and fleeing the scene of an accident involving great bodily injury or death. Defendant appealed, raising only one claim that he was not fully advised of his constitutional rights to a trial by 12 jurors prior to waiving his right to a jury trial and proceeding to a court trial. The Court of Appeals found that defendant's waiver of jury trial in this case was voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Doyle" on Justia Law

Following his conviction on four felony counts of second-degree burglary (Pen. Code 459, 460(b)) for crimes that occurred in 1996-97, Colbert was sentenced to a total term of two years eight months in prison, consecutive to a six-year prison term he incurred due to a robbery he committed in another county while out on bail on the burglary charges. In 2015, Colbert petitioned the trial court to redesignate certain of his felony convictions for second-degree burglary as misdemeanors pursuant to Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, Penal Code 1170.18(f). The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the petition, finding that he was not eligible for the relief requested. In each case, “[Colbert] and an accomplice entered an establishment and, while one of them distracted the cashier . . . , the other snuck into the non-public areas of the building to commit the intended thefts,” so the offenses were based “upon entry into a private . . . office area and not a commercial establishment that was open during business hours” and could not qualify as “shoplifting” under section 459.5. The court declined to consider an argument based on the finding concerning the amount stolen. View "People v. Colbert" on Justia Law

In 2000, defendant pleaded guilty to a felony, Penal Code 470(a), in that he, “with the intent to defraud, and knowingly without authority to do so, sign the name of another person and of a fictitious person, to [a] RECEIPT FOR GOODS.” The state dismissed a misdemeanor section 484g(a) charge. Defendant was placed on probation for 36 months and ordered to pay $159.92 restitution. In 2015, defendant petitioned to have his felony forgery conviction redesignated as a misdemeanor under Proposition 47, Penal Code 1170.18(f). The state argued that “certain types of 470’s were not affected by Prop 47 … the types that were affected were [forgeries] involving check fraud, cashier’s checks, traveler’s check[s], or money orders. This involved a credit card, which was not one of those items.” Defendant filed proof that the amount was under $950 and argued that his conviction was a “forgery offense sentenced pursuant to Penal Code Section 473.” The court denied defendant’s petition. The court of appeal affirmed, reasoning that “receipt for goods” forgery is not listed as a misdemeanor in section 473(b). There is a rational basis for Proposition 47’s distinction between offenders who were convicted of forgery involving instruments listed in section 473(b) and offenders convicted of “receipt for goods” forgeries. View "People v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Guiomar entered into a plea agreement that resulted in four convictions. The court imposed a six-year aggregate sentence: four years for robbery, a consecutive 16-month term for burglary, a consecutive eight-month term for failure to appear on a felony charge, and a concurrent two-year term for possession of a controlled substance. The electorate then passed Proposition 47, which reclassified certain felony drug and theft related offenses as misdemeanors. The court granted Guiomar’s petition for recall of sentence, Penal Code 1170.18(a), designating the convictions of burglary and possession of a controlled substance as misdemeanors. The court then imposed a six-year term for the robbery and a concurrent four-year term for the failure to appear. The court of appeal modified the sentence. When a defendant’s aggregate sentence includes multiple felony offenses, some of which are reduced to misdemeanors pursuant to Proposition 47, a court may resentence the defendant to increased terms for the remaining felony convictions, if the new aggregate sentence does not exceed the original aggregate sentence. When a defendant is convicted of failure to appear on a felony charge, but the underlying felony charge is later reduced to a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47, the court is not required to vacate the failure to appear conviction. In this case, however, the trial court imposed an unauthorized second-strike sentence for defendant’s conviction of failure to appear on a felony charge. View "In re: Guiomar" on Justia Law

Defendant Miguel Guarneros appeals from an order of the trial court denying his motion to reduce the restitution collection fee imposed on him in a criminal case. Guarneros ran a car dealership in Spring Valley, which was required to file and pay sales tax to the California Board of Equalization (BOE) on a quarterly basis from sales of cars. Between 2008 and 2011, Guarneros failed to remit to the state all of the sales tax that he collected from customers. Instead, Guarneros filed fraudulent tax returns with the BOE. Guarneros pled guilty and agreed to pay victim restitution. The court ordered victim restitution and imposed a restitution collection fee of 15 percent of the total restitution ordered, pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1, subdivision (l) and San Diego County Code of Administrative Ordinances, article XX, section 363, subdivision (m) (Collection Fee Ordinance), which authorized the imposition of such a fee. Guarneros contended on appeal of that order that the trial court's denial of his request to reduce the 15 percent restitution collection fee was erroneous and/or amounted to an abuse of the court's discretion. The Court of Appeals rejected Guarneros's contention and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "California v. Guarneros" on Justia Law

Defendant Lorenzo Chavez plead no contest to charges that he offered to sell a controlled substance and then failed to appear. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for four years. After defendant successfully completed his probation in 2009, he filed a motion pursuant to Penal Code section 1385, asking the trial court to dismiss the action in the interests of justice based on ineffective assistance of counsel and asserted legal errors. The trial court concluded that because the motion was brought pursuant to section 1385 rather than section 1203.4, it did not have authority after probation ended to grant the requested relief. The State argued the denial was not an appealable order. Defendant contended the order was appealable and the trial court erred in ruling that it lacked authority to dismiss under section 1385. The Court of Appeals concluded the order was appealable and the trial court did not err. "Section 1203.4 is the exclusive method for a trial court to dismiss the conviction of a defendant who has successfully completed probation." View "California v. Chavez" on Justia Law