Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Hannon, an attorney, represented Barber in litigation against the victim, Barber’s former domestic partner, Dr. Magno. In December 2006, the parties agreed that Barber would fund a college trust for their children. Barber paid $27,500.32 to Hannon as the trustee of the children’s funds and authorized Hannon to open a bank account. In February 2011, the victim became aware that the children’s funds had been misappropriated. Hannon may have used the money to cover legal fees owed by Barber. Charged with grand theft by embezzlement by a fiduciary (Pen. Code 487(a), 506), Hannon ultimately pled no contest to misdemeanor theft by embezzlement. The trial court placed him on probation for two years, ordered him to perform 240 hours of community service, and ordered him to pay $40,800 in restitution to the victim: $25,000 in attorney’s fees, $15,000 in lost wages, and $800 in mileage. The court of appeal rejected challenges to the restitution award and held that the victim was entitled to file a victim impact statement on appeal, pursuant to the Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008 (Marsy’s Law, Proposition 9 (2008)), but may not raise present legal issues not raised by Hannon or facts not in the record below View "People v. Hannon" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murdering her former boyfriend. The court agreed with defendant that the trial court erred by refusing her request for a jury instruction on a heat of passion theory of voluntary manslaughter. In this case, there was sufficient evidence of both objective provocation and defendant's subjective emotion to warrant a heat of passion instruction. Defendant stated that the boyfriend had treated her badly for years, belittling her cancer diagnosis and demanding oral sex from her when the breast cancer had debilitated her. The bad blood between the couple increased shortly before the shooting. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. On remand, the prosecution shall have the option to retry defendant for second degree murder, or to accept a modification of the judgment to reflect a conviction for voluntary manslaughter. View "People v. Asbury" on Justia Law

The Los Angeles County District Attorney filed two wardship petitions, alleging that appellant, age 17, committed misdemeanor disorderly conduct by soliciting or agreeing to engage in prostitution on two different dates. Appellant moved under to exclude all evidence that she engaged in commercial sexual acts, because she was a “victim of human trafficking,” who had been coerced into performing those acts by a pimp who was a human trafficker under Penal Code 236.1(c).. The district attorney argued that neither petition alleged she had engaged in any commercial sex act. The court heard the testimony of two undercover police officers and of an expert on human trafficking and found appellant to have committed the charged acts “as a result of being a victim of human trafficking,” but denied her motion to exclude evidence. The court concluded that Evidence Code 1161 did not apply to juvenile proceedings and, even if it did, would not apply to cases in which the victim of human trafficking did not actually engage in “sexual conduct on account of which anything of value is given or received by any person.” The court of appeal reversed, reasoning that section 1161 does apply in juvenile proceedings, and that acceptance of the prosecutor’s interpretation of that statute would virtually wipe out a significant protection afforded victims of human trafficking. View "In re N.C." on Justia Law

T.P., age 28, has an IQ of 46, and functions at an elementary school child level or younger. Because of his cerebral palsy, he needs a wheelchair and has difficulty speaking. He suffers from urinary incontinence and needs assistance after bowel movements. T.P. attends Milestones day program in Vallejo for adults with developmental disabilities. Defendant was assigned to care for T.P. A Milestones staff member was looking for T.P and found the door closed, contrary to standard procedure. A metal bar clattered to the floor when she forced the door open. She saw defendant bent over T.P., who was in his wheelchair, with “his hands down in [T.P.’s] pants, and he was fondling with [T.P.’s] penis.” T.P. was interviewed by the police the next day and confirmed defendant had put his hand down his pants and “rubbed” his penis. T.P said he did not want defendant to rub his penis, and had asked defendant to stop, but defendant did not stop. T.P. said it had happened two or three other times. Defendant was convicted of committing a lewd act on a dependent adult by a caretaker, Penal Code 288(c)(2). The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court erred by refusing to instruct on simple battery as a lesser necessarily included offense. View "People v. Chenelle" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and first degree attempted murder. The court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied defendant's motion for a mistrial. The court found this especially true as defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the first day of voir dire, when granting a mistrial or dismissing the jury panel would not have caused undue delay. In this case, no admonition or instruction could have cured the prejudice that resulted from the trial court’s statement that it believed a plumber would lie in court, when defendant's alibi witness was a plumber who the prosecution argued came to court to lie for his friend. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "People v. Tatum" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of assault with a deadly weapon and one count of simple battery. The court reversed the trial court’s determination that defendant's 2002 conviction for aggravated assault constituted a serious felony conviction and hence a strike based on the trial court’s reliance on judicial fact-finding beyond the elements of the prior conviction itself. In this case, given that none of the documents in the record of the prior conviction distinguished between assault with a deadly weapon and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, the court concluded that the trial court’s determination that the prior conviction constituted a serious felony is unsupported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Learnard" on Justia Law

Appellant John Lewis sought post-conviction relief under Proposition 47 to recharacterize his grand theft felony conviction to a misdemeanor. Lewis argued on appeal that the standards outlined in subdivision (f) of Penal Code section 1170.18 applied, and that the trial court erred when it denied his section petition for relief because it erroneously employed the standards for petitioners who were still "serving" their sentences. The different procedures and standards for obtaining the relief made available by section 1170.18 depended on whether the petitioner has "completed his or her sentence" (subdivision (f)), or is "currently serving a sentence" (subdivision (a)), for a felony that has been recharacterized as a misdemeanor under Proposition 47. The issue here was a matter of first impression and turned on statutory interpretation: which set of procedures and standards applied to a petitioner who is not currently incarcerated but was out on parole or postrelease community supervision. The Court of Appeals concluded that the standards and procedures specified in section 1170.18, subdivision (f), had limited applicability: it was only available to those persons who have completed their entire sentence, including any period of postrelease supervision, whether through parole or through PRCS. For those still serving "[a] sentence resulting in imprisonment in the state prison . . . [which] shall include a period of parole supervision or postrelease community supervision," the standards and procedures specified in section 1170.18, subdivision (a) applied, including the requirement (imposed under section 1170.18, subdivision (d)) that a successful petitioner serve a one-year period of parole unreduced by any "Sosa" credits. Because the trial court correctly selected the standards applicable to Lewis' petition, and he raised no separate claim that the court's rejection of his second application was an abuse of discretion, the Court affirmed the order. View "California v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Using software tools known as RoundUp, police learned that an IP address, later determined to be assigned to Evensen’s mother, had downloaded child pornography, using peer-to-peer file-sharing networks. Evensen pleaded guilty to various sex crimes after the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Evensen’s argument that, the use of the Roundup software violated his Fourth Amendment rights by infringing on his reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer. View "People v. Evensen" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to one count of felony vandalism and the trial court ordered him to pay restitution to the City of Los Angeles. Defendant contends that the restitution order must be vacated because it lacks a factual nexus to the damage caused by his conduct. The court concluded that the trial court did not violate Luis M. or otherwise abuse its discretion in ordering defendant to pay $475 in restitution to the City of Los Angeles. Accordingly, the court affirmed the restitution order. View "People v. Aguilar" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of corporal injury on a cohabitant or coparent, false imprisonment, making criminal threats, attempting to dissuade a witness from testifying, and dissuading a witness from prosecuting a crime. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in not applying Penal Code section 654 to his sentence for dissuading a witness from prosecuting a crime. The People concede the point, and the court agreed. The court concluded that, under applicable state and federal law, the trial court’s finding - that his prior conviction for a homicide offense in the State of Sinaloa, Mexico, constituted a serious felony within the meaning of the serious felony sentence enhancement statute, as well as the three strikes law - is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court strikes the trial court’s finding. The matter is remanded for resentencing. View "People v. Navarette" on Justia Law