Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The trial court refused to reduce defendant Jillian Rendon’s felony conviction for forgery to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47 because the court concluded that while the counterfeit bills she possessed had a face value of only $260, other material she also had in her possession (security strips, Benjamin Franklin faces, and blank pre-cut paper money) could have been used to make “tens of thousands of dollars” of counterfeit bills. After review of this matter, the Court of Appeals concluded the trial court erred because the statute that dictated the punishment for forgery specified that where the offense related to a bank bill or note, the offense was punishable as a misdemeanor “where the value of the . . . bank bill[ or] note . . . does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950).” Material that could be used to make counterfeit bills has no bearing on the application of the statute, and blank pre-cut paper money has no face value. "In applying section 473, only counterfeit bills that have a discernible face value are relevant to the valuation process. Here, defendant possessed counterfeit bills with only $260 in discernible value." In addition, the Court concluded the State was not entitled on remand to withdraw from the plea agreement that resulted in defendant’s forgery conviction just because that conviction could be reduced to a misdemeanor. "Even assuming the right to withdraw from a plea agreement may be available when the reduction of a conviction under Proposition 47 deprives the People of the benefit of the agreement, the People here have not shown that the reduction of defendant’s forgery conviction will result in such a deprivation. Accordingly, unless the trial court makes a discretionary determination that defendant would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, the court must reduce her forgery conviction to a misdemeanor." View "California v. Rendon" on Justia Law

Defendant Victor Buford was serving a term of 25 years to life in prison for his conviction of a felony that was not violent (as defined by Pen. Code, sec. 667.5 (c)) or serious (as defined by Pen. Code, sec. 1192.7 (c)). Defendant filed a petition pursuant to the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (hereafter Proposition 36 or the Act) to have his sentence recalled and to be resentenced. The trial court concluded resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety and denied the petition. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeals held that the State had the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts on which a finding that resentencing a petitioner would have posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety reasonably can be based. Those facts would be reviewed for substantial evidence. The Court held further that the preponderance of the evidence standard did not apply to the trial court’s determination regarding dangerousness, nor did section 1170.126, subdivision (f), create a presumption in favor of resentencing. The ultimate decision of whether resentencing an inmate would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety was within the sound discretion of the trial court. In the unpublished portion of the Court's opinion, it found no abuse of discretion and affirmed. View "California v. Buford" on Justia Law

In 1997, Cleamon Johnson was convicted for the first-degree murders of Peyton Beroit and Donald Loggins, with multiple-murder special-circumstances findings as to both. For these murders, Johnson was sentenced to death. In 2011, the California Supreme Court reversed Johnson's convictions and remanded for retrial. Before the second trial, the State investigated other murder and attempted murder cases from the early 1990s in which Johnson had been suspect. Ultimately, the State added new charges to the pending case against Johnson. In all, Johnson faced five capital murder charges and one attempted murder charge. The State also added gang enhancements. Johnson challenged the filing of the new charges in a motion to dismiss for vindictive prosecution. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed, holding that the trial court erred in denying Johnson's motion to dismiss three of the new charges, but affirmed as to the others. As for gang enhancements added to the Beroit and Loggins counts, the Court remanded the case for an evidentary hearing to allow the State to present evidence to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness. View "Johnson v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The State appealed a trial court's suppression order and subsequent dismissal of its prosecution of defendant Maria Elena Lopez on drug possession charges. Defendant was outside her car when a police officer, who watched her park the car, asked whether she had a driver’s license; when defendant said she did not, the officer asked whether she had any identification and defendant said she thought it was in the car; the officer then placed her in handcuffs and another officer retrieved a purse from the car; the subsequent search of the purse for identification uncovered a small amount of methamphetamine. The Attorney General argued the methamphetamine was found during a lawful search for identification and the trial court erroneously ruled the United States Supreme Court’s decision in "Arizona v. Gant," 556 U.S. 332 (2009) compelled suppression of the evidence. Defendant argued the officer unlawfully detained her and the subsequent search of her purse for identification was nevertheless unlawful on these facts. After review, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Attorney General’s assessment of the issue and reversed the trial court’s orders granting the suppression motion and dismissing the case against defendant. View "California v. Lopez" on Justia Law

The victim and her boyfriend’s eight-year-old son exited a bus in San Leandro. The boy then informed the victim that he had seen “a male,” later identified as 16-year-old D.H., “standing behind her on the bus and exposing his penis and masturbat[ing]” and that “the male eventually ejaculated and the semen landed on the back of [the victim’s] clothing.” The victim had not noticed anything at the time but discovered “a white substance” on the back of her jacket. She eventually reported the incident. A juvenile court declared D.H. a ward of the court and placed him on probation after he admitted to a misdemeanor count of indecent exposure. Raising mostly constitutional claims of vagueness and overbreadth, he challenged four probation conditions that required him: not to access pornography; to submit to warrantless searches of his electronic devices and provide passwords; to attend school regularly; and not to leave home without a parent or the probation officer’s permission. The court of appeal held that the no-pornography and electronics search conditions were vague, and remanded. The court affirmed the attendance condition and, in light of ambiguity in the record, requested clarification of whether the court intended to impose the stay-home condition. View "In re D.H." on Justia Law

Sotelo-Urena, a homeless 31-year-old, had been stabbed several weeks earlier, when he was approached by Bloom near a homeless encampment in December 2013. Bloom appeared to be intoxicated and aggressive. The encounter ended with Sotelo-Urena stabbing Bloom to death. At his trial for first-degree murder, Sotelo-Urena sought to introduce expert testimony that as a result of their higher rate of victimization, homeless individuals experience a heightened sensitivity to perceived threats of violence. Sotelo-Urena argued that the evidence was relevant to his claim that he acted in self-defense or imperfect self-defense. The trial court excluded the testimony as irrelevant to his claim that he actually and reasonably believed he needed to use lethal force to defend himself, stating that homelessness was a “common experience with the jurors and not subject to expert testimony.” The court of appeal reversed, stating that the exclusion of the expert testimony was an abuse of discretion and deprived Sotelo-Urena of his constitutional right to present a complete defense. View "People v. Sotelo-Urena" on Justia Law

The People appeal postjudgment orders granting probation to Raul Alberto Lopez and Freddie Chacon after the trial court recalled their sentences pursuant to newly amended Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d). Defendants were sentenced to life without possibility of parole (LWOP), in 1994, for crimes they committed as juveniles. The People contend that the trial court was without jurisdiction to recall the sentences after the LWOP sentences were modified to simple life sentences in 2012 pursuant to Graham v. Florida. The People contend that the court should adopt the plain meaning of the rule. The court explained that modification of the LWOP sentences because of the Graham opinion should not render them ineligible for resentencing. If that were the rule, every juvenile offender who exercised his/her Eighth Amendment right to modify a LWOP sentence would be precluded from filing a section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) petition for resentencing. The court agreed with the trial court’s articulated rationale and its common sense appraisal of the case. The court noted that, in an appropriate case, the letter of the law should gracefully and charitably succumb to the spirit of justice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murdering his mother and conspiracy to murder his stepfather. Defendant was sixteen years old at the time he committed the crimes and was sentenced to a term of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). Defendant seeks resentencing in light of Miller v. Alabama. Miller held that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders. After the trial court reimposed the LWOP term, the Supreme Court issued Montgomery v. Louisiana, which held that Miller announced a substantive rule of law that had retroactive application in state collateral review proceedings. The court reversed and remanded for resentencing because the trial court exercised its discretion in resentencing defendant without the guidance provided by Montgomery. View "People v. Padilla" on Justia Law

Defendant challenges the trial court's finding that he is a sexually violent predator pursuant to Welf. & Inst. Code, 6600 et seq., and order of commitment to a state hospital for an indefinite term. The court agreed with defendant's argument that the diagnosis of hebephilia by the People‘s expert was fundamentally flawed due, inter alia, to a lack of information about the physical characteristics and/or sexual development of the victims. The expert explained, "Hebephilia is designated as a sexual arousal pattern, deviant pattern, that involves sexual interest in pubescent-age children. It would not be pre-pubescent, not post-pubescent. It‘s in that in-between area from pre-pubescent to post-pubescent." The court concluded that the judgment committing defendant to an indeterminate term as a SVP must be reversed for lack of substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court reversed. View "People v. Wright" on Justia Law

In 1996, Leonard Joseph Rangel was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and of two misdemeanors. As a “third striker,” he was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life in state prison. In 2012, the electorate adopted Proposition 36, known as the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. Rangel filed a request under Proposition 36 which the superior court granted in 2014. Rangel was resentenced to a total of nine years in state prison. The State did not challenge the order granting Rangel’s petition. Due to the nature of his conviction, Rangel would normally have been subject upon release from prison to a period of community supervision under part of the Postrelease Community Supervision Act of 2011 (PCSA). The superior court in this case offered Rangel the choice to participate in the community supervision program. Rangel declined the offer, and the superior court did not order him to participate in community supervision. The State petitioned the Court of Appeals for extraordinary relief, challenging the Superior Court's order declining to place Rangel on community supervision following his release from prison. In the Court of Appeals' original published opinion (filed January 12, 2016 and modified on Feb. 2 and 4, 2016), the Court agreed with the superior court’s decision and denied the petition. The California Supreme Court granted the State's petition for review and subsequently transferred the matter to back to the Court of Appeals with directions to vacate the prior opinion and to reconsider the cause in light of "California v. Morales," (63 Cal.4th 399 (2016)). Having considered "Morales" and the supplemental briefs filed by the parties, the Court of Appeals granted the State's petition. View "California v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law