Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted defendant-appellant William Johnson of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated and hit and run with injury. The jury also found true two enhancement allegations; defendant fled the scene, and the collision resulted in a fatality. The jury did not reach a unanimous verdict on the other charged count, second degree murder, and the trial court granted a mistrial with respect to that count. On retrial, a new jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder. In this appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred during his retrial by not informing the jury that he had been convicted in the first trial of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, and that the error required reversal of his second degree murder conviction. The Court of Appeals agreed that the trial court’s instructions to the jury for defendant’s retrial were erroneous in several respects, and the second degree murder conviction had to be reversed. View "California v. Johnson" on Justia Law

William Cady drove his vehicle at an excessive and unsafe speed while intoxicated, resulting in an accident that killed three of his passengers and injured two others. A jury found Cady guilty of: (1) three counts of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (with the further finding that he personally inflicted great bodily injury); (2) one count of driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury; (3) one count of driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent or more causing injury; and (4) one count of driving under the combined influence of alcohol and a drug causing injury. The trial court sentenced Cady to 18 years in prison. Cady raised two issues on appeal: (1) that the crime of driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury was a lesser included offense of the crime of driving under the combined influence of alcohol and a drug causing injury, so that he should not have been convicted on the former count; (2) with regard to the charge of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, the trial court prejudicially erred in not sua sponte giving the jury the option of convicting him of the lesser included offense of vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated for those counts. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded that the conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury was indeed a lesser included offense of the driving under the combined influence of alcohol and a drug causing injury, for which Cady was convicted in another count. However, there was no merit to Cady's contention that the trial court erred by failing to instruct on vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated as a lesser included offense of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. The Court reversed the conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury, and affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. Cady" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of four counts of assault with a firearm, among other crimes. The jury found true allegations that defendant had inflicted great bodily injury (GBI) on Efren Cisneros specifically with respect to each of the four assaults. On appeal, defendant argues that Penal Code section 654 prohibits multiple punishment on multiple great bodily injury enhancements relating to the same injuries to the same individual. Under People v. Oates, the court concluded that the relevant acts or omissions are the assaults and the GBI enhancements simply follow from those assaults. In this case, because there were multiple victims of the assaults, the court concluded that the multiple victim exception to section 654 applies and multiple punishment is permitted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Reyes-Tornero" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of simple assault, assault with a deadly weapon, second degree robbery with personal use of a deadly weapon (scissors), battery on a peace officer, and criminal threats. Defendant admitted two prior prison term enhancements and was sentenced to six years in state prison. The court reversed and remanded for resentencing, concluding that the trial court erred in not staying the one-year sentence for the assault with a deadly weapon (ADW) count pursuant to Penal Code 654. Section 654 prohibits multiple punishment for a single act that violates different provisions of law. In this case, the armed assault with scissors was incidental to and facilitated the armed robbery with scissors. View "People v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Defendant Leo Sweeney was convicted of 10 felonies, all arising out of a take-over bank robbery, and sentenced to a total of 82 years to life in prison. He filed a petition to redesignate two of those felonies as misdemeanors pursuant to Proposition 47 (this would not have changed the total term). The trial court denied the petition, ruling that defendant was not eligible for relief under Proposition 47, because the two felonies at issue were accompanied by gang enhancements. Defendant appealed. After review, the Court of Appeals held that the gang enhancements did not disqualify defendant from relief. However, he failed to carry his burden to show that the two felonies involved property worth $950 or less. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded with directions to allow defendant to file an amended petition. View "California v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Jeff Boswell was found guilty by jury of murdering Blanche Griffin while engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a robbery and burglary, and burglary of an inhabited dwelling. The jury also found Boswell guilty of two counts of commercial burglary and petty theft. The trial court found true certain prior conviction allegations. The court sentenced Boswell to a total term of life without the possibility of parole, plus 20 years and four months. Boswell appealed, contending: (1) his burglary conviction should be vacated because it was a lesser-included offense of the burglary special circumstance attached to his murder conviction; (2) consolidation of the charges denied him the due process right to a fair trial; (3) the trial court prejudicially erred in allowing the prosecution to admit certain crime scene and autopsy photographs; and (4) the abstract of judgment contains clerical errors. After review, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment as modified to correct certain clerical errors in the abstract of judgment. View "California v. Boswell" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Javante Scott appealed after the trial court, at a resentencing hearing, imposed the same 120-years-to-life term as at his original sentencing. Defendant was a minor at the time he committed his crimes, but was tried as an adult and convicted of three counts of attempted murder with firearm enhancements. Defendant argued the sentence was cruel and unusual because it imposed a de facto life sentence on him as a juvenile offender. The State argued that a new statute, Penal Code section 3051,1 which guaranteed defendant a future parole eligibility hearing, rendered the sentence constitutional. After review, the Court of Appeals held that section 3051 complied with the central constitutional requirement that the State provide a juvenile offender with a meaningful opportunity to obtain release within his or her expected lifetime. For this reason, the Court affirmed but with directions that the trial court determined whether defendant was afforded an adequate opportunity to make a record that complied with the requirements set forth in "California v. Franklin" (63 Cal.4th 261 (2016)). View "California v. Scott" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a deadly shooting that took place in 1992. Several suspects were identified in the wake of the shooting, but the case was not prosecuted until 2011. By that time, an eyewitness who had exonerated petitioner Darrell Booth could not be found, and the case proceeded to trial in his absence. Even without this favorable defense witness, the jury acquitted Booth of first degree murder, and found him guilty of second degree murder. In this consolidated proceeding, Booth challenged his conviction by direct appeal and petition for writ of habeas corpus. Among the claims in his habeas petition, Booth argued his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to move to dismiss the case based on precharging delay. After review, the Court of Appeals agreed with this contention, granted Booth’s petition, reversed the judgment and remanded the matter for a new trial. In light of this disposition, Booth’s appeal was moot. View "California v. Booth" on Justia Law

Accredited Surety posted a $25,000 bail bond for the release of Jose Estrada, who had been charged with several felony offenses. Estrada failed to appear for arraignment, and the trial court ordered the bond forfeited. Accredited moved to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond under Penal Code section 1305. The motion was denied, and Accredited appealed, arguing the trial court erred in ordering forfeiture. Estrada, a Mexican national, fled to Mexico. Accredited found Estrada in Mexico and notified the district attorney of his whereabouts. Subdivision (g) of Section 1305 described the situation whereby bond must be forfeited, and means of exonerating the bail of the bond agency locates the defendant in another jurisdiction and brings that person before a local law enforcement officer, but the district attorney elects not to seek extradition. Accredited contended that it complied with the requirements of the statute. But the record reflected questions with whether defendant had been brought before local law enforcement where Estrada was located. Given its interpretation of the statute, the Court of Appeals concluded the trial court did not err by denying Accredited's motion. View "California v. Accredited Surety" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged in case No. NA098956 with second degree commercial burglary committed on April 22, 2014, in violation of Penal Code section 459. After the information was amended to deem the burglary a misdemeanor pursuant to Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b), defendant entered a plea of no contest to the misdemeanor charge to resolve the primary case. At issue is whether the two year enhancement set forth in Penal Code section 12022.1 may be imposed on defendant for conviction of a felony in a “secondary offense” while on bail on a felony in a “primary offense,” when the primary offense is settled by a no contest plea to a misdemeanor. The court held that, based on language in People v. Walker, the two-year enhancement under section 12022.1 does not apply when the primary offense is reduced to a misdemeanor and resolved by a plea of no contest. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for habeas corpus and directed the trial court to strike the enhancements under Penal Code section 12022.1 as to counts 1 and 3. Because no error appears in the record on appeal, the judgment is affirmed. View "People v. Reyes" on Justia Law