Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) revoked Branden Lee Hall's driver's license because, after being arrested for driving under the influence, he refused to submit to a chemical test for blood alcohol content. Hall filed a petition for a writ of mandate or review (petition) seeking an order directing the DMV to vacate the revocation on the grounds there was no admissible evidence that police properly admonished him that refusing to submit to a blood alcohol test would result in his license being revoked. While Hall's petition was pending, the DMV hearing officer who upheld the revocation, Alva Benavidez, pleaded guilty in federal court to taking bribes in exchange for giving favorable treatment to persons arrested for driving under the influence. Hall amended his petition to allege Benavidez's corruption deprived him of his due process right to a fair hearing. The DMV filed opposition, asserting there was no evidence Benavidez was actually biased in deciding Hall's case. The superior court granted Hall relief by remanding to the DMV for a new hearing, stating Benavidez's "criminal conduct while acting as a hearing officer for the DMV . . . raises a red flag with respect to all hearings presided by her." Unsatisfied with a new hearing, Hall appealed, contending Vehicle Code section 13559 required the court to order the DMV to reinstate his driver's license. Hall also contends there was no admissible evidence that police properly admonished him that refusing a blood alcohol test would result in revocation of his driver's license. Additionally, Hall again argues Benavidez's bribe-taking in other cases deprived him of his due process right to a fair DMV hearing. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court correctly ordered a new administrative hearing. The Court rejected Hall's contention that section 13559 compelled reinstatement of his driver's license in this case. Furthermore, the Court declined to reach the issue of whether police properly admonished Hall about the consequences of refusing a blood alcohol test. View "Hall v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

A jury convicted Harquan Johnson and KeAndre Windfield of first degree murder, during which they personally used and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death, and a principal personally discharged a firearm causing death. The jury also convicted defendants of attempted premeditated and deliberate murder, during which they personally used and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury, and a principal used and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury. As to both offenses, the jury found that defendants committed them for the benefit of a criminal street gang. The jury also convicted defendants of assault with a semiautomatic firearm, during which they personally used a firearm and which they committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Both were sentenced to prison for 90 years to life. They appealed, claiming the preliminary hearing testimony of a prosecution witness should not have been admitted into evidence at trial, the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions of attempted murder, and the jury was misinstructed. Defendants also claim that the firearm allegation findings as to the attempted murder must be stricken. In its original opinion (dated August 19, 2014), the Court of Appeal agreed in part and directed that the jury’s true findings that the defendants personally used a firearm or personally and intentionally discharged a firearm to be stricken. Both defendants had asserted that the abstracts of judgment should be corrected and Court directed the trial court to correct Windfield’s, and, upon the resentencing of Johnson, to ensure that his abstract and the minutes of the hearing correctly reflected the year the crimes were committed and the award of pretrial custody credit. Each defendant claimed that the sentence imposed upon him, without consideration of his individual characteristics, is a violation of the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The Court of Appeal disagreed as to Windfield, but agreed as to Johnson. Therefore, Windfield’s judgment was affirmed except as to corrections the trial court was directed to make. As to Johnson, the Court affirmed his convictions and remanded to the sentencing court for consideration of the factors as set forth in "California v. Gutierrez," (58 Cal.4th 1354 (2014)). Then the California Supreme Court denied both defendants’ petitions for review, but, on its own motion, issued a grant-and-hold of review as to Johnson, for consideration pending review in "In re Alatriste," (S214652), "In re Bonilla," (S214960), and "California v. Franklin," (S217699). On May 26, 2016, the Supreme Court issued its decision in "Franklin" (63 Cal.4th 261 (2016). The Supreme Court then retransferred this case to the Court of Appeals with directions to vacate its opinion and to reconsider the juvenile sentencing issue in light of "Franklin." Pursuant to that order, the Court of Appeals vacated its original opinion; reaffirmed those portions of its original opinion pertaining to issues not subject to the grant and hold, modify its holding of Windfield’s cruel and unusual punishment issue, and reconsidered Johnson’s sentencing claim in light of "Franklin." View "California v. Windfield" on Justia Law

In February 2014, a jury found defendant Kenneth Davis guilty of two 2010 misdemeanors, diverting the natural course of a stream and petty theft (of water). It also found him guilty of a trespass injuring wood or timber in 2010 in another case (which was consolidated solely for purposes of trial) that involved a road he had bulldozed across neighboring property to his own. The court placed him on a three-year period of informal probation, conditioned on a 90-day jail term. Defendant appealed his conviction of petty theft of water, arguing there could not be a theft in this case as a matter of law because the natural stream at issue was nuisance groundwater that the owner was diverting from its property, and the State of California had only a regulatory interest in use of these public waters that otherwise were not personalty that can be the subject of a larceny. The Court of Appeal agreed that there could not be a simple larceny of uncaptured flowing water. The Court reversed and remanded for dismissal of that count. View "California v. Davis" on Justia Law

Connors was on probation for a sex offender registration violation. One of the conditions of his probation barred him from associating with probationers. He associated with a probationer, and the court found him in violation of his probation. It revoked and reinstated his probation with additional conditions, including one barring him from possessing sexually explicit materials. The court of appeal modified the sexually explicit materials condition, to require that defendant be made aware of what items fall within its scope. The court rejected an argument his association with a probationer could not reasonably be found to be a violation of his probation because the probationer was his new girlfriend, and an argument that the sexually explicit materials probation condition was unreasonable. Defendant forfeited his reasonableness challenge to the association condition by failing to object to that condition on reasonableness grounds when it was imposed. View "People v. Connors" on Justia Law

A search of Nassetta‘s truck revealed multiple containers of substances that Nassetta identified as cocaine, methamphetamine, and hash wax; drug use paraphernalia; a notebook containing amounts owed or paid; and a semiautomatic firearm in a locked container. Nassetta entered a plea of no contest to felony possession for sale of cocaine and misdemeanor DUI with a prior DUI conviction. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and granted Nassetta formal probation for five years. The probation officer‘s report recommended 18 terms and conditions of probation. Number 16 was a curfew, 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. Nassetta‘s attorney objected to the curfew limit as not part of the plea bargain, and as a substantial burden unrelated to future criminality. The trial court observed that in its experience, “about two-thirds of [DUI cases] happen in the middle of the night . . . it seems curfew is very closely related to the behavior . . . and the future criminality” and that, given Nassetta‘s significant substance abuse problems, “curfew seems like a really reasonable and sensible idea.” The court of appeal modified the probation order, striking condition 16 as unreasonable because it is not related to Nassetta‘s criminal offenses and does not relate to conduct that is itself criminal. View "People v. Nassetta" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the denial of his petition for resentencing under Proposition 47, Penal Code 1170.18, for his prior conviction of theft and unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle, Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a). The court concluded that violating Vehicle Code section 10851 is not obtaining any property by theft; voter intent does not demonstrate a desire to amend Vehicle Code section 10851; the overall statutory scheme does not demonstrate a desire to amend Vehicle Code section 10851; and excluding Vehicle Code section 10851 from Proposition 47 does not lead to absurd results. Because the court concluded that there is no violation of equal protection requiring the court to construe Proposition 47 to include violations of Vehicle Code section 10851 for the purposes of determining eligibility for resentencing, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Sauceda" on Justia Law

The State appealed a trial court's order granting defendant Julia Huerta's Proposition 47 petition to re-designate a prior felony conviction to a misdemeanor. Huerta pled guilty to one felony count of second degree commercial burglary for the theft of eight bottles of perfume worth $463 from a Sears Department Store. Huerta sought to have her conviction redesignated as the newly created misdemeanor of shoplifting, "entering an open commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny of $950 or less." Huerta’s petition stated "the value of the . . . property does not exceed $950.00." At a hearing, the People did not contest the value of the stolen property, but contended Huerta’s burglary offense did not qualify as shoplifting because she entered the store with another person with whom she shared the intent to commit conspiracy. On appeal, the State argued the trial court erred by: (1) reaching the merits when Huerta failed to satisfy her initial burden by attaching evidence to her petition; and (2) concluding Huerta was eligible for relief when her conduct could have been punished as felony burglary even after Proposition 47, because she entered Sears with the intent to commit conspiracy. Finding no error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Huerta" on Justia Law

Defendant, 17 years old, committed a residential burglary. Defendant entered the youth rehabilitation center in April 2011 and was granted early release in September 2011, with good reports. A December 2011 review hearing concluded that defendant “has fully complied with the conditions of his probation” and was participating in the GED program, while working part time in a restaurant. As recommended by the probation department, the court ordered defendant’s parole “terminated successfully” and maintained his wardship. No further proceedings were held until January 2016, when defendant was 22. It was reported that defendant “perform[ed] well in the community.” Defendant had not paid restitution ($2,100 plus a $100 fine). Defense counsel cited Welfare & Institutions Code 786(c)(2): “An unfulfilled order or condition of restitution, including a restitution fine that can be converted to a civil judgment under Section 730.6 or an unpaid restitution fee shall not be deemed to constitute unsatisfactory completion of supervision or probation.” The prosecutor argued that the restitution order remained an “unfulfilled” probation condition, preventing a finding that probation was successfully completed. The court, believing it lacked authority to issue a civil judgment because defendant was over 21, terminated probation unsuccessfully. The court of appeal reversed. The court had the authority to enter a civil judgment; defendant agreed that a judgment should have been entered. View "In re J.G." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause in response to William Ilasa's petition based on his allegations that he was denied due process of law when, at the conclusion of a prison-reduction procedure developed pursuant to the order of the three-judge federal court, the Board of Prison Hearings did not grant him parole as a non-violent, non-sex-registrant second-strike (NVSS) inmate. The federal court order at issue was issued in a prison class action litigation after the court found that California state prisoners' federal constitutional rights had been violated as a result of overcrowding, after the court found that a prison release order was the only relief capable of remedying the constitutional deficiencies, after the United States Supreme Court affirmed those rulings, after the three-judge court issued its remedial order in reliance on the state defendants' representation and agreement that they would develop comprehensive and sustainable prison population-reduction reforms, and after the state defendants agreed not to contest the remedial order. The California Court of Appeal concluded that, because the Board's decision involved a constitutionally protected liberty interest, Ilasa was entitled to judicial review of the decision. The Court further concluded that, because the record of what was presented to the Board during the review process contained some evidence to support the Board's decision, Ilasa's due process rights were not violated. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal considered Ilasa's petition on its merits and denied it. View "In re Ilasa" on Justia Law

Defendant was found to be a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), Welf. & Inst. Code, 6600, et seq. At issue is whether defendant’s various mental conditions, including frotteuristic disorder, exhibitionist disorder, bipolar disorder, and anti-social disorder, which two experts opined would likely result in future acts of sexual battery, satisfy the requirement of the SVPA that a defendant “will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.” The court held that the trial court properly interpreted the statutory language of the SVPA in finding that under the circumstances in this case sexual battery constitutes sexually violent criminal behavior. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. White" on Justia Law