Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was declared a Mental Disordered Offender (MDO) pursuant to the Mentally Disordered Offender Act, Pen. Code 2962, subd. (e)(2)(A)-(Q), based on his conviction of resisting an executive officer, an offense not specifically enumerated in the MDO Act. In People v. Stevens, the state Supreme Court held that “in a commitment hearing under the MDO Act, the People may not prove the facts underlying the commitment offense (that are necessary to establish the qualifying offense) through a mental health expert’s testimony.” In this case, the court rejected defendant's claim that Stevens renders evidence - that defendant pled guilty to a complaint expressly alleging that he used force and violence in committing the offense - insufficient to support his MDO commitment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Woods" on Justia Law

In July 2014, prior to the passage of Proposition 47, defendant-appellant James Varner entered a guilty plea to a felony violation of receiving stolen property, specifically a 1986 Yamaha M300 motorcycle. Defendant filed a petition to recall his sentence stating that his felony conviction should be reduced to a misdemeanor. The trial court denied his Petition on the grounds that his conviction was not eligible for resentencing under Proposition 47. Defendant claimed on appeal the trial court erred by finding his conviction did not qualify for resentencing under Proposition 47 because: (1) Proposition 47 redefined all theft-related offenses with the value of the property under $950 as misdemeanors; and (2) if the Court of Appeal found Penal Code section 496d (the section under which defendant was convicted) was not affected by Proposition 47, the omission from Proposition 47 violated his equal protection rights under the state and federal Constitutions. The Court of Appeal affirmed: a conviction for receiving a stolen motor vehicle in violation of section 496d was not an eligible offense under Proposition 47. Defendant also did not show an equal protection violation. View "California v. Varner" on Justia Law

In July 2012, defendant Richard Cortez plead guilty to one felony count of possessing methamphetamine, one misdemeanor count of possessing drug paraphernalia, and one misdemeanor count of being under the influence of methamphetamine. Defendant admitted a prior strike and a prison prior. The court sentenced defendant to three years’ probation on condition he serve 270 days in county jail. Approximately two years later, defendant violated the terms of probation for the second time and was sentenced to 16 months in prison on count 1, which was the low term, and a concurrent term of six months in jail on each of the two misdemeanor counts. As a basis for choosing the low term on count 1, the court stated, “Defendant pled at an early stage of proceedings, Small amount of contraband, and no violence.” In June 2015, defendant petitioned for resentencing of his felony conviction as a misdemeanor pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivisions (a) and (f). Because defendant was still under supervision, the court found he was still serving his sentence and denied the petition under subdivision (f), but granted the petition under subdivision (a). The court resentenced defendant to 364 days in county jail on count 1, 129 days consecutive in county jail on count 2, and 129 days concurrent on count 3, for a total jail term of 493 days. The court found defendant had 494 days of custody credit. It imposed one year of parole pursuant to section 1170.18, subdivision (d), and credited the extra day to defendant’s parole period. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether, when a court recalls a felony sentence and imposes a misdemeanor sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (a) (Proposition 47), the court could revisit the sentence imposed on other misdemeanor counts not subject to Proposition 47, and impose a harsher punishment. The Court of Appeal found that yes, the trial court may do so, provided that the new aggregate sentence did not exceed the prior sentence. View "California v. Cortez" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted in 1987 of first-degree murder as an aider and abettor in a “mistaken identity” shooting. A jury convicted petitioner of first degree murder, but found that he did not personally use a firearm or inflict great bodily injury. He was sentenced to 30 years in prison. In 2014, the California Supreme Court held that an aider and abettor may be convicted of first-degree premeditated murder only under direct aiding and abetting principles, not under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Petitioner claimed that the record did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury convicted him of first-degree murder on a legally authorized ground. The court of appeal vacated the conviction. There is no way to tell from the verdict whether the jury relied on the invalid natural and probable consequences theory or viewed petitioner as a direct aider and abettor. The prosecution may either accept a reduction to second-degree murder or retry the greater offense under a direct aiding and abetting theory. View "In re: Brigham" on Justia Law

In 2007, Blackwell, then 17 years old, committed a burglary and attempted robbery with an accomplice and shot and killed Carreno in the course of those offenses. The district attorney elected to directly file the case in adult court under the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d). Blackwell was convicted in 2009 of first-degree murder with a robbery-murder special circumstance (Pen. Code 187(a), 189, 190.2(a)(17)(A)) and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). In 2013 the court of appeal remanded for resentencing pursuant to the constitutional standards announced by the Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama, which held mandatory LWOP sentences for homicide amount to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment when imposed on a defendant who was a juvenile at the time of the offense. On remand, the trial court considered the factors outlined in Miller, and again imposed an LWOP sentence. The court of appeal affirmed, stating that it was unpersuaded that Blackwell’s LWOP sentence is disproportionate to his individual culpability and amounts to cruel and unusual punishment in his particular case. View "People v. Blackwell" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to second-degree burglary of the Santa Rosa Country Club, a felony, and to impersonation, a misdemeanor. The next year, defendant filed a Proposition 47 petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.18. Florriani, the general manager of the country club, testified that a stolen television was worth “$650, $670” and at “least three boxes” of personalized golf balls were taken, valued at $50 each. A painting was also taken. The artist testified the painting was worth $2,000. In denying defendant’s petition, the trial court stated: “The petition is going to be denied not for the amount, though I think the amount is probably over [$]950; it hasn’t been proven.... But this is not a commercial establishment, in my opinion, within the meaning of Prop 47. This is a private club that you have to be a member. The court of appeal reversed. Proposition 47 is to be liberally interpreted; “commercial establishment” means a business that is primarily engaged in the buying and selling of goods or services regardless of whether to “members” or the general public. The defendant is entitled to have his conviction reduced to misdemeanor shoplifting, unless the court determines that resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety View "People v. Holm" on Justia Law

Shortly after 1:00 a.m. on October 21, 2013, Sheriff’s Sergeant Buford observed the defendant commit various traffic violations. As Buford turned on the flashing lights of his patrol car to initiate a traffic stop, defendant pulled over on his own because he had arrived at his house. Buford ordered the defendant to get out of his car, but he refused. Additional deputies arrived, and the defendant was wrestled out of the car and detained. During the struggle, the defendant and two deputies were injured. The district attorney charged the defendant with a single count of resisting an executive officer by the use of force or violence (Penal Code Section 69.1). The court of appeal affirmed, upholding the admission of expert testimony on excessive force and the trial court’s ruling in precluding defense counsel from questioning one of the officers involved in the arrest about a pending civil lawsuit against the officer. View "People v. Sibrian" on Justia Law

Deandre Ellison was shot to death as he drove into his driveway in the Del Paso Heights neighborhood of Sacramento. Four other men, including Latrele Neal, were also in Ellison’s car. Before the car came to a stop in the driveway, an SUV driven by Jesse Cornejo slowly drove past Ellison’s house; the SUV's front and backseat passengers, Adam Cornejo and Isaac Vasquez, opened fire on Ellison‘s car. After crashing the SUV while being pursued by law enforcement, Adam, Jesse, and Isaac were taken into custody a short time later. Each was a Norteno gang member. Adam, Jesse, and Isaac were tried together and convicted by jury of one count of second-degree murder, four counts of attempted murder, and one count of shooting at an inhabited dwelling. Jesse was also convicted of one count of driving in willful or wanton disregard for safety while fleeing from a pursuing peace officer. With respect to the murder, the jury found the offense was committed by means of shooting a firearm from a motor vehicle at another person outside the vehicle with the intent to inflict great bodily injury. The jury also found the crimes were committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members. Various firearm enhancement allegations were also found to be true. The trial court sentenced Adam and Isaac to serve an aggregate indeterminate prison term of 120 years to life plus a consecutive determinate term of 9 years 4 months. Jesse was sentenced to serve the same indeterminate term of 120 years to life plus a consecutive determinate term of 10 years. Defendants appealed. Having reviewed the trial court record and the briefs submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeal concluded that the holding in "California v. Prunty," (62 Cal. 4th 59 (2015)) required reversal of the gang enhancement findings as to all defendants. Also, because each defendant was found to qualify for vicarious firearm enhancements under Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1), which required violation of section 186.22, subdivision (b), as an element of that enhancement, the Court reversed these vicarious firearm enhancements as to all defendants too. The Court affirmed as to all other alleged errors at trial and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "California v. Cornejo" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with misdemeanor counts of driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a), and driving while having 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his blood in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b). He pled not guilty, and moved for military diversion under Penal Code section 1001.80. Section 1001.80 authorizes a trial court to grant pretrial diversion to a defendant charged with a misdemeanor if the defendant was, or currently is, a member of the United States military and suffers from sexual trauma, traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), substance abuse, or mental health problems as a result of his or her military service. Based on the rules of statutory construction, the language of section 1001.80 and Vehicle Code section 23640, and the legislative history of section 1001.80, the court concluded that Vehicle Code section 23640 does not bar pretrial diversion for veterans or active duty members of the military who meet the criteria of section 1001.80 and are charged in a DUI case. The court urged the Legislature to act by amending section 1001.80 to express its intent with regard to military diversion in DUI cases. Therefore, the court discharged the order to show cause and ordered a peremptory writ of mandate directing the Appellate Division to vacate its order denying petitioner's petition for writ of mandate, and to make a new and different order granting the petition. View "Hopkins v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 2012, defendant was charged in the County of San Diego with driving under the influence and for possession of cocaine and oxycodone. Defendant pleaded guilty to both counts. After defendant was sentenced to probation by the Superior Court of the County of San Diego, the "entire jurisdiction" of his case was transferred under Penal Code section 1203.9 to the Superior Court of the County of Riverside. The State contended defendant’s petition had to be decided by the trial court in San Diego that originally sentenced defendant. "Based on established principles of statutory construction and considerations of judicial resources," the Court of Appeal held that the Riverside Superior Court had entire jurisdiction over defendant’s case and could decide defendant’s petition. Additionally, the Court held that defendant waived his right to have his petition decided by the San Diego court. View "California v. Adelmann" on Justia Law