Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was found guilty of premeditated and deliberate attempted murder (count 1) and attempted extortion (count 2). The court concluded that the evidence does not support defendant's conviction of attempted extortion. In this case, if the prosecutor intended to proceed on the theory that the food truck business was the target of the extortion, then the prosecutor should have amended the information during the trial to allege that defendant had attempted to extort from the owner of the business. And this court has no authority to order the amendment of the information on appeal. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of conviction on count 2. View "People v. Ochoa" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of three counts of committing a lewd act against a child under age 14 and sentenced to 105 years to life in prison. The court agreed with defendant that the jury was given an erroneous instruction on the use of Evidence Code section 1108 evidence to show a propensity to commit sex offenses, and that the instruction had the effect of reducing the prosecution’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also agreed with defendant that the trial court failed to give him an adequate advisement of his rights. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "People v. Cruz" on Justia Law

C.H. shoplifted a pair of jeans and was arrested after a physical altercation with a loss prevention officer at Kohl’s Department Store. He was charged with second-degree robbery and assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury. The robbery and assault charges were dismissed after C.H. admitted to felony grand theft from a person. Later, voters passed Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act; section 1170.18 permits offenders adjudicated of felony grand theft to petition for redesignation of their crimes as misdemeanors. The court redesignated C.H.’s felony as a misdemeanor but denied his request to expunge his DNA sample. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting C.H.'s argument that misdemeanants are not required to provide a DNA sample for the state database and that he is no longer a felon. Proposition 47’s directive to treat a redesignated offense as a misdemeanor “for all purposes” employs words that have a well-defined meaning and have never applied to alter a crime’s original status. The provisions of Proposition 47 can be harmonized with the DNA collection law, Proposition 69. In any event, Proposition 69 controls as the more specific law. The underlying purpose of both measures to protect public safety. View "In re C.H." on Justia Law

The minor broke into a Concord apartment and stole a cell phone, wallet, and Nintendo game. Leaving, the minor was confronted by the resident, who assaulted him. The minor brandished a knife. Charged with second degree robbery, first degree residential burglary, felony grand theft from the person, and misdemeanor burglary, the minor admitted counts three and four. Counts one and two were dismissed. The juvenile court adjudged the minor a ward of the court and ordered him to submit DNA samples for the state DNA database. The minor later sought relief under Penal Code section 1170.18, requesting that his felony grand theft adjudication be redesignated as a misdemeanor, that the order requiring submission of DNA samples be vacated, and that his DNA samples be expunged from the state database. The court granted the request to redesignate his felony offense, but denied requests to vacate the orders. The court of appeal affirmed, construing Proposition 47 (authorizing the redesignation), with the DNA and Forensic Identification Data Base and Data Bank Act, Penal Code section 295. The court noted that recently-enacted Assembly Bill 1492 clarifies that, under section 299, a court may not order expungement of a DNA sample when acting under section 1170.18 to redesignate a felony offense as a misdemeanor. View "In re C.B." on Justia Law

Defendant is currently serving a third strike indeterminate life sentence for a nonserious and nonviolent offense. In this petition, he seeks to recall his sentence and resentence as a second strike offender. The superior court denied his petition, finding defendant ineligible for resentencing because he had a disqualifying prior conviction for attempted murder. Defendant’s disqualifying “prior” conviction occurred after the conviction resulting in his third strike indeterminate life sentence. The court agreed with defendant that the trial court erred in finding him statutorily ineligible for resentencing. The court held that a prior disqualifying conviction under Proposition 36, Pen. Code 1170.126, must occur prior to the inmate’s conviction resulting in the inmate’s indeterminate life sentence under the three strikes law. Accordingly, the court remanded for the trial court to determine whether resentencing would pose “an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” View "People v. Spiller" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to six felony burglary counts and admitted the truth of allegations that he committed the current offenses while out on bail for another crime and had one prior conviction that qualified as a strike under the Three Strikes law. On appeal, defendant challenged a judgment resentencing him to an overall prison term the same length as his previous, plea-bargained sentence after the trial court granted his motion to reduce two of his several convictions to misdemeanors pursuant to Proposition 47, Penal Code 1170.18, subd. (e). The court held that Proposition 47 permits imposing a new sentence that equals the previous sentence and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by doing so in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. McDowell" on Justia Law

In 2014, loss prevention agent Marcus Nealy and manager Stephanie Garza, were working at a Sears department store in Yuba City, when they observed "H.W." enter the store via the store’s closed circuit surveillance system. Nealy saw the minor enter with “a backpack that looked empty” and noticed he was “looking around very suspiciously.” Nealy and Garza took up separate positions on the sales floor and communicated by cell phone as they continued to observe the minor. Garza told Nealy the minor removed the antitheft tag from a pair of jeans using a pair of pliers, carried the jeans into the restroom, and, when the minor came out of the restroom, Garza no longer saw the jeans. Nealy checked the restroom but found no jeans. Meanwhile, Garza alerted Nealy the minor was leaving the store without stopping at a cash register or attempting to pay for the jeans. Nealy headed outside to apprehend the minor, stopped him, and called police. When Yuba City Police Officer Joshua Jackson arrived at the store, Nealy and Garza informed him the minor used “a pair of diagonal cutters or wire cutters” to remove the security tag on the jeans and placed the jeans in the backpack before leaving the store without paying for them. A search of the minor’s backpack revealed the jeans and a pair of pliers. The minor had no wallet, no money, no credit cards, and no identification. A delinquency petition was filed, alleging the minor committed theft, possessed of burglary tools, and trespassed. Following a contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court sustained the theft and burglary tool possession allegations, but found the trespass allegation had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The minor was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court and placed on juvenile probation. The juvenile court committed the minor to two days in juvenile hall with credit for time served, and set a maximum term of confinement of eight months. The minor appealed, challenging the evidence presented against him. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re H.W." on Justia Law

Defendant, confined to a wheelchair, appealed his conviction for making a criminal threat and attempting, by means of a threat, to deter an executive officer from performing his duties. The court concluded that a person confined to a wheelchair is capable of making a criminal threat; the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions; the trial court was not required to sua sponte give an unanimity instruction; defendant failed to carry his burden of showing that there could have been no conceivable reason for trial counsel’s allegedly deficient tactical decisions and, in any event, defendant failed to show prejudice; and the trial court properly admitted evidence of defendant's prior uncharged threats against other persons where the evidence was highly probative, the trial court gave a limiting instruction, and defendant did not object to or request amplification of the instruction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Orloff" on Justia Law

Defendant Erik Flores was the father of three young children (John Doe 1, John Doe 2, and Jane Doe). The information alleged that, from 2011 to 2014, Flores tortured the children, and abused his children. The information specifically alleged that Flores personally inflicted great bodily injury on the children in on certain counts. Defendant Mariah Sugg had an "off-and-on" girlfriend relationship with Flores, and was separately charged with the same set of offenses against the same victims, but with differing windows of commission. The trial court sentenced each defendant to two life terms plus six years, and imposed but stayed the sentence on the remaining convictions and true findings. On appeal, Flores argued the court prejudicially erred by instructing the jury it could return guilty verdicts on the torture counts as an aider and abettor of Sugg under the "natural and probable consequences" doctrine. He also argued the evidence was insufficient to support the torture convictions because there was no evidence either he or Sugg had the specific intent to "cause cruel or extreme pain or suffering for the purposes of revenge, persuasion or any sadistic purpose." In Sugg's separate appeal, she claimed Penal Code section 273a, subdivision (a), was unconstitutional based on vagueness and, alternatively, that the court was sua sponte required to instruct that the jury could not find her guilty of violating section 273a under the "willfully . . . permits" prong of that statute unless the jury found she had a duty to control Flores's conduct. The Court of Appeal remanded these cases back to the trial court with instructions that the court correct the minute orders and abstracts of judgment to reflect imposition of life terms on counts 3 and 7 as to Flores and counts 1 and 5 as to Sugg and, as so modified, the judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Flores" on Justia Law

In 2012, petitioner was charged with unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle; possession of burglar’s tools; and possession of a stolen vehicle. Petitioner pleaded no contest. The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed petitioner on probation for three years. Weeks later, a violation petition alleged petitioner had been arrested for three felonies: unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle with a prior conviction of buying or receiving a stolen vehicle and felony evading an officer. Petitioner pleaded no contest to evading. The negotiated disposition provided that petitioner would be sentenced to a three-year prison term but that execution of sentence would be suspended. He placed on probation. Months later, a notice of violation alleged that petitioner had failed to report. The court summarily revoked probation in each case and issued a bench warrant. Petitioner had been convicted of grand larceny and eluding the police in Nevada. While in prison, petitioner sent notifications, which the court received. Eight months later, the court ordered petitioner’s previously imposed three-year sentence to run consecutively to his Nevada sentence. Petitioner argued the trial court lost jurisdiction because it did not order execution of his previously-imposed sentence within 60 days of being properly notified of his imprisonment in Nevada. The court of appeal agreed and vacated the order executing his three-year sentence. View "In re Mancillas" on Justia Law