Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After defendant failed to report to his supervising parole agent - a violation of parole supervision conditions that defendant admitted - the trial court revoked and reinstated parole on condition that defendant serve an additional 60 days in custody. Defendant appealed, arguing that the parole revocation petition should have been denied because adequate consideration was not given to intermediate sanctions as required by Penal Code section 3000.08, subdivision (f). Defendant also argued that, even if the revocation petition was properly granted, the trial court lacked authority to order defendant to serve more than four additional days in custody because the maximum confinement time for a misdemeanor drug offense is 364 days and, pursuant to the terms of Proposition 47, his underlying drug conviction must now be “considered a misdemeanor for all purposes” other than limitations on ownership or possession of firearms. The court concluded that defendant's challenge to the revocation order is properly decided by this court; intermediate sanctions were appropriately considered for defendant's violation of his parole conditions; and the trial court's authority under section 1170.18, subdivision (d), and 3000.08, subdivision (f), to revoke and reinstate parole on condition the parolee served additional custodial time following a Proposition 47 resentencing is not limited by the 364-day maximum sentence for misdemeanors. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Hronchak" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of charges for their involvement in a razor-blade-shank attack by “Southside” gang members on a Los Angeles County jail inmate who refused to stab another inmate at the gang’s behest. The court vacated defendants' convictions for assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (count 2) because in June 2008, when the offense was committed, assault with a deadly weapon, as charged in count 1, and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, as charged in count 2, were alternative statements of the same offense; the court reversed defendants' sentences for count 1 and 3; and the court remanded for resentencing and for calculating defendant Vega and Rangel's custody credits. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Miranda" on Justia Law

The trial court found that defendant entered a grocery store with intent to commit theft by false pretenses, and determined that defendant was statutorily ineligible to have her felony burglary conviction reduced to a misdemeanor. This appeal involves an issue currently pending before the California Supreme Court: whether a felony conviction for second degree commercial burglary, Penal Code 459, is reducible to misdemeanor shoplifting if the defendant entered the commercial establishment with intent to commit theft by false pretenses. As enacted by the voters, section 459.5 provides that “shoplifting” is committed when, inter alia, a defendant enters a commercial establishment with “intent to commit larceny.” The court concluded that the voters intended “larceny” as used in section 459.5 to include all forms of “theft,” including “theft by false pretenses.” In this case, defendant’s second degree commercial burglary conviction based on using a forged $100 traveler’s check is a nonviolent offense, not demonstrably more serious than classic shoplifting, viz., entering a store and filching $100 worth of items. Reclassifying it as a misdemeanor is thus consistent with the articulated purposes behind Proposition 47. Therefore, the court concluded that defendant is eligible to have her felony burglary conviction reclassified to misdemeanor shoplifting. View "People v. Garner" on Justia Law

The trial court revoked defendant-appellant Jesse Wagner's parole, ordered that he serve 120 days of local custody, and reinstated his parole. After the time to appeal from the order revoking his parole had passed and after Wagner completed his term of custody, Wagner discovered evidence which he argued showed that in pursuing revocation of his parole, a parole officer acted in retaliation for litigation Wagner initiated against another law enforcement officer and testified falsely at the revocation hearing. Upon discovering this evidence, Wagner filed, and the trial court denied, a motion for relief under Penal Code section 1473.6. The trial court did not reach the merits of Wagner's motion but instead found that it did not have jurisdiction under section 1473.6 to consider Wagner's claims. Wagner filed a timely notice of appeal. Contrary to the trial court's determination, the Court of Appeal found that section 1473.6 did give it jurisdiction over its earlier order revoking Wagner's parole. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded for a hearing on the merits of Wagner's motion. View "California v. Wagner" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. On appeal, defendant challenged the postjudgment order denying his petition for recall of his sentence on his conviction and for resentencing under Penal Code 1170.126 (Proposition 36 or the Act). The court affirmed the Proposition 36 court's finding that defendant intended to cause great bodily injury, which is an expressly enumerated factor for disqualifying, or rendering ineligible, a defendant for resentencing under Proposition 36. Contrary to defendant’s claim, that court was not foreclosed from making this factual finding of intent, which he characterizes as “a brand new factual finding of intent” prohibited by People v. Guerrero. The court concluded that, in determining eligibility for Proposition 36 relief, a court is empowered to consider the record of conviction and to make factual findings by a preponderance of the evidence, even if those findings were not made by the jury or the trial court in convicting a defendant of the current offense. Preponderance of the evidence is the statutory standard of proof and is also the constitutional standard, because Proposition 36 is an ameliorative act, not one that operates to increase the defendant’s “penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.” View "People v. Newman" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for three sex offenses against his adult roommate and two sex offenses against a minor. At issue is whether defendant should be convicted of both attempted oral copulation of a minor (Penal Code, 664, 288a, subd. (b)(1)) and luring a minor with intent to orally copulate (Penal Code, 288.3). In the published portion of the opinion, the court concluded that defendant is guilty of both crimes where he engaged in a preparatory communication and a direct act. In this instance, the “general” statute (attempt) contains an element that is not contained on the face of the more recently enacted “special” statute (luring). Attempt requires a direct but ineffectual act that goes beyond mere preparation. Luring does not. Accordingly, the court stayed the four-month sentence for attempted oral copulation, corrected the abstract of judgment to delete a dismissed count, and otherwise affirmed. View "People v. Medelez" on Justia Law

Babyray Hudson appealed the denial of his petition to reduce his second degree burglary and forgery convictions to misdemeanors under Proposition 47. Hudson's convictions stemmed from a 2011 incident in which he entered a bank, falsely impersonating another person, with the intent to commit a felony by signing someone else's name to a check. After review of Hudson's arguments on appeal, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court properly denied the petition because Hudson failed to establish his eligibility for resentencing. View "California v. Hudson" on Justia Law

After pleading no contest to a charge of false imprisonment and receiving a sentence of four years, appellant sought presentence custody credit under Penal Code section 2900.5. The trial court denied the request, finding that appellant’s confinement did not fall under section 1203.018, because that provision applies to inmates held “in lieu of bail,” whereas appellant’s home detention resulted from an agreement to post a lesser bail. However, the court found that appellant’s home detention entitled him to presentence custody credit under section 2900.5. The court adopted an interpretation of section 2900.5 that includes within the definition of “in custody” all “home detention[s]” under programs established pursuant to section 1203.018 provides appellant and all other defendants placed in the County’s electronic monitoring program by the court the same presentencing custody credit awarded to defendants assigned to the program by the correctional administrator. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and remanded for recalculation of presentence custody credit. View "People v. Raygoza" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to second degree commercial burglary and was sentenced to three years formal probation. Defendant then petitioned for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivisions (a) and (f), but the trial court denied the petition. The court concluded, based on the California Supreme Court's recent decision in People v. Garcia, that defendant was convicted of second degree burglary of a specific storage unit, not burglary of a commercial establishment open during regular business hours. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Stylz" on Justia Law

In 2014 defendant was charged with one count of possession or control of child pornography, Penal Code 311.11(a). A plea agreement was reached: with a felony plea to possession of child pornography, defendant would receive a probation sentence. After being advised of his rights and waiving them, defendant entered a no contest plea. The court suspended the imposition of sentence, placing defendant on probation for a period of three years. One of the conditions of probation was he could not “reside within 2000 feet of any public or private school, or park where children regularly gather.” Defendant, a first-time offender, lives with his mother, about 900 feet from a park. Because of the court’s concerns regarding this probation condition, it stayed the condition pending appeal. The court of appeal struck the condition, finding it not mandatory. Requiring a blanket condition in all probation cases would interfere with traditional policies of probation departments to rely on individual expertise in handling sex offenders on probation. View "People v. Lynch" on Justia Law