Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2001, Chatman pleaded no contest to a felony count of robbery and was placed on five years‘ probation. Two years later, he was convicted of misdemeanor reckless driving with alcohol involved. He successfully applied under Penal Code 1203.4 to have both convictions dismissed. In 2008, Chatman was convicted of another misdemeanor, driving under the influence and was placed under three years‘ probation with a condition that he served 10 days in jail. The conviction was never dismissed. In 2011, the executive director of a community organization offered Chatman a job as an administrator of a group home for foster and delinquent youth. Chatman was statutorily ineligible for the position because of his felony conviction. (Health & Saf. Code, 1522(a), (d).) Chatman applied for a certificate of rehabilitation (Health & Saf. Code 1522(g)(1)(A)(ii)), acknowledging that the statute rendered him ineligible as a former felony probationer who had spent time in jail after obtaining dismissals of prior convictions. He argued that his ineligibility violated his right to equal protection. The trial court rejected his petition. The court of appeal reversed. While it might make sense to deny certificate eligibility to all subsequently incarcerated former felons, there no rationale to deny eligibility only to those who have served sentences of probation. View "People v. Chatman" on Justia Law

The State appealed the superior court’s order granting defendant Willie Abarca Jr.’s Proposition 47 resentencing petition. Abarca pled guilty to one felony count of second degree burglary based on his attempt to pass a forged check for $300 at a bank. After voters passed Proposition 47, Abarca sought to have his felony conviction redesignated as the newly created misdemeanor of shoplifting, entering an open commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny of $950 or less. The State contended Abarca’s offense did not constitute shoplifting because banks are not commercial establishments. The superior court concluded banks were commercial establishments, granted Abarca’s petition, and resentenced him. The State raised three issues on appeal: (1) the superior court erred in reaching the merits because Abarca did not carry his initial burden by attaching evidence to his petition; (2) the superior court erred in determining a bank was a commercial establishment; and (3) the superior court erred because Abarca’s underlying conduct could have been punished as felony burglary even after Proposition 47, because Abarca’s act of passing a forged check constituted identity theft. The Court of Appeal disagreed with each asserted error and affirmed. View "California v. Abarca" on Justia Law

The Association, on behalf of certain custodial deputies designated as a "peace officer" by Penal Code section 830.1, subdivision (c), filed suit seeking a judicial declaration that such custodial deputies may lawfully carry concealed firearms while off duty without the necessity of obtaining a permit to carry a concealed weapon. The court concluded that the Association correctly maintains that the County's practice does not comport with Penal Code section 25450, which categorically exempts all peace officers listed in section 830.1 from the prohibition against carrying a concealed weapon. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions for the trial court to enter declaratory relief to the Association. View "Stanislaus Cnty. Deputy Sherrifs' Ass'n. v. County of Stanislaus" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, all raised the issue of whether Vehicle Code section 23640 prohibited military diversion pursuant to Penal Code section 1001.80 for defendants charged with driving under the influence offenses. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that military diversion was not available for defendants charged with driving under the influence offenses in violation of sections 23152 and 23153. View "California v. VanVleck" on Justia Law

Ana, age 17, was arrested following a chase and a crash involving a stolen car. Ana falsely reported to the arresting officer that she had been driving. The officer determined that her boyfriend, Eduardo, had been driving, which was confirmed following Eduardo’s arrest. Ana had been drinking. The district attorney filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. Ana admitted two misdemeanor counts (resisting arrest, and falsely reporting a crime); the remaining counts were dismissed. Ana was declared to be a ward of the court with a maximum confinement of 14 months, detaining her in the custody of her mother, and imposing conditions of probation. The court of appeal modified a condition that Minor “shall not possess any drug paraphernalia” to state that Minor “shall not possess any item that she knows is drug paraphernalia.” A condition that “Minor shall not possess or utilize any program or application, on any electronic data storage device, that automatically or through a remote command deletes data from that device” was vacated, subject to reinstatement in narrower form. A condition that Minor shall “obey all rules and regulations of the Electronic Monitoring Program” was modified to provide that Minor shall “obey all rules and regulations of the Electronic Monitoring Program, as posted on the probation department’s website, as approved by the court, and as explained to her by her probation officer.” View "In re Ana C." on Justia Law

In 1996, defendant Clifton Gibson was tried as an adult and convicted of first degree murder with special circumstances, assault with a firearm, and robbery. These offenses were committed when he was 17 years old, with two adult codefendants. Gibson was ultimately sentenced to life without possibility of parole (LWOP) for the murder, consecutive to a determinate term of 12 years, four months, in prison. In 2014, he filed a petition to recall his sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), which was denied by the trial court on the ground he failed to demonstrate he had been rehabilitated or that he was remorseful. Defendant appealed. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court: (1) improperly limited applicability of section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) relief to juvenile defendants who did not actually kill the victim; (2) abused its discretion in denying the petition despite evidence to support the existence of all the statutory factors; and (3) “flouted Miller [v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)] and Gutierrez[58 Cal.4th 1354 (2014)].” Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Gibson" on Justia Law

A Fort Bragg police officer found Watts in possession of 3.86 grams of methamphetamine, 1.16 grams of heroin, and drug paraphernalia. “[N]umerous text messages . . . indicating sales of controlled substances” were found on Watts’s cell phone. Under a plea agreement, she pleaded no contest to possession of methamphetamine for sale. The trial court suspended imposition of the sentence and placed Watts on probation for 36 months subject to conditions, including that she serve 120 days in county jail. Among other fines and fees, the court imposed “the $190 [crime-lab] fee under [section] 11372.5 of the Health and Safety Code.” An addendum to the probation order stated that the $190 “[f]ee imposed include[d] penalty assessments and surcharges as required.” Watts did not object to the imposition of the crime-lab fee or the associated assessments. The court of appeal affirmed, but ordered the penalty assessments imposed on the crime-lab fee stricken. After an extensive discussion of the statutory language, the court concluded that the “most sensible interpretation is that the Legislature intended the crime-lab fee to be exactly what it called it in the first paragraph, a fee, and not a fine, penalty, or forfeiture subject to penalty assessments.” View "People v. Watts" on Justia Law

Defendant appeals an order denying a petition to recall his sentence for felony petty theft with a prior and for resentencing to a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and School Act, Pen. Code, 1170.18, 666. When defendant was 14 years old, he committed two acts of forcible rape in concert with another and three acts of forcible sexual penetration. After he was discharged from the California Youth Authority, he was required to register as a sex offender. Defendant was later sentenced to prison for assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury. While he was on parole for that offense, he pled guilty to felony petty theft with a prior. After defendant was released on parole again, he violated parole by removing his electronic tracking device. The trial court revoked and reinstated his parole. Defendant then petitioned for resentencing to misdemeanor petty theft under the Act. The court held that a person is not eligible for resentencing pursuant to section 666 if the person is required to register as a sex offender as a result of a prior juvenile adjudication. This treatment of registered juvenile sex offenders does not deny defendant equal protection of the laws. View "People v. Dunn" on Justia Law

Defendant, age 30, responded to a Craigslist ad, posted by a Monterey County Sheriff’s Officer: “Young cutie looking for a hookup today!!! - w4m (Salinas).” During an ensuing online conversation, the “cutie” claimed to be 15 years old. They arranged to meet. Defendant was convicted of violating Penal Code 288.4(b): “Every person who, motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in children, arranges a meeting with a minor or a person he or she believes to be a minor for the purpose of . . . engaging in lewd or lascivious behavior” and “who goes to the arranged meeting place at or about the arranged time” commits a felony. He was granted probation. The court of appeal affirmed. While agreeing that the “motivated by” element requires proof that the motivation was a substantial factor in the commission of the prohibited conduct, the court found substantial evidence to support the verdict; the trial court did not have a sua sponte duty to give a substantial factor instruction. The court was not obligated to instruct on entrapment. Defendant’s trial counsel was not deficient in failing to object to the imposition of probation supervision fees. View "People v. Fromuth" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Dywon Levell Byrd guilty of first degree murder (court 1), and driving in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property while fleeing from a pursuing police officer (court 3). The jury found true the special allegation that defendant used a firearm in committing first degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life for first degree murder, a consecutive 25 years to life on the firearm allegation, plus a consecutive two-year sentence for driving in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property while fleeing from a pursuing police officer. On appeal, defendant contended the trial court erred in instructing the jury with the last bracketed paragraph of CALCRIM No. 226. Furthermore, he argued his conviction for the wanton driving charge was not supported by substantial evidence because there was no proof that either of the pursuing officers wore a distinctive uniform. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with defendant's latter contention, and reversed on that ground (count 3). The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "California v. Bryd" on Justia Law