Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant challenged his convictions arising out of three separate shooting incidents. The court affirmed defendant's convictions for murder in count 1, attempted murder in counts 4, 9 and 10, and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle and at an inhabited dwelling in counts 5 and 8. However, the court agreed with defendant that the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction that used the disjunctive "or" which permitted the jury to convict defendant for attempted murder without finding that he had the requisite intent to kill each victim. Because this error was prejudicial, the court reversed as to counts 2, 3, 6, and 7. Furthermore, defendant contends, and the Attorney General concedes, that the trial court erred in imposing restitution and parole revocation fines on each count of conviction. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's restitution and parole revocation orders. View "People v. Falaniko" on Justia Law

Duffy was charged with misdemeanor child endangerment. On August 23, 2013, Lexington Insurance posted a $50,000 bail bond for Duffy’s release from custody. Duffy appeared in court on August 29, 2013, at which time the court set a pre-trial hearing for October 1, 2013. Duffy failed to appear at the October 1 hearing. The court ordered Duffy’s $50,000 bail forfeited. Lexington brought a motion to vacate forfeiture and reinstate the bond pursuant to Penal Code section 1305. The court denied the motion and entered judgment against Lexington. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that Duffy was not required to attend the hearing. The court specifically ordered Duffy to appear at the October 1 pretrial conference by stating: “You are ordered to go back to Department 87 up on the second floor, Ms. Duffy, October 1st, 9:00 a.m. for your pretrial. Thank you.” Duffy’s nonappearance provided an adequate basis for the court’s order forfeiting the bond. View "People v. Lexington Nat'l Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant, an Almeda County resident, pled no contest to second-degree burglary; a felony charge of petty theft with a prior, was dismissed. The court admitted defendant to three years probation with a condition that she spend 60 days in the Napa County jail. The Napa probation officer advised the court that because of a felony conviction, defendant was on Post Release Community Supervision in Alameda County, set to expire in January 2015. The court granted a transfer motion. Alameda County accepted the transfer in March 2013. In July 2015, eight months after passage of Proposition 47, on the day that Alameda County summarily revoked her probation, defendant filed a petition to have her Napa burglary conviction reduced to a misdemeanor. The Alameda court denied it, stating that defendant had to seek relief in Napa County because that was where she received the sentence she was petitioning to have reduced. The court of appeal affirmed, noting the plain language: a “petition for a recall of sentence” by a probationer, or a former probationer, is to be filed with the “trial court that entered the judgment of conviction,” Pen. Code 1170.18(a),(f)1. The court stated that defendant sought the benefit of Proposition 47 "without complying with any of its burdens.” View "People v. Curry" on Justia Law

In 1990, Putney sexually molested his two- and four-year-old cousins, with whom he lived, and a nine-year-old neighbor. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison. In 2002, before Putney was due to be released on parole, the state sought his commitment as a sexually violent predator (SVP). He admitted to the allegations and was committed to Atascadero State Hospital for two years. After that term, the state did not seek to recommit Putney, He was released on parole and moved several times due to public outcry, became suicidal, and sought help from his parole officer. Putney returned to prison in 2005 after no other facility would accept him. His parole was revoked “based upon [the] psychiatric return.” Before Putney was due to be released, the state filed another petition. He was committed for another two-year term. Another petition was filed; a trial was set for 2008, but was continued many times and did not begin until 2014. One delay was because Putney was convicted of possessing a weapon while in prison. He was sentenced to 25 years to life. The court of appeal reversed his subsequent recommitment. The trial court lacked authority to recommit Putney as an SVP once his sentence for the intervening criminal conviction became final. View "People v. Putney" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for first degree residential burglary with a "person present" finding. The court rejected defendant's claim that the trial court undermined his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself when it denied his request for advisory counsel; assuming arguendo that the trial court erred in not excluding the statements at issue pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and defendant's inculpatory statements were merely incidental and were only used to impeach him; there was no prosecutorial misconduct where the use of defendant's statements for impeachment purposes was harmless in light of the eye witness identification, the physical evidence, and the DNA test results; because defendant did not object to the “person present” instruction or ask for an amplifying instruction, he waived the alleged error; and, waiver aside, the alleged instructional error was harmless by any standard of review. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Debouver" on Justia Law

Branden Johnson appealed a superior court order denying his petition to recall his felony sentence for receiving stolen property and to resentence him to a misdemeanor, as allowed in Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (a), which was enacted as part of Proposition 47. On appeal, Johnson argued that the trial court erred in ruling that he, not the State, had the burden of establishing eligibility for Proposition 47 relief. The Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the order without prejudice, to allow Johnson, if he chose to do so, to file a new petition attempting to meet his initial burden of demonstrating his entitlement to relief under Proposition 47. View "California v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant had contemplated a plea agreement negotiated with the prosecution for a principal four-year prison term that involved disposition of both cases at issue. Without stating any reason why defendant could not enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI), and after defendant indicated his desire to take the plea agreement, the trial court said it would not approve the plea and withdrew it from further consideration. The court found merit to defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting the plea bargain in the absence of any stated justification, and reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings; due to lack of prejudice, the court rejected defendant's contentions that he was denied his statutory right to plead NGI or that the trial court abused its discretion in denying two motions pursuant to People v. Marsden; and the court did not reach defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and due process. View "People v. Loya" on Justia Law

A jury convicted petitioner Jim Davis of three counts of first degree murder with enhancements. The trial court sentenced petitioner to multiple terms of life without the possibility of parole. Toward the end of 2011, petitioner notified the trial court that he sought postconviction discovery under section 1054.9. On January 26, 2012, the trial court held a hearing on petitioner’s request and ordered petitioner and real party in interest the State to informally resolve the issues of what discovery materials petitioner would receive but informed petitioner he would need to pay for copies before anything would be released. The parties subsequently exchanged several letters on this topic. On March 4, 2015, petitioner once again wrote the trial court about receiving postconviction discovery. He indicated that, in correspondence with the State, he had narrowed the list of items he wanted to six items, including police reports, the “Murder book,” all suspects questioned, all fingerprints collected, all DNA collected, and all witness statements. He also argued he could not be forced to pay for copies of discovery because he was indigent and could not be treated differently from wealthier defendants. Real party in interest filed a written opposition to petitioner’s March 4, 2015 request. It contended petitioner’s discovery requests were vague and/or overbroad and asserted petitioner could not evade paying for copies of postconviction discovery. On April 22, 2015, the court issued a minute order regarding petitioner’s March 4, 2015 request under section 1054.9. It flatly denied the request for postconviction discovery without explanation. Petitioner immediately appealed. "[P]etitioner, multiple attorneys involved in this case, and two courts have now spent a good amount of time attempting to decipher who may or may not have turned over what to whom, what might still need to be produced, and how production should occur. At oral argument . . . counsel for both petitioner and real party in interest agreed that the parties were able to agree upon a way to produce all relevant discovery at very low cost after [the Court of Appeal] appointed counsel for petitioner. Section 1054.9 appears to attempt to strike a balance between ensuring the availability of discovery materials to those inmates serving very long sentences while still conserving judicial and financial resources by requiring a good faith attempt to obtain the discovery materials from trial counsel before seeking judicial intervention and placing the burden of payment or reimbursement for discovery costs on the defendant. We suggest this balance would be struck better, and with significantly more convenience to courts and parties alike, if the Legislature provided for the right to counsel in preparation for filing a motion for postconviction discovery under section 1054.9." The Court issued a peremptory writ of mandate, directing the Superior Court to vacate its order denying postconviction discovery, and for the parties to reach an agreement on materials and costs. View "Davis v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Petitioner Ernest Cox was incarcerated at Mule Creek State Prison. He filed a civil complaint against real parties in interest, officials and employees of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), seeking monetary damages. Simultaneously, he filed a petition for relief from the government claims filing requirement. "The complaint is not a model of clarity, but in general alleges claims of sexual harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of due process." Respondent superior court deemed the civil complaint to be a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the court then denied. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate with the Court of Appeal, asserting respondent superior court erred in deeming the civil complaint to be a habeas corpus petition and that the court had to consider his petition for relief from the government claims filing requirement on its merits. Real parties in interest conceded respondent superior court erred. The Court of Appeal agreed, and ordered the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate. View "Cox v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Defendant was found to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) pursuant to the Welfare and Institutions Code. For “good cause” a prisoner may be held beyond the prisoner’s release date for 45 days to complete a full evaluation to determine whether the prisoner qualifies as an SVP. The court concluded that “a full evaluation” includes the prosecuting attorney’s decision to file a petition. The court also concluded that the petition was timely; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the probative value of the evidence of victim impact statements outweighed the substantial danger of undue prejudice; and the trial court did not err in excluding testimony that defendant faced a life sentence under the three strikes law if he reoffended. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Hydrick" on Justia Law