Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the evidence showed defendant Mouris Ghipriel, who weighed 240 pounds, kept one of his employees, who weighed approximately 100 pounds, in a very small office and sexually assaulted her. He appealed his ultimate conviction, arguing the evidence was insufficient evidence to show that he used additional force or menace required to establish felony false imprisonment. The Court of Appeal rejected Ghipriel's contention the record does not support his three felony false imprisonment convictions. The Court also rejected Ghipriel's contention the trial court erred in admitting testimony from the victim with respect to his attempt to digitally penetrate her. Accordingly, Ghipriel's convictions were affirmed. View "California v. Ghipriel" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the trial court's decision rejecting his petition for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, Penal Code section 1170.126, enacted by Proposition 36. The court held that the applicable standard of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. The court rejected People v. Arevalo, which found that the prosecution must prove ineligibility beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's determination that defendant was ineligible for recall of the sentence he was serving or for resentencing because of his expressed intent to inflict great bodily injury on his wife. View "People v. Frierson" on Justia Law

Minor and his friends entered an Oakland home through a back window and took a watch, a camera, and loose change. They were apprehended blocks away. The dispositional report noted that Minor had a “difficult” relationship with his mother and admitted he had experimented with drugs and alcohol and had associated with members of the Norteños gang. Minor was in danger of failing most of his middle school classes. He had significant behavioral issue. The juvenile court placed Minor under the supervision of the probation department and imposed probation conditions, including a 6:00 p.m. curfew, a no-contact order as to the victim and Minor’s co-offenders, and requirements that Minor attend school, complete his school work, remain drug-free, submit to regular drug testing, and submit to a search of his person, residence, vehicles, containers, and “electronics, including passwords.” Minor unsuccessfully moved to delete the electronic search condition. The court stated that Minor “has some fairly substantial drug issues” and “we need to use the electronics to make sure we can monitor the purchase, or sales, usage [of drugs].” The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the condition was not overbroad, was reasonably related to potential future criminality, and was necessary to ensure compliance with other conditions. View "In re J.E." on Justia Law

Defendant plead no contest to forgery and then petitioned to recall his sentence under Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, Pen. Code, 1170.18. The trial court denied the petition. The court concluded that, while Penal Code section 12022.6 permits a court to aggregate the losses sustained from multiple forgeries for purposes of the enhancement, the statute did not redefine the offense of forgery to include an aggregation principle. The court reversed the judgment, concluding that the trial court erred by aggregating the fact amounts of the forged checks. View "People v. Salmorin" on Justia Law

Sixteen-year-old M.H. used his smartphone to surreptitiously record a fellow high school student, Matthew B., in a school bathroom stall while Matthew was either masturbating or jokingly pretending to do so. The video, taken inside the bathroom, but about 20 feet away from the bathroom stall, did not show Matthew's face, but did reveal his distinctive socks and shoes, which were visible in the gap between the stall wall and the floor. M.H. uploaded the 10-second video to Snapchat with the caption, "I think this dude is jacking off [sic]." M.H. intended the video to be funny and to get a laugh. But about two weeks later, Matthew took his own life, stating in a suicide note, "I can't handle school anymore and I have no friends." The San Diego County District Attorney's Office filed a juvenile delinquency petition alleging M.H. engaged in an unauthorized invasion of privacy by means of a cell phone camera. The trial court found true the allegation that M.H. violated Penal Code section 647(j)(1). The trial court sentenced M.H. to probation on numerous conditions, including several restricting his use of social media. On appeal, M.H. argued: (1) no substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that he had the requisite specific intent "to invade Matthew's privacy" as required by section 647(j)(1); (2) (raised for the first time on appeal) section 647(j)(1) incorporated by reference the elements of the tort of invasion of privacy, and assuming that to be true, he asserts there is a "newsworthy" defense that immunizes him from criminal liability in this case; and (3) (also for the first time on appeal) section 647(j)(1) violated his First Amendment rights. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re M.H." on Justia Law

Defendant and Gillihan worked together and dated. In September 2010, defendant moved into Gillihan’s Benicia apartment. On February 11, 2011, Gonzales, a co-worker, went to check on Gillihan because both defendant and Gillihan had missed two scheduled work shifts in a row. Gonzales found the front door unlocked and Gillihan in bed. Gillihan’s mother then arrived and instructed Gonzales to call 911. Paramedics arrived and Gillihan was pronounced dead at 2:25 p.m. There were indications that she had been dead for many hours. Defendant was arrested the same day. In a videotaped interview, he admitted he killed Gillihan using a choke hold, but denied that he intended to kill her. A jury found him guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code 187). The court of appeal reversed. It was error to allow the jury to hear extensive evidence of defendant’s past act of domestic violence, which involved planning, hours of waiting, and a bloody knife attack on sleeping victims. Given the relative weakness of the evidence of premeditation and deliberation in the Gillihan case, there is a reasonable probability the improper admission of such vivid and inflammatory evidence of defendant’s past conduct affected the verdict. View "People v. Disa" on Justia Law

Defendant Eugene Snyder appealed his conviction on nine counts of child molestation and one count of possessing child pornography. He argued: (1) insufficient evidence supported one count of committing lewd acts upon a child under the age of 14; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 by admitting into evidence nearly 100 images of child pornography confiscated from defendant’s residence. The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant’s first contention but disagreed with his second after a review of the trial court record. The Court accordingly reversed in part, and affirmed in part. View "California v. Snyder" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to 21 years in prison. The sentence included, inter alia, a doubling of the term for attempted voluntary manslaughter due to defendant's 1999 New York conviction for attempted third degree robbery, which counted as a strike under the three strikes law, Penal Code 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), and a five-year enhancement for the serious felony, Penal Code 667, subd. (a). The court concluded that the trial court’s finding in the third recidivism trial that the conduct underlying defendant’s New York conviction would constitute attempted robbery in California constitutes the type of judicial fact-finding prohibited under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment in Descamps v. United States. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's determination that the plea colloquy in connection with the New York conviction demonstrated that the New York offense qualified as a serious felony and strike under California law. View "People v. McCaw" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Adam Ranlet of two counts of lewd and lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 years by use of force,1 four counts of lewd and lascivious conduct on a child under the age of 14 years, and one count of attempted lewd and lascivious conduct on a child under the age of 14 years. The jury also found true the allegation the offenses were committed against two or more victims under the age of 14 years. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve a term of 93 years to life in prison. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his participation in a private online discussion group called "ptcruzers" (in which participants made thinly veiled references to sexual molestations of minors); (2) the trial court should have excluded evidence that defendant showed the victim a video tape depicting the rape of a 10- to 12-year-old girl as unduly prejudicial; (3) the jury was misinstructed that his participation in the "ptcruzer" online chat group was an uncharged crime; (4) that the Court of Appeal should review the sealed documents relating to Child Protective Services (CPS) records for the victim; and (5) the Court of Appeal should strike one of his 15-years-to-life terms imposed for his two convictions of committing a lewd and lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 years by use of force against the same victim. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the online discussion group evidence was admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), to show defendant's intent to sexually molest the two victims in this case. Defendant's argument regarding admission of the video tape was not preserved for review. As to the instruction regarding the online discussion group, the Court concluded the trial court erred in stating to the jury that defendant's participation was an uncharged crime. However, the error was harmless. The Court reviewed the sealed record and determined the trial court did not err in ordering part of the CPS record to be disclosed to the parties. Finally, the Court struck one of the prison terms imposed for defendant's two convictions of section 288, subdivision (b)(1), against the same victim on the same occasion. Accordingly, the Court affirmed defendant's convictions but remanded for resentencing. View "California v. Ranlet" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Michael Fusting sought to have his second-degree felony burglary conviction reduced to misdemeanor shoplifting under Proposition 47. The trial court denied the petition because entry into a building with the intent to commit theft by false pretenses did not qualify as shoplifting. According to the change of plea form, Fusting entered a building with the intent to sell a stolen surf board. Fusting argued on appeal that the trial court's analysis of Penal Code sections 459.5 and 490a was flawed. He argues that the intent to commit larceny as used in section 459.5 should have been read consistently with the case law analyzing the same language in section 459. The State contended Fusting did not commit shoplifting when he entered the surf shop with the intent to commit theft by false pretenses because shoplifting required an intent to commit larceny. Also, the State argued section 490a was inapplicable because it did not redefine larceny as any theft. The Court of Appeal was not persuaded by these arguments. As such, the "intention to commit larceny" requirement of section 459.5 could be satisfied by the broader sense of an intent to commit theft. Thus, an intent to commit theft by false pretenses would satisfy that element. "Not only is this consistent with prior case law regarding the interpretation of the term 'larceny' as used in section 459, but it is also consistent with the voters' intent in passing Proposition 47." The order denying Fusting's petition to reduce his burglary conviction to shoplifting reversed, and the matter remanded with directions to grant the petition. View "California v. Fusting" on Justia Law