Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Kristie Hamernik was a licensed vocational nurse employed at the Vista Cove Care Center in Corona. Defendant was suspended from work but returned to the facility purportedly to retrieve personal items. While at the facility, she entered the room of one of her former patients, Eiko Dorsch, who used a mechanism called a "CADD pain pump." After defendant visited Eiko, the medication in the pain pump was empty. Defendant was found guilty of attempted possession of a controlled substance. Defendant appealed, arguing: (1) the trial court erred by finding that attempted possession of a controlled substance was a lesser included offense of possession of a controlled substance; thereby substituting the attempted possession of a controlled substance for the drug possession charge after granting defendant's motion to dismiss the greater charge at the end of the People's case-in-chief; and (2) the trial court erred by admitting prior acts evidence pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that the trial court erred by substituting attempted possession of a controlled substance for the possession of a controlled substance. Moreover, the Court rejected that it could correct the error by ordering the trial court to amend the information or that such error was harmless. As such, the Court reversed defendant's conviction. View "California v. Hamernik" on Justia Law

The trial court denied the Proposition 47 petition for resentencing of defendant-appellant James Mutter. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred because the crime for which he sought resentencing (possession or receipt of counterfeit currency) was a misdemeanor after the passage of Proposition 47. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that defendant's offense qualified as a misdemeanor under Proposition 47. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court and remanded: if defendant was still serving his sentence, the trial court was mandated to resentence defendant to a misdemeanor unless it determined that resentencing defendant would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public sentence. If defendant has completed his sentence, the Court directed the trial court to reduce defendant's felony conviction. View "California v. Mutter" on Justia Law

Defendant Joson Vang and his cousin, Ronnie Vang, broke into Keith Fessler's house to steal some property. Fessler was home at the time. When he came out of a back bedroom and confronted the burglars, they beat him, tied him up, and Ronnie executed him with two shots to the back of the head. After taking several items from the house and leaving with these items in Fessler's car, defendant and Ronnie came back and set fire to the house. Defendant and Ronnie were tried together before separate juries. Defendant's jury convicted him of first degree murder, first degree burglary, robbery, arson of an inhabited structure, and the unauthorized taking or driving of a vehicle. With respect to the murder, the jury found the crime was committed during the commission of both a burglary and a robbery. The jury also found a principal was armed with a firearm during the commission of the murder, burglary, and robbery. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, plus a consecutive determinate term of nine years eight months. Defendant appealed, arguing: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the arson conviction because Fessler was dead when he and Ronnie set the fire; and (2) the trial court violated the "Aranda/Bruton" rule, and thereby violated defendant's right of cross-examination under the Sixth Amendment by admitting certain out-of-court statements Ronnie made to two individuals that implicated defendant in the charged crimes and defendant conceded were non-testimonial in nature. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded defendant's arson of an inhabited structure conviction had to be modified to convict him of arson of a structure. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the Court rejected defendant's remaining claim his confrontation rights were violated by the admission of certain statements made by Ronnie because they were of a non-testimonial nature. View "Califronia v. Vang" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Smith appealed the denial of his Proposition 47 resentencing petition. Smith sought to have two felony second degree commercial burglary convictions (counts 1, 2) designated as misdemeanor shoplifting. As part of his petition, Smith declared as to both counts that “[t]he value of the check or property does not exceed $950.00.” The State responded by representing Smith “is entitled to resentencing” on count 2 and requesting a hearing to determine the new sentence. The State did not contest the value of the loss in count 1, but did request a hearing to determine eligibility because the “People do not believe count one is eligible as” the victim check exchange business “is not a commercial establishment,” which was a required element of shoplifting under new Penal code section 459.5. The superior court agreed the victim in count 1 was not a commercial establishment and denied relief, and also summarily denied Smith’s petition as to count 2 without explanation. Smith argued on appeal that the victim check exchange business was a commercial establishment and there was otherwise insufficient evidence to support the court’s denial of his petition as to counts 1 and 2. The Court of Appeal agreed and remanded for resentencing and further proceedings. View "California v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Lamonte Jefferson stole an ink cartridge worth $24.99 from a Riverside Kmart store. While serving a 32-month sentence for commercial burglary, defendant petitioned the trial court to recall his sentence and resentence him as if he had been convicted of misdemeanor shoplifting under Proposition 47. The parties agreed that defendant’s commercial burglary conviction qualified as a misdemeanor shoplifting conviction. The parties also agreed that, had defendant’s petition been granted at the January 12, 2015, hearing on the petition, defendant would have been eligible for immediate release from prison. However, the court denied the petition on the ground defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erroneously applied the preponderance of the evidence standard to its unreasonable risk of dangerousness determination. He argued the prosecution was required to prove his dangerousness to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or, at the very least, based on clear and convincing evidence. He also claimed the court abused its discretion in finding he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety under any standard of proof. After review, the Court of Appeal found no error or abuse of discretion, and affirmed. View "California v. Jefferson" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant, Casey Jones, Jr. appealed an order denying his petition to designate his conviction for burglary as misdemeanor shoplifting under Proposition 47. Jones also appealed the order denying his motion to strike the one-year prison prior enhancement imposed in this case on the basis of a conviction in a prior case which the superior court had previously designated a misdemeanor. Jones argued on appeal that the superior court erred by inadvertently denying his petition to designate the burglary conviction a misdemeanor and by denying his motion to strike the enhancement because the redesignated misdemeanor conviction could not have supported an enhancement had Proposition 47 been in effect at the time of his offenses. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the superior court did not err in refusing to strike the prison prior enhancement. However, the Court concluded the superior court erred in summarily denying Jones’s petition to have his burglary conviction reclassified as misdemeanor shoplifting. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Jones" on Justia Law

Martin Field was committed to a mental hospital after a jury found he was a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predators Act. Field appealed, arguing: (1) the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to provide a certain pinpoint jury instruction; (2) the repeated use of the term "sexually violent predator" during trial violated his due process rights; (3) the court prejudicially erred in failing to properly instruct the jury regarding the meaning of the word "likely"; (4) cumulative error required reversal; (5) the SVPA violated the equal protection, double jeopardy, due process, and ex post facto clauses of the federal constitution; and (6) his equal protection rights under the state and federal constitutions were violated when the court permitted the District Attorney to call Field as a witness over his objection. Regarding that last contention, Field argued that because a person found not guilty of crimes by reason of insanity (NGI) may not be compelled to testify at hearings to extend his or her commitment, neither should a person found to be an SVP be compelled to testify. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded Field's equal protection claim involving testifying at trial may have had merit and remanded the matter to the superior court for an evidentiary hearing on that issue. The Court rejected all of Field's other contentions. View "California v. Field" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction of first degree burglary of an inhabited recreational vehicle (RV), in violation of Penal Code 459, 460. Defendant argued that because an RV, statutorily referred to as a "house car," is not specifically included in section 460, subdivision (a), his first degree burglary conviction cannot stand. The court concluded, however, that the absence of the words "recreational vehicle" or "house car" from section 460, subdivision (a) is not determinative, and that the phrase "inhabited dwelling house," as used in that subdivision, includes an inhabited RV. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Trevino" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of first degree residential burglary, one count of making criminal threats, one count of false imprisonment as the lesser included offense of kidnapping, and one count of attempted extortion. All of the charged offenses were alleged to be gang-related within the meaning of Penal Code section 186.22, but the jury found the gang allegations true only as to the criminal threats and false imprisonment charges, and rejected the gang allegations as to the burglary and attempted extortion charges. The court concluded that the true findings on the gang enhancement allegations are not supported by substantial evidence; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to bifurcate the trial on the gang allegations; and fleeting references to defendant's prior criminal record do not warrant reversal. Accordingly, the court reversed as to the gang enhancement issue and affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Franklin" on Justia Law

Elijah C. signed a document waiving the one-year statute of limitations for petty theft as a condition of entering a diversion program for first-time offenders. The court held that a minor’s purported waiver of the statute of limitations for an offense is not valid, when that waiver was made without consultation with counsel and before a petition against the minor was filed. Although Elijah did not yet have the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment because no petition had yet been filed, he faced what was in effect a critical stage of the prosecution. Accordingly, the court reversed the juvenile court's order overruling the demurrer. View "In re Elijah C." on Justia Law