Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Soto, armed with a knife, kicked in the front door of Ramirez’s apartment, entered the apartment, and found Ramirez and Saavedra in the living room, with their young son, watching television. Soto and Ramirez engaged in a knife fight. Both parties stabbed each other repeatedly. Soto fled. Ramirez died from his wounds. Saavedra later testified that Soto stabbed Ramirez first. Soto claimed that Ramirez started the fight, forcing Soto to protect himself, and that he had been using alcohol and methamphetamine in the days before the offense. Soto asserted a theory of imperfect self-defense. The jury found him guilty of second-degree murder and first-degree burglary. The court sentenced Soto to 16 years to life in prison. The court of appeal affirmed, acknowledging that the trial court erred by limiting the jury’s consideration of evidence of voluntary intoxication, but finding the error not prejudicial. Penal Code section 29.4 expressly allows for consideration of voluntary intoxication with respect to express malice. Because an actual but unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense negates express malice, section 29.4 makes evidence of voluntary intoxication relevant to the state of mind required for imperfect self-defense. The court did not err in excluding pretrial statements Soto made to police as prior consistent statements; defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek their admission. View "People v. Soto" on Justia Law

Carreon, on bail and awaiting sentencing for two commercial burglaries, and her young son were staying in a converted garage unit of a residence leased by probationer Anderson. Officers arrived to conduct a probation search of the residence. The garage unit was accessible from inside the house through a laundry room and a closed, unlocked door. The probation officer who entered the garage unit to search it believed it was Carreon’s room and not the residence of Anderson, the female probationer he had come to search. In that room, he found a pay/owe sheet in a drawer and, in a purse, a plastic bag containing a crystalline powder that tested presumptively positive for methamphetamine. Carreon was charged with possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11378) while released on bail (Pen. Code, 12022.1). After her suppression motion was denied, she entered a no contest plea; the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on formal probation for three years. The court of appeal reversed. Anderson’s probation search condition, without more, did not authorize officers to look into a purse or drawers located in a separate living unit. View "People v. Carreon" on Justia Law

Defendants Kiesha Smith and Michael Mitchell appealed their convictions for the murder of Josephine Kelley. Defendants were tried together before separate juries. Smith raised two contentions on appeal: (1) the trial court prejudicially erred in instructing her jury that any testimony from an accomplice required corroborating evidence before the jury could accept it as true; and (2) the trial court prejudicially erred in discharging Juror No. 8 during the jury's deliberations. For his part, Mitchell raised a number of claims challenging the trial court's admission of certain evidence regarding statements Smith purportedly made to acquaintances that inculpated both Smith and Mitchell in Kelley's murder. The Court of Appeal reversed Smith's first degree murder conviction on the ground that the trial court erred in instructing about accomplice testimony, so the Court did not address the discharge of Juror 8. With regard to Mitchell's argument, the Court disagreed with Mitchell's contention that the admission of certain statements violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him, but agreed that the statements should not have been admitted against him under California's rules of evidence. The Court further concluded that the admission of these statements was prejudicial to Mitchell under any standard of prejudice review, and that Mitchell's conviction had to therefore be reversed. View "California v. Smith" on Justia Law

M., born in 1990, testified that when she was five years old and lived with mother and defendant (the father of M.'s half-sisters), defendant told her he wanted to have “father and daughter love.” Defendant began kissing her on the lips using his tongue, and touching her “private parts,” including her chest, vagina, and back. He told her not to tell anyone. M. testified about escalating abuse that continued until 2003, when defendant returned to the home after a domestic violence incident and M. disclosed the abuse. Defendant was charged in 2014 and was convicted of 17 felony counts (Pen. Code, 288.5(a); 288(b)(1); 269(a)(1), (a)(4).) The trial court imposed a 78-year determinate prison sentence for the continuous sexual assault and the forcible lewd act counts and a consecutive indeterminate term of 75 years to life for the aggravated sexual assault counts. The court of appeal reversed with respect to the sexual assault counts. Defendant was prejudiced by the trial court’s incorrectly responding “No” to a question the jury asked during deliberations: “If we are ‘hung’ on a count (ie: 14), are we able to consider the alternate count (ie: 19?)” The court rejected a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request an instruction on voluntary intoxication. View "People v. Olivas" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Sergio Romo was charged with unlawfully importing controlled substances (i.e., heroin) into California from Mexico; unlawfully possessing controlled substances (i.e., heroin) for sale; unlawfully importing controlled substances (i.e., methamphetamine) into California from Mexico; and unlawfully possessing controlled substances (i.e., methamphetamine) for sale. A jury returned guilty verdicts on all four counts and on enhancements. The court sentenced defendant to a total term of seven years. Defendant appealed, arguing that: (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument when the prosecutor allegedly improperly reversed the presumption of innocence; (2) that the court prejudicially erred when it admitted hearsay evidence; (3) that the State's experts should not have been allowed to opine that defendant was not a "blind mule" when he crossed into the United States from Mexico; and (4) that defendant was entitled to seven additional days of presentence credits. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed defendant was entitled to seven additional days of presentence credit. In all other respects, the Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "California v. Romo" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Kevin Bollaert of extortion (counts 3, 16, 18, 21, 27, 29) and the unlawful use of personal identifying information ( counts 2, 4-15, 17, 19, 20, 22-24, 26, 28), stemming from his operation of Web sites, "UGotPosted.com," through which users posted private, intimate photographs of others along with that person's name, location and social media profile links, and "ChangeMyReputation.com," through which victims could pay to have the information removed. As to some of the victims, the jury unanimously found that Bollaert committed the unlawful act of an invasion of privacy by disclosure of private facts. The trial court declared a mistrial as to one of the identity theft charges (count 25) and a conspiracy charge (count 1). It sentenced Bollaert to a split sentence of 18 years: eight years of local confinement followed by 10 years of mandatory supervision. On appeal, Bollaert argued his convictions under Penal Code section 530.5, subdivision (a) had to be reversed for insufficient evidence because: (1) he was immunized from liability under section 530.5, subdivision (f) as an "interactive computer service" or "access software provider" within the meaning of the Communications Decency Act (CDA); (2) he did not take action to develop or create the content of his Web site, and therefore was not liable as an "information content provider" as defined by the CDA; and (3) he did not willfully obtain the personal identifying information for an unlawful purpose. Bollaert further contended the evidence was insufficient to support his extortion convictions because he did not directly or implicitly threaten any of the victims to expose any secret; the alleged secrets (photographs) were already in the public domain; and he merely engaged in a business practice whereby legally posted information could be removed. Further, Bollaert argued the trial court erred by giving the jury instructions on civil liability regarding intrusion into private affairs and public disclosure of private facts. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Bollaert" on Justia Law

A petition was filed with the juvenile court alleging that George F. committed a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14, and that George willfully annoyed and molested a child under the age of 18. The State offered to dismiss count 1 if George admitted to count 2. George admitted to count 2 and the juvenile court found a factual basis for that admission. The court then granted the State's motion to dismiss count 1, declared George a ward of the court, and ordered him to juvenile probation on various terms and conditions. George appealed, contending that the conditions of his probation restricting his use of electronics or requiring the submission of those electronics to search were invalid under "California v. Lent (15 Cal.3d 481 (1971)) and (2) unconstitutionally overbroad. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re George F." on Justia Law

Hartley arranged for a taxi ride home from a bar, then argued with the driver, who had missed a turn while Hartley was talking on his cellphone. After Hartley began to walk away without paying, the driver pursued him. During their argument, Hartley pulled a knife from his pocket. A neighbor heard the disturbance and witnessed Hartley advancing on the driver, but saw nothing in Hartley’s hands. Police arrived after the men had separated. A jury acquitted Hartley of felony assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, 245(a)(1), but convicted him of the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor simple assault and acquitted Hartley of making criminal threats but convicted him of misdemeanor petty theft by false pretenses. The trial court sentenced Hartley to two years of probation, imposed conditions including an order to stay away from the victim, and ordered Hartley to pay a fine, penalty assessments, attorney fees, and restitution. The court of appeal found insufficient evidence to sustain the petty theft conviction, reversed that judgment, and remanded for resentencing on the conviction for simple assault, at which time the trial court shall specify the appropriate amounts and statutory bases for any fines, fees, and penalty assessments. View "People v. Hartley" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from two counts of misdemeanor methamphetamine possession and one count of attempted second degree robbery. In the published portion of the opinion, the court concluded that the Health and Safety Code section 11372.7, subdivision (a) drug program fee may not be suspended. Because defendant did not have the ability to pay the fine, the court concluded that it may not be imposed at all. The court also concluded that no section 1202.5, subdivision (a) crime prevention fee may be imposed. The court concluded that attempted robbery is not an enumerated offense in section 1202.5, subdivision (a). In this case, when defendant is resentenced, no drug program nor crime prevention fees may be imposed. The court affirmed the conviction, but reversed the 14-year sentence. View "People v. Jefferson" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Arlon Buchanan of possession of heroin for sale (count 1), transportation of heroin for sale (count 2), possession of methamphetamine for sale (count 3), transportation of methamphetamine for sale (count 4), possession of a firearm by a felon (count 5), and possession of ammunition by a felon (count 6). The jury also found true the allegations defendant was armed during the commission of the four narcotics-related offenses (counts 1, 3, 4), had a prior strike conviction, and had served four prior prison terms. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve 32 years and 8 months in state prison. On appeal, defendant contended: (1) the trial court erroneously excluded from the evidence a signed statement by a person who claimed to own some of the drugs and drug paraphernalia, and the handgun that were found; (2) defendant's convictions for possession and transportation of heroin should have been reversed because the police violated his rights under "California v. Trombetta" by destroying exculpatory evidence when they mixed together the similar-looking contents of two bindles before detecting heroin in the combined mass; (3) the mixture of the contents of the two bindles rendered the evidence of his possession and transportation of heroin insufficient; (4) Penal Code section 654 precluded multiple punishments for his simultaneous transportation of methamphetamine and heroin for sale; (5) Penal Code section 654 also prevented multiple punishments for his possession of a firearm as a felon and being armed in the commission of the narcotics offenses; and (6) multiple sentence enhancements were precluded under section 654 for being armed in the simultaneous commission of the four narcotics-related offenses. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding a hearsay statement from the owner of the vehicle where the contraband were found because the defense did not demonstrate due diligence in attempting to secure the testimony of the proposed witness. The trial court did not err in admitting evidence of the mixed substance that tested positive for heroin. The police did not destroy the evidence by combining the similar-looking contents of the two bindles nor did they discard any of the packaging materials from which they originated. The Court rejected defendant's insufficiency of the evidence argument because it was undisputed that what the police found in defendant's possession was heroin. The Court also rejected defendant's contention the trial court erred in imposing separate sentences for defendant's methamphetamine and heroin-related offenses. The Court accepted the State's concession that section 654 applied to stay one of defendant's separate sentences for possession and transportation of heroin for sale, and also applied to stay one of defendant's sentences for possession and transportation of methamphetamine for sale. Finally, the Court concluded section 654 barred separate punishments for defendant's possession of a single firearm on a single occasion. Accordingly, the Court affirmed defendant's convictions but reversed and remanded for resentencing. View "California v. Buchanan" on Justia Law