Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1973, at the age of 19, defendant was charged with felonies arising from two incidents on successive days, including a home invasion robbery in which, according to the police report, defendant held a woman and her children at gunpoint while threatening violence. In 1995 he was convicted of carrying a concealed dagger and, because he had accumulated four convictions for serious or violent felonies for purposes of the Three Strikes law, Penal Code 667 and 1192.7, he was sentenced to 25-years-to-life. In 2013 he sought resentencing under Penal Code 1170.126, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Proposition 36), which entitled him to a reduction in his sentence unless such a reduction would “pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” The trial court denied his petition. While his appeal was pending, voters adopted the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47), which substantially narrowed the definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” as that phrase was “used throughout this Code,” Penal Code 1170.18(c). The court of appeal reversed, holding that the new definition applies to determinations of dangerousness under the Reform Act, and applies to petitions that had already been adjudicated when it was adopted. View "People v. Cordova" on Justia Law

Dunn pleaded no contest to possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) and admitted two prison prior allegations with the understanding he would receive a five-year sentence; the prosecution requested dismissal of two other charged felonies. In August 2014 he received a five-year “split sentence” with two years six months in county jail and mandatory supervision for the remainder. Three months later, voters approved Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, which reduced specified property and drug offenses to misdemeanors, and established a recall procedure to resentence defendants convicted of certain felonies. Dunn petitioned under Proposition 47 to have his sentence recalled and his felony conviction reclassified a misdemeanor. After the trial court confirmed his unwillingness to withdraw his plea as a condition to obtaining relief, it denied the petition. The court of appeal reversed. Penal Code section 1170.1 (a) does not preclude Proposition 47 resentencing when the conviction upon which the sentence was based arose out of a negotiated plea. Under the circumstances presented here, the trial court should neither condition a grant of the petition on the defendant’s withdrawal from the plea agreement nor grant the prosecution’s request to withdraw from the plea agreement. View "People v. Dunn" on Justia Law

Branden Johnson sought to recall his sentence for felony receiving stolen property, and to be resentenced for a misdemeanor under that part of the Penal Code enacted as part of Proposition 47. The superior court denied Johnson's petition, and Johnson appealed. Johnson argued that the trial court erred in ruling that he, not the State, had the burden of establishing he was eligible for Prop. 47 relief. After review of the superior court record, the Court of Appeal disagreed with Johnson's contention and affirmed the denial. View "California v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The trial court granted real part in interest Albert Sokolich’s motion to dismiss the petition for his commitment as a sexually violent predator pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act, Welf. & Inst. Code, 6600 et seq. Petitioner seeks a writ directing the trial court to reinstate the petition, vacate the order for Sokolich’s release, and set the matter for further proceedings. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in determining that on April 20, 2009. Sokolich was not “in custody” pursuant to the circumstances enumerated in section 6601(a)(2); under section 6601(a)(1), mere negligence in determining an individual’s release date does not, by itself, preclude application of the “good faith mistake” provision; and, because the belated filing of the petition was due to a good faith error, Sokolich’s commitment as a sexually violent predator was improperly dismissed. Accordingly, the court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing that the trial court reinstate the petition, vacate the order for Sokolich’s release, and set the matter for further proceedings. View "People v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Marcia Tate appealed an order revoking probation and imposing a seven-year prison term. Tate contended that the trial court erred in awarding her zero days of Penal Code section 4019 conduct credits, by concluding she had waived all conduct credits, including future credits, by virtue of an agreement in which Tate admitted violating parole and agreeing to waive her credits in exchange for reinstatement of probation. The State argued that Tate's waiver included a waiver of future section 4019 credits that she might otherwise have earned. After its review of the record, the Court of Appeal found that Tate agreed to waive past conduct credits under section 4019. The Court therefore reversed the award of zero days of section 4019 conduct credits in the order revoking probation and imposing the seven-year prison term, and remanded the matter for the limited purpose of determining Tate's eligibility for conduct credits under section 4019 for the time period after she waived section 4019 credits at a October 18, 2013 hearing. View "California v. Tate" on Justia Law

In 1997, defendant, age 17, left a residential treatment center without authorization and bought a pistol, intending to rob and kill people and to settle gang scores. Defendant arrived in Monterey, obtained ammunition, and connected with three acquaintances. They drove around, stopping at the Monterey Wharf, where two women, drinking coffee, did not hear defendant demand money. Defendant fired nine shots at them. One woman died immediately; the other survived, but had brain operations and suffered permanent injuries. The four changed cars to escape detection. They drove to Seaside, where defendant's friend shot a pedestrian six times. She died immediately. Days later, defendant gave his gun and bullets to a friend, stating that the gun was “heated.” Defendant was arrested that day. He was convicted of two first degree murders, attempted premeditated murder, and aggravated mayhem. The court rejected defendant’s claim that he was suffering from a mental illness that reduced his culpability; noted that “all of the doctors” characterized defendant as argumentative, explosive, controlling, defiant, resistant to feedback, and a danger to society, with poor impulse control; stated that defendant “must never be allowed the possibility of drawing another breath in freedom,” and sentenced defendant to two consecutive life without parole terms, a consecutive term of 15-years-to-life, and two consecutive terms of 25-years-to-life. His appeals and habeas petition were unsuccessful. The court of appeal affirmed denial of defendant’s 2014 petition for recall and resentencing (Penal Code section 1170(d)(2)). View "People v. Willover" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of criminal threats and battery, and the jury found true a criminal street gang allegation applied to both offenses. The trial court found true the allegation that defendant had a prior felony conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (Penal Code 667, subds. (a)-(d) & 1170.12, subds. (b)-(i)) and four prior felonies within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). The court concluded that sufficient evidence supports the jury's gang allegation findings and the trial court's prior strike conviction finding. The court concluded that defendant was entitled to 416 days of sentence credit consisting of 208 days of actual custody and 208 days of conduct credit. Accordingly, the court modified the sentence to reflect the credit and otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Puerto" on Justia Law

In May 2015, defendant- appellant Marc Endsley, then-committed to Patton State Hospital, petitioned for conditional release to an outpatient program pursuant to Penal Code section 1026.2. The trial court summarily denied his petition without stating its reasons for doing so. Endsley appealed, arguing 1026.2 entitled him to a hearing. The State acknowledged a defendant is entitled to a hearing on a petition for conditional release, but contend Endsley’s petition was “deficient on its face” pursuant to section 1026.2, subdivision (l) because it “failed to include the requisite recommendation by the state hospital director.” Endsley countered that section 1026.2, subdivision (l) required the court, not the defendant, to obtain the medical director’s recommendation in advance of the hearing. The Court of Appeal agreed with Endsley: "Once a defendant initiates a petition for conditional release, section 1026.2, subdivision (l) requires the court to obtain a recommendation regarding the appropriateness of conditional release from the person in charge of the defendant’s treatment." The Court reversed the trial court's order summarily denying the petition for a hearing, and remanded for the trial court to request a recommendation from Patton’s medical director in advance of the hearing. View "California v. Endsley" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of felony forgery after he pleaded no contest to possessing three counterfeit $50 bills. The trial court denied defendant's petition to recall his sentence under Proposition 47, Penal Code section 1170.18, where defendant argued that the amendments the proposition made to section 473 made him eligible for a reduction of his forgery conviction to a misdemeanor. It is undisputed defendant’s conviction rests on facts he possessed three counterfeit $50 bills. Therefore, the court concluded that there is no issue as to whether the value of the bank bills defendant possessed exceeded $950. Unless the trial court makes a discretionary determination defendant would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, it must recall his felony sentence and resentence him in accordance with the terms of section 1170.18. Accordingly, the court reversed and directed the trial court to resentence defendant unless it finds he would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. View "People v. Maynarich" on Justia Law

In February 2014, defendant and another person entered a convenience store with a stolen credit card and attempted to buy gift cards valued at $50. Defendant pleaded no contest to commercial burglary under Penal Code section 459. In December 2014, defendant petitioned for resentencing on the ground that Proposition 47 made the offense a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 459.5 (shoplifting). The trial court denied the petition, stating that defendant was not eligible for resentencing because he had entered the convenience store with the intent to commit felony identity theft under Penal Code section 530.5. The court of appeal reversed, holding that entering a commercial establishment with the intent to use a stolen credit card to purchase property valued at no more than $950 constitutes shoplifting, a misdemeanor Penal Code section 459.5(a). Furthermore, Penal Code section 459.5(b) provides that “[a]ny act of shoplifting as defined in subdivision (a) shall be charged as shoplifting.” View "People v. Garrett" on Justia Law