Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Stephen Lucero was shot to death several hours after he and fellow gang members, defendants Alberto Lara, Issiah Flores, and Aurelio Espinoza, III burglarized a house in Stockton, taking an assortment of electronics and firearms from the house. Each defendant was charged with Lucero’s murder, residential burglary, and gang participation; defendants Flores and Espinoza were also charged with possession of a firearm by a minor and possession of ammunition by a minor; Flores was further charged with additional counts of possession of a firearm by a minor and possession of ammunition by a minor and receiving stolen property. Defendants were tried together before two separate juries; each defendant was convicted of murder (first degree as to Lara, second degree as to Flores and Espinoza), residential burglary, and gang participation. Flores was also convicted of the remaining counts charged against him; Espinoza was not convicted of the remaining counts charged against him. Lara was sentenced to serve an indeterminate prison term of 25 years to life for the murder plus a consecutive determinate term of 12 years. Flores was sentenced to serve an indeterminate prison term of 15 years to life for the murder plus a consecutive determinate term of 12 years. Espinoza was sentenced to serve an indeterminate prison term of 15 years to life for the murder plus a consecutive determinate term of 10 years. On appeal, defendants: (1) challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support their murder convictions; and (2) challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support their gang participation convictions and the gang enhancement findings. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded there was insufficient substantial evidence to support Lara’s first degree murder conviction, requiring reduction of that conviction to second degree murder. The evidence was also insufficient to support second degree murder convictions as to Flores and Espinoza, requiring reversal of their murder convictions. With respect to the gang evidence, the Court concluded the evidence admitted against defendants was sufficient to support the gang convictions and enhancement findings notwithstanding an additional “associational or organizational connection” requirement. Because evidence establishing that required connection, as well as gang membership on the part of Flores and Espinoza, was admitted in violation of the controlling caselaw, and because admissions made by defendants during booking interviews were admitted against them in violation of "Elizalde," the Court reversed the gang crime convictions and enhancements for these constitutional errors. View "California v. Lara" on Justia Law

Defendant Terry Shorts sexually assaulted and murdered 13-year-old Jessica S. in 1996, shooting her in the head and leaving her half-naked body in a park in the middle of the night. Sixteen years later, he was connected to the crime when his DNA was identified in samples taken from Jessica’s body. At trial, defendant conceded that he had sexual relations with Jessica, but claimed he did not kill her. Instead, he argued that Sammy Rodriguez did it. The jury convicted defendant of the murder and sex offenses, and the trial court sentenced him to life without possibility of parole, as well as other terms. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court: (1) improperly admitted evidence of his prior sex offenses against J.P., his ex-girlfriend, over his Evidence Code section 352 objection; (2) improperly excluded evidence of Rodriguez’s propensity for violence; and (3) improperly admitted lay opinion testimony that Rodriguez did not commit the murder. Finding no prejudicial error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Shorts" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of assault with a firearm. At issue in the published portion of the opinion was the jury's finding that defendant committed the offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang. The court concluded that there was substantial evidence that the Black P-Stones gang was a criminal street gang within the meaning of Penal Code section 186.22, and there was substantial evidence defendant committed the assaults in association with the Black P-Stones. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Garcia" on Justia Law

On March 21, 2011, S.M. made a police report stating that someone had broken the window of his parked car and stolen his laptop computer. S.M.’s insurer, State Farm, told him that his policy did not cover the loss. That evening, S.M. purchased comprehensive automobile insurance over the telephone with GEICO. When asked whether he had any vehicle vandalized or stolen, “all or part,” in the last five years, S.M. answered “no.” The next day, S.M. filed an online incident report with the San Francisco Police Department stating that the incident occurred on March 22. On March 23, S.M. filed a $360 claim with Geico, with a copy of the online police report. Before any payment was made, GEICO discovered that the break-in occurred before the inception of the GEICO policy. An information charged S.M. with three felony counts relating to filing a fraudulent insurance claim (Penal Code 550(a)(1), (a)(4) & (a)(5)), and three misdemeanor counts (550(b)(1), (b)(2) & (b)(3)). After multiple continuances, the trial court dismissed in 2015, citing Penal Code 1385. The court of appeal upheld the dismissal, noting the court’s consideration of S.M.’s age, education, and employment; that he had no prior criminal history and had not reoffended in the more than four years the case was pending; and that there was no actual loss. View "People v. S.M." on Justia Law

Respondent Angela Vandiver pled guilty in 2012 to a single felony count of receiving stolen property based on her possession of blank checks she knew had been stolen. She later petitioned to have the conviction redesignated a misdemeanor under the new provisions of Proposition 47 on the ground the checks were worth $950 or less. The State opposed, arguing the balance of the victim’s checking account was greater than $950. The trial court found the value of the blank checks to be de minimis and granted the petition. The State contended the court erred by: (1) reaching the merits because Vandiver did not attach evidence of value to her petition; and (2) determining the checks’ value was de minimis. The State contended the trial court should have dismissed the petition as unsupported or found the checks were worth the full amount in the linked checking account and denied the petition on the merits. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "California v. Vandiver" on Justia Law

Yolo County District Attorney Jeff Reisig on behalf of the State of California (plaintiff), filed this civil action against the Broderick Boys criminal street gang (a/k/a BRK a/k/a BSK a/k/a Norteno a/k/a Norte a/k/a XIV) and 23 of its members, to enjoin as a public nuisance activities in a 2.98-square-mile area (safety zone) of West Sacramento. In a prior appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed, for the most part, a preliminary injunction. This appeal by eight individual defendants (appellants) came after a bench trial during which the eight appellants were represented by various attorneys. The trial served as a prove-up hearing as to defaulting defendant Broderick Boys. The trial court issued a judgment and permanent (seven-year) injunction against defendant Broderick Boys, its a/k/a’s, and its "active members" including but not limited to 17 individual defendants. Several of the original defendants were dismissed. Appellants argued evidentiary error, insufficiency of evidence, constitutional claims, and "miscellany." Appellants appeared to the Court to advocate a standard whereby an individual cannot be subject to a gang injunction unless he personally commits multiple nuisance activities. The Court found that "much of appellants’ briefing hinges on the flawed premise, unsupported by authority." Finding no reversible errors in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Acuna" on Justia Law

Icke, a chiropractor, was convicted of sexual penetration by fraudulent misrepresentation of professional purpose. (Pen. Code 289(d)(4)). The jury found that Icke digitally penetrated a client for a sexual purpose during a chiropractic massage. The court of appeals affirmed, rejecting Icke’s argument that the trial court erred in rejecting a proposed jury instruction that would have stated he was not guilty of violating section 289(d)(4) if he penetrated the client against her will. The court found the argument foreclosed by the California Supreme Court’s 2016 decision, People v. Robinson, which held the “unconsciousness” requirement of fraudulent misrepresentation of professional purpose crimes is the equivalent of a lack of consent. Icke also argued his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence because the victim protested and did not actually believe he was acting for professional purposes at the time of the act. The court held that a victim’s misgivings do not exonerate a defendant under section 289(d)(4) if the evidence establishes that the victim allowed a sexual touching to occur because of a representation of professional purpose. View "People v. Icke" on Justia Law

Felipe Malago appealed certain mandatory supervision conditions related to alcohol consumption, alcohol testing, alcohol treatment, and substance abuse treatment. Malago contended the superior court abused its discretion when it did not rule on his objections to these conditions, but instead, deferred any rulings to the mandatory supervision judge. He also argued that the conditions were unreasonable and invalid because they were unrelated to Malago's current offense or future criminality. The Court of Appeal agreed that the superior court erred in failing to rule on Malago's objections to the mandatory supervision conditions. However, the Court concluded that Malago suffered no prejudice as the conditions are reasonable and valid. Thus, the Court affirmed. View "California v. Malago" on Justia Law

“The trial judge in this case exercised uncommon common sense” in this case: appellant Michael James Jackson was faced with having to choose between revealing damaging information to the judge about to hear his bench trial, or giving up his chance at a new attorney. Appellant was convicted of multiple counts of sexual misconduct arising from his work as a massage therapist. His sole claim on appeal was that the trial judge erred in transferring his motion for a new attorney (a “Marsden” motion) to another judge for adjudication. Although Marsden motions generally should be heard by the judge who was assigned to a defendant’s case, the transfer here was justified because at the time appellant made his motion, he was facing a bench trial in front of the very judge to whom he would have addressed his complaints. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Profitt was charged with felony driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and misdemeanor driving with a license suspended for prior DUI convictions. The trial court bifurcated trial on three prior DUI convictions that were alleged as sentence enhancements for the felony charges, but rejected Profitt‘s request to also bifurcate trial of the misdemeanor charges with prior DUI conviction elements. During closing arguments, defense counsel made certain concessions, stating: The only reason we’re hearing about the DUIs is because, amongst other things, Mr. Profitt is too much of a fool to plead guilty to them and keep it out of court. The court of appeals affirmed his convictions, rejecting Profitt‘s claims that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to bifurcate trial on the misdemeanors and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on defense counsel‘s demeaning statements in closing argument and failure to seek dismissal of the case based on the failure to videotape the field sobriety tests. The trial court reasonably found counsel‘s apparently dismissive comment was an attempt to portray Profitt as unsophisticated and thereby engender some sympathy. View "People v. Profitt" on Justia Law