Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Deandre Ellison was shot to death as he drove into his driveway in the Del Paso Heights neighborhood of Sacramento. Four other men, including Latrele Neal, were also in Ellison’s car. Before the car came to a stop in the driveway, an SUV driven by Jesse Cornejo slowly drove past Ellison’s house, and passengers Adam Cornejo and Isaac Vasquez, opened fire on Ellison’s car. Neal managed to return fire with Ellison’s gun before the SUV drove away. After crashing the SUV while being pursued by law enforcement, Adam, Jesse, and Isaac were taken into custody a short time later. Each was a Norteno gang member. Isaac was 16 years old with a developmental disability; Adam and Jesse were 17 and 18 years old, respectively. Adam, Jesse, and Isaac were tried together and convicted by jury of one count of second-degree murder, four counts of attempted murder, and one count of shooting at an inhabited dwelling. Jesse was also convicted of one count of driving in willful or wanton disregard for safety while fleeing from a pursuing peace officer. Various firearm enhancement allegations were also found to be true. And the jury found the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. The trial court sentenced Adam and Isaac to serve an aggregate indeterminate prison term of 120 years to life plus a consecutive determinate term of 9 years 4 months. Jesse was sentenced to serve the same indeterminate term of 120 years to life plus a consecutive determinate term of 10 years. Defendants appealed. During the pendency of this appeal, the California Supreme Court decided "California v. Prunty," (62 Cal.4th 59 (2015)), squarely addressing defendants' first argunement on appeal, that there was insufficient to establish the “criminal street gang” requirement of the gang enhancements because there was no evidence Sacramento Norteño subsets were part of the larger Norteño organization. Because each defendant was found to qualify for vicarious firearm enhancements the Court of Appeal felt reversal of these vicarious firearm enhancements as to all defendants was also warranted. The Court rejected defendants' remaining arguments on appeal ,and remanded this case for resentencing. View "California v. Cornejo" on Justia Law

In 2008, real party in interest (the State) charged petitioner Patrick Jackson with a violation of section 288, subdivision (b), under case No. INF061963 based on conduct that allegedly occurred on May 3, 2008. On July 24, 2008, the trial court declared doubts as to petitioner’s competency to stand trial. Two years later, the trial court found petitioner to be incompetent to stand trial. Petitioner was ordered committed to Patton State Hospital in 2012. In 2015, the trial court ordered petitioner released from custody, finding that he had reached the maximum time of commitment authorized by law. The State then secured an indictment and initiated case No. INF1500950 three days later. In case No. INF1500950, the trial court declared doubts regarding petitioner’s competency to stand trial, however the record did not demonstrate that a determination regarding petitioner’s competence to stand trial had been made in the later case. Arguing that he could no longer be confined because he had exceeded the maximum commitment period authorized by law, petitioner, just as he had done in case No. INF061963, moved for his release from custody in case No. INF01500950. The trial court denied that motion. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that the record failed to support at least two assumptions central to petitioner’s reasoning. View "Jackson v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Sergeant Deras stopped defendant for speeding, then determined there were no warrants outstanding, defendant’s license was valid, and he was not on probation or parole. Defendant was registered as a sex offender. Deras testified that, days earlier, another officer gave him information that led Deras to infer that defendant might not actually live at his registered address. While Deras was trying to call that officer, Detective Richmond called and told Deras to “hang on” to defendant because of information from a “validated confidential informant” that defendant was selling narcotics and firearms. While Deras waited for backup, a civilian ride-along stated that he had seen defendant make what Deras believed was a “furtive move.” Backup arrived. Defendant consented to a search of his pockets. Officers found an object consistent with the size and texture of crack cocaine. Officers placed defendant in handcuffs. After Deras determined the object was a diamond, defendant, still handcuffed, “took a moment” and consented to a car search. Officers found baggies, an electronic scale, and methamphetamine. They obtained a warrant for defendant’s residence, where they found a gun and ammunition. The court of appeal reversed denial of a motion to suppress. Officers had reasonable suspicion to extend the duration of the traffic stop, but defendant did not give valid consent for the car search; officer lacked probable cause to keep him under arrest when they requested his consent. View "People v. Espino" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Smith appealed the summary denial of his Proposition 47 resentencing petition. Using the Superior Court’s standard petitioning form, Smith sought to have two felony second degree commercial burglary convictions (counts 1, 2) designated as misdemeanor shoplifting because “[t]he value of the check or property does not exceed $950.00.” The State responded, also using the standard form, by checking the box conceding Smith “is entitled to resentencing” and requesting a hearing to determine “[r]e-sentencing on Ct 2.” The State did not contest the value of the loss in count 1, but did check the box requesting a hearing because the “People do not believe count one is eligible as [the victim] is not a commercial establishment,” which is a required element of shoplifting. The superior court agreed the victim in count 1 was not a commercial establishment and denied relief, and also summarily denied Smith’s petition as to count 2 without explanation. On appeal, Smith argued the victim check exchange business was a commercial establishment and there was otherwise insufficient evidence to support the court’s denial of his petition as to counts 1 and 2. The Court of Appeal agreed, and reversed the superior court’s ruling with directions to either summarily grant his petition or hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve any material factual issues revealed by the superior court’s review of the record of conviction. View "California v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendants Aleman and Medrano were convicted of first degree murder and other criminal offenses. The court rejected Medrano's contention that the prosecution, motivated by group bias, removed six prospective jurors by the improper exercise of peremptory challenges; the trial court did not err in admitting a letter referring to drug distribution where it was more probative than prejudicial; the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of a person's character or trait under Evidence Code section 1101; the trial court's flight instruction was justified because it shows consciousness of guilt where defendants wanted to avoid observation or arrest; the trial court correctly refused to instruct the jury to disregard that a witness was called to the witness stand, allowing her unjustified refusal to answer the prosecutor's questions to remain before the jury; the mere presence at a crime scene, without more, makes someone an eyewitness, not an accomplice; in any event, the failure to give an accomplice instruction was harmless; the court rejected Aleman's claims with respect to a police search of a storage unit which turned up a gun, ammunition, and Aleman's driver's license; the court rejected Aleman's contention that no credible evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a shooter in the Bentley incident; and the court rejected defendants' remaining contentions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Aleman" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant guilty of one count of sodomy of a person under age 10; two counts of oral copulation with a person under age 10; and two counts of lewd acts on a child. The jury also found true that both counts of lewd acts on a child involved substantial sexual conduct. During closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that the presumption of innocence applies only until the charges are read. The court concluded that when a prosecutor argues to a jury the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, she or he may not mislead jurors with an incorrect explanation that lightens the prosecution's burden. In this case, the overwhelming evidence against defendant and the trial court's instructions rendered the prosecutorial misconduct harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Cowan" on Justia Law

In this case, the juvenile court at the dispositional hearing determined that Ivan N. (the minor), who had admitted to a felony sex offense, should have been placed out of his home for treatment in a community-based organization (CBO), which could include, if necessary, education at a juvenile court school. During further dispositional proceedings, the court denied the minor's motion for an additional hearing to consider whether he could be returned to his high school of origin after he received a short period of such treatment. On appeal, the minor contends the juvenile court erred in denying his motion and he should be entitled to further hearings on his educational preferences (i.e., returning him to his school of origin), as a person who fits the definition of a "foster child" under Education Code section 48853.5, subdivision (a) by remaining "the subject of a petition filed under [section 602]." After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the juvenile court was correct in determining that the Education Code provisions and related California rule of court relied upon by the minor (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.651) did not require it to grant a separate hearing on the request. "The procedures created by Education Code section 48853.5, subdivisions (a) through (g) were intended to be primarily directory toward state and local educators and their designated staff educational liaisons who act on behalf of foster children. Education Code section 48853.5, subdivision (h) carves out an exception to those administrative procedures, and prevents interference with the discretion granted to a juvenile court that has made section 602 jurisdictional findings that a minor is a ward of the court, to make related placement orders giving the probation officer the authority to determine the appropriate placement for the ward. Once the true findings on the section 602 petition were made, the procedures of section 727 controlled the minor's dispositional proceedings. Based on the court's placement order under section 727, subdivision (a)(4), the probation officer could exercise authority without regard to the definitions of a "foster child" in Education Code section 48853.5, subdivision (a)." The Court affirmed the order and judgment. View "In re Ivan N." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the denial of his Penal Code section 1016.5 motion to vacate his nolo contendere plea for felony sexual battery. Prior to defendant’s plea, former Deputy District Attorney Teresa Sullivan, twice advised him that his plea would result in adverse immigration consequences if he was not a United States citizen. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that defendant was properly advised of the immigration consequences of his nolo contendere plea. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Arendtsz" on Justia Law

Defendant Allen Silva plead no contest to a number of felony offenses and one misdemeanor petty theft charged in connection with two separate events. The parties agreed to a maximum sentence of six years eight months. The trial court sentenced defendant to the negotiated term of six years eight months on the felonies, but added a consecutive sentence of 30 days on the misdemeanor petty theft, which the trial court subtracted from defendant’s presentence custody credits. Defendant contended the trial court did not properly advise him he could withdraw his plea if the court was inclined to impose a higher sentence than the agreed maximum and contends the error required specific performance of the plea. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that neither the trial court nor the Judicial Council plea form used in this case properly advised defendant of his right to withdraw his plea as required by Penal Code section 1192.5. However, specific performance was not the appropriate remedy in this case. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Silva" on Justia Law

Vladislav Kroutik appealed a domestic violence restraining order against him in favor of Elena S., contending that the order was void because he did not stipulate to a commissioner for adjudication of the matter. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding Kroutik's argument failed for two reasons: (1) he failed to demonstrate on the record he provided that the parties did not orally stipulate to the commissioner; and (2) by his participation in the hearing, he impliedly consented to the commissioner. View "Elena S. v. Kroutik" on Justia Law