Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Deegan was convicted of three felony counts: assaulting a park ranger with a deadly weapon other than a firearm, assaulting a police officer with a deadly weapon, and forcibly resisting three police officers based on threats and violence. As to the forcible resistance, he was also found guilty of an enhancement based on his personal use of a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced him to imprisonment for six years. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument under Penal Code section 654, that the assault and forcible resistance charges with respect to the police officers were based on the same conduct and intent and that he may not be punished for both. There was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s application of the multiple-victim exception to Deegan’s sentencing and the trial court did not violate Deegan’s Sixth Amendment rights by making findings of fact on that issue. View "People v. Deegan" on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks to have his 1995 felony conviction designated as a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47, Penal Code section 1170.18. The trial court granted the petition to redesignate petitioner's conviction, but denied his request to vacate the completed sentence. The court concluded that Penal Code section 1170.18 allows resentencing only for petitioners currently serving a sentence for a qualifying felony. In this case, because petitioner was not currently serving the sentence relating to his qualifying conviction, section 1170.18 did not give the trial court jurisdiction to vacate or otherwise change petitioner’s completed sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Vasquez" on Justia Law

Defendants McEntire and Rodriquez were convicted of charges related to their illegal gang activities. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support defendants' conviction on count 8 for actively participating in a criminal street gang; there was sufficient evidence the crimes were committed for the benefit of or in association with a criminal street gang; and there was sufficient evidence to support the presence of nonparticipant during commission of the burglary. The court also concluded that the trial court erred by instructing the jury regarding the violent felony enhancement, but the error was harmless; the trial court does not have a duty to define "present during the commission of a burglary" because it is a commonly understood phrase; the trial court did not err by failing to provide the jury with a clarifying instruction, sua sponte, on the meaning of the term "in association with a criminal street gang" pursuant to the gang enhancements; and the trial court did not err by refusing to bifurcate the gang enhancements from the remaining charges. Finally, the court agreed with the parties that defendants' sentence for illegal possession of ammunition must be stayed because they were already punished for possession of a firearm by a felon. Accordingly, the court modified in that respect and affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. McEntire" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and the jury found true an allegation that he personally used a weapon. The court agreed with defendant's contention that the trial court violated his constitutional rights to a fair trial and to present a defense by improperly restricting the psychiatric testimony that he could introduce. In this case, the expert testimony explained how defendant's past history of trauma was likely to affect his mental state at the time of the offense. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "People v. Herrera" on Justia Law

In 1997, Jason Berg was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for committing a first degree murder with special circumstances when he was 17 years old. In 2014, Berg petition for habeas relief pursuant to "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)). The habeas court granted the petition. The State appealed, arguing that "Miller" did not apply retroactively. If Miller could be applied retroactively, the State argued alternatively that the sentencing court complied with Miller by considering "youth-oriented factors" before imposing an LWOP sentence. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the habeas court and affirmed the order granting relief. The case was remanded for resentencing. View "California v. Berg" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Omar Mariscal was charged with five counts of raping his daughter when she was 15 years old and three counts of committing lewd and lascivious conduct against her when she was 10 years old. The last paragraph of the information, alleged defendant inflicted great bodily injury upon a person "within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.61, subdivision (d)(6)." At the preliminary hearing and at trial, the prosecution presented testimony that the victim had become pregnant and given birth to a child as a result of one of the rape offenses. At trial, the jury heard evidence the victim suffered extreme pain while giving birth. At the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury that if it found defendant guilty of one of the rape charges, had to decide whether it was also true defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim in committing the crime. The court instructed the jury that committing rape does not by itself constitute inflicting great bodily injury and great bodily injury “may or may not be established by pregnancy.” The jury found defendant guilty on all counts and found he did personally inflict great bodily injury on the victim in committing a rape offense. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 25 years to life in state prison on count 1 under the version of the “One Strike” law that took effect in 2010, after the offenses occurred. The court also imposed consecutive upper term sentences of eight years for the other four rape counts (counts 2-5) and consecutive two-year terms (one-third the midterm) for each of the lewd conduct counts (counts 6-8). Defendant’s total prison term was a determinate term of 38 years plus an indeterminate term of 25 years to life. On appeal, defendant challenged the sentence on count 1. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err by sentencing defendant under the One Strike law, but defendant had to be resentenced on count 1 to a term of 15 years to life. View "California v. Mariscal" on Justia Law

Defendant obtained a degree in computer science in Nigeria and a Ph.D. in Canada. In 2013, defendant got a job and moved to Santa Clara, without his wife of 12 years and three children. In 2014, defendant called 911 “having numerous paranoid delusions ... for some time.” He was diagnosed with psychosis and admitted for a 72-hour hold. He had not slept in a week, had eaten only grapes for two days, and had contemplated suicide. He agreed to try a medication, risperidone, but never actually took it. His doctor believed defendant required further treatment. His wife and children moved to California. Defendant locked himself and his wife in the bedroom and assaulted her. The children called 911. Officers forced the door open, but defendant continued assaulting his wife and resisted the officers. Defendant’s wife stated defendant had significant changes in behavior for two weeks before the assault. His family returned to Canada; defendant was placed on a 72-hour hold (later extended) and on suicide watch and was charged with domestic violence and other felonies. Later, the court suspended criminal proceedings and ordered evaluation by a neuropsychologist and a psychiatrist. Both reported that defendant was mentally incompetent to stand trial, that it was medically appropriate to treat defendant with antipsychotic medication, and that defendant did not have the capacity to make decisions about medication. The court of appeal upheld the order authorizing the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication. View "People v. Lameed" on Justia Law

Defendant challenged his state prison sentence imposed after a contested a violation proceeding under Penal Code section 1203.2, subdivision (a). The court affirmed the finding that defendant violated the terms of his probation. The court also affirmed the three-year, eight-month prison sentence for violating Vehicle Code section 2800.2 where Vehicle Code section 2800.4, like Vehicle Code section 2800.2, criminalizes eluding a peace officer in a specific manner; Vehicle Code section 2800.4 applies to a person who drives backwards; Vehicle Code section 2800.2, subdivision (a) applies to a person who drives recklessly; Vehicle Code section 2800.4 was amended in 2011 to provide for realignment sentencing; and Vehicle Code section 2800.4 was later amended in 2012 to reinstate state prison sentencing. The Legislature has clearly indicated it considers driving recklessly while eluding a peace officer not to be a low-level felony. Therefore, the defendant was correctly sentenced to state prison. The January 2, 2015 oral pronouncement of judgment is modified to omit the additional probation revocation restitution fines imposed in each case; the January 9, 2015 oral pronouncement of judgment is modified to: acknowledge the previously imposed parole revocation restitution fine in the amount of $240 in case No. YA083992; impose a parole revocation restitution fine in the amount of $280 in case No. YA087652; and order 583 days of presentence custody credit and 582 days of conduct credit for a total of 1,165 days of credit. Upon remittitur issuance, the abstract of judgment must be amended to reflect those credits. Also upon remittitur issuance, the trial court is to calculate the amount of unsatisfied assessments, penalties and fines. An amended abstract of judgment is to be prepared that specifically sets forth the amounts and statutory bases thereof. View "People v. Butcher" on Justia Law

In 2003, defendant Tony Johnston entered guilty pleas to unlawful possession of a firearm (case No. F2763), and to first degree burglary, unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle, and arson of a vehicle (case No. F2825). The trial court sentenced him to state prison for over six years in the two matters. In 2011, defendant entered guilty pleas to possessing methamphetamine and receiving stolen property (case No. 11F5155). The trial court sentenced him to a two-year state prison term. In May 2015, defendant filed a petition in propria persona to reduce these felony convictions to misdemeanors (as well as a 1999 receiving stolen property conviction not pertinent to this appeal). He asked the trial court to “broadly and liberally” construe Penal Code section 1170.18 to apply to all of these offenses, even if they did not all “fi[t] squarely into [the] mold set forth in this act.” The prosecution opposed reduction of the 2003 convictions because they were not eligible offenses. It did not object to reduction of the 2011 methamphetamine conviction, but stated the value of the property at issue in the other 2011 conviction was a vehicle worth more than $950. The trial court denied relief for the facially ineligible offenses, reduced the methamphetamine conviction to a misdemeanor, and after holding a hearing (at which defendant appeared through counsel) denied relief on the other 2011 conviction because it involved property valued at more than $950. Defendant appealed the adverse rulings. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Johnston" on Justia Law

The amended information in this matter charged defendant Travis Brown with one count each of murder (count one) and active participation in a criminal street gang (count two). It alleged the murder was for the benefit of and in association with a criminal street gang, and further alleged a special circumstance allegation that the victim was “intentionally killed” while defendant was an active gang member and that the murder was carried out to further the activities of the criminal street gang. There were also firearm charges: one that defendant personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death; personally used a firearm in the commission of the murder; and vicariously discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death. The defense was that defendant was not the shooter. The person defendant contends was the shooter, Kevin Martinez, was the only witness to say defendant was the shooter. Martinez, who was interrogated by the police about the shooting, pled guilty to a lesser crime in exchange for a six-year sentence and his agreement to testify against defendant, after following a police officer’s lead to say he was not the shooter and did not know there was going to be a shooting. There was evidence the shooter was left-handed, Martinez was left-handed, defendant was right-handed, and Martinez matched the general description of the shooter. Defendant was prosecuted for first degree murder under three different theories: he was the actual killer (shooter); he aided and abetted the murder with the intent to kill; and he was liable under the natural and probable consequence theory of aider and abetter liability. Late in the day following deliberations, the jury informed the bailiff it had a verdict, but would prefer to return to court the next day to render its verdict. The bailiff retrieved the verdict forms for the court to review and the matter was continued to the next day. The court reviewed the verdict forms and saw the signed and dated not guilty verdict form on the murder count had “withdrawl [sic]” and “void” written across it in large letters. The court did not notify counsel of the irregularity. The court asked that the jury re-complete the form and sign it. The next day, with the forms properly complete, the jury found defendant guilty for first degree murder and active participation in a criminal street gang, and found all the special allegations true, including that defendant both personally discharged and vicariously discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death. Only after the jury had been excused did the court explain what had occurred the day before regarding the prior not guilty form. Defendant appealed the conviction and sentences he received. Under the totality of the circumstances the Court of Appeal found in this record, it concluded that a number of factors here, "besides being confounding," resulted in prejudice to defendant in this close case. The conviction on count one (first degree murder) and its attendant special allegations were reversed and the matter was remanded. The judgment on count two was affirmed. View "California v. Brown" on Justia Law