Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2010, Roach was acting erratically and under the influence of drugs or alcohol in a Novato liquor store; witnesses saw a handgun in his waistband. He had stolen jewelry and bullets in his possession when he was arrested. Roach pleaded guilty to two felonies and was placed on probation for three years. In 2012, Roach was charged with possession of methamphetamine, being under the influence of a controlled substance, and three counts of prowling. He refused to obey responding officers. The court again placed him on probation. In 2014, Roach was charged with reckless driving while evading a peace officer, resisting an officer, driving under the influence of drugs and alcohol, and failing to stop after an accident. The court sentenced Roach on all three cases, imposing an aggregate term of 52 months in state prison. After serving part of his sentence, Roach petitioned for recall and resentencing under Proposition 47. The trial court reduced two of his convictions to misdemeanors and imposed the same aggregate term originally imposed. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that, under Penal Code 1170.18, when one or more components of a consolidated sentence are offenses qualifying for sentencing relief, the offender is entitled to an overall shorter sentence. View "People v. Roach" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant John Fruits guilty of elder abuse (count one), assault with a deadly weapon (count two), making criminal threats (count three), exhibiting a deadly weapon (count four), and attempting to dissuade a victim or witness (count five). The trial court also found true enhancements for defendant having served a prior prison term, and that defendant committed count one while on bail or while released on his own recognizance in connection with other cases. Combined with three other cases, defendant was ultimately sentenced to an aggregate term of 8 years 4 months. On appeal, in connection with count three, defendant argued the trial court abused its discretion in admitting testimony concerning alleged prior threats against his mother to prove the less specific current threats charged in this case. He also argued that the trial court made a series of errors in imposing restitution and parole revocation fines. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of prior threats and other misconduct. Defendant asserted that the trial court misunderstood how he planned to deal with the evidence of prior threats in trial and based its Evidence Code section 352 balancing analysis on this erroneous understanding. The Court concluded that defendant forfeited any claim related to the trial court’s balancing analysis, because defendant did not inform the court how the defense planned to handle the prior threat evidence so that the court could factor that into the Evidence Code section 352 analysis. In the unpublished portion of this case, the Court concluded that defendant forfeited a number of his contentions with regard to restitution and parole revocation fines. However, the Court agreed that the trial court erred in imposing a restitution fine and parole revocation fine related to a stayed sentence. Finally, the Court concluded the trial court erred in failing to impose sentences on two felony counts, and then stay execution of those sentences. The Court modified the judgment to: (1) decrease the restitution fine and parole revocation fine; (2) impose a sentence of four years plus a one-year enhancement on count two and stay execution of that sentence; and (3) impose and stay execution of a sentence of one year on count four. As so modified, the Court affirmed. View "California v. Fruits" on Justia Law

Defendant, a board certified gynecologist who practiced cosmetic surgery, appealed his conviction for involuntary manslaughter. Defendant performed liposuction procedures in a room in his medical office, which was not an accredited surgical center. The victim died during a liposuction procedure. The court concluded that defendant's office assistant was not an accomplice. In the absence of any evidence to suggest that the assistant knew the victim's surgery was performed in a grossly negligent manner or that she otherwise shared defendant's grossly negligent mental state, the assistant cannot be considered an accomplice to defendant's commission of involuntary manslaughter. Even if the assistant were an accomplice, there was abundant corroboration of her testimony, rendering any instructional error harmless. The court also concluded that the jury properly made a great bodily injury finding as to the involuntary manslaughter conviction under Penal Code section 1192.7. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Mohamed" on Justia Law

John Valdez appealed an order denying his petition for recall of his indeterminate life sentence and resentencing in accordance with the Three Strikes Reform Act. Although the trial court determined appellant was eligible for resentencing, it denied his petition based on a discretionary determination that “resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” Appellant argued the court erred because: (1) Proposition 36 established a presumption in favor of resentencing eligible inmates, and authorized denial of a resentencing petition on the basis of dangerousness only in extraordinary circumstances; (2) the definition of what constituted “an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” that was adopted by the electorate in the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47) must also be applied to resentencing petitions filed pursuant to Proposition 36; (3) if the Proposition 47 definition was not applied, then the “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” standard used in Proposition 36 must be deemed void for vagueness. Appellant also contends he was entitled to a jury trial on the issue of his dangerousness and that the factual findings underlying the court’s determination he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety were unsupported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant’s contention that the more specific definition of “an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” contained in Proposition 47 was the appropriate standard to apply to resentencing petitions under Proposition 36. Having concluded the appropriate standard for assessing appellant’s dangerousness the Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the trial court with directions to reconsider the issue in accordance with that standard. "[A]n inmate has no constitutional right to have a jury determine whether the sentence properly imposed upon him in accordance with the law should be reduced. Because that is the remedy offered by section 1170.126, appellant had no right to a jury determination of any factual issue, and no right to have adverse factual finding subjected to proof beyond a reasonable doubt." View "California v. Valdez" on Justia Law

In 2012, J.C., a minor. admitted to second-degree​ burglary by shoplifting (Penal Code 459 & 460(b)), then a felony. In 2014, the electorate passed Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, which reduced several crimes from felonies to misdemeanors, including shoplifting, if the stolen property was worth less than $950. Proposition 47 also allowed a person serving a felony sentence for a crime reduced to a misdemeanor to petition for redesignation of the conviction and a reduction in sentence. J.C. petitioned to reduce her felony violation to a misdemeanor and to have her DNA record expunged from the state databank, on the theory she would not have been required to provide a DNA sample as a misdemeanant. The juvenile court reduced her violation to a misdemeanor, but declined to order expungement of her DNA record. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of expungement. After J.C.'s filing, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 1492, prohibiting granting a request for expungement in connection with a petition for recall of sentence under Proposition 47. Because Bill 1492 clarifies, rather than changes, the meaning of the relevant provisions of Proposition 47, it applies to requests for expungement made prior to its enactment. View "In re J.C." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of felony drug possession and admitted to probation. While his appeal was pending, voters enact Proposition 47, The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, Penal Code section 1170.18. At issue is whether defendant is entitled to have the appellate court remand the case for resentencing under the Act. The court held that defendant is not, because defendant must utilize the specific procedure specified by section 1170.18. Because the case must be returned to the trial court for determination with respect to Proposition 36 probation, however, the court found it preferable and appropriate to deem defendant to have petitioned under section 1170.18, subdivision (a) or applied under section 1170.18, subdivision (f) - whichever is applicable - and to direct the trial court to proceed as specified in that statute upon remand. Upon resolution of the section 1170.18 issue, the trial court should then make whatever determinations and rulings may be required with respect to Proposition 36 probation. Such a disposition most efficiently uses scarce judicial resources while not prejudicing the rights of either party. View "People v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether an appellate court was required to independently review an appellate record for the existence of meritorious issues in a matter where the superior court extended the civil commitment of an individual previously found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI), when the individual's appointed counsel informed the court he or she has found no arguable issues on appeal, the client has been notified of that fact, and was given the chance to file a brief, but did not raise any issues for appeal. Defendant-Appellant Jose Martinez was found NGI; his appointed appellate counsel found no arguable issues, and Martinez did not file a supplemental brief on his own behalf. Counsel raised the issue of due process, and contended that the Court of Appeal had an obligation to review the appellate record as was the rule in first criminal appeals of right. California courts have found no such obligation on an appeal from the establishment of a conservatorship after the denial of a petition for outpatient treatment of an NGI or of an order committing an individual as a mentally disordered offender. The Court of Appeal held that due process did not require an appellate court to conduct an independent review of the appellate record for possible issues in an appeal from an extension of an NGI's civil commitment. View "California v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Defendant Dawson McGehee stabbed his mother ten times in the neck, chest, and abdomen with a kitchen knife; eight of the stab wounds were independently fatal. By all accounts, defendant was mentally disturbed when he did so. A jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder, during the commission of which he personally used a deadly weapon, and further found he was legally sane when he committed the crime. The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for an indeterminate term of 15 years to life for the murder, plus a consecutive determinate term of one year for the use of a deadly weapon, and imposed other orders. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal addressed and rejected defendant's claims that: (1) the trial court erred in instructing the jury, during the guilt phase of the trial, with CALCRIM No. 362 on consciousness of guilt along with CALCRIM No. 3428 on the limited use of evidence of mental impairment; and (2) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense to murder. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court rejected defendant's remaining contentions that the trial court prejudicially erred and violated his federal constitutional rights by excluding certain out-of-court statements defendant made (e.g., that demons were coming after him), and admitting other out-of-court statements establishing the same, but limited the jury's consideration of these statements to circumstantially prove defendant's state of mind, rather than allowing the jury to consider the statements to prove the truth of the matters asserted. The therefore affirmed the judgment. View "California v. McGehee" on Justia Law

Defendant Charles Steele pleaded no contest to possession of methamphetamine and admitted a prior strike allegation after the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence. The trial court sentenced defendant to six years in prison, consistent with his plea agreement. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. Here, sheriff’s deputies pulled their patrol car behind two vehicles parking at night on a driveway out of sight from a nearby highway. The two vehicles included a lead vehicle and a second vehicle driven by defendant. The deputies activated their emergency lights to investigate a felony arrest warrant for the registered owner of the lead vehicle. Defendant argued the sheriff’s deputies detained him without reasonable suspicion, requiring suppression of the evidence regarding the controlled substances discovered in his vehicle. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err: sheriff’s deputies detained defendant, but officer safety justified the detention to assure that defendant did not present a danger to the sheriff’s deputies while they approached and investigated the lead vehicle. View "California v. Steele" on Justia Law

Defendants Marquon Deanthony Vasquez and Shoreen Dominique Bryant were tried together in front of separate juries for murder and attempted murder with allegations these crimes were committed for the benefit of a street gang. These charges arose from the 2013 shooting death of Deandra Horton and wounding of Tionee Duncan. Bryant had driven Vasquez to where the shooting took place and was also the getaway driver. The shooting was retaliation for an altercation between Vasquez’s cousin (Kaveon Plummer-Lee) and one of Duncan’s friends (Marcus Lebeau). Bryant, Vasquez, and Plummer-Lee were members of the North Highlands Gangster Crips. Lebeau was a member of the rival Bloods. The first jury found Vasquez guilty of second degree murder (a lesser to the charged first degree murder) and attempted voluntary manslaughter (a lesser to the charged attempted murder) and found not true the gang enhancements. The second jury found Bryant guilty as an aider and abettor of both first degree murder and attempted murder and found true the gang enhancements. On appeal, Bryant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions and the gang enhancements, and Vasquez challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions, the instructions, and his counsel’s performance. Finding no merit in these challenges, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgments. View "California v. Vasquez" on Justia Law