Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The victim, Jane Doe, was at a friend’s house drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana and methamphetamine. She had been “high” on methamphetamine for the past three days. Jane Doe left her friend’s house and walked to defendant’s apartment. Defendant was Jane Doe’s uncle. When Jane Doe arrived at defendant’s apartment, she greeted him, ate some food, called a friend, and fell asleep on the couch. She next remembered waking up in a dark bedroom on defendant’s bed, on her side, with defendant behind her. She felt his hand under her shirt and bra, touching her bare breast. Her pants were down below her knees and she felt something inside her vagina. When Jane Doe moved away, she heard defendant say, “It was okay.” She pushed defendant, screamed, ran outside, and went downstairs and knocked on the door of a downstairs neighbor. A jury would find defendant Dario Jimenez guilty of felony sexual penetration of an unconscious person and misdemeanor sexual battery. On appeal, defendant contended the trial court committed prejudicial error in giving CALCRIM Jury Instruction number 105 because it was legally erroneous, lacked evidentiary support, and created a “ ‘permissive inference’ ” and “ ‘false impression’ ” that the victim’s character for truthfulness was good. Disagreeing, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Jimenez" on Justia Law

A jury found Michael Lucero guilty of murder, second degree robbery, and assault with a semi-automatic firearm. The jury also found true an allegation that Lucero committed the murder during the course of a robbery. In addition, with respect to these counts, the jury found true allegations that Lucero personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (d) and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (c). On appeal, Lucero claimed that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the murder charge on the lesser included offenses of second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter, given the evidence of his voluntary intoxication presented at trial. ). In a published portion of this opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court properly instructed the jury that it could not consider Lucero's voluntary intoxication for purposes of determining the truth of these firearm enhancement allegations. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded that any error in failing to instruct on second degree murder was harmless and that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter. Lucero also claimed that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could not consider evidence of Lucero's voluntary intoxication in determining whether he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing bodily injury or death within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (d) and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (c). Additionally (unpublished), the Court directed the trial court to correct an error in the abstract of judgment. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment was affirmed, but the matter remanded to the trial court to prepare a corrected abstract of judgment. View "California v. Lucero" on Justia Law

Appellant Eddie Dunley appealed a judgment extending his commitment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). He contended that because persons subject to civil commitment after being found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) have a statutory right, pursuant to Penal Code section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(7), not to be compelled to testify in proceedings to extend their commitments, so should a person facing commitment as an MDO. He pointed out that this right has been extended to commitment proceedings for sexually violent predators (SVP) by application of equal protection principles. The Court of Appeal held that MDO’s, SVP’s and NGI’s were all similarly situated with respect to the testimonial privilege provided for in section 1026.5(b)(7). However, this appeal was moot because a subsequent petition for recommitment was denied by the trial court on or about March 7, 2016, based on the court’s finding that appellant no longer met the criteria for commitment as an MDO. View "California v. Dunley" on Justia Law

In 2011, Grays was charged for the first-degree murder of Brown with the use of a firearm; being a felon in possession of a firearm, and receiving stolen property. In 2013, a jury acquitted Grays of first-degree murder, convicted him of the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder and found true the firearm allegation, convicted him of being a felon in possession, and acquitted him of receiving stolen property. The court sentenced him to prison for 40 years to life. The court of appeal affirmed. While the court too narrowly defined “residence” and erred in refusing to instruct the jury under Penal Code 198.5, which provides that a person using force within his residence against a person who forcibly entered the residence shall be presumed to have held a reasonable fear of injury to self or another, but found the error harmless. While a reasonable jury could have found that the apartment was Grays’ residence, it could not have concluded that he was in that residence at the time of the shooting. The court rejected claims concerning an instruction about the unavailability of self-defense for a person who provoked the fight; excluding certain defense exhibits; and excluding evidence of the victim’s prior acts. View "People v. Grays" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions for murder and attempted murder arising from an incident at a party during which he shot two people, killing one and wounding the other. The court concluded that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury pursuant to a kill zone theory of liability for attempted murder, and the error was prejudicial. Therefore, the court reversed defendant's attempted murder conviction. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder. Although the court has already concluded that the conviction must be reversed, the court must address this issue because if the prosecution did not produce substantial evidence of attempted murder, it would be barred from retrying defendant for this offense. Finally, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to put into question whether defendant had initiated the attack on the victim and created the need to use self-defense. Accordingly, the jury instruction on this issue was proper. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Cardona" on Justia Law

In 2013 and 2014, minor Y.A. had two petitions filed against her alleging offenses for unrelated incidents. For each petition, she was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court and placed on probation. Y.A. satisfactorily completed the terms of probation for only the offense alleged in the later-filed petition, which was then dismissed and all records pertaining to it sealed. Records relating to the prior petition were not sealed. The issue in this appeal was whether, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786, a juvenile court could seal the records pertaining to a prior petition against a minor when the minor satisfactorily completed probation for an offense alleged in a later-filed petition. Based on the plain language of the statute, the Court of Appeal concluded it could not. View "In re Y.A.." on Justia Law

Defendants Weddington, Nunnery, and Bashir appealed their convictions for various crimes committed as a member of the “Seven Trey Gangster Hustler Crip” criminal street gang. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the attempted burglary convictions; substantial evidence supports the trial court's true findings on the gang allegations; defendants' convictions for evading a police officer in willful disregard for safety find substantial evidentiary support in the record; the trial court had no sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor evading; and defendants have forfeited any claim on appeal regarding the trial court's exercise of its sentencing discretion as to Count 8, possession of burglary tools. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgments. View "People v. Weddington" on Justia Law

In 2015, a felony complaint was filed in Nevada County Superior Court to charge petitioners with one count of possession of cash money in excess of $100,000 for unlawful purchase or sale of marijuana. The face of the complaint was stamped: “Assigned to Judge Robert L. Tamietti For All Purposes.” The court’s docket indicates it calendared the matter for arraignment before Judge Tamietti in “Dept A – Main Courtroom” of the Truckee branch of the Nevada County Superior Court. The district attorney sent petitioners a notice to appear informing them a complaint had been filed and instructing them to appear in court. However, the notice to appear did not include a copy of the complaint. At a hearing in August, defense attorney Ravn Whitington appeared on behalf of petitioners. Petitioners, who lived in Georgia, did not personally appear because they had filed waivers of personal appearance. At the continued hearing one month later, Whitington still had not received a copy of the complaint. Whitington had received a copy of the complaint produced through discovery. That copy was not file-endorsed nor did it bear a stamp indicating that the case had been assigned to Judge Tamietti for app purposes. This constituted the first notice the defense received regarding assignment of the case. Whitington and Ward filed peremptory challenges on behalf of petitioners to disqualify Judge Tamietti under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. The trial court filed an order denying the peremptory challenges as untimely on grounds that more than 30 days had elapsed since the initial appearance in a court with only one judge. The question in this case concerned whether the one-judge-court deadline under section 170.6 had become irrelevant because there were no longer any counties with only one superior court judge, or whether the one-judge-court deadline should be adapted to apply to branches of superior courts for which there is only one assigned judge. The Court of Appeal concluded a branch of the superior court with only one assigned judge was not a court for which a single judge was authorized for purposes of the one-judge court deadline under section 170.6. Petitioners’ challenges were timely because they complied with the deadline imposed by section 170.6 that provides 10 days to file a peremptory challenge after receiving notice of an all-purpose assignment. The Court issued a peremptory writ directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the challenges to disqualify Judge Tamietti and to accept the challenges. View "Jones v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Petitioner sought an order directing personnel at the CCI in Tehachapi, California to process his inmate grievances in accordance with applicable regulations. The trial court determined that habeas corpus relief was a more appropriate remedy and dismissed the mandamus petition. Based on the nature of both habeas corpus and mandamus, the court concluded that habeas corpus relief was not available to petitioner “in the ordinary course of law.” The ordinary way to compel the CDCR to process inmate grievances as required by its own regulations is a writ of mandate, not a writ of habeas corpus. Therefore, the court concluded that petitioner stated a claim for a writ of mandate, habeas corpus was not the more appropriate remedy, and the demurrer should have been overruled. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Villery v. Dept. of Corr. & Rehab." on Justia Law

In 2010, 15-year-old Turner fired a gun at a group of young men, killing Allen, and grazing two others. Turner knew the victims from high school. A jury convicted Turner of second degree murder (Pen. Code, 187(a)), and two counts of attempted murder, and found true the allegations that Turner, personally used a firearm and personally inflicted great bodily injury. The court sentenced Turner to an aggregate state prison term of 84 years-to-life. The court of appeal affirmed the convictions, but modified the sentence, so that Turner will be entitled to a parole hearing after 25 years. The court upheld the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the theories imperfect self-defense and justifiable homicide based on self-defense; its use of the instructions on a kill zone theory. The court also rejected a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to raise the issue of cruel and unusual punishment below and failure to present readily available mitigating evidence in support of a lesser sentence. View "People v. Turner" on Justia Law