Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2008, a jury convicted petitioner Jesus Lopez of one count of first degree murder and one count of street terrorism. As to count 1, the jury found true a vicarious firearm use enhancement and a criminal street gang enhancement. Petitioner was 17 years old at the time of the offenses. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a term of 50 years to life in prison. The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction in a prior opinion. Petitioner then applied for habeas relief, seeking to challenge the sentence of 50 years to life. He sought relief based on two claims: (1) under "California v. Chiu," (59 Cal.4th 155 (2014)), his first degree murder conviction should have been vacated because it was based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine; and (2) his 50-year-to-life sentence was unconstitutional under "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)). As a remedy for the first claim, Petitioner asked for relief from the first degree murder conviction with the prosecution given the choice of accepting a reduction to second degree murder or retrying the murder charge. As a remedy for the second claim, Petitioner asked for an order resentencing him with respect to "Miller." After review, the Court of Appeal held that "Chiu" was retroactive to convictions, such as Petitioner’s, that were final on appeal when Chiu was decided. The Court also concluded Petitioner was entitled to relief because the record reflected his conviction for first degree murder was based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine impermissible under Chiu. The Court therefore granted relief and vacated Petitioner’s conviction for first degree murder. On remand, the State could accept a reduction of the conviction to second degree murder or elect to retry the greater offense. In light of the Court's decision on Petitioner’s first claim, Petitioner’s second claim was moot or not yet ripe for adjudication. View "In re Lopez" on Justia Law

The principal of a Pleasanton high school observed that P.O., who was then 17 years old, appeared to be under the influence of drugs. P.O. admitted to using hashish oil earlier that morning, and a search revealed 11 tablets of Xanax in his pockets. The juvenile court order declared P.O. a ward of the court and placed him on probation after he admitted to a misdemeanor count of public intoxication. A condition of his probation required him to submit to warrantless searches of his “electronics including passwords.” The court of appeal modified the condition and struck two other conditions. While electronic search condition is reasonably related to future criminality, the condition was overbroad. Another condition, requiring him to “be of good behavior and perform well” at school or work and another requiring him to “be of good citizenship and good conduct” are unconstitutionally vague. View "In re P.O." on Justia Law

Defendant Kevin Eagle appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to vacate his conviction for transporting methamphetamine. He contended that if the transportation was not for sale, his felony conviction for transportation should have been reduced to a misdemeanor conviction for the lesser included offense of possession of methamphetamine. The State conceded that defendant was entitled to the benefits of the amendments to Health and Safety Code section 11379, but disagreed as to the remedy. Instead, the State argued the matter should have been remanded to allow defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea and the State should be allowed to proceed on the original charges. The Court of Appeal agreed with the State and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "California v. Eagle" on Justia Law

In 2009, Monterey County charged defendant with: felony possession of heroin; misdemeanor possession of a hypodermic needle; and misdemeanor possession of controlled substance paraphernalia, and later charged him ,in a separate case, with: felony sale or transport of heroin; felony possession of heroin; misdemeanor driving under the influence; and misdemeanor being under the influence of a narcotic. Defendant pleaded guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance and to driving under the influence. The other counts were dismissed. The court suspended imposition of sentence in both cases and placed defendant on formal probation for three years, conditioned on completing a drug treatment program. Defendant successfully completed that program. In 2011, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty pleas to the felony possession charges. The court granted the motions and entered not guilty pleas as to each, vacated the sentence on those charges, and dismissed them. After enactment of Proposition 47, defendant applied to have the possession charges designated as misdemeanors. Thel court denied both applications because his convictions were dismissed under Penal Code section 1203.4. After the state agreed that a dismissal under section 1203.4 does not preclude relief under Proposition 47 and conceded the court erred in denying defendant’s request, the court of appeal reversed. View "People v. Tidwell" on Justia Law

Defendant Santiago Sanchez was convicted by jury of four sex offenses: one count of sexual penetration, one count of attempted sexual intercourse, and two counts of lewd or lascivious conduct. These acts were committed against an eight-year-old girl, D.C. He was convicted of two additional sex offenses: two counts of lewd or lascivious conduct, committed against D.C.'s ten-year-old sister, M.C. The jury also found defendant committed lewd or lascivious acts against more than one victim. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve 65 years to life in state prison and imposed other orders. Defendant appealed. After reviewing his arguments on appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed defendant's convictions and remanded the matter for resentencing. The Court found that while there was no direct evidence of the specific act of sexual penetration defendant was convicted of committing, other than his confession during interrogation, the circumstantial evidence was more than sufficient to establish the corpus delicti of the crime. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered evidence purportedly relevant to impeach S.S. or by allowing the challenged CSAAS testimony. Defendant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct is forfeited by his failure to object and request a curative instruction. Nor did defense counsel's failure to so object amount to constitutionally deficient performance. Defendant's assertion of cumulative prejudice also failed. With regard to resentencing, the Court concluded that the trial court's imposition of three consecutive life terms was not unauthorized, and therefore defense counsel's failure to object to this sentence below arguably forfeit the issue on appeal. However, "it is apparent from the record that the trial court believed it was required to impose full, separate, and consecutive terms pursuant to section 667.6, subdivision (d), and rule 4.426 of the California Rules of Court that were not applicable to this case. Assuming the issue is forfeited, we conclude defense counsel's failure to object and correct the trial court's misunderstanding amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel." View "California v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

A jury convicted James Michael Poisson of mayhem and battery with serious bodily injury. The trial court sentenced Poisson to prison for 12 years, consisting of eight years for mayhem and four years for battery with serious bodily injury. Poisson appealed, contending he could not be convicted separately of both mayhem and battery with serious bodily injury because the latter was a lesser included offense of the former. The Court of Appeal rejected that contention. Battery with serious bodily injury was not a lesser included offense of mayhem. View "California v. Poisson" on Justia Law

Defendant admitted he had violated his felony probation in this case by committing another crime in a new case and was sentenced in both cases to an aggregate three-year term in county jail. After the passage of Proposition 47, defendant petitioned to recall his sentence in both cases. On appeal, defendant claimed that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself and his right to be present at the resentencing hearing in this case. The court rejected defendant's contention because it is based on the unsupported assumption that he continued to assert rather than waive this right. The court also rejected defendant's contention that, apart from the alleged violation of his right to self-representation, the trial court deprived him of his right to be present at the hearing. Defendant has forfeited the issue, and the argument is otherwise meritless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Fedalizo" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to felony possession of methamphetamine. The court suspended imposition of sentence and imposed five years’ probation. Months later, the state sought revocation of probation on grounds defendant had again possessed a controlled substance. Before defendant’s hearing, the electorate passed Proposition 47, which reduced his violation to a misdemeanor. Any person “currently serving a sentence” for a crime that was reduced to a misdemeanor may petition for a recall of sentence. A recalled conviction is considered a misdemeanor “for all purposes,” except the defendant continues to be barred from possessing firearms, as a felon would be. At the hearing, defendant’s attorney requested that defendant’s conviction be reduced. Because defendant had been on probation, counsel argued he was not “currently serving a sentence,” so that the reduction should be under the Estrada retroactivity principle: absent contrary legislative intent, statutory amendments mitigating criminal punishment apply retroactively. The court insisted defendant was required to file a petition to obtain a sentence recall. Defendant filed his petition under protest. The court reduced his conviction. Defendant admitted the probation violation, he was sentenced to time served, and his probation was restored. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that persons on probation for a felony conviction are “currently serving a sentence” for purposes of Proposition 47. View "People v. Davis" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Leonel Reyes of (1) forcible oral copulation; (2) forcible rape; (3) lewd acts upon a child under the age of 14; and (4) first degree burglary. The jury found true allegations that the crimes of counts 1 and 2 occurred during the commission of a first degree burglary, that Reyes committed the crimes of counts 1 and 2 during the commission of a burglary with the intent to commit those crimes, and that the victim, Daniela R., was age 14 or older but under the age of 18. The trial court sentenced Reyes to eight years plus one consecutive term of life without the possibility of parole, consisting of life without the possibility of parole for the special findings under section Penal Code section 667.61, subdivision (l), the upper term of eight years for the count 3 offense, a concurrent midterm of four years for count 6 (not listed above), and 15-year-to-life terms on counts 1 and 2 pursuant to section 667.61, subdivisions (b) and (e) stayed under section 654. Reyes argued on appeal of the conviction and sentences that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by arguing for the first time in rebuttal the relevance of evidence that Daniela was gay on the issue of consent, and also by explaining the reasonable doubt standard in such a way as to dilute the People's burden of proof in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Reyes further contended his sentence of life without the possibility of parole for committing two forcible sex offenses violated the proscriptions in the federal and California Constitutions against cruel and unusual punishment, and his counsel was prejudicially ineffective for failing to object on this ground under the California Constitution. In a supplemental brief, Reyes also argued the trial court sentenced him under section 667.61, subdivision (l) in counts 1 and 2 under the mistaken belief it had no discretion to impose a lesser sentence. The State asked that the Court of Appeal order the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect the jury's true findings on the allegations under section 667.61, subdivision (l) attached to counts 1 and 2 as well as the court's oral pronouncement of judgment on those counts, and to indicate that Reyes was sentenced under that section. Reyes agreed with the State as to that point. The Court of Appeal concluded the abstract of judgment should be modified to reflect those changes. As so modified, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Reyes" on Justia Law

Both defendant Robert Jones and the Attorney General appealed after a jury convicted defendant of residential burglary, receiving stolen property, and resisting a peace officer and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 25 years under the Three Strikes law. Defendant contended that trial counsel’s representation violated his right to counsel because the attorney had a conflict of interest, and the Attorney General contended that remand was required because the trial court failed to provide written reasons in the court’s minutes for dismissing a strike. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that: (1) even assuming a conflict of interest violated defendant’s right to counsel, there was no resulting prejudice; and (2) then-current law did not require the trial court to provide written reasons in the minutes for dismissing the strike. View "California v. Jones" on Justia Law