Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Appellants Gonzalez, Estrada, and Garcia appealed from their conviction and sentence for felony murder. The court concluded that the record supports the trial court’s admission of the percipient witness’s remarks as spontaneous statements, as they were made shortly after the shooting of the victim, while the witness was under the influence of that startling event, and were not testimonial; as to the alleged accomplice, the court concluded that he was not an accomplice as a matter of law, and that the trial court properly instructed the jury to determine the issue; moreover, any error was harmless; with respect to the trial court’s failure to instruct, sua sponte, on malice murder, its lesser included offenses and defenses, the court concluded that in light of the jury’s guilty verdicts on felony murder and its true findings on the robbery special circumstance allegations, any error was harmless; and, under People v. Banks, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s true findings as to all appellants on the robbery special circumstance allegation. Therefore, appellants were statutorily eligible to be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The court modified the abstracts of judgment to delete the parole revocation fines and affirmed the judgments. View "People v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after being convicted of several counts related to the sexual assault of the victim, C. Penal Code section 1170.15 provides that if a defendant is convicted of a felony, and he or she is also convicted of dissuading a witness from reporting or testifying about the first felony, then the trial court must impose a full term sentence for the dissuading a witness conviction instead of the normal one-third the midterm for a second felony. The trial court understood this section to require it to impose a full term consecutive sentence for the dissuading a witness felony. Defendant argued, and the People concede, that section 1170.15 applies only if the trial court first determines it will impose consecutive sentences for the dissuading a witness felony. Because the trial court did not realize it had discretion to impose a concurrent sentence for the dissuading a witness felony, the court remanded for resentencing. The court concluded that there is sufficient evidence to support the three prior prison term enhancements as alleged in the petition because defendant admitted each of them. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "People v. Woodworth" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Ybarra appealed after he was convicted by jury on multiple counts related to two incidents: a group attack on a fellow prison inmate and a separate battery by gassing on a correctional officer. A jury found defendant guilty on five of seven counts. Defendant was sentenced to state prison for a term of thirteen years. On appeal, defendant contended that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the counts arising from the assault on the inmate from the counts arising from the gassing of the correctional officer; and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the verdicts related to the inmate assault because the accomplice testimony was insufficiently corroborated. In the published portion of this opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court properly denied defendant’s severance motion because at the time the motion was made, defendant did not demonstrate prejudice and he has failed to demonstrate gross unfairness amounting to a due process violation based on anything that transpired during the trial. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, the Court concluded that there was sufficient corroboration of the accomplice testimony. View "California v. Ybarra" on Justia Law

Defendant Rolando Esteban Sanchez was convicted and sentenced on a number of felony convictions in this matter. The court originally sentenced him to an aggregate term of 63 years to life. A consecutive sentence of one year eight months on count five (possession of a concealed firearm in a motor vehicle) was part of the aggregate term. The court found that based on the sentence imposed on count five, Penal Code section 654 precluded punishing defendant on count eight (possession of a loaded firearm in a motor vehicle). On remand, the trial court held defendant had no right to appear for his resentencing. Defendant contended he was denied his right to counsel and to be present at his resentencing hearing when the trial court resentenced him in his absence on remand after the federal district court ordered defendant’s conviction on count five vacated and the matter remanded for trial on count five for resentencing. The Attorney General does not argue defendant’s right to be present or to have the assistance of counsel were not violated, but argued that defendant was not prejudiced. According to the Attorney General, defendant did not demonstrate he “could have received a more favorable result if he had been present or able to confer with his attorney.” The Court of Appeal disagreed: "Because the trial court changed the previously imposed term to defendant’s detriment, defendant has demonstrated he was prejudiced by not being permitted to be present and to confer with his attorney." The Court ordered the sentence imposed on count eight at the resentencing hearing vacated, and remanded the matter to the superior court for resentencing with the defendant present. View "California v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Daniel Rogers of (count 1) inflicting corporal injury to a cohabitant/child’s parent, (count 2) false imprisonment by violence or menace, (count 3) assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury, and (count 4) simple assault, a lesser included offense to assault with a deadly weapon. The jury also found true allegations that defendant inflicted great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence and served a prior prison term. On appeal, defendant argued he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to object to the prosecution’s motion to amend the information to add counts 3 and 4 and the GBI enhancement after defendant waived a preliminary hearing. Defendant asked that the entire judgment be reversed, or alternatively, that his convictions for the new charges be struck. The State conceded that the information could not be amended to add the new charges, but argued that complete reversal was unprecedented, and the appropriate remedy was to strike the improper charges. As for the GBI enhancement, the State contended that it was properly added to the information, even though defendant had waived his preliminary hearing. After review, the Court of Appeal argued that when a defendant waived his or her right to a preliminary hearing, an information cannot thereafter be amended to add conduct enhancement allegations. Accordingly, the Court ordered that the GBI enhancement be struck along with counts 3 and 4. Because the Court concluded that defendant suffered no prejudice by the inappropriate amendments, it affirmed the convictions on the original charges and the prior prison term enhancement. The case was remanded for resentencing because defendant’s sentence on this case was part of a global settlement involving other cases. View "California v. Rogers" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Bradley Zaun guilty of three counts of burglary, two counts of attempted burglary, and one count of receiving stolen property. On appeal, defendant challenged only the two convictions for attempted burglary, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support those convictions. Finding the evidence sufficient to support his conviction, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Zaun" on Justia Law

A firearm was discovered at the minor’s school. School administrators suspected his involvement, and in the course of questioning him, they seized and searched the minor’s cell phone. Interspersed with the text messages on the phone were a number of digital images, including a photograph of the minor holding what appeared to be the firearm found on campus. When the prosecution sought to use these images as evidence in the proceeding below, the minor unsuccessfully moved to suppress them. The juvenile court found the minor had possessed an assault weapon, and declared him a ward of the juvenile court (Welfare & Institutions Code 602.1). The court of appeal affirmed in part, finding the search of the cell phone reasonable. Considering all the circumstances, the juvenile court properly found the search was justified at its inception and permissible in scope. The order must be modified to reflect his maximum term of confinement and the matter must be remanded to the juvenile court so that it may calculate the custody credits to which he is entitled. View "In re Rafael C." on Justia Law

Defendant’s wife, the subject of a protective order, riding a bus, eported defendant following the bus in a car. Officers stopped defendant, smelled alcohol, saw beer cans in plain view, searched the car, and found empty beer cans, sealed beer cans, and an open beer in the center console. Defendant acknowledged that his wife was aboard the bus and that he knew about the protective order. Charged with driving under the influence of alcohol with prior convictions, driving while having a blood-alcohol content of 0.08 percent or higher with prior convictions, driving when his privilege was suspended for a prior DUI conviction, driving with a suspended license, driving when his privilege was suspended or revoked, and violating a criminal protective order, defendant pleaded nolo contendere to driving with a blood-alcohol content of 0.08 percent or higher with prior convictions and driving when his privilege was suspended for a prior DUI conviction, and admitted his prior convictions. The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on five years‟ formal probation. Defendant was ordered to not change his place of residence from Monterey County or leave the state without permission and to pay penalties, fines, and fees totaling $2,254.00. The court of appeal struck the condition concerning moving his residence or leaving the state and modified the financial sanctions. View "People v. Soto" on Justia Law

In 1998, officers saw defendant urinating behind a San Jose store. Officers believed defendant dropped something on the ground and discovered a bag containing 0.19 grams of cocaine near where he had been standing. Defendant pleaded guilty to felony possession of cocaine base and misdemeanor being under the influence. He admitted to four strike convictions (robberies in 1976, 1990, and 1993) under the former Three Strikes Law and that he had served three prison terms. The court sentenced defendant to 25-years-to-life plus three years for his prior prison terms. In 2013, defendant (63 years old and 15 years into his sentence) sought resentencing under Penal Code 1170.126. Prison records reflected that he had been involved in fights while incarcerated, as recently as 2009, but had not abused substances . He had been accepted into a transitional program. A relative testified that defendant would receive support if released. The court denied defendant‘s petition, finding that resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting defendant’s argument, based on a narrow definition, that “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” means an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent felony within the meaning of Penal Code 667(e)(2)(C)(iv). View "People v. Florez" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of forcible oral copulation, and the lesser included offense of simple kidnapping. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the aggravated kidnapping circumstance; the trial court declined to exercise its judgment to direct the jury to reconsider its inconsistent finding on the aggravated kidnapping circumstance, and the court did not find the jury’s verdicts to be so inconsistent as to require reversal; but the trial court erred in sentencing defendant for the aggravated kidnapping circumstance and the substantive offense of simple kidnapping because he was punished twice for the same act of kidnapping. The court ordered the abstract of judgment modified accordingly. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Kelly" on Justia Law