Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with first degree premeditated murder (count 1), being a felon in possession of a firearm based on the murder weapon (count II), and other felony offenses. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on counts I and II, and the trial court declared a mistrial on those counts. Defendant was convicted of the other charged offenses and sentenced to 12 years in prison. During jury selection, the People used peremptory challenges to excuse all three African-American women from the panel. Defendant objected pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky and People v. Wheeler, but the trial court found that the prosecutor had stated race-neutral reasons. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his Batson/Wheeler objections. In the published portion of this opinion, the court concluded that the record supports the trial court’s ruling as to the prosecutor’s reasons for excusing two of the prospective African-American jurors. However, the prosecutor’s stated reason for excusing the third prospective juror is not supported by the record and contrary to the evidence presented at voir dire. Consequently, the court reversed defendant's convictions because of Batson/Wheeler error. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "People v. Arellano" on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty to driving or taking a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). On appeal, defendant challenged the denial of her petition for recall and resentencing under Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, Penal Code 1170.18. The court concluded, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that all convictions under Section 10851 - including those committed with the intent to deprive the owner of permanent possession of a vehicle - are ineligible for reduction in accordance with section eight of Proposition 47. Felony prosecutions under Section 10851 serve important public safety and deterrence functions that differ from those served by prosecutions for theft. It is thus reasonable for the Legislature to afford prosecutors the discretion to prosecute joyriders as felons rather than misdemeanants. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Solis" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of aggravated kidnapping, rape in concert, oral copulation in concert, and robbery, and the jury found firearm and kidnapping allegations true as to each count. Defendant appealed, contending that his prior conviction for carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle was not a crime of moral turpitude and therefore, its admission was unlawful and prejudicial. The court held that the crime of carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle in violation of Penal Code section 25400(a)(1) is a crime of moral turpitude which may be used as impeachment. In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the prior conviction to impeach defendant's credibility as a witness. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Aguilar" on Justia Law

Defendant Wade Bush appealed an order denying his petition to reduce to misdemeanors his felony convictions for theft from an elder and receiving stolen property pursuant to Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act. The trial court denied defendant’s petition on the ground he was not eligible for relief under Proposition 47 due to the nature of his convictions. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court committed reversible error by denying his petition without stating the reasons for doing so or specifying the materials relied upon in making its determination. Defendant further argues remand is required because the amount of the stolen property, which was determinative of eligibility for resentencing, is not readily evident from the record. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the record on appeal did not support the trial court’s finding of non-eligibility for resentencing because of the nature of those crimes. Furthermore, because the trial court did not state its reasoning for concluding the crimes alleged in counts 12, 14, and 15 were not eligible for resentencing and the record did not support the trial court’s ineligibility finding, the trial court’s ruling denying defendant’s resentencing petition was reversed and remanded for reconsideration of defendant’s petition solely as to counts 12, 14, and 15. The judgment was affirmed as to the trial court’s denial of defendant’s resentencing petition as to counts 2 and 23. View "California v. Bush" on Justia Law

Chamul’s daughter, was born in December 2006. Chamul and his wife, K.S. separated in 2010, after Chamul, who was a master sergeant in the Air Force, returned from a deployment. After the separation, daughter stayed with Chamul at his home every other weekend. K.S. believed daughter and Chamul, had “a close relationship,” and she trusted him. They divorced in 2011. After a 2011 visit to Chamul’s home, the daughter reported sexual activity to K.S. and to a daycare worker, who reported to Child Protective Services. After an investigation Chamul was charged with sexual intercourse with a child aged 10 years or younger; sexual penetration of a child aged 10 years or younger; and oral copulation with a child aged 10 years or younger, A jury convicted him of the oral-copulation count and acquitted him of the other counts, He was sentenced to a term of 15 years to life. The court of appeal reversed, finding that Chamul was denied an opportunity to effectively cross-examine daughter because she did not answer hundreds of questions posed by his trial counsel, including approximately 150 that sought substantial information on important issues and her credibility. Chamul was prejudiced by daughter’s refusal to answer these questions. View "People v. Giron-Chamul" on Justia Law

Sonoma County charged Smith with felony possession of heroin. Months later, failing to meet the conditions of diversion, he entered a plea of not guilty, invoking his right to a preliminary hearing “at the earliest possible time” A hearing was set for March 6, with an acknowledgment that March 10, was the tenth day for purposes of Penal Code 859b. On March 6, the court and defense counsel indicated readiness to proceed, but the prosecutor, who had given no prior notice of any need for a continuance, made an oral request to continue the hearing under section 1050 because the drug lab testing was not finished. She stated she had been assured on the previous day the results would be ready in time for the hearing, but found out that morning the drugs were not at the lab yet. She advised the court the drugs would be at the lab “today[,] and they will, hopefully, be done by Monday.” The defense made no attempt to show it would be prejudiced by a continuance. The court denied the motion and dismissed. The court of appeal reversed. Smith did not and could not complain that his right to a speedy preliminary hearing was violated or demonstrate any other form of prejudice. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant Ronald Myers appealed the denial of his petition to resentence under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Proposition 36) based on a finding that resentencing him would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. A jury convicted defendant of the felony of possession by a felon of ammunition, and two misdemeanors: assault and possession of a syringe. The trial court found he had served a prior prison term and had four strikes. He was sentenced to prison for 25 years to life plus one year, with concurrent misdemeanor terms. The Court of Appeal affirmed. On appeal, Myers argued the trial court used the wrong standards to determine whether he posed a risk of danger, the trial court abused its discretion in making such finding, and he was entitled to have a jury, not a trial judge, make such finding. Disagreeing, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Myers" on Justia Law

This case arose out of two separate incidents. In the first, defendant Anthony Medina was driving with defendants Brandon Morton and David Whitehead in the back seat, and fired a gun at a black Lexus, hitting its two occupants. Medina was convicted of two counts of attempted murder and shooting into an occupied vehicle. In the second incident, Morton believed he had been “shorted” several grams of methamphetamine in a drug sale. Morton, with Medina and Whitehead, met with the woman who had made the sale. She was accompanied by her boyfriend Jason Fletcher and another man. Morton shot and killed Fletcher. All three defendants were convicted of first degree murder with a robbery special circumstance and attempted robbery. Sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP), they appealed, raising a myriad of contentions including insufficiency of the evidence, evidentiary errors, and instructional error. This case returned to the Court of Appeal on remand for reconsideration of this case in light of "California v. Banks," (61 Cal.4th 788 (2015)), which articulated the standards to apply in determining whether an accomplice who lacked the intent to kill may qualify as a major participant for purposes of the felony-murder special circumstance. On further consideration, the Court of Appeal modified its earlier opinion. The Court agreed with defendants’ contentions relating to presentence custody credit and Whitehead’s request for correction of his abstract of judgment. The Court modified the judgments to award presentence custody credit and to correct unauthorized sentences, and ordered corrections and amendments to the abstracts of judgment. View "California v. Medina" on Justia Law

The Alameda County District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition under Welfare and Institutions Code 602, 2 alleging that 17-year-old A.S. committed a misdemeanor assault (against her mother) by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 245, (a)(4)). The court declared her a ward of the juvenile court. Her probation conditions required to submit her “electronics including passwords under [her] control” to warrantless searches by the probation department and law enforcement (electronic search condition) and prohibited her from unauthorized or unsupervised presence on school property (school grounds condition). The court of appeal modified the order. Under the particularized facts of this case, the electronic search condition is reasonable under the test established by People v. Lent, and is not unconstitutionally overbroad. The school grounds condition, however, was unconstitutionally vague because it did not incorporate a “knowledge” requirement so as to prohibit the unauthorized or unsupervised presence on property she knows is school property. View "In re A.S." on Justia Law

On June 28, 2014, defendant Manuel Valencia went into an AT&T store and purchased a prepaid phone for $249.74 with counterfeit $50 bills. When defendant was later contacted by the employee who sold him the phone, he admitted that the bills he tendered were counterfeit. Defendant was charged with second degree burglary and forgery along with two prior prison term allegations. He pleaded guilty to second degree burglary and was sentenced to an eight-month county prison term, to be served consecutively to a nine-year term imposed in unrelated cases. Defendant subsequently filed a Penal Code section 1170.18 petition for resentencing, seeking a reduction of the second degree burglary conviction to a misdemeanor. The trial court denied the petition, finding defendant was not eligible for relief because his criminal activity did not constitute shoplifting. He argued on appeal to the Court of Appeal that the trial court erred in finding his conviction for second degree burglary was ineligible for resentencing. The Court agreed: since defendant’s criminal conduct in purchasing a prepaid phone with counterfeit bills could not be prosecuted as a burglary had Proposition 47 (approved Nov. 4, 2014) been in effect, he was eligible for relief under section 1170.18. The Court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded for additional proceedings on defendant’s petition. View "California v. Valencia" on Justia Law