Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, age 43, met Doe, age 16, through social media. Doe claims that they maintained a consensual relationship that involved kissing and sleeping together, but no further sexual conduct, until Doe stayed at defendant’s residence. Defendant and two male friends forced Doe to orally copulate them. Doe left and called the police. After he expressed suicidal thoughts, Doe was taken into custody. Days later, he made a slightly different statement. The prosecution charged defendant with oral copulation with a minor. (Pen. Code, 288a(b)(1).) Defendant pleaded no contest to false imprisonment by means of deceit (Pen. Code 236, 237(a)) in exchange for dismissal of the oral copulation count. The court suspended imposition of sentence and granted three years' probation to include a jail sentence of 236 days. The court imposed probation conditions that “Any computers and all other electronic devices belonging to the defendant … shall be subject to forensic analysis search for material prohibited by law. You shall not clean or delete internet browsing activity on any electronic device that you own and you must keep a minimum of four weeks of history.” The court of appeal found the condition allowing for searches unconstitutionally overbroad as worded, but upheld the condition requiring defendant not to delete his browser activity. View "People v. Appleton" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of a felony and sentenced to a two-year term in county jail to be followed by two years of mandatory supervision. After defendant was sentenced, he was released from custody on sheriff's parole. Defendant was then arrested and convicted of receiving stolen property. The trial court denied defendant presentence custody credits, explaining that defendant was still serving the custodial portion of his previous conviction. The Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011, Stats. 2011, ch. 15, section 1, made numerous offenses previously punishable by specified terms in state prison now punishable by serving that same term in local custody at the county jail. At issue is in this appeal is what effect a term in the county jail rather than in prison, and being released on “sheriff’s parole” instead of regular prison parole, has on entitlement to presentence credits and to the use of the jail commitment as a “prison prior.” The court concluded that the location of a defendant’s service of his or her felony sentence makes no significant difference on how these issues should be analyzed and resolved. In the published portion of this opinion, the court concluded that defendant is entitled to presentence custody credits, but the court also found that the trial court did not err by finding true and imposing an enhancement on the prior prison term pertaining to his incarceration for the prior felony. View "People v. Hutton" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to forgery and receiving stolen property. On appeal, defendant challenged the denial of his oral petition for resentencing. The trial court had suspended defendant's four-year felony state prison sentence and placed him on three years' probation. Defendant then failed to appear for a probation violation hearing and his probation was revoked. In regard to the forgery conviction, defendant argued that the $950 value amount set forth in Proposition 47, Penal Code section 473, subdivision (b), corresponds not to the stated amount on the face of the forged instrument but to the intrinsic value of the instrument itself. The court concluded that, even if its understanding of People v. Cuellar and related cases could be considered as constituting a change in interpretation, this change could not have had any impact on defendant’s pre-Proposition 47 decision to plead guilty. In regard to the receiving stolen property conviction, the court concluded that defendant has not demonstrated on this record that he petitioned the trial court to resentence him on this offense. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and ordered the superior court to prepare an amended abstract of judgment to correct a typographical error. View "People v. Franco" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with felony possession of methamphetamine(Health and Safety Code 11377(a). In 2013, the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed her on felony probation for three years, with 60 days in jail. In 2015, defendant sought resentencing under section 1170.18(a), asserting eligibility for reduction of her conviction to a misdemeanor. The district attorney argued that the statute did not apply because she “has not been sentenced.” The court denied the petition. The court of appeal reversed. Section 1170.18, derived from Proposition 47, provides: “A person currently serving a sentence for a conviction ... of a felony or felonies who would have been guilty of a misdemeanor under the act that added this section … had this act been in effect at the time of the offense may petition for a recall of sentence … to request resentencing.” Proposition 47 was intended to reach those with “nonserious, nonviolent crimes like . . . drug possession,” which would encompass many who were granted probation. To deprive those defendants of the benefit of the reduced penalty for their offenses would create an incongruity the voters would not have either anticipated or approved. View "People v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Defendants Moreland and Adams were convicted of numerous offenses related to the rape, kidnapping, robbery, and attempted murder of the victim. In the published portion of this opinion, the court modified defendants' presentence custody credits; held that under Penal Code section 667.61, as amended in 2006, defendants were not entitled to presentence conduct credits; and held that the indeterminate aggravated kidnapping sentences must be stayed where, pursuant to Penal Code section 209, subdivision (d), the trial court was required to stay the punishment on count 4, kidnapping to commit rape or oral copulation, as to each defendant. View "People v. Adams" on Justia Law

Proposition 47, Penal Code 1170.18, downgrades several felonies and wobblers to misdemeanors and permits persons convicted of those felonies and wobblers to have them redesignated as misdemeanors. Penal Code 667.5, subdivision (b), requires a court to increase any sentence of imprisonment for a felony by one extra year for each of a defendant’s prior felony convictions that resulted in a separate term of imprisonment. The court held that, when a defendant’s sentence for felony no. 2 is enhanced under section 667.5, subdivision (b), for defendant’s service of a term of imprisonment on felony no. 1, and when the defendant later has felony no. 1 redesignated as a misdemeanor under Proposition 47, that redesignation does not operate retroactively and thereby entitle the defendant to be resentenced on felony no. 2 to eliminate the section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order declining to resentence as to the defendant in this case. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law

After defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm and served two years in prison, he was released and placed on postrelease community supervision (PRCS). Defendant was on PRCS when he was arrested for being under the influence of a controlled substance and tested positive for methamphetamine. The trial court found him in violation of PRCS, ordered him to serve 60 days in jail, and granted him 52 days of credit (including actual custody and conduct credits). Proposition 36, Penal Code section 1210.1, mandates that, as a general rule, a person who commits a non-violent drug possession offense should be referred to drug treatment rather than to jail. In this case, the court concluded that the trial court erred when it imposed a jail term without first determining whether defendant qualifies for drug treatment under Proposition 36. Therefore, the court remanded the matter for a finding on this issue. The court also concluded that the trial court's order revoking defendant's PRCS did not violate his rights to due process or equal protection. Accordingly, the court affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant David Root petitioned for relief under Proposition 47. His burglary convictions involved incidents in which Root entered banks, during regular business hours, for the purpose of cashing forged checks in amounts less than $950. Although the precise issue in dispute had been challenged, the question presented to the Court of Appeal was whether entry into a bank to commit theft by false pretenses in amounts under $950 qualified as "shoplifting" under newly enacted section 459.5. The Court concluded that proper application of statutes and case law compelled the Court to conclude such crimes fit within the shoplifting offense, as then defined, and therefore Root's petition for relief had to be granted. View "California v. Root" on Justia Law

In the People's criminal complaint, Count 1 alleged that defendant failed to disclose that he had applied for, received, and used an Illinois driver's license under another name, and Count 2 alleged that defendant entered the Department of Motor Vehicles, "a commercial building," with intent "to commit larceny and any felony." On appeal, the People challenged the trial court's order, issued under Proposition 47, Penal Code 1170.18, reducing defendant's felony second degree burglary conviction to a misdemeanor second degree burglary, and modifying terms of probation in accord with the new misdemeanor conviction. The court concluded that the record before it on the People's appeal establishes without any room for doubt - regardless of which side had the burden of proof in the trial court on the question of defendant's eligibility for Proposition 47 relief - that defendant did not commit the offense of misdemeanor shoplifting. He was convicted of felony second degree burglary based on the entry into a building with the intent to commit the felony of perjury. This is established by the pleadings and record of conviction. Defendant was not convicted of a felony offense that is now reduced to a misdemeanor offense under Proposition 47. Consequently, defendant is not eligible for Proposition 47 relief, and his petition should have been denied. The court reversed the trial court's order. View "People v. Chen" on Justia Law

Defendant petitioned to modify his maximum term of confinement, contending that Penal Code section 1170.126 should be “interpreted” to permit people found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to a state hospital (“NGI committees”) to petition for recalculation of their maximum term of confinement. Defendant further asserts that a contrary interpretation would violate equal protection principles. The court concluded that section 1170.126 does not permit an NGI committee to petition for recalculation of a maximum term of confinement where section 1170.126 applies exclusively to certain “persons presently serving an indeterminate term of imprisonment ….” The court also concluded that defendant has failed to present a viable equal protection claim where, under rational basis review, defendant is not similarly situated to three classes of persons where defendant failed to negate every conceivable basis for the statute's disparate treatment between himself and those convicted of similar offenses in the same time period; defendant failed to negate every conceivable basis for the statute's disparate treatment between himself and current felons; and defendant failed to develop his claim that the statute improperly treats him differently than pre-Act insanity committees subject to a determinate maximum term of confinement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of defendant's petition. View "People v. Dobson" on Justia Law