Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Foy was convicted of seven counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211) and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (former section 12021(a)(1)). Foy was sentenced under the three strikes law to 120 years-to-life in state prison. The court of appeal reversed, finding that Foy‘s Sixth Amendment confrontation clause rights were violated by the trial court‘s admission of a witness‘s videotaped conditional examination testimony without a showing of unavailability. View "People v. Foy" on Justia Law

Defendant was serving a state prison term imposed following his conviction of four theft-related felonies. Defendant subsequently filed a petition pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (a) seeking to have his felony burglary conviction reclassified as misdemeanor shoplifting on the grounds that it involved an attempted theft of no more than $200. The trial court granted defendant‟s petition and resentenced defendant on all counts, including the non-proposition 47 counts, to a five-year prison term. The court agreed with defendant that he was entitled to have counsel present at the resentencing hearing to protect his substantial rights. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for a new resentencing hearing. View "People v. Rouse" on Justia Law

In 2012, defendant Phillip Pernell entered a bank in Moreno Valley and attempted to cash a check for $587.64. The check was made out to defendant and was drawn on the account of Innovative Design Concepts. Defendant was charged with second degree burglary and check forgery. The information also alleged a prison prior and a strike prior. Defendant pleaded guilty to count 1 and admitted the prior allegations. The trial court sentenced him to three years eight months in state prison. Then in 2014, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (a). Over the People's objection on the ground that defendant was not eligible for resentencing, the trial court granted the petition, resentenced defendant for a misdemeanor violation of section 459.5, and gave him credit for time served. The State appealed the trial court's order, arguing defendant failed to meet his burden of proving eligibility for resentencing, and the trial court erred in granting defendant's petition because he remained guilty of second degree burglary, not misdemeanor shoplifting. The Court of Appeal agreed with the State and reversed the judgment. View "California v. Bias" on Justia Law

Defendant drove away from a gathering at which he and his passengers had been drinking. A passenger testified that after visiting a liquor store, defendant began to “drive crazy,” ultimately causing the vehicle to flip. Three passengers fled the scene. Two others were injured, one with a brain injury. Defendant was taken to Santa Clara Medical Center where he was arrested. A blood sample was drawn, while defendant was unconscious, disclosing a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent. Defendant was charged with felony driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, causing injury; felony driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent, causing injury; and misdemeanor driving without a license. Several enhancements were charged because of the passengers' bodily injuries. The court denied a motion to suppress, finding that blood extraction was permissible, without a warrant or a showing of exigent circumstances, under California’s “implied consent” law, which declares that one who drives a motor vehicle is “deemed” to consent to blood alcohol testing. The court of appeal affirmed. While the consent imputed to drivers under that law cannot alone justify a seizure without a duly issued warrant, the officer reasonably relied on the statute, bringing the case within the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule. View "People v. Arredondo" on Justia Law

In 2013, defendant cultivated marijuana in a state park in Sonoma County, diverting water for 40-50 marijuana seedlings. Defendant’s Proposition 215 card to use medical marijuana had expired. Officers seized a bin containing 30 pounds of marijuana. Defendant was charged with cultivating marijuana, carrying a concealed weapon, possessing methamphetamine, possessing a firearm inside a state park, polluting public water, and entering onto land for the purpose of injuring property. He pled no contest to cultivating marijuana and diverting a water stream. The remaining counts were dismissed; he was placed on three years' probation. In a motion for return of seized property, defendant stated that he is a medical marijuana patient. The court ordered the return of defendant’s cell phone, computer, and other personal items, but declined to return the marijuana, pipes, and the digital scale. The court ordered that $1404 in seized cash be used toward payment of $3,788 restitution owed for restoration of the park. In 2014 defendant filed a petition under Penal Code 1170.18, to reduce his felony conviction to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47. The court denied the petition on the grounds that defendant’s cultivation conviction (Pen. Code, 11358) was not an enumerated offense eligible for resentencing under Proposition 47. The court of appeal affirmed. View "People v. Descano" on Justia Law

Brown, age 67, was riding his bicycle on a Richmond sidewalk when Officer Ricchiuto ordered him to stop for wearing earphones while riding, and for not having a light. Brown attempted to flee, but Ricchiuto and Officer Moody, chased and arrested him. After a physical altercation during the arrest, the officers restrained Brown and found drugs in a baggie he had discarded during the chase. Charges arising out of this incident resulted in felony convictions for possession and transportation of cocaine and for using force or violence to resist an executive officer in the performance of his duty in violation of Penal Code section 69. The court of appeal reversed in part, based on the lower court’s failure to instruct the jury sua sponte regarding simple assault as a lesser necessarily included offense and erroneous admission of expert testimony regarding police standards for use of force. The errors require either a modification or reversal of Brown’s conviction for resisting an officer by force or violence. View "People v. Brown" on Justia Law

Defendant, 17-years-old, was arrested after police found him loitering near a school. The DA filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 charging him with violating Penal Code section 653b, loitering about a school, and Health and Safety Code section 11350, possession of a controlled substance. At issue on appeal is whether section 653b is unconstitutionally vague and whether sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s true finding. The Legislature made the judgment - based at least in part on that special sensitivity - that a person found near a school who remains in the area and exhibits behavior demonstrating a nefarious intent to commit a crime should be subject to apprehension and punishment. The court held that section 653b, as construed, achieves that end in a constitutional manner because it provides reasonable notice of what is prohibited to the ordinary citizen and does not encourage discriminatory enforcement. The court concluded that there is substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that defendant loitered at Jane Addams High with the specific intent to commit an assault. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re Gary H." on Justia Law

In 1993, Kristopher Kirchner, age 16 at the time, and Damien Miller, age 15, executed a plan to rob a gun store in Vista owned by Ross Elvey. Once inside the store, Kirchner repeatedly hit 59-year-old Elvey in the head with a metal pipe causing severe trauma that ultimately resulted in Elvey's death after languishing in a coma for 40 days. Kirchner was initially charged in juvenile court, however, the court found Kirchner unfit to be prosecuted as a juvenile and he was charged as an adult. Kirchner was found guilty of one count of first degree murder, and remanded to the California Youth Authority (CYA). CYA concluded there was a reasonable probability that Kirchner's likelihood to commit further crimes could be reduced or eliminated within the available confinement time if sentenced as a juvenile. The trial court declined to follow the recommendation of the CYA and sentenced Kirchner to LWOP on the murder conviction, plus one year consecutive for the weapon enhancement. Kirchner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in October 2014 contending that under "Miller v. Alabama" and "California v. Gutierrez," his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The district attorney's return argued Miller and Gutierrez could not be applied retroactively and Kirchner was, therefore, barred from collaterally attacking his sentence. The court granted the request to file a supplemental return. Kirchner filed a supplemental denial. In 2015, the superior court granted Kirchner's petition. The district attorney appealed. The Court of Appeal concluded after review that the trial court correctly concluded the holdings of Miller and Gutierrez applied retroactively in state collateral proceedings such as the one presented here and that the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution required that when inmates, such as Kirchner, were serving life terms for crimes committed while they were juveniles, they must, except in the most extraordinary circumstances, be given an opportunity to seek parole. However, where, as was the case in California, a legislature has provided inmates serving life sentences for crimes committed while they were juveniles with an opportunity to obtain a parole hearing, the state has remedied any constitutional defect in the inmate's sentence. View "In re Kirchner" on Justia Law

An information accused defendant Victor Quiroz of committing assault with a deadly weapon, with an enhancement for great bodily injury; and battery with serious bodily injury, with an enhancement for personal use of a weapon. The information also alleged defendant had previously been convicted of arson, a prior strike conviction. The trial court first found defendant incompetent to stand trial in March 2007 and committed him for treatment. In November of that year, the state hospital certified defendant was mentally competent, and criminal proceedings resumed. However, in August 2008, the court again found defendant incompetent to stand trial and committed him for treatment. In this appeal, the issue before the Court of Appeal was whether a trial court had jurisdiction to convene a competency hearing after a state hospital certified that a defendant, who has been involuntarily confined for three years due to incompetence to stand trial, was not likely to regain competency. After review, the Court concluded the relevant statutory scheme did not authorize a trial court to hold such a competency hearing. As a result, the Court held the trial court in this matter exceeded its jurisdiction when it held a competency hearing for defendant after the state hospital determined he was not likely to regain competence, found him competent, and subsequently pronounced judgment against him. View "California v. Quiroz" on Justia Law

Respondent Daniel Paramo, Warden at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (collectively RJDCF), appealed a superior court order granting petitioner Kevin Andres's petition for writ of habeas corpus. The court found that Andres properly prepared and timely submitted via institutional mail an administrative appeal involving an incident that occurred on January 20, 2013, despite the fact the RJDCF appeals office never received the appeal. Without reaching the merits, the court merely ordered RJDCF to process Andres's appeal as being timely received. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re Andres" on Justia Law