Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed the denial of her petition for dismissal of two misdemeanor convictions under Penal Code section 1203.4a. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that the fact that defendant served a prison term for a conviction that has been reclassified as a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47 does not disqualify her from relief under section 1203.4a, subdivision (a). The court explained that whatever sentence defendant had served for such offense was irrelevant under section 1203.4a, and the trial court erred in denying defendant's petition for dismissal. View "People v. Khamvongsa" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her carjacking conviction and sought a petition for habeas relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that defendant used force to take the vehicle from its owners. In this case, both the surveillance video and the owner's testimony established that the owner held onto the vehicle and tried to stop the vehicle as defendant backed out of the parking space. The court rejected defendant's claim that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the lesser offenses of theft and the unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle. Finally, the court held that, because there is no reasonable probability that defendant would have achieved a more favorable result had defense counsel objected to the prosecution's purported misconduct, defendant was not deprived of effective representation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to 65 years in prison after being convicted of sodomy of a person under age 10, two counts of oral copulation with a person under age 10, and two counts of lewd acts on a child. In this appeal, defendant argued that the prosecutor committed misconduct in closing argument by misstating the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof. The court agreed and concluded that it is improper for the prosecutor to misstate the law, and in particular to attempt to reduce the People's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The court explained that the prosecutor's inaccurate definition of reasonable doubt left in the minds of the jurors an image as graphic as a map. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "People v. Cowan" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Jorene Nicolas guilty of vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence. Defendant was on her phone and texting while driving on the freeway. The victim had been in her car, stalled in a traffic jam. Defendant crashed into the rear of the victim’s car at about 80 miles per hour. In this appeal, defendant claimed: (1) there was insufficient evidence of gross negligence; (2) the trial court committed three separate instructional errors; and (3) the court abused its discretion by imposing an upper term sentence (six years). The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that the trial court committed three separate instructional errors; one of the errors requires automatic reversal because it had the effect of lowering the prosecution’s burden of proof. View "California v. Nicolas" on Justia Law

Police responded to a home burglary alarm in Corte Madera at the Ryborg/Fellows home and encountered Lena in the neighborhood, with fresh mud on his trousers. The Ryborg/Fellows home was near a hillside thick with mud. Officers followed Lena’s car and tried to make a traffic stop. Lena, attempting to escape, cornered himself on a dead-end street, jumped out of his car, pointed a gun at the officers, then fled on foot. Unable to catch him, the officers searched Lena’s vehicle and discovered firearms that had been stolen in four different burglaries and several stolen passports, one of which had been taken from a house in the Ryborg/Fellows neighborhood, that same day. Lena was apprehended after a high-speed chase into Canada that ended with a shootout. Lena was imprisoned in Canada for discharging a firearm at a person and attempted murder. After serving his sentence, Lena was returned to California, convicted of two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm upon a peace officer, residential burglary, and possession of a firearm by a felon, for which, with enhancements and prior convictions, he received a sentence of 51 years. The court of appeals affirmed, rejecting an argument that it was error to sanction Lena for refusing to answer questions on cross-examination by striking his entire testimony, and to admit evidence of uncharged burglaries to show intent, motive, and common plan. View "People v. Lena" on Justia Law

Defendant Percy Camel killed two men in separate criminal incidents. Convicted of two counts of first degree murder and other crimes and sentenced to two consecutive indeterminate terms of life without the possibility of parole and other terms, he appealed. Defendant argued that the trial court erred by determining: (1) he did not have standing to challenge a search of the trunk of a car parked on the front lawn of his residence; and (2) his trial attorney violated his right to effective assistance of counsel by not proffering evidence of standing to the trial court in connection with the motion to suppress. The Court of Appeal concluded: (1) the court employed the correct probable-cause test; (2) the court properly sealed the documents attached to the wiretap request; and (3) there was probable cause to support the wiretap authorization. In the unpublished part of this opinion, the Court addressed defendant’s remaining contentions on appeal and find that some of them required modification of the judgment. The Court therefore modified the judgment and affirmed it as modified. View "California v. Camel" on Justia Law

Defendant and another man went to a drug dealer’s home for the purpose of purchasing a quarter-pound of methamphetamine. Defendant was carrying two cell phones, a large knife in a concealed sheath, another knife in a pocket, and $1,300 in cash. They were apprehended by law enforcement before they could enter the dealer’s home. Defendant admitted that he had intended to use the $1,300 to purchase a quarter-pound of methamphetamine, was acting as a middleman for a third party. He pleaded no contest to attempted possession of a controlled substance for sale (Pen. Code, 664; Health & Saf. Code, 11378). The trial court placed him on probation for three years with numerous conditions and ordered him to register as a narcotics offender under Health and Safety Code 11590. The court of appeals affirmed, rejecting arguments that section 11590 does not permit a court to require narcotics offender registration where the conviction was for an attempted, rather than completed, violation of section 11378 and that a probation condition requiring him to submit his cell phones and computer to search and to provide any passwords necessary to conduct such a search was unreasonable, vague, and overbroad. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

Faris Alsafar appealed the extension of his period of commitment to a state mental hospital as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). He argued the trial court violated his constitutional right to equal protection when it compelled him to testify over his objection at the trial to determine whether his commitment should be extended. Alsafar contended that because persons subject to civil commitment after being found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) have a statutory right, pursuant to Penal Code section 1026.5 (b)(7) not to be compelled to testify in proceedings to extend their commitments, so should a person facing commitment as a MDO. He pointed out that this right has been extended to commitment proceedings for sexually violent predators (SVP) by application of equal protection principles. The Attorney General argued it was not a denial of equal protection to treat MDO’s differently from NGI’s, and any disparate treatment was related to a legitimate government purpose. Alternatively, she maintained any error was harmless. The Court of Appeal asked the parties to submit supplemental letter briefs discussing a recently decided opinion by Division Two of the Fourth District, which held that MDO’s, SVP’s, and NGI’s were all similarly situated with respect to the testimonial privilege provided for in section 1026.5(b)(7). In addition, it looked as if Alsafar’s one-year commitment order expired while the appeal was pending due to the Court of Appeal’s “pressing caseload.” The Court ordered the parties to notify the Court if there was a new commitment order, and if this ruling rendered the appeal moot. The Court concluded the question of equal protection was a legal issue of continuing public importance that was likely to reoccur in MDO proceedings. “A reviewing court may exercise its inherent discretion to resolve an issue rendered moot by subsequent events if the question to be decided is of continuing public importance and is a question capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Because Alsafar had been recommitted without being required to testify, the issue of equal protection was rendered moot as to him. View "California v. Alsafar" on Justia Law

Black called Knarr to suggest a real estate investment. Knarr gave Black $124,456, documented by a May 2006 promissory note. Knarr testified that he would not have invested without a promised 10 percent return if sale or development of the property failed. The parties modified the note in May 2007 to reflect Knarr’s additional investment of $155,474 and extended the maturity date of the note several times, through mid-January 2012. Knarr obtained information inconsistent with what Black had told him and asked Black for his money. Receiving no response, Knarr initiated an investigation. In 2013, Black was charged with five counts (there were other investors) of using false statements in the offer or sale of a security (Corp. Code, 25401, 25540(b)). The trial court set aside two counts, finding that the note was not a security. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the promissory notes offered for Knarr’s investment in the real estate development scheme were not securities within the meaning of the Corporate Securities Law. The evidence of other investors was insufficient to meet the public offering prong of the risk-capital test and there was insufficient evidence that Knarr was “led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter.” View "People v. Black" on Justia Law

In 1997, Clark was convicted of indecent exposure and sentenced to a prison term of 26 years to life under the “three strikes” law. He had prior convictions for the same offense and two for lewd and lascivious conduct (Penal Code section 288(a)) In 2014, after adoption of the Three Strikes Reform Act, he unsuccessfully petitioned for resentencing. The court of appeals affirmed the denial, rejecting an argument that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a hearing and rule on his motion to strike one of his prior convictions on the ground that it was constitutionally invalid and in ruling it lacked authority to dismiss the prior conviction in the interests of justice. Although not expressly designated by number in the Reform Act, section 1170.12(c)(2)(C)(iv), violation of section 288.7 is a disqualifying “serious and/or violent felony offense punishable in California by life imprisonment or death.” View "People v. Clark" on Justia Law