Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Nicole, a minor, arranged for a friend to lure the victim, E.Y., to Heron Park in Brentwood. A school official obtained from an anonymous student a video depicting an attack on E.Y. by four females, including Nicole, who admitted her involvement but blamed others for arranging the assault. She said she gave her phone to another individual to record the fight. Following a contested dispositional hearing, the juvenile court adjudged Nicole a ward of the court and ordered that she be removed from her father‟s custody and detained in juvenile hall pending placement. The court imposed probation conditions, including a condition permitting searches of Nicole’s cell phone and other electronic devices. Nicole was placed at the Warner Mountains Group Home, approximately 340 miles from her father’s home, although there were closer facilities. The court of appeal upheld removal of Nicole from her home, but concluded no substantial evidence justified her distant placement. On remand, the trial court is to modify the search condition and specify the maximum time of confinement. View "In re Nicole H." on Justia Law

Defendant-respondent Joanna Gonzalez pled guilty to one felony count of grand theft from a person and one misdemeanor count of battery. As part of the plea agreement, the State dropped charges of robbery and burglary. The trial court sentenced Gonzalez to 36 months of formal probation on the condition she serve 365 days in a work release program, with 51 days of presentence custody and behavior credits. California voters subsequently passed Proposition 47. Relevant to Gonzalez, Proposition 47 converted grand theft from a person into a misdemeanor where the amount of the theft was less than $950. She petitioned for resentencing, and the trial court granted the petition, deemed her conviction on count 3 a misdemeanor, vacated her sentence of formal probation, and resentenced her to summary probation. The State appealed, arguing the trial court erred in granting the petition on the grounds that: (1) Gonzalez was not eligible for resentencing because she was convicted under a negotiated plea agreement under the terms of which the State dismissed other felony counts in return for Gonzalez receiving a sentence of formal probation; and (2) Gonzalez did not carry her burden of showing her offense would have become a misdemeanor because she did not show the underlying conduct would not have constituted felony robbery and burglary, as originally charged. In the alternative, the State argued the trial court erred by refusing to find Gonzalez breached the plea agreement by petitioning for resentencing and by refusing to allow them to withdraw from the plea agreement and restore the dismissed counts. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Eric Cunningham was convicted by jury on one count of attempted murder and one count of robbery. The jury found true as to both counts the allegation defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury which caused the victim to become comatose due to brain injury. Defendant admitted to serving one prior prison term, and being convicted of two prior serious violent felonies. The trial court imposed a term of 25 years to life for count 1 and a term of 25 years to life for count 2, to run consecutively. In addition to other enhancements, the trial court imposed a consecutive five-year enhancement in count 1 and a concurrent five-year enhancement in count 2 based on the jury finding that defendant’s attack caused the victim to become comatose due to a brain injury. Defendant appealed, contending the evidence that the victim’s treating physicians sedated her to conduct surgery and relieve pain associated with use of a respirator was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that the victim was comatose. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

Defendants who are found mentally incompetent to stand trial (IST) are transferred to the Department of State Hospitals for treatment, under procedures set forth in Penal Code section 13701. Petitioners requested that the court order the Department to admit IST defendants from Contra Costa County to DSH-Napa within four weeks after a trial court makes an order of commitment. The trial court ordered that such admissions must take place within 60 days, not four weeks, of the commitment order. The court of appeal affirmed and remanded with directions to modify the order as necessary to conform to new statutory provisions enacted while the appeal was pending. The court rejected arguments that the order was inconsistent with section 1370; undermined DSH’s ability to carry out its statutory duties under section 1370, causing disruption and public harm, and subjecting DSH to potential equal protection and due process claims; and circumvented established habeas procedures. View "In re Loveton" on Justia Law

Penal Code section 1202.4(f)1 requires trial courts to order criminal defendants to make direct restitution to the victims of their crimes, generally limited to the economic losses victims suffer. However, section 1202.4(f)(3)(F) permits trial courts to order restitution for “[n]oneconomic losses, including, but not limited to, psychological harm, for felony violations of Section 288.” McCarthy was convicted of numerous acts of child sexual abuse, including continuous sexual abuse of a child under section 288.5. He was not convicted of violating section 288, the general child sexual abuse statute. Over defense objections, the trial court ordered McCarthy to make direct restitution to his victim, ruling that section 1202.4(f)(3)(F) authorizes restitution for noneconomic losses when a defendant is convicted under section 288.5. The court of appeal affirmed; section 1202.4(f)(3)(F) permits restitution for noneconomic losses if a defendant’s conduct violates section 288, even if the defendant is convicted of felony child abuse under a different section of the Penal Code, such as section 288.5. To say that the statute applies only to the lesser offense would give little meaning to the statute and result in an absurd consequence. View "People v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

Christopher Carrea appealed the denial of his Penal Code section 1170.18 motion to dismiss a one-year prison prior enhancement, imposed at his 2013 sentencing for conviction of inflicting corporal injury to a former cohabitant. He argued that because, after his sentencing, he obtained a section 1170.18 order reducing the 2004 convictions on which that prison prior enhancement was based from felonies to misdemeanors, the trial court should have stricken or dismissed that enhancement pursuant to section 1170.18 and Proposition 47. Because the Court of Appeal concluded section 1170.18 did not provide for retroactive redesignation, dismissal, or striking of final pre-Proposition 47 sentence enhancements based on prior convictions that were subsequently reduced from felonies to misdemeanors pursuant to section 1170.18, the court correctly denied his motion. View "California v. Carrea" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second degree robbery. Voters later enacted Proposition 47, which provided a mechanism by which a person who had completed his or her sentence for a conviction of a felony that was made a misdemeanor by the Act, could apply to the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction and have the felony offense designated as a misdemeanor. While defendant’s appeal was pending, the conviction underlying one of the prior prison term enhancements imposed in the current case was designated a misdemeanor under the Act. The court held in the published portion of the opinion that a previously imposed sentence enhanced by a Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison term is not altered by the granting of a Proposition 47 application reducing the felony that gave rise to that prior prison term to a misdemeanor. The Act does not so operate retroactively. The court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Ruff" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of grand theft auto and driving a vehicle without the owner's consent, appealed the denial of his petition for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Proposition 36), which amended Penal Code sections 667 and 1170.12 to reduce the punishment for some third strike offenses that are neither serious nor violent. The court concluded that defendant is eligible for resentencing as a matter of law. Under a properly applied “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, defendant's acquittal on the weapon possession charge, and the not-true finding on the allegation of being armed with a firearm, are preclusive of a determination that he is ineligible for resentencing consideration. The court remanded to determine whether, under a preponderance of the evidence standard, defendant would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety such that he should not be resentenced. View "People v. Arevalo" on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Triplett appealed the partial denial of his petition to recall his sentence and reduce certain felonies to misdemeanors pursuant to Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act. He argued his two convictions for second degree burglary should have been reduced to misdemeanors and the trial court erred in relying on facts outside the record and misunderstood the law. He further argued for the first time on appeal, that two of his one-year prior prison term enhancements should have been stricken. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded that in determining a defendant's eligibility for resentencing under the Act, the trial court could consider, in addition to the record of conviction, any facts the parties clearly agreed to, as long as such facts only augmented, and did not contradict or otherwise detract from, the record of conviction. Here, considering the additional facts agreed to by the parties, the Court found defendant established eligibility for resentencing as to one of his two second degree burglary convictions. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court's order declining to find eligibility as to this prior conviction, and remanded for additional proceedings. The Court declined to strike defendant's prior prison term enhancements, because the Act did not apply retroactively. View "California v. Triplett" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendants Jerry Ramirez and Catherine Rodriguez Villarreal of attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon. The jury found them both not guilty of active participation in the Surenos, an alleged criminal street gang, and the jury rejected gang sentencing enhancement allegations that the attempted murder and the assault were committed for the benefit of the Surenos. Defendants appealed their convictions, arguing the trial court erroneously denied their motion to set aside the gang participation charges and the gang enhancement allegations under Penal Code section 9951 and, as a result, irrelevant but highly inflammatory gang evidence was admitted which deprived them of their due process rights to a fair trial on the attempted murder and assault charges. The Court of Appeal reviewed the case and concluded that the preliminary hearing evidence did not support the gang participation charges or the gang enhancement allegations, so the 995 motion should have been granted. The Court also determined the gang evidence erroneously admitted at trial violated defendants’ due process rights and resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial. Therefore, the judgment was reversed. Any other arguments defendants made was mooted by this reversal. View "California v. Ramirez" on Justia Law