Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

On December 13, 2008, Jane stepped out of her car and encountered Salvador and three other men, who robbed and raped her. Salvador was convicted of 15 felonies with 98 enhancements, and sentenced to 425 years and four months to life in state prison. The court of appeal affirmed the conviction but remanded for resentencing. The court rejected arguments that the testimony of the prosecution’s expert on criminal street gangs was based on improper hearsay material, and that defendant’s cross-examination was unduly restricted and that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that Salvador’s possible intoxication was not relevant to the issue of whether he formed the specific intent required for conviction on kidnapping counts and two other charges where he was alleged to have aided and abetted others. The trial court erred when it imposed consecutive 10-year gang enhancements terms on the 10 counts carrying indeterminate life terms under Penal Code 667.61, the so-called “One Strike” law. View "People v. Salvador" on Justia Law

In August 2012 Nichols pleaded no contest to the felony offense of buying or receiving a stolen motor vehicle with a prior conviction for vehicle theft (Pen. Code, 496d, 666.5), and admitted the allegation that he had one prior violent or serious felony conviction that also qualified as a strike within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (sections 667(b)-(i), 1170.12). The trial court imposed a term of four years in the state prison. In November 2014 defendant filed a petition for habeas corpus, which the trial court treated as a petition for resentencing under section 1170.18(a) (Proposition 47), the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act . The trial court denied the petition on the ground that section 1170.18 does not apply to a felony conviction for buying or receiving a stolen motor vehicle in violation of section 496d and, therefore, resentencing defendant as a misdemeanant was not authorized by Proposition 47. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that Proposition 47 would not apply, even if the actual value of the stolen motor vehicle was $950 or less. View "People v. Nichols" on Justia Law

Laura Valenzuela was convicted of carjacking, reckless evasion of a peace officer, and possession of methamphetamine. Valenzuela waived a jury trial on two alleged prison priors. The trial court found one alleged prison prior true and the other not true. The court sentenced Valenzuela to a total term of six years eight months in prison, consisting of the middle term of five years on count 1, eight months (one-third the middle term) on count 2, one year for the prison prior conviction, and the middle term of two years, concurrent, on count 3. On appeal, Valenzuela argued that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to ask her whether she had a prior conviction for reckless evasion. Valenzuela also asserts that Proposition 47 required the Court of Appeal to reduce count 3 to a misdemeanor and strike the one-year sentence enhancement imposed for her prison prior. After review, the Court rejected Valenzuela's contentions and affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Valenzuela" on Justia Law

Mark, then age 14, was being escorted to the office at his high school in connection with a fight during the lunch period. When a campus supervisor reported that she saw a suspicious bulge near Mark’s waistband, an officer pat searched him and retrieved a folding pocket knife with a blade two and three-fourths inches long. A search of Mark’s backpack revealed a canister of pepper spray, which is considered contraband at the school. Mark stated that he carried the items for self defense. Mark was arrested, and the district attorney filed a wardship petition under Welfare and Institutions Code 602(a). The matter was referred to the probation department for consideration of informal supervision pursuant to section 654.2. The juvenile court received the probation department’s report, which concluded that Mark was suitable for informal supervision, even though his alleged violation made him presumptively ineligible under section 654.3. Mark unsuccessfully argued that informal supervision was appropriate because he had a stable family. Mark later admitted the allegations in the petition. The juvenile court imposed conditions of probation, including a requirement that he submit to warrantless searches of his “electronics including passwords” The court of appeal affirmed, but modified to strike the electronics search condition. View "In re Mark C." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second degree robbery of his wife (a cell phone), and of misdemeanor battery against her, a lesser included offense of the charged corporal injury to a spouse. On appeal, defendant principally contends that when a robbery involves the taking of community property, the charged spouse cannot be guilty if the taking was committed with the intent only to temporarily, as opposed to permanently, deprive the other spouse of the property, because in such circumstances the charged spouse has not taken property not his or her own.The court held that properly understood, People v. Llamas compels the conclusion that one spouse can be convicted of robbing the other of community property on a temporary taking theory, that the principles of separate and community property are immaterial to a robbery prosecution, and that instructions on those principles are unwarranted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Aguilera" on Justia Law

Defendant filed a petition for recall of sentence pursuant to Penal Code 1170.126, subd. (b). At issue is the requirement that the inmate be serving an indeterminate life term “for a conviction of a felony or felonies that are not defined as serious and/or violent felonies by subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 or subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7.” The court held that, for purposes of determining whether an inmate is ineligible for resentencing under section 1170.126, subdivision (e)(1), “serious bodily injury,” as that term is used in section 243, subdivision (d) and defined in section 243, subdivision (f)(4), is the equivalent of “great bodily injury,” as that phrase is used in section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8). Accordingly, a person serving an indeterminate life term as a third strike offender for a violation of section 243, subdivision (d), when he or she personally inflicted serious bodily injury, is ineligible for resentencing under section 1170.126. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment, reaching the same conclusion in denying the petition for recall of sentence. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death, sought discovery from the office of the Los Angeles District Attorney pursuant to Penal Code section 1054.9. In this case, petitioner seeks a writ of mandate vacating the trial court's order requiring petitioner to pay $2,560.53 pursuant to 1054.9, subdivision (d), as reimbursement for not only the cost of copying documents onto electronic media, but also for the time spent by a staff paralegal examining the records in preparation for production. At issue is the meaning of the phrase “actual costs of examination or copying” in section 1054.9, subdivision (d). The court concluded that where the production of paper or electronic discovery is at issue, a defendant seeking postconviction discovery pursuant to section 1054.9 need not reimburse the agency providing the discovery for costs related to examination and preparation of documents for production. However, “actual costs” does include the labor cost of the employee who actually copies items or transfers them to electronic media, a proportional share of equipment costs, and the cost of the copies, such as the ink, paper, or compact disc. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for the writ of mandate. View "Rubio v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Defendant David Ewing, Jr. and three others were involved in a drug deal gone bad: the victim was shot but survived, and defendant and his cohorts were caught trying to escape. Defendant was convicted of multiple offenses and various enhancements, including, including that he shot at an occupied vehicle for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang. On appeal, defendant argued insufficient evidence supported the gang enhancement and that the State's gang expert improperly testified that defendant committed the crimes in order to promote or further a criminal street gang. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Ewing" on Justia Law

Police responded to a call that the body of a male, later identified as Osby, had been found in the bushes of the Vallejo Masonic Lodge. Neighbors had heard a gunshot the night before, some time between 11:30 p.m. and 12:30 a.m. Osby’s hands were tied and bound with duct tape behind his back, a bloodied blindfold covered his eyes, and he had a gunshot wound to his head. A pathologist concluded the cause of death was “gunshot wound to the head, and blunt force trauma to the torso.” Another pathologist testified Osby died of the gunshot wound to the head. The incident precipitating Osby’s death was the theft of a PlayStation III and a computer from defendant and her brother, Bigoski. The court of appeal affirmed defendant’s conviction for first-degree​ murder and torture as supported by substantial evidence. While there was instructional error due to a conflict in the language of the standard CALCRIM instructions where a kidnapping with intent to kill special circumstance finding is sought under Penal Code 190.2(a)(17)(M), the error was harmless because the jury found true the special circumstance that the murder was intentional and involved torture under section 190.2(a)(18). View "People v. Odom" on Justia Law

Defendant had prior “strike” convictions: two 1992 residential burglaries and a 1996 robbery, involving “entering a residence, brandishing knives and demanding money.” Defendant also had three other felony convictions and 13 misdemeanor convictions before his 2001 conviction. He pleaded guilty to grand theft and admitted the strike and prison prior allegations in exchange for dismissal of the robbery count and the prior serious felony conviction allegations. Defendant admitted to a substance abuse problem. He had been deported several times. The court struck the prison priors and sentenced defendant to prison for 25 years to life. During his 11 years in prison, defendant has repeatedly disobeyed correctional officers and been involved in fights with other prisoners. The court of appeal affirmed denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code 1170.126.1 Although defendant was “eligible” for resentencing, the court exercised its discretion because resentencing “would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” The court of appeal rejected arguments that the court erroneously placed the burden of proof on the defendant; equal protection precluded the court from denying resentencing; section 1170.126 establishes a presumption favoring resentencing; and that defendant was entitled to a jury trial with a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof. View "People v. Garcia" on Justia Law