Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Clayton Perkins was charged with one felony count of receiving stolen property, three felony counts of grand theft of a firearm, two felony counts of possession of methamphetamine for sale, two felony counts of burglary, three misdemeanor counts of resisting a peace officer, and one misdemeanor count of using a controlled substance. After a jury found defendant guilty on all counts, he admitted to a prison prior, a serious felony prior, and a serious or violent prior, and the trial court imposed an aggregate term of 20 years 8 months in state prison. The trial court sentenced defendant to eight months in state prison on the receiving stolen property count, running consecutively to the sentences imposed on the burglary and possession of methamphetamine for sale counts. The trial court sentenced defendant to two years for each grand theft of a firearm count and stayed those sentences under section 654 because they arose out of the same events as the principal first degree burglary offense. Defendant appealed his conviction, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. California voters later passed Proposition 47, which converted receipt of stolen property and grand theft of a firearm into misdemeanors where the value of the stolen property does not exceed $950. Defendant filed a form to request resentencing, but the form mistakenly excluded the option of petitioning for resentencing grand theft offenses. As a result, and contrary to his intention, Perkins’s petition asked for resentencing on the receiving stolen property conviction alone. Defendant’s petition stated the requirements for eligibility for resentencing on that conviction, but attached no evidence, included no declaration, and provided no record citations to support the factual assertion that the stolen property did not exceed $950 in value. The superior court denied the petition without holding a hearing on the ground that the value of the stolen property exceeded $950. The order did not mention the convictions for grand theft of firearms. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the superior court erred in denying his petition for resentencing on the receipt of stolen property conviction because its finding that the value of the stolen property exceeded $950 was not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the superior court erred in failing to consider the petition for resentencing on defendant’s three convictions for grand theft of a firearm. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order denying the petition for resentencing on the receiving stolen property conviction because defendant did not carry his burden to submit evidence of the value of the stolen property. The Court did not reach the putative petition for resentencing on the grand theft of firearms convictions because defendant did not properly request resentencing on those convictions. The Court concluded, however, that defendant could file new petitions on his convictions for both the receipt of stolen property offense and the theft of firearms offenses. View "California v. Perkins" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Gloria Ramos guilty of multiple crimes, including transportation of heroin, and possession of methamphetamine for sale, both with various firearm enhancements. The court granted probation and ordered defendant to serve 365 days in jail. Defendant argued on appeal of her convictions that her transportation of heroin conviction should have been reversed, and not retried, in light of a recent amendment to Health & Saf. Code section 11352 that made transportation for sale (i.e., non-personal use) an element of the charge. The State conceded the amendment applied, but argued the conviction should nevertheless be affirmed under the harmless error standard of review. Alternatively, the State contended retrial on the transportation of heroin charge was not barred by the double jeopardy clause. Defendant also contends her possession of methamphetamine for sale conviction must be reversed because there is insufficient evidence to prove she harbored any intent to personally sell the methamphetamine. The People disagree and argue there is sufficient evidence defendant possessed the methamphetamine with the intent to sell it. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the transportation of heroin conviction should have been reversed and remanded for further proceedings, but there was substantial evidence defendant possessed the methamphetamine with the requisite intent to sell it, so that conviction was affirmed. View "California v. Ramos" on Justia Law

The State appealed a trial court order sustaining a demurrer to the felony complaint in this case, which contended (as relevant), the complaint failed to provide sufficient notice of its charges in violation of Penal Code sections 950 and 952. The State maintained they met applicable pleading requirements. According to the People, Defendants Sabas Trujillo, Lucia Trujillo, Richard (Rick) Trujillo, Laura Fitzpatrick, and Alex Trujillo (collectively Defendants), owned or were current or former employees of three entities: United Paving, Prestige Striping, and Yeguada Trujillo, Inc. Following earlier pleading challenges, the State filed a 20-count first amended felony complaint in January 2015, alleging Defendants submitted payroll documents that underreported employee wages over a period of years to, among others, two insurance companies, the State Compensation Insurance Fund, and the Employment Development Department, for purposes of reducing insurance premiums and taxes. For each count relating to insurance and tax fraud, the State identified a particular defendant or defendants, business, the statutory provision at issue, the relevant time period (which, according to the State, generally corresponded to an insurance policy term), and the alleged victim. Defendants demurred on statute of limitations grounds, and for failure to conform to the pleading provisions the applicable statutes, contending counts were "vague and uncertain as to the charges alleged." After review of this matter, the Court of Appeal agreed with the State that it met the applicable pleading requirements, and reversed the trial court. View "California v. Trujillo" on Justia Law

Ernest Orozco pled guilty to one count of unlawfully driving a vehicle of another without permission, and one count of receiving a stolen vehicle. After Orozco entered his guilty plea, California voters passed Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act of 2014. Orozco filed a petition under Proposition 47 to reduce the felonies to misdemeanors. The trial court denied Orozco's petition, finding Proposition 47 did not apply to section 496d and Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), and sentenced him to one year in prison with mandatory supervision for three years after his release. The trial court stayed the sentence for Orozco's section 496d violation under section 654. Orozco timely appealed the order, arguing the trial court erred in denying his petition to reduce both his felony convictions to misdemeanors under Proposition 47. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Orozco" on Justia Law

Deandre Ellison was shot to death as he pulled into his driveway. Four other men, including Latrele Neal, were also in Ellison’s car. Before the car came to a stop in the driveway, an SUV driven by defendant Jesse Cornejo slowly drove past Ellison’s house; the SUV’s front and backseat passengers, Adam Cornejo and Isaac Vasquez, opened fire on Ellison’s car. Neal managed to return fire with Ellison’s gun before the SUV drove away. After crashing the SUV while being pursued by law enforcement, Adam, Jesse, and Isaac were taken into custody a short time later. Isaac was 16 years old with a developmental disability; Adam and Jesse were 17 and 18 years old, respectively. Adam, Jesse, and Isaac were tried together and convicted by jury of one count of second-degree murder, four counts of attempted murder and one count of shooting at an inhabited dwelling. Jesse was also convicted of one count of driving in willful or wanton disregard for safety while fleeing from a pursuing peace officer. With respect to the murder, the jury found the offense was committed by means of shooting a firearm from a motor vehicle at another person outside the vehicle with the intent to inflict great bodily injury. The jury also found the crimes were committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members. The trial court sentenced Adam and Isaac to serve an aggregate indeterminate prison term of 120 years to life plus a consecutive determinate term of 9 years 4 months. Jesse was sentenced to serve the same indeterminate term of 120 years to life plus a consecutive determinate term of 10 years. All defendants appealed. Having reviewed the parties' briefing, the Court of Appeal concluded the gang enhancement findings should have been reversed as to all defendants. Also, it was error to enhance defendants' sentences based on vicarious firearm enhancements. The Court agreed with the Eighth Amendment challenge brought by both Adam and Isaac: the record was unclear as to whether the trial court properly took into consideration all mitigating circumstances attendant in each juvenile offender’s life, including but not limited to his chronological age at the time of the crime and his physical and mental development, before imposing a functionally equivalent LWOP sentence. "In light of the importance of this constitutional right, and uncertainty as to whether the trial court appropriately took such mitigating circumstances into account, we conclude the appropriate remedy is to remand for a new sentencing hearing as to Adam and Isaac." The Court affirmed in all other respects and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "California v. Cornejo" on Justia Law

Penal Code section 459.5 was among the provisions added by Proposition 47. It reduces certain second degree burglaries to misdemeanors by defining them as “shoplifting,” that is, “entering a commercial establishment with the intent to commit larceny while that establishment is open during regular business hours, where the value of the property that is taken or intended to be taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950).” In this case, the trial court refused to reduce defendant’s second degree burglary conviction to a misdemeanor because she entered a check cashing establishment with the intent to use a forged check for $148, not to commit what the trial court commonly understood as shoplifting. The court concluded that defendant may qualify for resentencing because plaintiff has not disputed that defendant entered the check cashing establishment with the intent to commit theft by false pretenses. There is no dispute that defendant’s second degree burglary involved less than $950, so she would be entitled to resentencing unless the trial court determines in its discretion that resentencing defendant would “pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "People v. Vargas" on Justia Law

Defendant Todd White appealed an order denying his petition for recall of his "Third Strike" indeterminate life sentence. In 1996, defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon. He was also found to have been previously convicted of two serious felonies and to have served two prior prison terms. For this "third strike," he was sentenced to a term of 27 years to life in prison. Defendant contends the trial court erred in determining the record of his underlying conviction demonstrated he was “armed” during the commission of the offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm because (1) the case it relied upon, "California v. White," (223 Cal.App.4th 512 (2014)), was inapposite; and (2) the disqualifying factor of being “armed” during the commission of the offense for which the indeterminate life sentence was imposed cannot apply to a mere possessory offense. In affirming the sentence, the Court of Appeal concluded that defendant attempted to distinguish White on the basis the evidence in that case “inexorably established” the defendant actually, rather than constructively, possessed the gun in question because he was observed throwing the gun away. Here, the police did not observe defendant discard his gun into the trash can where it was later found. But it was nonetheless clear defendant’s conviction was based on either the inference he discarded the gun into the trash can on that occasion or he had placed it there earlier. Either way, his possession amounts to being armed. Consequently, White was not materially distinguishable. View "California v. White" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of misdemeanor false imprisonment and felony resisting an executive officer. Prior to the amendments resulting from the Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011, section 1202.45 required imposition and stay of a parole revocation restitution fine on defendants sentenced to prison. Section 1202.45 has since been amended to provide for parole, post-release community supervision or mandatory supervision revocation restitution fines. In the published portion of the opinion, the court concluded that no type of section 1202.45, subdivisions (a) and (b) revocation restitution fine could have been imposed in this case and the court modified the judgment. The court affirmed the judgment as modified. View "People v. Butler" on Justia Law

In 2002, Thurston was convicted of felony driving in disregard for safety of persons or property while fleeing from a police officer, with three prior strike convictions for robberies in 1990 and 1984, and two prison priors for the 1990 robbery and a 1999 violation of Vehicle Code section 2800. He was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison for the 2002 conviction plus two consecutive one-year terms for the prison priors. He appealed denial of his request for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act. The appeal court affirmed the denial, rejecting his arguments that the trial court erred in finding he was not eligible for resentencing due to a 1975 juvenile adjudication of rape because that adjudication was not pleaded and proved in the third strike case; a prior juvenile conviction is not a “prior conviction” for purposes of determining eligibility for resentencing; the record of the juvenile adjudication was not properly before the court; the court’s statement that it would not resentence Thurston even if he was eligible for resentencing should be disregarded; and the evidence did not support the court’s statement that, if he was eligible, it would find that resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety. View "People v. Thurston" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of multiple charges related to his sexual abuse of 15 children over nearly 30 years: continuous sexual abuse, lewd act on a child, child molestation, forgery, and violating a court order. Defendant raised numerous issues on appeal. The court reversed the convictions for counts 1, 5, and 10 for insufficient evidence, and count 14 for violating the Ex Post Facto Clause, concluding that these counts may not be retried; reversed the convictions for counts 6 through 9 for failure to instruct on an element of the offense, and remanded for retrial; vacated the indeterminate sentences imposed for counts 2 and 12, and remanded for resentencing without application of the One Strike Law; reversed the noneconomic restitution awards for all counts, and remanded with directions to conduct a restitution hearing for counts 15, 23, and 24 only; and directed the trial court, upon resentencing, to recalculate defendant’s custody credit to reflect no more than 15 percent local conduct credit. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Valenti" on Justia Law