Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) because she participated in the murder of a 13-year-old when she was 16-years-old. Based on the intervening decision in Miller v. Alabama, and with the agreement of the prosecution, the trial court vacated the LWOP sentence and conducted a new sentencing hearing in 2015. The trial court ruled inadmissible defendant's proffered evidence of her rehabilitative conduct in prison and again sentenced defendant to LWOP. The court concluded that the trial court erred in excluding defendant's evidence of rehabilitation in prison where the state Supreme Court in People v. Gutierrez held that, under Miller, “a sentencing court must consider any evidence or other information in the record bearing on ‘the possibility of rehabilitation’” before imposing an LWOP sentence on a juvenile who kills. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for resentencing. View "People v. Lozano" on Justia Law

Johnson, Thornton, Schnebly, and Crocker emerged from a car that sped into a Lake Mendocino campsite. Crocker, wearing a bandana over his face, ran toward the campsite and shouted for everybody to get on the ground. Litteral was shot to death; Haggett was shot and seriously wounded. A fingerprint lifted from the shotgun belonged to Crocker. Johnson and Thornton were tried for: murder, attempted murder, and attempted kidnapping. The murder charge was based on two theories: first-degree felony murder in connection with attempted robbery or attempted kidnapping, and second-degree murder based on aiding and abetting another who acted with malice aforethought. Both were convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder, and were acquitted of attempted kidnapping. The California Supreme Court transferred the case back to the appeal court with directions to reconsider the matter in light of its 2015 Banks decision, focusing on implied malice as a theory underlying the murder convictions. The court concluded that Banks does not apply and reinstated its earlier decision, that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it did not have to unanimously agree on a theory of murder where one theory of murder was first-degree murder and the other theory was second-degree murder and the error was prejudicial. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 years old. Defendant's conviction was based in part on expert testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS). In the published portion of the court's opinion, the court held that the trail court had no sua sponte duty to give the pattern jury instruction explaining the limited purpose of expert testimony on the CSAAS. The instruction need only be given if requested. The court rejected defendant's remaining claims and affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Mateo" on Justia Law

Defendants Centeno, Leon, and Palofox received life sentences for their role in a conspiracy arising from a series of home invasion robberies. In the published portion of the court's opinion, the court applied the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v. Elizalde to resolve challenges to evidence of gang affiliation admissions made by Centeno and defendants' co-conspirators when they were booked into jail. The court further held that trial courts have discretion under Penal Code section 669 to impose concurrent sentences for gang-related offenses punishable under the alternate penalty provisions of Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4). Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "People v. Leon" on Justia Law

In 1996, real party in interest Leonard Rangel, was convicted of felon in possession and two misdemeanors. As a “third striker,” he received an indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life. In 2012 the electorate, by initiative measure (Proposition 36), amended Penal Code section 667 so that many of those defendants who have two prior strikes but whose current conviction is not for a “serious and/or violent felony” are subject only to a doubled base term sentence rather than the minimum 25-to-life terms reserved for more serious current violators. At the same time, the electorate added section 1170.126 as a mechanism by which inmates sentenced as “third strikers” under the old law could seek to be resentenced under the new provisions, if they would have been subject only to the lesser term had they been sentenced under the new law and met specified other requirements. In November 2012, Rangel filed such a request, which the court granted in 2014. Rangel was resentenced to the upper term of three years for the weapons offense, doubled to six years, plus three additional prior prison term enhancements for a total of nine years. The State challenged the trial court’s failure to place Rangel under community supervision was based on the theory that such supervision was by statute mandatory, (which was not disputed) to the extent that parole was also mandatory. The State also pointed out that Penal Code section 2900.5, subdivision (a) did not include the term of community supervision as one which may be reduced by excess credits, although it does expressly include the period of parole. Rangel casted the problem in terms of a violation of the equal protection clause. He argued that he was similarly situated with those released from prison who are subject to parole, and that there was no rational basis for applying excess credits to a parole term but not a community supervision term. Finding no error with the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal agreed and denied the State's challenge to Rangel's sentence. View "California v. Superior Court (Rangel)" on Justia Law

In 2007, Corona was shot to death during an attempt to kill a cast-out gang member. After three mistrials in which juries deadlocked, Verducci was convicted of first degree murder of Corona (Pen. Code, 187(a)). The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting due process arguments. Fundamental fairness did not require dismissal of the charges after the mistrials. The trial court properly allowed “hearsay” testimony concerning a phone call. View "People v. Verducci" on Justia Law

During a custodial interrogation of murder suspect Fabian Perez, a police sergeant told Perez that if he "[told] the truth" and was "honest," then, "we are not gonna charge you with anything." The sergeant continued, telling Perez that he was either a "suspect that we are gonna prosecute," or a "witness," and added that Perez had "witnessed something terrible that somebody did." The sergeant followed up this statement by telling Perez that if he was honest and told the truth during the interview, "[Y]ou'll have your life, maybe you'll go into the Marines . . . and you'll chalk this up to a very scary time in your life." Immediately thereafter, Perez stated that he had "some information" and, shortly after that, confessed his involvement in a robbery during which Perez's accomplice killed the victim. The People charged Perez with first degree murder and alleged that the murder had been committed in the course of a robbery. A jury found him guilty and sentenced Perez to life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, among other claims, Perez argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement officers. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that Perez's statements were clearly motivated by a promise of leniency, rendering the statements involuntary, and that the trial court thus erred in denying Perez's motion to suppress the statements. View "California v. Perez" on Justia Law

When defendant was 15 years old, he was shot by a deputy in the chest after plaintiff brandished a replica of a semiautomatic pistol. Plaintiff filed suit against deputies and the County, alleging a violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. A jury returned a partial verdict in favor of plaintiff and awarded him approximately $1.1 million in compensatory damages, as well as attorney fees. The County appealed. The court agreed with the County that the trial court erred by concluding that plaintiff's section 1983 claim was not barred by Heck v. Humphrey. In this case the court found that there was an underlying conviction and/or sentence relating to plaintiff’s section 1983 claim for the purposes of the Heck inquiry; a judgment in favor of plaintiffs in the section 1983 action would necessarily imply that the prior conviction or sentence was invalid; and plaintiff's prior conviction or sentence was not invalidated or terminated in his favor. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and order of attorney fees. View "Fetters v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In 2012, police stopped defendant while he was driving a car that had been reported stolen. The front license plate was missing, and the rear license plate number did not match the registered number. The stereo was missing. Police found pliers on the floor of the car; defendant had a shaved key in his sweater. When police asked for his driver’s license, defendant told them it had been suspended. He pleaded guilty to vehicle theft, possession of burglary tools, and driving with a suspended license. He had a prior felony conviction and had served two prior prison terms. The court sentenced defendant to four years in prison and, in 2015, denied his petition for resentencing under Proposition 47. The court found that a conviction for theft of a car under Vehicle Code section 10851 did not meet Proposition 47’s eligibility criteria as a matter of law. The court of appeal affirmed. While a defendant convicted under Section 10851 may be eligible for Proposition 47 resentencing if he can show the offense qualifies as a petty theft under Section 490.2, this defendant did not satisfy his burden to prove that he committed theft of a vehicle valued at $950 or less. View "People v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed an order denying a post-judgment motion to vacate her conviction by guilty plea to first degree residential burglary, claiming that the trial court failed to properly advise her of the immigration consequences of the conviction when the change of plea was entered. The court concluded that the appeal was without merit, even bordering on being frivolous. In this case, given defendant's criminal history, the record made when she entered into the negotiated disposition, and the fact that she voluntarily returned to Mexico to avoid federal criminal prosecution in 2009, the showing of unawareness of deportation seems as disingenuous to the court as it must have been to the trial court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Araujo" on Justia Law