Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a citizen of Eritrea, has been a lawful U.S. permanent resident since 1981. In 1988, police witnessed a hand-to-hand exchange involving defendant. As the men ran away, an officer saw defendant reach into his waistband and drop a loaded handgun and throw a plastic baggie that contained rocks of cocaine base, weighing a total of 2.34 grams. An officer found a glass pipe with cocaine residue on top of defendant’s wallet, which did not contain a large amount of cash. Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine base for sale and admitted the firearm allegation. He was not advised of the immigration consequences. In 1992, defendant admitted violating probation by failing to maintain contact with his probation officer and testing positive for cocaine. In 2004, defendant returned to the U.S. after an overseas trip and was “not admitted” based on the conviction, but was allowed to remain in the U.S. Defendant was detained in 2013. Defendant filed an unsuccessful Penal Code 1016.5 motion to vacate the convictions and to withdraw his pleas. The court found that he “had failed to show prejudice.” The court of appeal remanded for determination of whether defendant made the required showing of reasonable diligence. View "People v. Asghedom" on Justia Law

Alejandro, a minor, admitted to being an accessory to illegal drug sales and was found to be a ward of the court. In addition to typical conditions of probation, the juvenile court imposed a condition requiring him to submit to warrantless searches of his electronic devices and his use of social media. The court of appeal modified that condition. The condition, while valid, is overbroad as imposed. Any probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition.The juvenile court should limit searches to sources of electronic information reasonably likely to reveal whether the minor is boasting about his drug use or otherwise involved with drugs, such as text and voicemail messages, photographs, e-mails, and social media accounts, so that data related to matters such as medical care and personal finances are not subject to search. View "In re Alejandro R." on Justia Law

In January 2015, pro se defendant Pharaoh Haywood filed a petition pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.181 to redesignate his 1996 felony conviction for unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle to a misdemeanor. He waived personal appearance if the matter was not contested. The trial court, acting ex parte, appointed a public defender, then summarily denied the petition in a minute order “due to ineligibility based due to: [c]urrent [sic] conviction(s).” Defendant appealed, arguing that even if unlawful taking/driving of a vehicle was not expressly included among the offenses “in accordance with” which he can be resentenced to a misdemeanor, it can constitute a “theft conviction,” and thus the Court of Appeal should construe section 1170.18 as including it because of the purpose of the initiative enacting it. Defendant contended the trial court erred as a result in summarily denying his petition. After review, the Court of Appeal rejected this effort to have it "engage in judicial legislation." The Court therefore affirmed the order denying the redesignation petition. View "California v. Haywood" on Justia Law

In March 2013, when the minor (K.R.) was 13 years old, a delinquency petition was filed alleging he had committed the crimes of robbery, criminal threats, and brandishing a knife. In August 2013, Judge James Arguelles presided over a jurisdictional hearing on the petition in Department 97 and found the allegations true. At a disposition hearing in Department 97 in September, Judge Arguelles granted the minor probation with a number of conditions, including 150 days of confinement. In April 2015, the minor’s probation officer filed a petition alleging the minor had violated his probation by remaining away from his home overnight without parental permission; failing to keep his probation officer informed of his address and telephone number; using marijuana; and committing the crimes of having marijuana on a school campus, falsely identifying himself to a law enforcement officer, and being a disruptive presence on a school campus. A week later, the People filed a petition alleging the minor had violated his probation by committing the crimes of brandishing a firearm and brandishing a replica firearm. The parties appeared before Judge Jack Sapunor in Department 97 for a settlement conference. The minor’s attorney told the court the minor was prepared to admit the allegation in the first petition that he remained away from his home overnight without parental permission and the allegation in the second petition that he brandished a replica firearm. Judge Sapunor was a “regular visiting judge” in juvenile court. The settlement conference was continued, and when it resumed, Judge James Arguelles presided. He noted that there was “a minute order saying that May 28th the minor admitted a violation of probation” and “[a]pparently, probation is recommending that [the minor] just be shipped off to Vegas to live with his mother.” Judge Arguelles disagreed with that proposal and stated that his intention was “probably to send him to DJJ [Department of Juvenile Justice]." The matter was continued again, and upon the resumption of the conference, the minor’s attorney objected to Judge Arguelles presiding over the disposition because “we have not affirmatively asserted an Arbuckle waiver in this case.” She requested that the matter be set for hearing in front of Judge Sapunor. Judge Arguelles reiterated his disagreement with the proposed disposition, set a schedule for the parties to brief the application of Arbuckle, and continued the matter to July 2. On June 25, the minor commenced the proceeding underlying this appeal, essentially requesting that the Court of Appeal order Judge Arguelles to either: (1) impose the disposition the parties had agreed upon in front of Judge Sapunor or (2) set the case for a disposition hearing in front of Judge Sapunor. The Court of Appeal denied the minor's petition for a writ of mandate: "[w]hile the minor certainly had a reasonable expectation that he would receive the agreed-upon disposition that was part of the plea agreement approved by Judge Sapunor, and the refusal by Judge James P. Arguelles to impose that disposition certainly entitles the minor to withdraw his negotiated plea, the minor has failed to show that he entered into the plea agreement in expectation of and reliance upon Judge Sapunor conducting the disposition hearing. Thus, the minor is not entitled to have the disposition hearing set in front of Judge Sapunor, nor is he entitled to an order requiring Judge Arguelles to impose the agreed-upon disposition." View "K.R. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Mark Goode guilty of: burglary (count 1) for opening a metal storm door on a residence; and attempted burglary (count 2) for jiggling a window on the same residence a few seconds later. The trial court sentenced defendant to 16 months in prison for the burglary at the front door and to a consecutive eight months for the attempted burglary at the window, finding that defendant had “[t]wo separate intents to enter and burgle [the victim’s] home.” On appeal, defendant argued his conviction for burglary should be reversed because, in his view, “[t]he evidence was insufficient to establish [he] actually opened the metal door,” and, in any event, “there was zero evidence . . . that he actually put some part of his body on the interior side of that door.” He further argued that he could not be separately punished for the burglary at the front door and the attempted burglary at the window because the evidence showed only a single, indivisible intent: to enter the victim’s residence to commit a theft. After review, the Court of Appeal disagreed with defendant that the evidence was insufficient to prove he committed a completed burglary at the front door, but agreed that he could not be separately punished for burglarizing the victim’s home at the front door and then, only a few seconds later, attempting to burglarize the home through a nearby window. Accordingly, the Court modified the judgment to stay an eight-month term on defendant’s conviction of attempted burglary at the window (count 2) pursuant to Penal Code1 section 654 and will affirmed the judgment as modified. View "California v. Goode" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the denial of his resentencing petition under Penal Code section 1170.18, contending that he is entitled to resentencing because his grand theft conviction for violating section 484e, subdivision (d) has now been reclassified as a misdemeanor under section 490.2, subdivision (a) (added by Proposition 47). The court agreed, concluding that defendant is eligible for resentencing under section 1170.18 because, under Proposition 47, his conviction has been reclassified as a misdemeanor. The court also concluded that remand is required because the trial court did not reach the issue of whether resentencing defendant would pose an unreasonable risk of danger pursuant to section 1170.18, subdivision (b). Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "People v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second degree murder in connection with a vehicular death. At defendant's first trial, he was convicted of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, and the jury deadlocked on the charge of second degree murder. At defendant's second trial for second degree murder, the trial court refused to advise the jury that defendant had been convicted of gross vehicular manslaughter, a lesser related offense, in his first trial. In the published portion of the court's opinion, the court held that the trial court did not err in refusing to give that advisement. Even if the trial court erred in refusing to advise the jury that defendant had been convicted of gross vehicular manslaughter in the first trial, the error was harmless under the standard in either People v. Watson or Chapman v. California. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Hicks" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a post conviction order denying his petition for resentencing as a second-strike offender under Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, Pen. Code, 1170.126. The court concluded that the trial court properly found that defendant was ineligible for resentencing based on preliminary hearing testimony. In this case, the trial court properly looked at the circumstances of this crime; it did not draw conclusions based on other offenses. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Estrada" on Justia Law

On November 4, 2014, California voters approved Proposition 47, The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act; it went into effect the following day. Penal Code section 1170.18 was added and provided that a person currently serving a sentence for a felony conviction, whether by trial or plea, who would have been guilty only of a misdemeanor had Proposition 47 been in effect at the time the plea was entered, or at the time of trial, may petition for a recall of the sentence before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case to request resentencing. Prior to the passage of Proposition 47, defendant entered a guilty plea to a felony violation of Vehicle Code section 10851 for unlawfully driving and taking a 2002 Chevy Suburban. Defendant filed a petition to recall his sentence, arguing that his conviction for violating Vehicle Code section 10851 should be reduced to a misdemeanor violation of petty theft under Penal Code section 490.2. The trial court denied the petition on the ground that all Vehicle Code section 10851 convictions were not eligible for resentencing under Proposition 47. Defendant argued on appeal to the Court of Appeal that: (1) Penal Code section 1170.18 should have been broadly interpreted to include violations of Vehicle Code section 10851; (2) the trial court should have provided the parties an opportunity to litigate the value of the loss to the victim prior to ruling on his Petition to determine if the offense committed was petty theft (loss to the victim was less than $950) within the meaning of Penal Code section 490.2; (3) the People had the burden of proving at the hearing on the Petition that the value of the vehicle taken exceeded $950; (4) the valuation of the loss for a temporary taking of an automobile should be that amount of compensation to make the victim whole, not the market value of the automobile; and (5) equal protection requires that offenses under Vehicle Code section 10851 be treated like violations of Penal Code section 487, subdivision (d)(1), and be reduced to misdemeanors. Finding none of these arguments availing, the Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of the Petition. View "California v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Marks appealed an order denying his petition for recall and reduction of sentence under Penal Code section 1170.18 and Proposition 47. Defendant contended that his prior convictions for violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350 were eligible for resentencing, and the Court of Appeal should construe his petition as requesting such relief. After review of defendant's arguments on appeal, the Court found that the relief defendant sought was not resentencing for his former convictions, but reclassification of those convictions as misdemeanors. Section 1170.18 provided no procedure for reclassifying prior offenses through a petition for resentencing on a current conviction. Rather, as to the prior offenses, defendant was required to file a petition under section 1170.18, subdivision (f), in the court in which he suffered those convictions. The complaint here showed shows that defendant was convicted of his Health and Safety Code section 11350 offenses in the County of Los Angeles in 1988, 1997, and 1998. Thus, to have those offenses redesignated as misdemeanors, defendant was required to file his petition “before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction,” the Superior Court for Los Angeles County. Finding, therefore, no reversible error in the denial of his petition for recall and reduction of sentence, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Marks" on Justia Law