Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A jury found defendant guilty of one count of pimping and one count of pandering. The court held a bench trial and found it to be true that defendant committed the offenses while out on bail. The court sentenced defendant to the midterm of four years on the pimping count, stayed imposition of the sentence on the pandering count, and imposed, but stayed, a two year on-bail enhancement. On appeal, defendant raised a single issue: that the court erred by permitting the People’s expert to testify that certain text messages sent from defendant to individuals other than the particular prostitute at issue were consistent with pimping activity. Defendant argued this was improper character evidence under Evidence Code section 1101. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the evidence was relevant to rebut the defense that the prostitute was merely defendant’s girlfriend (a nonpropensity basis for relevance) and thus affirmed. View "California v. Scally" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of committing lewd acts upon a child and was sentenced to prison. After he was released on parole, he committed multiple parole violations. Defendant was then arrested for failing to register as a sex offender. While his case was pending, he was committed to determine if he was competent to stand trial. Defendant ultimately was convicted and sentenced to state prison. Defendant subsequently challenged the Board of Parole's determination that defendant met the requirements for commitment for treatment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). The trial court granted defendant's motion for judgment, concluding that he could not be certified as an MDO because the Board did not obtain a timely MDO evaluation. The People appealed. The court reversed, concluding that the Board properly placed a hold on defendant's release from prison to allow time for an MDO evaluation. In this case, the Board's actions were consistent with its authority under Penal Code section 2963 and did not require a written order to detain. View "People v. Gerard" on Justia Law

Appellant Chase C. (a minor) was charged with resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer. An adjudication hearing was held, at which the juvenile court found the allegation against Chase to be true. The court adjudged Chase a ward of the court and placed him on formal probation for one year or until Chase's 18th birthday, whichever was longer. These proceedings were instituted over an incident in May 2014, when a San Diego Sheriff's Deputy was conducting a foot patrol through Turtle Park, in the Forest Ranch area of San Diego. The deputy was not in full uniform at the time, but was wearing either an external raid vest with "Sheriff" written on it, or a Sheriff shirt with patches. The deputy was approached by a group of middle school children, who told him that two high school aged children had tried to sell them drugs. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on a novel issue regarding whether Chase (once the deputy caught up with a group of teens matching the middle schoolers' descriptions) who allegedly urged his cohorts not to cooperate with a police investigation, rose to the level of a violation of Penal Code1 section 148. This case called for the Court to determine when a refusal to cooperate with police becomes unlawful interference with police activity under section 148. The Court concluded that refusal to cooperate only becomes criminal when it obstructs lawful police activity. Here, substantial evidence did not support the trial court's finding with regard to section 148(a)(1), and reversed. View "In re Chase C." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Leroy Burton III appealed his conviction on one count of first degree murder. Defendant was charged with the first degree murder of Ja’bari Jones and the personal use of a firearm causing death. The information also alleged that defendant had one prior strike conviction and had served three prior felony prison terms. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal rejected: Burton’s contentions that the evidence was insufficient to show that he deliberated and premeditated the killing; that the court erred in its instruction on premeditation and deliberation; and that trial counsel provided constitutionally deficient representation. In the published portion of the opinion, the Court rejected the contention, based on "Morales-Garcia v. Holder," (567 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2009)), that intimate partner battery, in violation of Penal Code section 273.5, was not categorically a crime of moral turpitude. The Court concluded that Burton’s two prior convictions for violation of that statute were properly admitted for impeachment purposes. View "California v. Burton" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the trial court's restitution order requiring him to pay the City $18,878.23 in restitution for 32 incidents of graffiti. The court affirmed the order, concluding that substantial evidence supports the restitution award and this case is distinguishable from Luis M. v. Superior Court. In Luis M., the California Supreme Court held that no factual nexus existed between the minor’s conduct and the juvenile court’s restitution order. In this case, the People presented evidence of defendant’s specific acts, and that evidence was considered in calculating the amount of restitution. In Luis M., the restitution order was based only on the average cost for graffiti remediation. The court also concluded that a reduction in investigative costs was reasonable. View "People v. Santori" on Justia Law

In early 1993, defendant, then 51 years old, was arrested for possession of methamphetamine; he was also found in possession of drug paraphernalia and a loaded firearm. While on bail in 1993, defendant fired a machine gun and injured a police officer, and the next day shot at an officer and a police dog. A jury found him not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) of two counts of attempted murder, two counts of assault on a custodial officer with great bodily injury, unlawful possession of a machine gun, and interfering with a dog being used by a police officer. Defendant’s adult criminal record also included molestation of his 10-year-old stepdaughter, three convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and carrying a concealed weapon. On July 11, 1994, defendant was committed to a state mental hospital. His maximum commitment date was April 5, 2014. When the State's petition to extend defendant's commitment to 2016, he appealed, arguing there was no substantial evidence: (1) that he had serious difficulty in controlling his behavior; (2) that he had a mental disease, defect, or disorder; and (3) that his mental disease, defect, or disorder created a substantial danger of physical harm to others. After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeal disagreed with these contentions and affirmed the extension. View "California v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant Tuyen Tran appealed a trial court’s denial of his motion to reduce his 2005 felony conviction for assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury to a misdemeanor. In 2005, a complaint charged defendant with shooting at an inhabited dwelling. He pled no contest to assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (a lesser related offense) and to being a misdemeanant in possession of a firearm. Defendant and Nho Dao got into an argument prior to shots being fired at Dao's home. Dao was not home at the time, but three of his brothers were. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and granted defendant formal probation. In 2009, defendant filed a motion to terminate probation early, to expunge his record, and to reduce his offense from a felony to misdemeanor. By the time of the hearing on the motions, defendant had successfully completed probation. The trial court denied the motions. Defendant argued on appeal to the Court of Appeal that: (1) the trial court violated his due process rights by considering facts that were not elements of the charged offense and were not proven at trial; (2) the plea agreement itself provided the court would declare the offense a misdemeanor and barred the court from considering the facts underlying the offense in a motion to reduce; (3) having performed satisfactorily on probation, he was entitled to all statutory rehabilitation, including having the offense declared a misdemeanor; and (4) the trial court implicitly promised defendant in 2009 that it would grant defendant’s next motion to reduce his felony to a misdemeanor. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded: (1) the trial court properly considered the facts underlying the conviction in deciding whether to reduce defendant’s felony conviction to a misdemeanor; (2) the plea agreement did not restrict the trial court’s discretion and did not bar the court from considering the facts underlying the offense in a motion to reduce; (3) defendant was not entitled to have his felony conviction declared a misdemeanor upon successful completion of probation; and (4) the trial court did not promise it would grant defendant’s next motion to reduce his felony to a misdemeanor. View "California v. Tran" on Justia Law

In 2012, petitioner Byron Mason went with his wife, his two children, his dog, and friends to the Shirttail Canyon swimming hole in Foresthill for a party. It was fire season, and numerous fires had started in the surrounding area. Mason lit and threw an aerial firework into the middle of the swimming hole where it initially floated, then exploded, throwing flares in all directions and up in the air. A spark landed on a dry, grassy edge of the cliff about 27 feet above the surface of the pool and ignited some brush. The fire spread quickly and soon expanded beyond control. By the time a fire suppression crew arrived the fire had burned some 500 acres. A firefighter suffered a fracture of his right forearm when a large boulder hit his arm. In all, 2,650 acres of grassland and forest were destroyed. Mason tearfully confessed to law enforcement. Mason was initially charged by complaint with arson, and the lesser offense of unlawfully causing a fire. The arson charges were dismissed at a preliminary hearing and Mason was held to answer on the lesser offense. The People did not file an information in the Superior Court; instead they convened a grand jury and obtained an indictment charging Mason with arson that caused great bodily injury and the burning of an inhabited structure. The grand jury was instructed with a modified version of the standard CALCRIM instructions for an arson that causes great bodily injury and for an arson that causes an inhabited structure to burn. The trial court denied Mason’s motion to set aside the indictment. Mason challenged a modification to the standard instruction, and the grand jury evidence and procedures, claiming in part that the jury should have been instructed on the lesser offense of unlawful burning, and that an indictment does not lie where a complaint is not dismissed and the defendant is held to answer on another charge. He argued that arson required an intent to burn a property, that when he set off the firework he was on an outing with his wife and children to a swimming hole, into which the firework was thrown and did not intend to cause a forest and grassland fire. He claimed that his conduct amounted at most to the lesser offense of unlawfully causing a fire. The Court of Appeal concluded this case turned on the culpable state for arson. Because the Court followed the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of “causes to be burned,” it affirmed the indictment on the ground the grand jury proceedings showed there was probable cause to believe that the natural and highly probable consequence of the act of igniting and throwing a large, unlawful, aerial firework into the swimming hole in the middle of a forest and grassland in extreme fire conditions would be the burning of the forest land. View "Mason v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Minor J.B. appealed a condition of probation that the trial court imposed after he was convicted of petty theft. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, J.B. argued the trial court unconstitutionally imposed a condition of probation that required him to permit searches of and disclose all passwords to his electronic devices and social media sites. Because there was no evidence connecting the juvenile’s electronic device or social media usage to his offense or to a risk of future criminal conduct, the Court of Appeal concluded the condition was unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court modified the judgment to strike this condition. View "In re J.B." on Justia Law

In 2013, after the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 went into effect, Defendant filed a petition for recall of sentence and request for resentencing under the Act. The Act created a postconviction release proceeding for third strike offenders serving indeterminate life sentences for crimes that are not serious or violent felonies. If such an inmate meets certain criteria, he will be resentenced as a second strike offender unless the court determines that such resentencing would pose “an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” The trial court denied Defendant’s recall and resentencing petition, concluding that Defendant would in fact be a danger to the community if resentenced. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court erred in its determination of current dangerousness because it based its determination on past, rather than current, facts and mere speculation. Remanded. View "People v. Esparza" on Justia Law