Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Gerardo Villasenor, a Sureno gang member, shot two rival gang members on two separate occasions. With respect to the first shooting, defendant was charged with one count of attempted murder (Count One) and one count of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (Count Two). With respect to the second shooting, he was charged with one count of attempted murder (Count Four) and one count of shooting from a motor vehicle at another person outside that vehicle (Count Five). Each count alleged a gang enhancement; with the exception of Count Two, each count also alleged defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury. After the trial court severed trial on the counts relating to the first shooting (first trial) from trial on the counts relating to the second shooting (second trial), separate juries found defendant guilty and found each enhancement allegation to be true. Defendant was sentenced to serve an aggregate indeterminate prison term of 50 years to life, plus an aggregate determinate prison term of 24 years, eight months. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred and violated his federal constitutional rights by admitting into evidence statements defendant made to police after he invoked his right to remain silent. Defendant also argued the trial court prejudicially erred and violated his state and federal constitutional rights in the second trial by denying his request for a removal order for a proposed defense witness, who was an inmate in an out-of-county prison at the time of trial, thereby preventing him from calling a necessary and material witness. Furthermore, he argued the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and a clerical error in the abstract of judgment had to be corrected. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the first two contentions: because defendant’s showing of necessity and materiality was lacking, the trial court neither abused its discretion nor violated defendant’s constitutional rights by denying his request to remove this particular inmate from prison. The evidence was also more than sufficient to support defendant’s convictions and the enhancement findings with respect to each shooting. The Court did, however, agree the abstract of judgment had to be corrected. View "California v. Villasenor" on Justia Law

Defendant Dennis Nilsson, the facilities superintendent for the Sacramento Public Library Authority (Library), was involved in several schemes to receive kickbacks for Library maintenance work provided by outside contractors. One of these schemes included defendant James Earle Mayle, Sr., who was also a Library employee, and defendant Mayle’s wife, defendant Janie Mae Rankins-Mayle, who was not a Library employee. The scheme involving all three defendants resulted in a loss of more than $780,000 to the Library. Defendants were convicted of grand theft, embezzlement, offering or receiving a bribe, and conflict of interest. After review of their arguments on appeal, the Court of Appeal concluded that: (1) as to defendants Mayle and Rankins-Mayle, the Court struck an enhancement imposed under Penal Code section 186.11 because the prosecution did not meet the pleading and proof requirement; (2) as to defendant Nilsson, the Court struck one count of grand theft because the law applicable at the time he committed his crimes permitted only one grand theft conviction for multiple takings done pursuant to a single overarching scheme; and (3) as to defendant Nilsson, the trial court had to properly indicate in the abstract of judgment what restitution was subject to joint and several liability. Finding no other prejudicial error, the Court made these modifications to the convictions, affirmed the convictions as modified, reversed the sentence, and remanded for resentencing and preparation of amended abstracts of judgment. View "California v. Nilsson" on Justia Law

Patrick, age 17, burglarized a neighbor’s home with an adult cousin who was on parole. Patrick admitted to a juvenile wardship petition allegation of second degree burglary. Patrick told the probation officer who prepared a report for the hearing that he stole because he wanted marijuana and did not want to ask his parents for money and that he smoked marijuana up to three times a day and had not attended school regularly for a long time because of his marijuana use. The court adjudged Patrick a ward and placed him on probation, with conditions requiring him to “[s]ubmit person and any vehicle, room or property [and] any electronics and passwords under your control to search by Probation Officer or peace office[r] with or without a search warrant at any time.” Defense counsel objected, arguing there was no nexus between electronics and the burglary. The court of appeal declined to strike the condition entirely, but modified the reference to electronics to read: Submit all electronic devices under your control to a search of any text messages, voicemail messages, call logs, photographs, e-mail accounts and social media accounts, with or without a search warrant, at any time of the day or night, and provide the probation or peace officer with any passwords necessary to access the information specified. View "In re Patrick F." on Justia Law

Morris entered a Costco store, concealed a laptop computer under his shirt, and left the store without paying for it. The theft was discovered when a store employee found an empty laptop box. The store manager reviewed video surveillance and distributed a photograph of Morris to store personnel. When Morris returned to the store days later, he was recognized and arrested. Morris pleaded no contest to the felony charge of petty theft with three or more prior theft convictions (Pen. Code, 666(a)) and admitted that he had one prior violent or serious felony conviction that also qualified as a strike within the meaning of the Three Strikes law and had served two prior prison terms. The trial court imposed a term of four years in the state prison. Morris later filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.18(a), which was enacted by Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act. The trial court granted the petition and resentenced Morris as a misdemeanant. The court of appeal modified the judgment to reflect that the restitution fine ($200) imposed under section 1202.4 has been satisfied in full by Morris’s excess days spent in custody. View "People v. Morris" on Justia Law

Defendant Scott Thornton Garness pleaded guilty to a single felony count of receiving a stolen motor vehicle. Subsequently, California voters enacted Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, which among other things established a procedure for specified classes of offenders to have their felony convictions reduced to misdemeanors and be resentenced accordingly. In this appeal, defendant challenged the denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Proposition 47. He argued the trial court erred by determining he was not eligible for relief. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Garness" on Justia Law

Defendant, a 19-year-old heroin addict with borderline personality disorder, appealed an order denying a petition to recall her sentence for seven felony forgery convictions and for resentencing to misdemeanors pursuant to Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, Pen. Code, 1170.18, 473. Defendant had taken a booklet of checks from her parents and forged her mother's name on 18 checks and cashed them. These checks totaled to $8,734. Defendant also cashed two checks for $80 from a friend and used the friend's bank card to withdraw $25 without permission. The trial court reasoned that the aggregate value of the forged checks took defendant "outside the spirit" of Proposition 47. The court reversed, concluding that the trial court may not refuse to reduce a defendant's sentence based on the court's notion of the statute's "spirit." The "criteria" for resentencing are explicitly stated in section 1170.18, subdivision (a), and "unreasonable risk" is defined in subdivision (c). If the criteria are met, and the resentencing does not pose an unreasonable risk of a new super-strike offense, the "felony sentence shall be recalled and the petitioner resentenced to a misdemeanor." View "People v. Hoffman" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for driving while his license was suspended or revoked, arguing that the trial court did not explicitly advise him of his constitutional trial rights before accepting his stipulation to the substantive crime that he drove a vehicle while knowing his license was suspended. The court held, in connection with the stipulation, that the trial court did not commit reversible error. The court further concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, the record affirmatively shows the stipulation was voluntary and intelligent. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Farwell" on Justia Law

Petitioners were 13-year-old girls who were dependents of the juvenile court. While they were residing at the Polinsky Children's Center, they knocked over a vending machine and took items from inside it. When staff confronted them, petitioners fled but later returned to the Center. Staff then reported the incident to police, who arrested petitioners and booked them into Juvenile Hall. The district attorney filed petitions in the juvenile court alleging petitioners committed two misdemeanors, petty theft and vandalism. The district attorney asked the court to declare them wards. The probation officer prepared detention reports recommending petitioners be detained in Juvenile Hall, on the unexplained grounds they were likely to flee the court's jurisdiction and such detention was necessary for the protection of person or property and of petitioners. The reports included detention screening forms that showed no grounds for mandatory secure detention and that petitioners' risk assessment scores did not warrant discretionary secure detention. Petitioners promptly challenged the detention orders by filing petitions for peremptory writs of mandate in the first instance directing the juvenile court to vacate the orders. The Court of Appeal treated the petitions as petitions for writs of habeas corpus. The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the juvenile court erred by ordering petitioners' detention in Juvenile Hall pending further hearing. The juvenile court made no findings regarding its decision to order petitioners' continued detention in Juvenile Hall. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal granted petitioners' petitions. View "In re Bianca S." on Justia Law

In July 2014, Justin Cuen was charged with six felonies: two counts of possession of a controlled substance (counts 1, 2), one count receiving stolen property (count 3), possession of blank checks (count 4), two counts of theft of access card information (counts 5, 7), and forgery (count 6). It was also alleged he had served a prior prison term. A few months later, Cuen pled guilty to counts 1, 3, 5, and 7 and admitted the prior prison term in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts and a three-year split sentence. Cuen appealed an order denying his petition to recall and resentence as misdemeanors his two felony convictions for theft of access card information. The trial court ruled a conviction under section Penal Code 484e(d) was not subject to recall and resentencing, because it is not one of the offenses listed in section 1170.18, subdivision (a). Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Cuen" on Justia Law

Defendant, 15-years-old at the time the crimes were committed, was convicted of first degree murder and attempted murder and sentenced to 90 years to life in prison. The court rejected defendant's contention that the evidence was insufficient; identification procedures violated his due process rights; the jury was biased; the judge was biased; and there were errors in the admission and exclusion of evidence. Therefore, the court affirmed the conviction. However, the court concluded that the trial court failed to consider the factors in Miller v. Alabama before imposing on the juvenile defendant a sentence that is the functional equivalent of life without parole. Accordingly, the court reversed the sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. View "People v. Dokins" on Justia Law